Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition has come up before us on a reference by our learned brother M.P. Menon, J. on the question whether S.20A of the Land Conservancy Act excludes from its ambit suits under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act, as held by Padmanabhan, J. in Philip v. Skaria, 1987 (1) KLT 213. 2. The short facts are the following: Petitioners-plaintiffs filed O.S.No.360 of 1981 under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act for recovery of 2.15 acres of poramboke land in Sy.No.748 of Pasupara Village, which the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had reduced to possession since 1950. He was in enjoyment of that property since then. Revenue authorities had imposed and collected penal tax from him under the Land Conservancy Act in L.C.No.734/52. Two years prior to the institution of the suit, he had put up a shed in the suit property. He was staying 4 Kms. away therefrom. The, first defendant is the immediate neighbour on the northern side of the suit property. On 10-8-1981, first defendant forciably took possession of the property taking advantage of the absence of the original plaintiff. The second plaintiff was examined as Pw.1 and two other witnesses were also examined in support of the plaintiffs' claim. They produced Ext.Al tax receipt. Defendants produced Exts.B1 to B5 in support of their contentions. 3. Defendants in their written statement contested the claim of the plaintiffs for possession since 1950 or any right in the suit property. They also asserted that at the time when they entered possession of the property, it was vacant tharisu land belonging to Government The first defendant got patta of the property. He put up a house in the suit property which was numbered as 365A/1 of Upputhara Panchayat. They also submitted that the Special Tahsildar, Peermedu, had initiated proceedings for grant of patta in favour of the wife of the first defendant A notice under R.12 of the Land Assignment Rules was published on 31-8-1981. They also contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of S.20A of the Land Conservancy Act. 4. The trial court framed the following issues: (i) Is the suit maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiff had possession in the suit property at any time. (iii) Whether the court fee paid is correct? (iv) Reliefs and costs. Issue No.3 was found in favour of the plaintiffs. 4. The trial court framed the following issues: (i) Is the suit maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiff had possession in the suit property at any time. (iii) Whether the court fee paid is correct? (iv) Reliefs and costs. Issue No.3 was found in favour of the plaintiffs. On issue No.2, the trial court entered the finding that first plaintiff was in possession of plaint schedule property prior to his dispossession by defendants on 10-8-1981. On issue No.l, the court held, that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit seeking eviction of any person in unauthorised occupation of Government land. Trial court, therefore, found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and dismissed the same as not maintainable. In this revision petition, the petitioners submit that the finding of the trial court on the maintainability of the suit, is bad for error of law and amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. 5. It is not seriously disputed before us, that if Philip v. Skaria, 1987(l) KLT 213, has laid down the correct law, the finding in the judgment of the trial court on the entertainability of the suit is liable to be vacated. The question which we have therefore to consider is whether that decision is correct. Counsel for respondents submitted that the suit which gave rise to Philip v. Skaria (supra) was not for relief under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act and therefore the observations contained in that judgment may not apply to the present case. He submitted further that dismissal of the suit filed under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act does not preclude reliefs which may be available to the petitioners since they may file a suit otherwise than under S.6 of the Act for the same relief. 6. We understand the decision in Philip v. Skaria (supra) as laving down the proposition that in a dispute between two persons claiming possession of land belonging to another, be the latter the Government or a private party, the person who was in possession earlier is entitled to protection of such possession from trespass. We understand that principle to be the policy of our law. If we are to hold otherwise, the result will be scramble possession, and any person who forcibly dispossesses a person in possession of Government land will obtain a premium for such forcible dispossession. We understand that principle to be the policy of our law. If we are to hold otherwise, the result will be scramble possession, and any person who forcibly dispossesses a person in possession of Government land will obtain a premium for such forcible dispossession. We are aware of the position in law that a trespasser in Government land does not obtain any right as against the Government. He is liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of Land Conservancy Act. Any decision in any proceedings, including those in a civil suit between persons claiming possession of such land will not in any manner affect the right of Government to dispossess such person or persons, except in cases where the person in possession has perfected title by adverse possession. It appears to us that this is the proposition which this court accepted in Philip v. Skaria, (supra). 