RAJASHEKARA MURTHY, J. ( 1 ) IN these writ petitions, the special notice issued under Rule 9, schedule iii of the taxation rules framed under the Karnataka municipal Corporation Act (Annexure-C), the demand made by the corporation pursuant to the revision (Annexure-E) and the order passed by the administrator dated 23-12-1981 (Annexure-j), are challenged. ( 2 ) THE petitioner a partnership firm is the lessee under a lease deed dated 1-6-1959 executed by one Smt. Kamala krishna lyengar and b. k. govindaraj in respect of the property described in schedules a and b to the said lease deed. Schedule-a refers to the premises bearing No. 12, 'manorama', kempegowda road, Bangalore city consisting of the main building and out-houses along with adjoin ing vacant land, schedule-b is the portion of the main premises let out and on which there existed a petrol bunk and other structures. The petitioners executed a deed of agreement on 7-9-1966 as per Annexure-B in favour of one Smt. T. N. Subhadramma under which a vacant site measuring 50'x 50' which was a portion of the property let out under the lease deed annexure-a, was sublet for the purpose of constructing buildings suitable for show-rooms abutting kempegowda road. The period stipulated in the first lease for a period of 20 years, Sri shivaram the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the term was extended subsequently by a registered lease deed dated 15-6-62 by another period of 15 years. The lease of the vacant plot under the agreement dated 7-9-66 is co-terminus with the lease dated 1-6-59 i. e. for a ' totel period of 35 years from 1-6-59. On the vacant plot sub-let by the petitioners in favour of Smt. Subhad- ramma, shops were constructed by the petitioners. The corporation determined annual rental value of those buildings at Rs. 29,960/- which was revised later to Rs. 51,750/ -. The latest revision of the annual rental value to Rs. 91,750/- is the subject matter of these writ petitions. The proceedings for the revision of the assessment started with a special notice issued under rule-9. Schedule iii to the petitioners as per anne- xure-c dated 6-9-1980. The demand made as per annexures c and e was confirmed by the administrator who exercised powers of the taxation appeal committee with the only modification that the revision of assessment should be effective from 1-4-1980. Schedule iii to the petitioners as per anne- xure-c dated 6-9-1980. The demand made as per annexures c and e was confirmed by the administrator who exercised powers of the taxation appeal committee with the only modification that the revision of assessment should be effective from 1-4-1980. There was no further appeal against the order of the administrator. The revised demand and the order of the administrator, are challenged in these writ petitions. It is urged by Sri shivaram the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners who are tenants under the lease deed of 1-6-59, are not maintainable in law and the recovery of the revised taxes cannot be enforced against them. ( 3 ) THE next contention of the petitioners is that they being only tenants of the leased premises; they cannot be made liable to pay the tax in respect of the property sub-let by them and the tax that is being demanded from them exceeds the rent that they are recovering from the sub-lessees. The show-rooms and other shop premises were put up by the sub-lessee under the agreement dated 7-9-66 executed by the petitioner. The buildings put up on the vacant site by the petitioner were put in possession of the sub-lessee as per the terms of the agreement. The first assessment of this property as appears from the special notice Annexure-C was on the rental value of Rs. 29,960/- and later revised to Rs. 51,750/ -. It is not the case of the petitioners that they, at no point of time, they paid the tax in respect of this property prior to the latest revision made pursuant to the special notice dated 6-9-1980. But the provocation to file the writ petitions was only the latest revision which was enforced with effect from 1-4-1980. The argument of Sri shivaram is that the primary liability to pay the taxes on this building is on the owner of the property, namely, the lessors, who is referred to as the first party in the lease deed dated 1-6-59. ( 4 ) THE last ground on which the demand is resisted is, admitting for the sake of argument that sec. ( 4 ) THE last ground on which the demand is resisted is, admitting for the sake of argument that sec. 112 (2) of the Corporation Act is applicable to the facts of the case, there was no lease of the 'land' under the original (ease deed dated 1-6-1959 and that it was a composite lease of both building and land. The learned - counsel has relied upon several Provisions of the corpo- ration'act in'support of his contentions and taken me through the relevant Provisions. Sri shivaram has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in National And Grindlays Bank Ltd. V Municipal Corporation For Greater Bombay (AIR 1969 S. C. 1048) in support of his contention that in cases of lease of vacant land the owner is alone is responsible and liable to pay the property tax on the building constructed on it. Sri castelino, learned counsel appearing for the corporation, opposed the stand of the petitioners relying on the Provisions of Section 112 (2) and has contended that the tenant becomes primarily liable 10 pay the tax on the buildings put up on the land leased. He has also refied upon the taxation rules, and in particular rules 6 and 9 under which the liability is imposed on the occupier of the property along with the owner in case of revision of tax. This case, according to the learned counsel, is covered by the special Provisions of Section 112 (2) under which the tenant is made primarily liable to pay the tax. The learned counsel has also demonstrated that under the scheme of the Act, the lessor of the premises, namely, the owner is made primarily liable for tax assessed on the property leased and in cases of premises which is sub-let, the superior lessor is made liable to pay the tax. Have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri castelino for the corporation. The main question that arises for decis'on in these cases is, about the liability of the petitioner who is the lessee of the property under the lease deed dated 1-6-1959. It would be necessary to refer to the said lease deed and to the schedule thereto. The main question that arises for decis'on in these cases is, about the liability of the petitioner who is the lessee of the property under the lease deed dated 1-6-1959. It would be necessary to refer to the said lease deed and to the schedule thereto. Under the said lease deed though