Judgment :- JANARTHANAM This is a petition filed under section 482, Cr. PC to set aside the judgment and order passed in Criminal Revision Case No. 80 of 1988, dated 23-1-1989 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, confirming the judgment passed in EOCC 172 of 1988 in the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, (EOI), Egmore, Madras. 2. P V George, the petitioner herein, was originally employed as an Accountant in Messrs. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited. The company is having its main office in Bombay and branches at Madras as well as in Bangalore. The petitioner was originally appointed and posted as an accountant of the company in the branch office in Bangalore on 1st February 1975 and subsequently, transferred to the branch office in Madras in January, 1976. During his tenure of office in Madras, he occupied the premises in No. 5 De Monte Street, Santhome High Road, Madras-4. The above said premises was taken on lease by the company and the same was allotted to the petitioner under Ex.P-4, allotment order dated 15-11-1977 with retrospective effect from 11-4-1976, the date of occupation of the premises by him. During October 1987, disciplinary proceedings for misconduct against him had been instituted resulting in his dismissal from service by Ex. P-5 order with effect from 30-12-1987. Thereafter a notice under Ex.P-6 dated 9-1-1988 was issued directing him to vacate the premises forthwith. Neither did he send a reply nor did he comply with the notice. The company authorised its Branch Manager, V S Narendranath, respondent herein to lodge a prosecution against him under section 630 of the Companies Act (here in after referred to as "The Act") Ex. P-1 is the power of attorney authorising the respondent to lodge the prosecution and Ex.P-2 is the xerox copy of the same. The respondent, pursuant to the authorisation so given to him, lodged the prosecution against the petitioner before learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, (EOI), Egmore, Madras for an offence under section 630(2) of the Act, appeared to have been committed by the petitioner. Learned Magistrate took the same on his file in EOCC No. 172 of 1988. 3. The respondent, pursuant to the authorisation so given to him, lodged the prosecution against the petitioner before learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, (EOI), Egmore, Madras for an offence under section 630(2) of the Act, appeared to have been committed by the petitioner. Learned Magistrate took the same on his file in EOCC No. 172 of 1988. 3. The defence of the petitioner in the Trial Court was that the prosecution so lodged is not maintainable in law of the fact that he had challenged the issuance of the termination order before I the competent forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. During the pendency of such proceedings, it is incompetent for the Criminal Court to proceed further in the matter. 4. Learned Magistrate on a perusal of the materials placed before him found him guilty under section 630(l)(b) read with section 630(2) of the Act, convicted him there under and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 200 with a direction to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent within three months, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks. 5. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred Criminal Revision 80 of 1988 before the Court of Session, Madras Division and the same was dismissed confirming the judgment of the Trial Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted the following points for consideration. (1) Pendency of proceedings before the competent forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 challenging the termination order of the petitioner is a bar for the institution of criminal proceedings against him. (2) The premises in No. 5, De Monte Street, Santhome High Road, Madras-4, cannot at all be stated to be the property of the company under section 630 of the Companies Act in view of the fact that the owner of the premises is a different person and consequently, proceedings under section 630 of the Act is not maintainable. (2) The premises in No. 5, De Monte Street, Santhome High Road, Madras-4, cannot at all be stated to be the property of the company under section 630 of the Companies Act in view of the fact that the owner of the premises is a different person and consequently, proceedings under section 630 of the Act is not maintainable. (3) Though the present petition had been filed under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, yet the same should not at all be construed as one filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, and the same has to be construed as a revision on the face of the express and explicit provision incorporated in the proviso to clause (d) of section 376, Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that an appeal may be brought against any such sentence, if any other punishment is combined with. (4) Messrs. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited wherein the petitioner was employed as an Accountant should not at all be construed as a company in the circumstances of the case, and consequently, its invoking the provisions of section 630 of the Act is not legally permissible. 