8. This question came up for consideration in S.S.Ltd. v. Rev.Fr. Alexander, 1968 KLT 182. The following observations of the Supreme Court are relevant: "Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised. As this was a suit of latter kind title could be examined. But whose title? Admittedly neither side could establish title. The plaintiff at least pleaded the statute of limitation and asserted that he had perfected his title by adverse possession. But as he did not join the State in this suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not rested his case on an acquired title. His suit was thus limited to recovering possession from one who had trespassed against him. The enquiry thus narrows to this: did the Society have any title in itself, was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or was it just pleading a title in a third party? To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. It is clearly in the negative. The enquiry thus narrows to this: did the Society have any title in itself, was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or was it just pleading a title in a third party? To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. It is clearly in the negative. So the only question is whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the State? Since in every such case between trespassers the title must be outstanding in a third party a defendant will be placed in a position of dominance. He has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is in someone else. As Erle J., put it in Hurling v. Road (11 QB 904) 'parties might imagine that they acquired some right by merely intruding upon land in the night, running up a but and occupying it before morning'. This will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in Perry v. Clissold. The law does not therefore countenance the doctrine of 'finding keepings.' 9. Raman Nair J., as he then was, in Vasudeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma,1964 KLT 468, held in Second Appeal from a suit instituted under Specific Relief Act: "Whatever the English law might be, it seems to be the policy of the Indian law that a person in possession, albeit without title, is entitled to remain in possession, even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law. The lawful owner is not entitled to take the law into his own hands and throw out the persons in possession. This is the policy underlying both Ss.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and S.9 of the Specific Relief Act; and it is significant to note that under S.54 of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction may be granted not merely to protect a plaintiffs right to property but also to protect his enjoyment thereof. True, the grant of an injunction is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised in accordance with the policy of the law which, as I have already said, is that a person in peaceful possession should be maintained in possession until evicted in due course of law. True, the grant of an injunction is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised in accordance with the policy of the law which, as I have already said, is that a person in peaceful possession should be maintained in possession until evicted in due course of law. If a person in possession is dispossessed, he can bring a suit under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act within six months of the dispossession and recover the property even though he has no title and his possessor has". 10. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathai,1966 KLT 1: "Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law and has legal incidents attached to it apart from ownership. Even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well-defined rights in property. It is now settled beyond all dispute that this interest is heritable, devisable and transferable. This interest is referred to as possessory title as distinct from proprietary title. A person having such interest must be allowed to enforce those rights against all the world except those who have a better right than himself". xxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx "We are therefore of the view that a person in judicial possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession even beyond six months from the date of dispossession and this is enough to dispose of the second appeal". 11. We understand that the policy of Indian law is to give protection to possessory title against subsequent trespassers. Such possessory title may be valid against all the world, except the true owner. Even the true owner can seek enforcement of rights only in accordance with law. We also understand S.6 of the Specific Relief Act to enable a person having possessory title to claim recovery of possession when he is dispossessed by another without his consent, or otherwise than in due course of law. 12. Two questions arise for consideration viz., (1) whether S.20A of the Land Conservancy Act was enacted in a conscious effort to depart from the policy of Indian Law in relation to enforcement of possessory title against trespassers? 12. Two questions arise for consideration viz., (1) whether S.20A of the Land Conservancy Act was enacted in a conscious effort to depart from the policy of Indian Law in relation to enforcement of possessory title against trespassers? and, (2) whether that section was enacted for the purpose of abrogating the relief provided by S.6 of the Specific Relief Act as far as persons claiming possessory title in Government lands for relief against dispossession without his consent or otherwise than in due course of law? 13. It is necessary to refer to S.6 of the Specific Relief Act and S.20A of the Land Conservancy Act to answer these questions. The former provides: "6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.-(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. And the latter provides: "20A. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.