JUDGMENT K.P. Singh 1. Necessary facts giving rise to the above noted writ petition are these :- Notice under Section 8 (iii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was served upon the opposite party no. 2 Shri J. N. Chaterji, resident of bungalow no. 18, Strachy Road, Allahabad showing 1774.16 sq. metres as surplus land. Shri Chaterji filed an objection. It appears that Shri Chaterji could not appear before the competent authority and, therefore, on 16-12-1985 the competent authority declared 1774.16 sq. metres as excess vacant land. On 17-12-1985 Shri Chaterji moved a restoration application before the competent authority. The restoration application was also dismissed on 15-1-1986 in the absence of Shri Chaterji. Aggrieved by the order of the competent authority dated 15-1-1986 Shri Chaterji preferred an appeal which was allowed by the District Judge through his order dated 8-4-1987 contained in Annexure III attached with the writ petition. Against the judgment of the appellate court dated 8-4-1987 the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The main contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the case on merits in terms of the alleged compromise between the parties. It has been stressed before me that there was no compromise as mentioned in the impugned judgment and that the appellate court could not decide the claims of the parties on merits in an appeal against the order dismissing restoration application in default. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the appellate court has patently erred in applying the principles of law laid down in State of U. P v. L. J. Johnson, 1983 AWC 798. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the aforesaid case is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the decision of the appellate court on merits to the effect that Shri Chaterji had no excess vacant land is patently erroneous. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party Shri Chaterji has replied that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the order passed by the appellate court was on the basis of a compromise between the parties. 4. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party Shri Chaterji has replied that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the order passed by the appellate court was on the basis of a compromise between the parties. 4. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is to the effect that in view of the decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Mrs. Rakesh Murthy, 1984 AWC 715 the contesting opposite party Shri Chaterji has no excess vacant land and the judgment of the appellate court is quite correct in the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, it should not be interfered with. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the facts alleged in para 2 of the counter affidavit. It has been stressed that as there are three buildings on the premises numbered as 18, Strechy Road, Allahabad, the opposite party no. 2 Shri Chaterji cannot be said to have any excess vacant land if correct calculation contemplated by law is done with regard to three buildings situate on the aforesaid premises. 5. In rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioners has canvassed that there is no compromise on the record, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party should be rejected that the writ petition is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. On enquiry I have learnt from the counsel for the parties that there is no compromise between the parties as mentioned in the impugned judgment but it has been stressed that an affidavit was filed on behalf of the contesting opposite party no. 2 which was not controverted by the petitioners, therefore, it has been inferred that there was a compromise. To my mind, the inference drawn is wholly unfounded and incorrect. Even if no counter affidavit had been filed on behalf of the petitioners it can be demonstrated that the statement made by the contesting opposite party might not be correct in view of the provisions of law applicable to the facts of the case. I think that the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the writ petition should be dismissed as not maintainable due to a compromise between the parties is not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I think that the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the writ petition should be dismissed as not maintainable due to a compromise between the parties is not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is no written compromise as commonly understood, therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party and I proceed to examine the merits of the writ petition. In my opinion, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the appellate court should not have decided the claims of the parties on merits in the appeal before it has some force. Really the appellate court was called upon to decide whether there existed sufficient cause for restoration of the objection filed by Shri Chaterji in the case or not. When the appellate curt came to the conclusion that 15-1-1986 was fixed for judgment, therefore, no question of dismissal in default arose, it should have set aside the order dated 15-1-1986 and remanded the case for decision on merits. To me it appears that the appellate court has patently erred in deciding the claims of the parties on merits on the basis of the alleged compromise and the decision reported in 1983 AWC 798. 7. However, on the facts alleged in para. 2 of the counter affidavit, I have proceeded to examine the claims of the parties. The facts alleged in para 2 of the counter affidavit have not been controverted by the petitioners in the present writ petition. It has been stated in the aforesaid paragraph that Shri Chaterji is entitled to get 1000 sq. metres as open space for each building for enjoyment of the aforesaid buildings situate on the premises in question. A Division Bench of this Court in State of U. P. v. Mrs. Rakesh Murthy, 1984 AWC 716 has considered the Supreme Court case-State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1983 AWC 798 and thereafter it has made the following observations vide para 9 :- "On the question whether any allowance is to be made at all for servants' quarters, the learned Division Bench in Johnson's case (supra), did not make an observation, as quoted above, although the said observation was made without any discussion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment on appeal has not dealt with the extent or otherwise of the servants' quarters or with the question whether any separate allowance is to be given or not for servants' quarters. It is, therefore, open to us to decide the matter untrammelled by authority." 8. In view of the dictum of law laid down in the above quoted Division Bench case, if the facts of the present case are examined, I find that the conclusion arrived at by the appellate court on merits to the effect that the opposite party no. 2 is possessed of no excess vacant land is correct. Total area held by the opposite party no. 2 in premises no. 18, Strechy Road, Allahabad comes to 3263 sq. metres. The contesting opposite party has claimed 1000 sq. metres as open space for the enjoyment of each building and 500 sq. metres with regard to the two soak pits existing on the disputed premises. The claim of the contesting opposite party has not been contested by the petitioners by filing rejoinder affidavit. During the course of argument the learned Standing Counsel for the petitioners did not dispute the claim of the contesting opposite party regarding the open land claimed by him in the counter affidavit. Therefore, on calculation it appears that the contesting opposite party is not possessed of any excess vacant land. It is noteworthy that if the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the dictum of law laid down by this Court in a Full Bench case reported in M/s. Agra Concrete Pipe Co. v. Competent Authority, Agra, 1987 AWC 643 , as well as in a decision of a Single Judge of this Court State of U. P. v. Manoj Kumar Mukherji, 1988 AWC 718 , it is difficult to say that the conclusion on merit in the impugned judgment of the appellate court is either wrong or illegal. On the principle that ordinarily no futile writ should be issued specially when no useful purpose is to be served, I think that it is not a fit case where any interference should be made with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioner by this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. On the principle that ordinarily no futile writ should be issued specially when no useful purpose is to be served, I think that it is not a fit case where any interference should be made with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioner by this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. At page 42 of the Book of Shri M. P. Mehrotra retired Judge, High Court, Allahabad and Shri S. P. Mehrotra, Advocate, High Court, Allahabad the guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing have been mentioned. The aforesaid guide lines have been taken note of by a Division Bench of this Court mentioned supra. According to guidelines mentioned at page 42 in the Book at item no. (c) it has been indicated that a servant quarter or out house if itself a separate building will be entitled to land appurtenant apart from the main building. AT item (d) it has been indicated that if the servant quarter or out-house has a dwelling unit in it, the said servant quarter or out-house will be entitled to as land appurtenant the land given in section 2 (g) (i) plus an additional 500 sq. mts. under section 2 (g) (ii), (underlined portion is being emphasised by me). 10. In view of the aforesaid guidelines I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the opposite party no. 2 is possessed of no excess vacant land as decided by the appellate court in the impugned judgment. It is well known that a futile writ should not be issued. For the foregoing discussions even when the appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the claim of the parties on merits in the facts and circumstances of this case but the conclusion arrived at is correct, no useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned judgment on technical ground if the net result is the same on correct calculation in view of the decided cases of this court reported in 1984 AWC 715 and 1988 AWC 718 (supra). 11. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.