7. Regarding the first bone of contention, there is no dispute whatever that the petitioner had been dismissed from service with effect from 30-12-1987. It is also not in dispute that he had challenged his order of dismissal before the competent forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner would contend that because the proceedings initiated by him challenging the order of dismissal had been pending, it is not legally permissible for the institution of a criminal prosecution against him as has been done in the instant case by preference of a complaint under section 630 of the Act. To this contention, I am unable to affix my seal of approval. The proceedings initiated by him challenging his dismissal from service are altogether distinct and different from the launching of prosecution by the company under section 630 of the Act. Different consideration would prevail regarding the decision in the respective cases. 8. To this contention, I am unable to affix my seal of approval. The proceedings initiated by him challenging his dismissal from service are altogether distinct and different from the launching of prosecution by the company under section 630 of the Act. Different consideration would prevail regarding the decision in the respective cases. 8. What is required to be proved for the institution of criminal prosecution under section 630 of the Act is that, if the employee, petitioner in this case, who had been given company's residential accommodation, after his dismissal from service with holds or retains possession of such an accommodation despite the issuance of notice to vacate and hand over possession of the same, it is definitely permissible to launch prosecution under the said section. Neither the provisions adumbrated in section 630 of the Act nor any provisions in the Act permit the dismissed employee like the petitioner to retain the accommodation given to him whilst in service as a condition of service. Even if the proceedings initiated by him challenging his dismissal from service and in his favour, then different considerations would prevail for allotting the office accommodation to him. If the conditions of service provide for company's accommodation after his reinstatement, he will be definitely entitled to such an accommodation on and from the date of reinstatement. Once he is terminated from service, it goes without saying that as per the provisions of the fore said section, he is not entitled to withhold or retain the quarters allotted to him whilst he was in service. If he retains the quarters even subsequent to his dismissal from service, not withstanding the issuance of notice directing him to vacate the premises and hand over possession forthwith, then the provisions of the section will come into play in the sense of launching of prosecution against him, as such the pendency of proceedings challenging the order of his dismissal can, by no stretch of imagination be construed as a bar for the institution of criminal prosecution against him. 9.An useful reference may be made in this connection to the decision reported in Jayappan v Perumal, First Income-Tax Officer, Tuticorin (1985 LW Cr. page 1). 9.An useful reference may be made in this connection to the decision reported in Jayappan v Perumal, First Income-Tax Officer, Tuticorin (1985 LW Cr. page 1). That is a case wherein the assessee had been prosecuted for the offences under sections 276-C and 277 of the Income-tax Act and under sections 193 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code for having deliberately filed false returns. The prosecution was launched by the Department while the re-assessment proceedings, under the Income- tax Act were pending. The assessee contended that the pendency of the re-assessment proceedings is a bar for the institution of prosecution against him and in fact filed an application under section 482, Cr. P C to quash the proceedings. The High Court dismissed the same giving rise to a special leave application under Article 136 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, on a careful consideration of the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act, took the view that the pendency of re-assessment proceedings cannot act as ' a bar to the institution of criminal prosecution for offences punishable under sections 276-C and 277 of the Income tax Act. The institution of criminal proceedings would not in the circumstances of the case also amount to an abuse of process of Court. The High Court was, therefore, right in refusing to quash the prosecution proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC. So observing the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Application. 10.My attention also has been drawn by learned counsel appearing for the respondent to the decision reported in Seenichamy v Ramakrishnammal (1978) LW Cri. p. 175 wherein this Court has held as follows: - " The point at issue in the civil suit is entirely different from the point at issue in the criminal proceedings. In the criminal proceeding, the rights of the parties are not decided. The Criminal Court deals with the question as to whether an offence has been committed. It is in the civil suit only that the rights of the parties are determined. The Criminal Court and Civil Court work within each of their own allotted spheres. In the criminal proceeding, the rights of the parties are not decided. The Criminal Court deals with the question as to whether an offence has been committed. It is in the civil suit only that the rights of the parties are determined. The Criminal Court and Civil Court work within each of their own allotted spheres. Though in the Criminal Court, decisions of the Civil Court with regard to rights of parties are respected, yet a criminal proceeding cannot be stayed to await the decision of a Civil Court on the rights of parties, even if these rights have some connection with the facts constituting the criminal proceeding." 