-(1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding for the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of Government, whether a poramboke or not, or the recovery of any fine, assessment, or prohibitory assessment or the value of any trees destroyed or appropriated or any compensation or damages, payable under this Act or cost of eviction or removal of encroachments, or any portion of such fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment, value of trees compensation, damages or cost. (2) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or the Board of Revenue or any officer of the Government for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder". (2) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or the Board of Revenue or any officer of the Government for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder". It is necessary to refer to S.20 of the Land Conservancy Act, which provides: "No suit against the Government shall be entertained in any Civil Court in respect of any order passed under this Act except upon the ground that the land in respect of which such order has been passed is not a land which is the property of Government whether a poramboke or not: Provided that Civil courts shall not take cognizance of any such suit unless it shall be instituted within one year from the date on which the cause of action arose." 14. It is true that in the first flush it may appear, that S.20A provides a bar of jurisdiction of civil courts to entertian any suit or proceeding for eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of Government and therefore a person having possessory title in Government land may not approach the civil court for recovery of possession from a trespasser. But the latter portions of that section make it unmistakably clear that the bar operated only against Government filing a suit or any other proceeding in a civil court for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of Government lands, or for recovery of fine, assessment, or prohibitory assessment or the value of any trees destroyed or appropriated or any compensation or damages, payable under the Act, or cost of eviction or removal of encroachments, or any portion of such fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment, value of trees compensation, damages or cost etc. If we are to read the former portion as prohibiting a suit by a person having title like the plaintiff, the latter portion cannot be reconciled because such a person cannot file a suit or proceeding for recovery of fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment, value of trees destroyed, cost etc. That can be done only by Government. 15. If we are to read the former portion as prohibiting a suit by a person having title like the plaintiff, the latter portion cannot be reconciled because such a person cannot file a suit or proceeding for recovery of fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment, value of trees destroyed, cost etc. That can be done only by Government. 15. There are more difficulties than one to accept the literal interpretation of S.20A; it may run counter to the current policy of Indian law; it may be difficult to give any meaning to the latter portion of the section if suits by persons in possession of Government lands are also covered by the prohibition and it may also create a manifest absurdity. If we accept the contention which found favour with the trial court, the result will be a scramble for possession of Government land, irrespective of prior possession by others. That may put a premium on forcible dispossession by trespassers of persons who are already in possession. S.20A may, in that sense, be a rogue's charter. It is true that if the words used in the statute indicate a departure from the current legal policy and the words are incapable of any other meaning, we have to give effect to those words. But we have to ascertain whether such a departure was meant as also whether there were and if so what were, those circumstances which necessitated such a course. We have also to be unusually wary in accepting an interpretation which has the effect of negativing the jurisdiction of civil courts or deprives parties of an ordinary remedy. Again, if acceptance of such an interpretation results in a manifest absurdity, we have to tarry and see whether an interpretation which is in consonance with the policy of law which is long and finds expression in S.6 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and also avoids such absurdity, is not reasonably possible. It is also our duty in such cases (1) to ascertain what were the circumstances which were in existence at the time of the enactment, (2) what was the defect sought to be remedied, and (3) what was the purpose to be achieved by the amendment. It is also our duty in such cases (1) to ascertain what were the circumstances which were in existence at the time of the enactment, (2) what was the defect sought to be remedied, and (3) what was the purpose to be achieved by the amendment. Though this course is not usually adopted, we have the authority of Lord Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Augustus of Hanover, (1951) 1 All E.R.49, and of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes in support of the same. On application of the above tests, we are not persuaded to hold that the Kerala Legislature intended to exclude suits by persons in occupation of Government lands to seek the assistance of courts to maintain possessory title against forcible dispossession. We cannot assume that the Legislature meant to create a situation where the policy of the law as understood and interpreted by courts should be set at naught and substituted by recognising lawlessness as law in respect of possession of Government lands. "Legislation must at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as rougue's charter" (Davis & Sons v. Alkins,1977 Imperial Court Report 662). 