Judgment Binod Kumar Roy, J. 1. The plaintiff has come up against an order passed by the learned Munsif, Branch upholding the contention of the defendants that the Civil Court had got no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute raised by him in the suit. 2. It appears that the suit in question was filed by the petitioner, who is an employee of opposite party Punjab National Bank for declaring that his correct date of birth is 1-7-1927 and not 1-7-1924 and the same may be recorded in the Bank record and the Bank and its authorities be directed not to disturb his working as Cash Peon till the expiry of 60 years from 1-7-1927 and for passing a decree for permanent injunction asserting that his correct date of birth is 1-7-1924 and not 1-7-1927. 3. The question of jurisdiction was raised on behalf of defendant No.3 the Branch Manager of the Bank asserting that the Bank is an Industry within the meaning of Sec.2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , which is a self contained code in itself and thus the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. 4. The Court below by the impugned order agreed with the contention of the defendants and held that the plaintiff may raise an industrial dispute under the Act and no useful purpose will be served in prosecuting the suit in civil Court and thus the plaint be returned to him. 5. Mr. Ram Sumiran Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends that the Civil Court alone has got jurisdiction to grant relief claimed by the petitioner and thus the court below has committed a jurisdictional error in holding to the contrary and in returning the plaint. 6. Mr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, contends that the court below was correct in holding that the dispute raised by ths plaintiff was such which was adjudicateable under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. He also referred to page 139 Section II paragraph 500 of a book entitled "award" of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes, Bombay on the Industrial disputes Between Certain Banking Companies And Their Workmen and submitted that item No.4 therein deals with age of retirement of an industrial worker. 7. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. He also referred to page 139 Section II paragraph 500 of a book entitled "award" of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes, Bombay on the Industrial disputes Between Certain Banking Companies And Their Workmen and submitted that item No.4 therein deals with age of retirement of an industrial worker. 7. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Sinha it is useful to reproduce paragraph 500 of the aforementioned book : "500. Terms and conditions of service cover a wide variety of topics. Some of them like standing orders, leave, hours of work overtime, medical aid, transfer, travelling allowance, promotions have been dealt with elsewhere by us. We now proceed to consider certain matters which do not fall under one or other of those heads but come more appropriately under "terms and conditions of service". We shall deal with them as follows : 1. Classification of employees.2. Search.3. Temporary stoppage of work.4. Age of retirement.5. Maintenance of service books.6. Redress of grievances.7. Service certificate. Issue of notices and orders. Procedure for taking disciplinary action. Termination of employment. " it is thus clear that under item No.4 there is a mention of the topic "age of retirement" therein which would mean that age of retirement of an industrial worker can be raised under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act. 8. In the Premier Automobiles Ltd V/s. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2238, a three Judges Division Bench held as follows : "it would, thus, be seen that through the intervention of the appropriate government of course, not directly, a very extensive machinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes. But since individual aggrieved cannot approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the Government, it is legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the act is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sec.2 (k)or within the meaning of Sec.2-A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act, Civil Courts will be the proper forum. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sec.2 (k)or within the meaning of Sec.2-A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act, Civil Courts will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability tinder the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suit or to chose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the Civil Court. It is plain that he cannot have both. He has to choose the one or the other. But we shall presently show that the civil court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act alone" . "to sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suit or is to get an adjudication under the act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Sec.33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Sec.33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. " "we may, however, in relation to principle 2 stated above has ten to add that there heardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sec.2-K of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsered workman which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2-A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise by an individual dispute, Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above. " 9. The said decision was followed by this Court in the case of adhyakasha Bihar Khadi Gram Udyog Sangh and others V/s. Ram Bilash Sliarma, 1985 PLJR 755, where this court relying upon the Premier Automobiles Ltd. V/s. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadkeand others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2238, held that when in a suit the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the order terminating his service is void and without jurisdiction, he has the right to claim a dispute under Sec.2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. 10. In my view, item No.4 of paragraph 500 of the "award" aforemention categorically lays down that it covers the matter relating to the age of retirement of a workmen and thus the provision of the Industrial Disputes act was rightly held to be applicable by the court below. 11. In fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner I proceed to consider the cases relied upon by him. 11. In fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner I proceed to consider the cases relied upon by him. In Ram Kumar V/s. State of Haryana air 1987 Supreme Court 2043, when a Bus conductor of the Haryana roadways filed a suit challenging the validity of the order of termination of his service on the ground of failure of the punishing authority to give any reason for the impugned order in violation of the principles of natural justice it was held by the Supreme Court that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and try the suit (vide paragraph 4 of the judgment ). This decision is, accordingly, of no help to the petitioner. After review of several decisions, a Division Bench of the Karnataka high Court in State of Karnataka and another V/s. T. Srinivas, AIR 1988 Karnataka 67, held that a suit for correction of the date of birth is maintainable and a decree can be passed rectifying the date of birth. 12. That was a case in which there was no award like the present one. In the said decision the Karnataka High Court was dissented from a judgment of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V/s. V. Padala Appanna, (HC) (RB) 1984 BLJR 26 , wherein some what in similar circumstances it was held by this Court that the Civil Court had got no jurisdiction. The aforesaid decision of this Court is binding on me. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, I find that there is no merit in the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner and I am of the view that the impugned has been correctly passed. 14. In the result, this civil revision application is dismissed but, in the peculiar facts and circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.