the property leased is described under two schedules 'a' and 'b', the lease was in respect of premises bearing No. 12 known as 'manorama', kempegowda road, Bangalore city forming one unit schedule 'b' on which there existed a petrol bunk abutting the kempegowds road, which became a vacant land later formed part of the premises bearing no. 12. Under the deed of agreement dated 7-9-1966 executed by the petitioners in favour of Smt. Subhadramma, the property sub-let was a vacant land measuring 50 x 50 abutting kempegowda road. The agreement between the parties was that the petitioners who were the lessees from the owners of the property had been permitted by the owners to put up any buildings or structures on the vacant space in front of the existing building snd abutting the kempegowda road, though the second party, namely the sub-lessee was to advance monies towards the construction of the buildings, one of the stipulations of the agreement was to pay rent on the buildings let out to the second party. It was therefore, a composite agreement of lease as well as an agreement for construction. As already stated, the duration of the lease of the buildings is co-terminus with the lease, namely for a period of 35 years from 1-6-1959. Therefore, the argument of Sri shivaram that it was not a case of any land baving been let under the agreement dated 1-6-195. 9 and that it was a composite lease of both building and land cannot be accepted. On a proper construction of the terms of the lease deed, the lease was in respect of the entire premises bearing No. 12, kempegowda road which included the buildings as well as the vacant land to the front of ft. Pursuant to the agreement entered into by the petitioners with the sub-lessee, the petitioners built upon the vacant land, showrooms and other shops in respect of which rent was payable by the sub- lessee. Pursuant to the agreement entered into by the petitioners with the sub-lessee, the petitioners built upon the vacant land, showrooms and other shops in respect of which rent was payable by the sub- lessee. In this context, the definition of land as defined in Section 2{15) of the act requires to be noticed:"2 (15) "land" includes iand which is being built upon or is built upon or covered with water, benefits to arise out of landfthings attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and rights created by law over any street;. . . . . . . . ""premises" is defined under Section 2 (28) of the act to include messuages, buildings and lands of any tenure whethor open or enclosed whether built upon or not and whether public or private. The argument of sri. Shivaram developed on a literal interpretation of Section 112 (2) that no land has been let in this case, cannot be accepted for the reasons stated above. With this undisputed position as to the facts relating to the building put up by the petitioners, they become 'superior lessors' of the premises under the act. Indisputably, the consequence that flows from this is, they become persons primarily liable to pay the property tax on the buildings errected by them on the premises. In the light of this inescapable position so far as their liability is concerned, the taxation rules contained in para ii of schedule iii of the act beco ne applicable to the case on hand. Under Rule 7 of the taxation rules, a special notice may be served on the owner or occupier of the property whenever there is a general revision or enhancement of the assessment. ( 5 ) THE owner or occupier, may, on the service of such special notice, file objections to the proposed enhancement and an order may be made after hearing objections by the commissioner which is required to be served on the owner or occupier. The other rules contained in part hi relating to collect ion of taxes also become applicable and a notice under Rule 26 may be served either on the owner or occupier. The rules also provide for recovery of the amount due on account of any tax by taking coercive steps either on the owner of the property or on the occupier. The rules also provide for recovery of the amount due on account of any tax by taking coercive steps either on the owner of the property or on the occupier. The decision of the Supreme Court in national and grindlays bank ltd. , case related to a lease of vacant land by the bank on monthly basis. It was, therefore held by the Supreme Court that the owner of the land was liable to pay the tax on the structures constructed by the lessees. This decision therefore does not help the petitioners' case. Next the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this court in Khan Sahib v Corporation Of Bangalore (1972 (1) kar. l. j. 238), in support of his contention that the basis for the enhancement is not mentioned in the special notice served on ths petitioner. The special notice served on the petitioner in khan sahib's case did not contain the besis for revision of the valuation, which was proposed to be made. Ths administrator had fixed the annual value on the besis of the profits determined by the income-tax officer. The impugned assessment order was therefore quashed by this court. A statement of objections is filed on behalf of the corporation in this case justifying the enhancement of the rental value from lime to time. The annual rental value adopted as per the impugned notice is Rs. 91,750/ -. This notice is sought to be justified on the ground that the enhancement was based on the actual rents realised from the property. It was also submitted by Sri castelino that there was no further appeal against the order of the administrator made in exercise of the powers of 'he taxation appeal committee, the administrator confirmed the demand and directed that it should be enforced with effect from 1-4-1980 only. It was, therefore, argued by the learned counsel that the petitioner having accepted the order of the administrator, it is not open to him now to challenge the demand by way of a writ petition. I agree with the contentions of Sri castelino, both on facts and law. The petitioner has failed in his attempt to dispute his liability under the act and also as to the basis for the enhancement. A further appeal is provided under the taxation rules to the district judge. I agree with the contentions of Sri castelino, both on facts and law. The petitioner has failed in his attempt to dispute his liability under the act and also as to the basis for the enhancement. A further appeal is provided under the taxation rules to the district judge. The writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy so far as the enhancement of the rental value is concerned. The writ petitions are therefore dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed. --- *** --- .