16. In Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581, the Supreme Court struck down as discriminatory section S of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act for the reason that it provided the State with choice of two alternative remedies viz., eviction under ordinary law by filing a suit and the speedier and summary remedy of eviction by executive action. The same applied to all State and Central enactments. Similar provisions were struck down by various courts in India. We need refer only to some of them: Rajendra Prasad Singh v. Union, AIR 1968 Calcutta 560 (F.B.), Raja Ram Verma v. State, AIR 1968 All.369 (F.B.), M/s.P.P. Industries Chunar v. District Magistrate, Mirzapur, AIR 1972 All. 97. The expedient which the Legislatures in India adopted to get over the effect of that decision was to amend the concerned enactment so as to take away one of the alternatives - in most cases, the ordinary remedy of filing suits. The result was to leave the State with only one option, namely the speedier and summary remedy of eviction of trespassers from its lands and premises. The result was to leave the State with only one option, namely the speedier and summary remedy of eviction of trespassers from its lands and premises. It appears from the Select Committee Report on the amendment Bill 1971 and the Legislative debates that the State Legislature also wanted to fall in line. It is clear from R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay,1984 (2) SCC 183, that the reports of Legislative Committee can be looked into as external aids to construction. The Court observed: "Therefore, departing from the earlier English decisions we are of the opinion that reports of the committee which preceded the enactment of a legislation, reports of joint parliamentary committee, report of a commission set up for collecting information leading to the enactment are permissible external aids to construction." It was evidently to avoid invalidation of S.7 to 11 of the Land Conservancy Act in the light of Northern India Caterers' case (supra) that the State Legislature enacted S.20A denying jurisdiction to civil courts to entertain suits by State for obtaining relief of eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation, recovery of fine, penal assessment, damages, cost etc., with the result that the only method of seeking eviction of unauthorised occupants was the summary provisions in the Land Conservancy Act. In otherwords, the State wanted to do away with the vice of discrimination by providing one and only manner of proceeding against persons in unauthorised occupation of Government lands. This interpretation has the advantage of giving effect to all parts of the section without splitting it into two. It does not run counter to the policy of Indian Law, does not impair the effect of S.6 of the Specific Relief Act and fits exactly into contemporaneous exigencies in the evolution of laws of a similar nature. 17. We find adequate support for the course which we adopt from authoritative text books. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition-page 228) has stated: "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications mack are mere corrections of careless language and relay give the true meaning". Francis Bennian had this to say about avoiding a disproportionate counter mischief in adopting a literal interpretation of statutes in his book on "Statutory Interpretations". "The Court seeks to avoid a construction that cures the mischief the enactment was designed to remedy only at the cost of setting up a disproportionate counter mischief, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament". The following passages from Crowford on Statutory Construction is relevant in this context: "Any construction should be avoided, if possible, as contrary to the intent of the law makers that produces any effect at variance with the commonly recognised concepts of what is right, just and ethical". 18. We may usefully refer to some of the decisions in this regard. In Thankappan Asan' v. Ammukutty Bai,1973 KLT 443, a Full Bench of this Court held, that there is already a presumption, that the legislature did not intend to overthrow legal principles which have been in existence for a long period of time, in the absence of a contrary intent clearly expressed in the statute. In other words, any statute which requires construction should be construed to be in harmony with the existing law. This is the basic principle of law." In Kesavan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala, 1976 KLT 427, another Full Bench of this Court held: "The legislative intent and purpose behind the- provision and the result sought to be achieved will have to be considered. The meaning to be attributed must be consistent with the intent and result sought to be achieved. The adoption of a wider meaning may result in extending the scope of the provision to matters which may not be necessary to be provided for under the scheme of the Act or for the purpose of the Act and to attribute such a wide meaning may lead to undesirable results. In such cases the adoption of a wider meaning ought to be avoided". In such cases the adoption of a wider meaning ought to be avoided". The Supreme Court accepted the statement of law as contained in the portion of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, which we have extracted in Para.17 as the law applicable to situations like the present in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830 and State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC276. We do not propose to multiply authorities on this point. 19. We are therefore, of the opinion that we have to read S.20A of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act in a restricted sense as disabling the Civil Courts from entertaining suits filed by the State - and only the State -- for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government whether poramboke or not and for other reliefs for which specific provisions are made in Ss.7 to 12 of the Act It does not operate to bar suits by persons in occupation of Government lands for recovery of lost possession under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. As a matter of fact, it does not have any application where the plaintiff is any one other than the Government or other authority which can seek remedies under Ss.7 to 12 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act. In this view, we allow the Revision Petition and vacate the finding of the trial court on issue No.l. Since the findings on the other issues are in favour of the petitioner/ plaintiff, we decree the suit--O.S.No.360 of 1981--as prayed for with costs. Parties will suffer their respective costs in this Revision Petition. Allowed.