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1989 DIGILAW 444 (KAR)

MASJIDA AGSA v. KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKFS

1989-12-07

K.A.SWAMI

body1989
SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for quashing the order dated 7-8-1988 published in the Karnataka gazette, dated 17-1-1988 produced as annexure-M issued by the first respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has also sought for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to hold regular enquiry in the matter under sections 42 to 45 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), pursuant to the show cause notice dated 25-3-1988. The petitioner has also further sought for issue of a direction to the respondents to deliver the possession of the wakf in question and its property to the petitioner. ( 3 ) THE petitioner claims to be the Managing Committee of the Ahale Sunathul Jamath, Fort mosque, Arkalgud which is registered under the karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 as per Annexure-A. Under the order dated 7th august, 1988 passed by the 1st respondent in exercise of its power under Section 43-A of the wakf Act it has assumed direct management of the institution known as Fort Mosque, Arkalgud (Masjid-e-Agsa), Hassan District. Though there is a difference in the name found in Annexure-A the registration certificate and the impugned annexure-M, but it is the case of the petitioner that the Mosque referred to in Annexure-M is the one which is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, whereas it is the case of the first respondent that the Mosque referred to in the impugned order annexure-M is the one which is described at Item no. 67 in the Notification dated 9-1-1964 issued under Section 5 (2) of the Act published in the gazette dated 10-11-1964. A Gazette copy of the said Notification is placed before Court. According to that Entry No. 67 reads thus:"67. For Mosque, Sunni, (under construction, Arkalgud Town ). K. No. 155 20x40 1. House K. No. 154 20 x 20 Syed Gular dastagir 2. House EXW-40 Saheb, landlord, 3. Site NXS. 20 Arkalgud. "60x60 ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the Fort Mosque, Arkalgud is not registered under the act and it is registered under the Karnataka societies Registration Act and the petitioner-committee is managing it. Therefore, the Wakf board has no jurisdiction to exercise any control over the same. House EXW-40 Saheb, landlord, 3. Site NXS. 20 Arkalgud. "60x60 ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the Fort Mosque, Arkalgud is not registered under the act and it is registered under the Karnataka societies Registration Act and the petitioner-committee is managing it. Therefore, the Wakf board has no jurisdiction to exercise any control over the same. The further case of the petitioner is that the Wakf Board issued notice dated 25- 3-1988 as per Annexure-D under Section 43 r/w section 45 of the Act to show cause as to why the committee of management of Fort Mosque, arkalgud Fort, Arkalgud should not be superseded under Section 43 (2) of the Act. That pursuant to the show cause notice the members of the petitioner-committee submitted the objections as per Annexure-E dated 15-4-1988 and thereafter the Wakf Board authorised the Assistant secretary of the Wakf Board to hold an enquiry and submit a report; that the Assistant secretary issued a notice dated 15-7-1988, Annexure-F fixing the enquiry on 27-8-1988 but the assistant Secretary did not attend the enquiry. Thereafter, another notice dated 15-7-1988, Annexure-H was issued fixing the enquiry on 27-8-1988. According to the case of the petitioner on 27-8-1988, the Assistant Secretary did not turn up and did not held an enquiry; that he had submitted a report without holding an enquiry; that after the report was submitted; the Wakf Board did not give any personal hearing and straightaway passed an order on 7lh August, 1988 assuming direct management. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order passed on 7th August, 1988 assuming direct management, and the further action taken pursuant thereto are opposed to the principles of natural justice as the impugned order and the further actions taken pursuant thereto, are without holding an enquiry and without affording an opportunity of hearing. ( 5 ) ON the contrary, it is contended by Sri D. L. N. Rao, learned counsel for the Wakf Board that as the petitioner-committee has not been appointed as Muthavalli by the Board; that as the petitioner-committee has claimed that the Masjid in question is not wakf and that they are not entitled to keep account and render accounts; that the 1st respondent is not entitled to have any control over them, the question of affording an opportunity of hearing does not arise. It is also contended that sub-section (4) of Section 43 does not come into play in a case like this. That in case where an action is taken under Section 43-A of the Act, the Wakf Board can straight-away assume the management, without holding an enquiry and without affording personal hearing. Alternatively, it is contended that as the petitioner-committee denies that the Masjid in question is wakf and claims that it is not liable to, and is under no obligation to maintain the accounts and submit the same to the Board, it has no right to be heard in the matter. Even otherwise, it is contended that the Assistant secretary held an enquiry and made report on the basis of which the impugned order is passed. ( 6 ) IN the light of these contentions, the point that arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order Annexure-M dated 7th August, 1988 passed by the Board is sustainable in law? ( 7 ) IN this case, it is sufficiently established that the Assistant Secretary, who was empowered by the 1st respondent under Section 45 of the act to hold an enquiry, though issued notice as per Annexures-F and H, did not held any enquiry except making a report. The case of the petitioner is that he did not turn up on 27-8-1988 to hold an enquiry and has made a report without holding an enquiry, that on 27-8-1988. he remained at the Travellers Bunglow and did not visit Masjid and did not hold enquiry. ( 8 ) OF