P. 0. PATHAK, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of civil Procedure by defendant challenging judgment and decree for a sum of rs. 36,871/-, passed against it. ( 2 ) THE appellant/defendant is Co-operative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter called 'the Act')- The plaintiffs leased out their Rice Mill situated at Baradwar, tehsil Sakti, district Bilaspur for a period of one year on rent of Rs. 51,000/-,w. e. f. 19-1-1980 The plaintiffs made demands of rent through bills dated 24-11-1980 for Rs. 38. 250/- and dated 9-1-1981 for Rs. 12. 750/ -. The defendant paid Rs. 26,784. 50 p. only on 30-8-1982. The plaintiffs accepted the amount executing a receipt (Ex. D. 6) in full and final satisfaction of both bills. The plaintiffs filed the suit for the balance of Rs. 24,215. 50 p. , interest of Rs. 12,555. 45 p. and notice charges Rs 100/-, total Rs. 36,871/- on the allegations that the Exhibit D. 6 was obtained by Shri Rajesh Tripathi the then District Marketing Officer of the defendant at Bilaspur, by coercion and undue influence. The threat alleged is that if plaintiff Moolchand, after accepting Rs. 26,764. 50 p. did not execute a receipt in full and final satisfaction of the entire demand, both the Hills would remain in suspense. Therefore, whatever was paid to him should be accepted by him. The plaintiffs further alleged that they are businessman and, therefore, apprehending loss in their business, accepted the amount and Moolchand executed the receipt in full satisfaction of the entire dues. However, the right to recover the balance did not come to an end. After Serving notice dated 14-3-1983 (Exhibit P. 1), the plaintiffs filed the suit on 25-7-1983 for the above mentioned sum. ( 3 ) THE appellant opposed the claim on the ground that under the agreement of lease, the plaintiffs were required to keep the Boiler in working order and covered by a valid licence. For want of renewal of the licence, the defendant could not use the Boiler from 18-1-1980 to 18-1-1981. The defendant sent letters dated 20-9-1980 (Exhibit D. 1), and 5/6-10-1980 (Exhibit D 3) requesting toe plaintiffs to obtain renewal of licence of the Boiler. For want of renewal of the licence, the defendant could not use the Boiler from 18-1-1980 to 18-1-1981. The defendant sent letters dated 20-9-1980 (Exhibit D. 1), and 5/6-10-1980 (Exhibit D 3) requesting toe plaintiffs to obtain renewal of licence of the Boiler. Even before the expiry of the licence, the defendant had served a notice on the plaintiffs on 4-7-1980 reminding them to obtain renewal of the licence. On their failure, the defendant again sent another notice dated 28-10-1980 (Exhibit D. 5) to the plaintiffs informing them that deductions will be made in the rent payabk to them. The defendant denied that Rajesb Tripathi gave any threat to withhold payment of entire rent unless the plaintiffs accept the amount offered against receipt for full and final satisfaction of the dues. The plaintiffs were informed through notice dated 28-10-1980 that on account of their failure to obtain renewal of the Boiler's licence, it could not carry on milling operation and, therefore, Rs. 21. 250/-, representing the proportionate rent for the duration, the Mill remained idle for want of a valid licence and Rs. 2,965. 45 p. spent by the defendant for maintenance of the Mill machinery total Rs. 24,215. 55 p. will be deducted from the rent payable by the defendant. After deducting this amount, the defendant paid Rs. 26,784. 50 p. on 30-8-1982 towards full satisfaction of the demand. The defendant also denied its liability to pay interest @ Rs. 12% per annum. The defendant fuether raised objections as to the non-joinder of Secretary, M. P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Bhopal and the Civil Court's jutisdiction on the, ground that milling of rice is the business of the Society and the dispute touching the business has to be referred under Section 64 of the, M. P. Co-operative societies Act, 1960 before the Registrar. ( 4 ) AFTER recording evidence of the parties, the learned trial Court held that the defendant obtained Exhibit D. 6 by coercion and threat and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for the balance of the rent as claimed together interest Rs. 12,555. 45 p. upto the date of suit and future interest at the same rate till realisation. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the defendant filed this appeal. 12,555. 45 p. upto the date of suit and future interest at the same rate till realisation. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the defendant filed this appeal. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant argued that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit was barred under Section 82 (1) (c) read with Section 64 (1) (c) and (f) of the Act Section 82 provides that no civil or revenue Court have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee or Board of Nominees. Section 64 provides that any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a Society shall be referred to the Registrar by any of the parties, if the parties thereto are among the following :" (C) A person other than a member of the Society who has been granted a loan by the Society or with whom the Society has or had business transactions and any penon claiming through such a person ; (f) a creditor of a Society. " ( 6 ) THE question for decision is whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for balance of the rent is a 'dispute touching the business' of the appellant Society. As seen above, the plaintiffs pleaded that the appellant is a Co-operative Society registered under the Act and its busuness is to reader service to agriculturist by milling rice. The appellant pleaded that milling of rice is one of the objects of the Society and therefore the claim for arrears of rent of the rice mill could not be filed in the Civil Court. The business of a Society can be ascertained only from the objects of a Society. In order to demonstrate it, the appellant did not file its bye-laws. Even if it is accepted that the business of the Society is to mill the rice, it does not mean that taking of a Rice Mill on lease is also its business. It is difficult to accept the proposition that whatever the Society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its object can be said to be part of its business. Milling of rice is separate and distinct from taking a Rice Mill on lease. It is difficult to accept the proposition that whatever the Society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its object can be said to be part of its business. Milling of rice is separate and distinct from taking a Rice Mill on lease. In Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M\s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others [ air 1969 SC 1320 ], a dispute between Co-operative Bank or its Member and a tenant was held a dispute touching the business of the Bank. The Bank cannot ordinarily be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it. Following this decision, this Court in C. R. No 879/75, dated 29-9-1977, Durg Brass Metal Workers Co-operative Society v. Durg Co-operative Stores Ltd, held that letting out a portion of the building owned by the plaintiff Society was not a dispute touching the business of the Society. ( 7 ) IN M. P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Umrao Singh Ramlal (Firm) and others [ 1980 JLJ 64 ], the plaintiff Firm instituted a suit for recovery of un-paid price of the wheat sold to the M. P. Co-operative Marketing Federation (the appellant in this case); it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Couit was not barred. ( 8 ) IN The Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Laxmibai and another [ilr 58 Mys. 582], the liability of the Society namely a Bank to pay rent was held to be an incidental and could not be said to relate to the business of the Society. ( 9 ) IN State Bank of India Employees, Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. , Raipur v. Nawal Shankar Dave and another [1972 MP LJ 71], a Housing Society purchased land from the plaintiff for providing residential accommodation to its members. Subsequentially the plaintiffs filed suit for ejectment from a piece of a land encroached upon by the Society. The Society pleaded that the suit was not maintainable since the dispute had to be referred to the Registrar. Rejecting the argument Shri A. P. Sen, J. (as he then was) held that the word 'business' means any 'trading or commercial or other similar business activity' of the Society. The Society pleaded that the suit was not maintainable since the dispute had to be referred to the Registrar. Rejecting the argument Shri A. P. Sen, J. (as he then was) held that the word 'business' means any 'trading or commercial or other similar business activity' of the Society. It has been used in a narrower sense meaning the actual trading, commercial or other similar business activity of the Society which the Society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the rules and its bye-laws. Any dispute as a result of purchase of landby a Housing Society cannot be said to be a dispute touching its business, unless it were shown that it owns buildings and lets them out at a part of the business of the Society. An act of encroachment can never be treated as something done in the normal course of its business. The jurisdiction of the ordinary Court was therefore not barred. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant argued that even if the claim in suit is not a 'dispute concerning the business' of the Society, yet the arrears of rent are 'debt' and the plaintiffs are 'creditors' within the meaning of Seption 64 (1) (f) of the Act. The term 'creditor' is co-relative to debtor and signifies a person to whom a debt, that is liquidated or specific sum of money is due. In its ordinary acceptation the term implies a person who has lent money or sold goods to another which has remained unpaid. The defendant did not plead that the relationship of the plaintiffs and the Society was that of a creditor and debtor. Even in the memo of appeal, no such ground is urged. So long as the relationship between the parties remained as lessors and lessee, the arrears of rent continue to retain that character and do not acquire the character of 'debt' under the provisions of Section 109 of the Transfer of Properties Act. It could become a debt only in the hands of a transferee. The decision in N. K. Kame v. Biharilal [1968 JLJ 337], it was held that the 'arrears of rent' due to vendor/landlord, when assigned by him to the purchaser, assume the character of 'debt' and cannot be recovered as 'arrears of rent' by the assignee. It could become a debt only in the hands of a transferee. The decision in N. K. Kame v. Biharilal [1968 JLJ 337], it was held that the 'arrears of rent' due to vendor/landlord, when assigned by him to the purchaser, assume the character of 'debt' and cannot be recovered as 'arrears of rent' by the assignee. The law laid down in Babu Bhai v. Bhagwandas [ air 1967 MP 143 ] was approved. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot be called the 'creditors' within the meaning of Section 64 (1) (f) of the Act and the claim in suit is not cognizable by Registrar. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant next argued that the plaintiffs had no right to file the suit after entering into an agreement of accord satisfaction and executing an acknowledgment (Exhibit D. 6) after accepting rs. 26,784. 45 p. in full and final satisfaction of the bill. Plaintiff Mool chand submitted a bill claiming Rs. 51,000/- on the Society. On 30-8-1982, the Society made- payment to Moolchand who gave an acknowledgment which tuns as under :"uprokt Bill Ka Katoti Upsant Rashi 26784. 45 Cheque Number o/110827 Ta : 30-8-82 Se Full And Final Bhuktan Prapt Hua. Hastakshar for Moolchand Sagar Mal partner"the aforesaid acknowledgment clearly shows that the Society after deductions agreed to pay the balance only against the claim of Rs. 51. 000/- and the plaintiff accepted that amount in full satisfaction of the bill In somewhat similar circumstances the Supreme Court in Lai a Kapurchand Godha and others v. Mir Nawab Himayatalikhan Azamiah [ air 1963 SC 250 ], held that the palintiff cannot recover his balance after receiving payment in full satisfaction. ( 12 ) THE plaintiffs, however, challenged the acknowledgment as obtained by coercion and undue influence. The original plea in para 6 of the plaint was that the District Marketing Officer of the Society gave a throat that unless he executed an acknowledgment in full and final satisfaction of the bill, no amount would be paid to him. On account of aforesaid undue influence, the plaintiff executed the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment being illegal has no effect on their right to sue for the balance. On 14-11-1984, the plaintiffs amended the plaint by adding a new para 6 (a), viz. On account of aforesaid undue influence, the plaintiff executed the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment being illegal has no effect on their right to sue for the balance. On 14-11-1984, the plaintiffs amended the plaint by adding a new para 6 (a), viz. that the District Marketing Officer Shri Rajesh Tripathi pressurised Moolchand by threatening him that in case did not execute the receipt as full satisfaction of the bill, payment of the lesser amount will be deferred sine die. Apprehending loss to their business the plaintiff moolchand executed the receipt ia full and final satisfaction of the bill else even the part payment would have been withheld. The question arises whether the afore said plea constitutes the 'coercion' within the meaning of section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 15 of the Indian contract Act runs as under :"section 15.- "coercion" is the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention'of causing any person to enter into an agreement. "in Bengal Stone Co. Ltd. v. Joseph Hyam [ (1918) 27 Cal. LJ 78j (quoted in pollock and Mulla's book on Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, tenth Edition, at page 151), it was held that a refusal oa the part of a mortgagee to convey the equity of redemption except on certain terms is not an unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property Within the meaning of this section. ( 13 ) THE Privy Council in Pao On v. Lau Yiu [ (1979) 3 All ER 651 held that to constitute duress of any kind there has to be coercion of will so as to vitiate the consent and in relation to a contract, commercial pressure alone did not constitute duress. Coercion vitiating coment depended on whether the person alleged to have been coerced did or did not protest, whether he had an alternative course open to him (e. g adequate legal remedy) at the time of coercion alleged, whether he was independently advised and whether after entering into the contract he had taken steps to avoid it. ( 14 ) IN the present case, the plaintiffs merely relied on threat to with hold the payment of even what was before offered. ( 14 ) IN the present case, the plaintiffs merely relied on threat to with hold the payment of even what was before offered. The question arises whether this can be called only unlawful detaining of the property. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate how the withholding of a part of the arrears amounts to unlawful detention within the meaning of Section 15. The plaintiffs were not without remedy. Accepting the amount in full and final satisfaction of the bill, without a word of protest, does not spell out a plea of coercion. The plaintiffs further pleaded that they had taken every step to keep the Mill in running condition and also performed all such obligations which they owed as lessor of the Society. The Society disputed this and submitted that on account of omissions and commissions of the plaintiffs, the Society could not make use of the Boiler of the Mill from 18-8-1980 to 18-1-1981. The Society sent notices (Exhibit D. 1 to D. 5)requesting the plaintiffs to obtain renewal of the Boiler's licence. In this background if the Society withheld payment of a portion of the rent, it can be said to unlawful, unless after trial, the Court holds otherwise. In my opinion the facts alleged do not constitute coercion or undue influence. Illustration (d) to Section 16 of the Contract Act may usefully be referred to in this connection. ( 15 ) APART from the infirmities noticed above, the plaintiffs failed to discharge the heavy burden, the law places on them. Moolchand (PW. 1)admits that after executing Exhibit D. 6. he lodged no report in the police station. The earliest protest by the plaintiffs is through notice (Exh. P. 1)dated 14-3-1983 i. e. after full six months and fourteen days of executing exhibit D. 6 and in that too, no averment of coercion or of undue influence mucaless the genesis of the facts pleaded in paras 6 and 6 (a) of the plaint is there. The pleas were introduced in the plaint on 25-7-1983. Their long silence, from 30-8-1982 till the filing of the suit, clearly shows that the pleas are after thought and an outcome of imagination. The plaintiffs are businessmen and are presumed to be worldly wise people unless they claim 19 the contrary. The pleas were introduced in the plaint on 25-7-1983. Their long silence, from 30-8-1982 till the filing of the suit, clearly shows that the pleas are after thought and an outcome of imagination. The plaintiffs are businessmen and are presumed to be worldly wise people unless they claim 19 the contrary. Had the Exhibit D. 6 been executed under duress, the least that was expected from the plaintiffs was to lodge a protest to the superior Authorities of the Society or would have sent a notice detailing the circumstances in which Exh. D. 6 came to be executed and claiming the balance. ( 16 ) MOOLCHAND (P. W. 1) stated that the last bill was submitted on 9-1-1981. He was called by Rajesh Tiwari on 30-8-1982. He went there along with his friend Bhimsen. Rajesh Tiwari allegedly told him that a cheque far Rs. 26. 000/- and odd could only be given to him. When he started executing the acknowledgment for the sum paid Rajesh Tiwari asked him to execute the acknowledgment in full and final satisfaction of the bill. If he did not comply with direction, he will be in troubles and the entire rent will be withheld. On account of fear accepted the cheque. He also apprehended, the members of his, family scold him for accepting the part payment. The narration of events by Moolchand is at variance with the plea. ( 17 ) BBIMSEN (P. W. 2) stated that Moolchand demanded cheque for rs. 51. 000/ -. The D. M. O. offered the cheque for the lesser amount and execute the receipt for full amount else he may have to institute a suit for its recovery. Rajesh Tripathi did not speak anything also except what is stated above. No protest was lodged by Moolthand. In cross-examination he stated that the cheque was written by Rajesh Tripathi himself. The witness did not advice Moolchand to lodge a report in the police station. ( 18 ) RAJESH Tripathi (DW. 2) stated that Moolchand had submitted bill Exh. D. 9 claiming the entile amount. The bill was forwarded to the Director of Rice Mill The Director sanctioned the bill for the past amount. Moolchand was informed that his bill has been sanctioned only for Rs. 26,784. 50 p. and he should receive the cheque. ( 18 ) RAJESH Tripathi (DW. 2) stated that Moolchand had submitted bill Exh. D. 9 claiming the entile amount. The bill was forwarded to the Director of Rice Mill The Director sanctioned the bill for the past amount. Moolchand was informed that his bill has been sanctioned only for Rs. 26,784. 50 p. and he should receive the cheque. In response to this letter, Moolchand executed Exhibit D. 6 in full and final satisfaction of the bill. He denied to have given threat or pressure. In cross-examination, he further stated that even without Moolchand's execution of acknowledgment, he was going to hand over the cheque for the said part amount. ( 19 ) CONSIDEIING the discrepancies in the statements of Moolchand and Bhimson, the variance between the plea and proof, as also the probabilities of the case, the plaintiffs' evidence is unworthy of credence. As against that, the evidence of the Society appears to be, truthful. It must therefore be held that the plaiatiff failed to prove that Exhibit D 6 was executed by Moolchand under coercion or having given the acknowledgment in full and final satisfaction of their total claim the plaintiffs are aot entitled to sue for the balance. ( 20 ) THE learned counsel for the Society further argued that it was justified in making the deductions and the interest allowed is excessive. These arguments need not be examined. ( 21 ) IN view of the foregoing discussions, the appeal succeeds, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, are hereby set aside and instead the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed with costs in both the Courts. Counsel's fee according to schedule, if cartified. Appeal allowed. .