11. From the aforesaid decisions, it is fluidly clear that the pendency of proceedings before the competent forum cannot be construed as a bar for the initiation of criminal proceedings wherein the Criminal Court deals with the question as to whether an offence had been committed and does not decide the rights of the parties. In this view of the matter, it goes without saying that the pendency of the proceedings initiated by the petitioner before the competent forum under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be construed as a bar for the institution of proceedings against him under section 630 of the Act. The contention, therefore, fails as of no substance. 12. The next contention is that since the premises in Door No. 5, De Monte Street, Santhome High Road, Madras-4, does not at all belong to the company, prosecution under section 630 of the Act is not maintainable. To put it otherwise, for the successful launching of the prosecution, the aforesaid premises allotted to the petitioner should actually belong to the company in the sense of the company being the real owner of the same, and unless and until the same is proved, section 630 of the Act will not at all get attracted. This contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, though appears to be very attractive at the first sight, yet, if the same is delved deep with a little bit care and circumspection, it would point out the utter untenability taking shelter under such a submission. The term 'property' used in section 630 of the Act is not at all defined by any of the provisions contained therein. The term 'property' used in section 630 of the Act is not at all defined by any of the provisions contained therein. It is, therefore, necessary to find out the real meaning that could be ascribed to the term 'property' in the context in which it was used in the aforesaid section. For better understanding, the meaning of the word 'property' as used in the section, one must have to understand the beneficient provisions adumbrated in that section . Accommodation is provided by the company as a condition of service to attract the best of talents. Therefore, once a person is lawfully employed in the company, he is given office accommodation for efficient discharge of his function during his career in the company. The moment he ceased to be an employee of the company, either on account of his super annuation or otherwise in the sense of his being terminated from service by way of dismissal, then it naturally follows that the company has to retrieve the property allotted to such a person whilst he was in service. The beneficent provisions had been enacted in the shape of section 630 of the Act for enabling the company to retrieve the property with utmost expediency, once the employee ceased to be an employee of the company. In case, if he is not in a position to hand over the office accommodation subsequent to his ceasing to be an employee of the company, launching of prosecution had been contemplated under the said section against such a person. 13. Viewed from this angle, an attempt may now be made to give a meaning to the term "property" used in section 630 of the Act. To expect the company to own as many accommodations as the number of persons employed in the concern is not a pragmatic way of looking at things. A company may own many an accommodation besides taking certain accommodations on lease so as to allot the same to the employees of the company as a condition of service. As such, the term 'property' as used in the said section has to be given an interpretation in a broader perspective. The term 'property' in such circumstances should be construed to signify the subject- matter over which the right of ownership or any lesser right carved out of ownership (e.g. mortgage right, leasehold right, etc., ) is exercised. As such, the term 'property' as used in the said section has to be given an interpretation in a broader perspective. The term 'property' in such circumstances should be construed to signify the subject- matter over which the right of ownership or any lesser right carved out of ownership (e.g. mortgage right, leasehold right, etc., ) is exercised. If such a meaning is given, I feel, it would satisfy the legislative Intent, taking into account the object of such benevolent provision as introduced in the Act. 14.It is not at all in dispute that the premises allotted to the petitioner had been taken on lease by the company, and the same had been allotted to him during his tenure of office, as evidenced by Ex. P-4, allotment order. The recitals of Ex. P-4 are couched in unambiguous terms that the aforesaid premises had been given to him as a condition of service and the moment he ceased to be an employee of the company, he has to hand over possession of the same to the company. On this aspect of the matter, there is also the evidence of the Branch Manager, examined as PW 1 in this case. The petitioner was also questioned during the course of recording statement under section 313, Cr. PC, as this aspect of the matter and he in his turn would categorically admit the same without any reservation whatever. In this view of the matter, it is not permissible to put ' any construction on the meaning of the term 'property that it signifies only ownership and not the lesser right carved out of ownership such as mortgage right, leasehold right etc. As such, the contention urged by learned counsel on this aspect of the matter also fails; and consequently, the same is rejected. 15. The next bone of contention revolves on the question as to whether the proceedings initiated before this Court is really one initiated under section 482, Cr PC or, whether the same should be construed as a revision. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the proceedings before this Court have to be construed as one of revision, on the face of express and explicit provision adumbrated in the proviso to clause (d) of section 376, Cr. PC which provides that "an appeal may be brought against any such sentence, if any other punishment is combined I with it". PC which provides that "an appeal may be brought against any such sentence, if any other punishment is combined I with it". No doubt true it is, that the petitioner had been convicted under section 630(l)(b) read with section 630(2) of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 with a direction to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent within three months, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks. From the conviction and sentence, it is rather clear that the sentence of fine of Rs. 200 is combined with the sentence of imprisonment for two weeks in case he disobeys the direction to deliver the possession of the premises to the respondent within three months. As such, proviso to clause (d) of section 376 Cr P C gets attracted to such a situation and an appeal, if preferred, is quite competent. Unfortunately, no appeal had been preferred as against the conviction and sentence, but only a revision had been preferred before the Principal Court of Sessions, Madras, for the reasons best known to the petitioner. It is not as if under the aforesaid proviso, appeal alone has to be brought in, in the circumstances indicated thereon. It is equally open to the aggrieved party to file a revision aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, instead of filing an appeal. If the petitioner had preferred a revision instead of filing an appeal, no one except himself has to be blamed for having resorted to such a course. Having opted to file a revision and the same getting dismissed, he cannot come forward again with a revision before this Court on the face of sanguine provisions adumbrated in section 397(3), Cr. PC which provides that if an application under the section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Court of Sessions, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. Realising the embargo or the bar created by section 397(3), Cr. PC, the petitioner had been advised to file an application under section 482, Cr PC, challenging the conviction and sentence and also the direction to deliver vacant possession of the premises allotted to him. 16. Realising the embargo or the bar created by section 397(3), Cr. PC, the petitioner had been advised to file an application under section 482, Cr PC, challenging the conviction and sentence and also the direction to deliver vacant possession of the premises allotted to him. 16. It is at this juncture, learned counsel appearing for the respondent had drawn my attention to the decision reported in Rajan Kumar Manchanda v State of Karnataka (1989 LW Cri. 64). In that case, an application had been filed for the release of a truck before the Magistrate, who in turn directed the release of the truck. Aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the State of Karnataka took up the matter in revision to the Court of Sessions. The Court of Sessions in exercise of its revisional power dismissed the petition of the State. The matter had been further agitated before the High Court under section 482 Cr P C asking for the exercise of its inherent powers. In exercise of that power, the High Court has reversed the order of the Magistrate, as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The matter was then agitated before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the question as to whether section 397(3), Cr PC would serve as a bar for the initiation of proceedings under section 482, Cr P C. The Supreme Court observed in that context as follows: - "The question for consideration is as to whether the bar under section 397(3), Cr. PC should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government, of action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained; it is not disputed by counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really on application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under section 397(3), Cr. PC. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked, the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted, every revision application facing the bar of section 397(3) of the Code could be labeled as one under section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. If that was to be permitted, every revision application facing the bar of section 397(3) of the Code could be labeled as one under section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed and we set aside the order of the High Court. The order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Session Judge is upheld." * 17. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner in this petition to quash the order of the Sessions Court passed in revision that though it may be true that when there is a specific provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure for a revision, filing of the petition under section 482, Cr. P C thereof, after exhausting the remedy, by way of revision, is not maintainable, the inherent power of the High Court cannot be whittled down or taken away merely because there is a provision under the Code providing for a revision, and such a power is always there, if there are materials on record to point out that there is a grave defect in the procedure or there is an illegality committed in the conduct of the trial resulting in miscarriage of justice. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would invite my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court made in Madhu Limaye v The State of Maharashtra 1978 AIR(SC) 47, 1978 CAR 1, 1978 (84) CRLJ 165, 1977 (4) SCC 551 , 1978 (1) SCR 749 , 1977 UJ 733 , 1977 CRLR 494, 1978 SCC(Cr) 10, 1979 AIR(AP) 146 : 1978 AIR(SC) 47, 1978 CAR 1, 1978 (84) CRLJ 165, 1977 (4) SCC 551 , 1978 (1) SCR 749 , 1977 UJ 733 , 1977 CRLR 494, 1978 SCC(Cr) 10, 1979 AIR(AP) 146 which are as follows: - "On a plain reading of section 482, it would follow that nothing in the Code which would include section 397(2) shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. However, it cannot be said that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, because it would be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of revisional powers. However, it cannot be said that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, because it would be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of revisional powers. A happy and harmonious solution would be to say that the bar provided in section 397(2) operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. The inherent power would come into play there being no other provision in the Code for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In case the impugned order brings about a situation, which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Such cases would be few and far between. The High Courts must exercise the inherent power very sparingly." * Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the principle evolved by the Supreme Court in Rajan Kumar Manchanda v State of Karnataka (1989 LW Cri 64) is that in the absence of relevant circumstances attracting the provisions of section 482, Cr. PC resort to initiation of proceedings under section 402, Cr. PC in order to get over the bar or embargo created under section 397(3), Cr. PC is not permissible. He is emboldened to make this submission, since the facts of that case did not at all disclose the presence of any of the circumstances attracting the four corners of section 482, Cr P C. Having stated so, he would further submit that the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482, Cr. P C is always there and the same can be invoked if there are circumstances warranting for the invoking of the power under the aforesaid section. 18. P C is always there and the same can be invoked if there are circumstances warranting for the invoking of the power under the aforesaid section. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent at this juncture would intrude and submit even assuming for argument's sake, that the proposition of law as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner interpreting the decision in Rajan Kumar Manchanda v State of Karnataka 1989 L W Cri 64 is correct, even then, there are no materials in the instant case pointing out the presence of any grave defect in the procedure or any illegality committed by the Courts below causing prejudice to the cause of justice and thereby calling for interference under section 482, Cr. PC. The materials available on record, if perused in the light of the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, would make it abundantly clear, the complete absence of any such material warranting interference under section 482, Cr. P C. As such, this bone of contention also fails as of no substance. 19. The last contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that M/s. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited, wherein the petitioner was employed as an Accountant, should not at all be construed as a company, in the circumstances of the case, and therefore, it is that the provisions of section 630 of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I feel is nothing but an attempt made by a man sinking in the deep sea and trying to escape by catching hold of a straw that was immediately available at arm's length. It cannot at all save him from the perilous consequence he was placed under such circumstances. Ex. 3 is the copy of the appointment order issued to the petitioner. The recitals in Ex. 3 are couched in such a fashion giving no rise to any ambiguity whatever that the petitioner had been appointed as an accountant in M/s. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited. Ex. 4 is the copy of the allotment order which also states in clear-cut terms that the company's premises had been given to him to do better work without any disturbances. PW 1 also had stated in his evidence that he is the Branch Manager of M/s. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited. He has also adverted to the appointment order. Ex. 3 as well as to the allotment order Ex. PW 1 also had stated in his evidence that he is the Branch Manager of M/s. Jayems Engineering Company Private Limited. He has also adverted to the appointment order. Ex. 3 as well as to the allotment order Ex. 4 issued to the petitioner. The petitioner in fact, had been duly questioned during his examination under section 313, Cr P C and he had categorically admitted all those facts. Top of all, he did not opt to put any question to PW 1 whilst he was in box on this aspect of the matter. He did not also adduce any evidence in proof of the same. It is for the first time he would put forth such a contention obviously to escape from the penal consequences to be flown by the operation of the provisions of section 630 of the Act. As such, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect of the matter cannot at all be expected to commend acceptance at the hands of the Court. 20. In view of my discussion on all the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, it goes without saying that the petition deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the petition is dismissed.