course, it is relevant to notice that the Assistant Secretary has not filed an affidavit as to what he did on 27-8-1988. In the report submitted by him, a copy of which is produced as annexure-R3, nothing is stated as to what he recorded on 27-8-1988. There is no record produced to show that any proceeding was recorded by the Assistant Secretary on 27-8-1988. In the statement of objections it is stated by the first respondent thus:"the petitioner's contention that Assistant secretary did not visit the Mosque is false. The Assistant Secretary, after visiting the mosque and enquiring with the Muslim public and examining the situation submitted his report. A true copy of the same is produced and marked as Anncxure-R3. In the statement of objections it is stated by the first respondent thus:"the petitioner's contention that Assistant secretary did not visit the Mosque is false. The Assistant Secretary, after visiting the mosque and enquiring with the Muslim public and examining the situation submitted his report. A true copy of the same is produced and marked as Anncxure-R3. " ( 9 ) IT is already pointed out that no record is produced to show as to what was enquired into, and what was the record made by the Assistant secretary on 27-8-1988. Further the affidavit filed in support of the statement of objections is sworn to by the Secretary of the Board, who has no personal knowledge as to what the Assistant secretary did on 27-8-1988 at Arkalgud. If really on 27-8-1988 the Assistant Secretary had held an enquiry he should have recorded the statements of some of the members of the Muslim community who were present at the Mosque in question or the members of the petitioner-committee or at any rate made a record of the summary of the proceedings. No such record is produced. After the report was submitted by the assistant Secretary, the Board also had not issued notice to the members of the petitioner-committee and did not afford an opportunity of hearing. ( 10 ) THE contention of the 1st respondent that no opportunity of hearing need be given to the members of the petitioner-committee cannot at all be accepted. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the power is exercised by the board under Section 43-A of the Act and assuming further that the petitioner-committee is an impostcr, nevertheless, it is not in dispute that it is the petitioner-committce which was in possession of the Masjid in question and managing its affairs before the 1st respondent assumed direct control and took possession of the Masjid, as such the members of the petitioner-committee were entitled to be heard in the matter and especially when they had filed the objections. This conclusion of mine emerges on the aforesaid facts even without the support of the provisions contained in Section 43 (2) of the Act. ( 11 ) OUR jurisprudence does not permit any person to take law into his hand and condemn or dislodge a person from the position or possession he enjoys without affording him an opportunity to show cause and of hearing. ( 11 ) OUR jurisprudence does not permit any person to take law into his hand and condemn or dislodge a person from the position or possession he enjoys without affording him an opportunity to show cause and of hearing. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the contention urged on behalf of the first respondent that the petitioner is not entitled to be heard even on assuming that the members of the petitioner-committee unauthorisedly in possession of the Masjid in question, and that they are not appointed by the Board as Muthavalli. The contention of the first respondent is that the petitioner-committee has not been appointed by the Board. There is no doubt and it is also not the case of the petitioner, that the petitioner-committee is appointed by the Board as muthavalli. But it is not the question at issue. The issue in question is as the Wakf Board wants to assume direct management of the Masjid under Section 43-A of the Act on the ground that there is no suitable person under Section 42 or sub-section (2) of Section 43 to be appointed as muthavalli. That being the position, the person who was in possession of the Masjid was entitled to be heard before assuming direct management. In the view I take, I do not consider it necessary to advert to the decision of this Court in Writ petition No. 17330/1985 dated 17-1-1987. ( 12 ) THE contention of the petitioner that Masjid in question is not a wakf as it is not registered under the Act as Wakf, cannot also be countenanced. As long as the subject matter in issue is a Masjid whether it is registered or not it is a wakf and once it is a wakf it does come under the purview of the Act and consequently the Board is entitled to take appropriate steps for control and management of the Wakf. Section 15 of the Act vests control and supervision of a wakf and its properties in the Wakf Board. See in Mohammed Ghouse v Karnataka Board of Wakf, ILR 1986 (2) Kar. 1523. Section 15 of the Act vests control and supervision of a wakf and its properties in the Wakf Board. See in Mohammed Ghouse v Karnataka Board of Wakf, ILR 1986 (2) Kar. 1523. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this Writ Petition is allowed in the following terms: (I) The order dated 7th August, 1988 passed by the Karnataka Board of wakfs in Notification No. KTW- omc/3665/87-88, Annexure-M and the notice dated 26-11-1988, Annexure-N are quashed; (ii) Liberty is reserved to the 1st respondent wakf Board to proceed with the enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in the light of the observations made and the findings recorded in this order and pass appropriate order; (iii) The petitioner-committee which was managing the Mosque in question is entitled to manage the same but subject to a condition that it shall have to maintain the accounts and submit the same to the Wakf Board. As the Wakf Board has assumed management pursuant to the notice dated 26-11-1988, Annexure-N issued pursuant to Annexure-M which are quashed, respondents-1 and 2 are directed to restore possession of the Mosque to the petitioner-committee. Compliance in four weeks from the date of the receipt of this order. --- *** --- .