JUDGMENT Shamsuddin Ahmed, J. : The order under challenge in this revisional application is order No. 47 dated 15.10.88, passed by the Learned Assistant District Judge, 10th Court at Alipore in the Title Suit no. 74 of 87. 2. The impugned order concerns the determination of a preliminary issue if the suit is maintainable because of lack of sanction under s. 73 (2) of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. The petitioners filed a suit for declaration, removal of mutwalli, framing of a scheme, accounts and permanent injunction etc. Their case was that the plaintiff., are disciples of Hazarat Moulana Sufi Mufti Azan Gaghi Saheb. The said Azan Gaghi Saheb dedicated his entire self acquired properties movables and immovables including business and cash assets verbally by declaration in or about 1895-96 to the All Mighty Allah fur the benefit of the general public appointing Hazi Khaja Bux Mallick Mustafi and other persons as mutwallis and parted possession thereof and also vested him with power of appointment mutwalli but there was no deed of wakf executed and registered by said Ann Gaghi Saheb. Razi Khaja Bux and others when seized of the properties as mutwallis and in response to the last wishes of Khaja Bux Saheb as donor executed a deed of Wakf confirming the said deed on 2.6.1916 and the same was duly registered in the office of the Sub Register at Sealdah. His elder son was appointed as mutwalli. There are other allegations leading to the filing of the suit for relief referred to earlier but those are not necessary for our present purpose. In defence the defendants mainly canvassed that the suit is not maintainable as permission required Linder s. 73 (2) of the Wakf Act was not obtained before the filling of the suit. The other defence taken by the defendants are not necessary for our present purpose. 3. The Learned Judge on the basis of the pleadings framed several issues, one of them relating to the maintainability of the suit. By the instant order the Learned Judge disposed of the sad issue relating to the maintainability as a preliminary issue and has come to the finding that the suit is bad for lack of sanction under the aforesaid provisions of law. The aggrieved plaintiff has filed this application. 4 Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has mainly canvassed three points for the consideration of the Court. Mr. The aggrieved plaintiff has filed this application. 4 Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has mainly canvassed three points for the consideration of the Court. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the court below faded to take into account whether the relief claimed in the suit is covered by the provisions of s. 14 of the Religious Endowment Act or s. 92 of the CPC. He further submitted that the bar contemplated by s 73(2) is not an absolute bar and it is only directory and can be regularised even after filing of the suit but before its disposal. Another point taken by Mr. Chatrerjee is that this suit cannot be disposed of by a separate consideration at the issue with regard to maintainability as on the facts of the case it cannot be covered by the provisions of Order 14 rule 2 of the CPC. Another point taken by the petitioner was that since an application under Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the CPC was filed by two persons for being added as plaintiff who had duly obtained sanction of the Commissioner under s. 73(2) of the Wakf Act and the Learned Judge committed an error by determining the issue as to the maintainability without disposing of the application filed by these two persons under Order 1 rule 10 of CPC. 5. Section 73(2) provides that no suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in sub-s. (1) relating to a wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Commissioner without the consent in writing of the Commissioner and for the institution of any such suit it shall not be necessary to obtain leave or consent referred to in the acts mentioned in sub-s. (1). Sub-section (1) speaks of reliefs mentioned in S. 14 of the Religious Endowment Act, 1963 and in Sec. 92 of the CPC relating to any wakf Accordingly, it has to be seen if the relief sought for in the instant suit is a relief mentioned in Sec. 14 of the R, E. Act or s. 92 of the CPC. At the outset we have referred to some of the relief sought for by the plaintiffs in this suit. At the outset we have referred to some of the relief sought for by the plaintiffs in this suit. Sec. 92 refers to any illegal breach, of any express or implied covenants (?) of trust created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature or the cases in which the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for administration of any such trust. It authorises the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court to institute a suit to obtain a decree relating to removing any trustee, appointing a new trustee vesting any property in a trustee, directing accounts and enquires etc. Mr. Chatterjee firstly submitted that s. 92 speaks of the relief mentioned therein. The Learned Judge erred in law in not considering whether the relief claimed in the suit were identical to reliefs mentioned s. 92 of CPC. It is true that the Learned Judge do not specifically decide the question in that light. But it is apparent that the Learned Judge has noted in his order the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff and it will appear that on the face of is there is no doubt that t he relief claimed by the plaintiff is covered by s. 92 of the CPC. For the purposes of consideration if the reliefs claimed are identical with the reliefs mentioned in s. 92 the Learned Judge could rely on the plaint filed by the plaintiff before him. Having a look at the plaint and the relief claimed therein there is no doubt that the suit contemplated was a suit covered by S. 92 of the CPC Even in the prayer portion leave of the court under S. 92 was prayed for. Therefore, we can easily hold that the suit framed and reliefs claimed therein are covered by the provisions of s. 92 of the CPC. 6. Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that the Learned Judge made an error in deciding the issue separately. As according to him the issue cannot be decided without entering into the evidence with regard to the nature and character of the Wakf concerned. In making this submission Mr. Chatterjee primarily relied on a decision reported in 44 CWN 969 (Abdul Halim V. Must. Chatterjee then submitted that the Learned Judge made an error in deciding the issue separately. As according to him the issue cannot be decided without entering into the evidence with regard to the nature and character of the Wakf concerned. In making this submission Mr. Chatterjee primarily relied on a decision reported in 44 CWN 969 (Abdul Halim V. Must. Nasibuliessa (Bibi), In the said decision the Learned Judge Amir Ali, J held that a wakf in which the bulk of the benefit is reserved for the family or family religious purpose--purposes which cannot be regarded as wholly public in Mahommedan Law - and the surplus is directed to go towards the Huj expenses of the mutwlli is not a trust created for public purpose, within the meaning of s.72 (?) of the CPC. The Learned Judge dealt with the difference between a public and private trust under the Mahommedan law. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that in the instant case also the Learned Judge in deciding whether the suit is maintainable ought to have gone into evidence to decide whether the wakf concerned in the suit is a wakf of public nature and as such the provisions of s. 92 of the CPC is attracted. On a reading of the plaint it will appear that the plaintiffs themselves claimed in the suit that the trust in question, was a trust public, religious and charitable in nature. Accordingly, only on a plain reading of the plaint it will appear that accepting the case of the plaintiff the wakf covered by the suit was a wakf in respect of which provisions of S. 92 of the CPC is attracted. Though the Learned Judge did not arrive at a specific finding in this respect but he has noted all the materials which lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Wakf concerned is a wakf public, religious and charitable in nature. 7. The next point urged by Mr. Chatterjee relates to the provisions of Order XIV rule 2 of the CPC. The aforesaid provision lays down that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue the court shall stick to the provisions of sub-rule (2) and pronounce judgement on all issues. 7. The next point urged by Mr. Chatterjee relates to the provisions of Order XIV rule 2 of the CPC. The aforesaid provision lays down that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue the court shall stick to the provisions of sub-rule (2) and pronounce judgement on all issues. Sub-rule (2) Jays down that there issues both of Jaw and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only it may try that issue first, if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. Mr. Chatterjee intended to submit that the instant suit is not a case covered by sub-rule (2) cl (b) of the aforesaid provision. According to Mr. Chatterjee without determining the nature and character of the Wakf concern the Court is not competent to apply the bar contemplated by cl. (b) of rule 2(2) of Order XIV. With regard to his contention relating to the nature and character of the Wakf concerned we have already indicated Our views. Therefore, we are unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that the instant case is not covered by the aforesaid provision of law and clause (b) does not apply in the facts of this case. Section (73) creates a legal bar as to the maintainability of the suit and the instant suit can be disposed of only on determination of that question. If the suit can be disposed of on an issue of law alone the court is competent to try tile issue separately and arrive at a finding and dispose of the Suit itself. There is nothing wrong in the facts of this suit to apply the provisions of clause (b) of sub-rule (2) as stated aforesaid. 8 Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that the Court below failed to take into account the subsequent facts and dispose of the suit on the basis of the subsequent change and development. He relies on a decision of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, J. as his Lordship then was speaking for the Division Bench that a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed ac the date of its commencement. He relies on a decision of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, J. as his Lordship then was speaking for the Division Bench that a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed ac the date of its commencement. An exception to this rule viz that a Court may take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis of the altered condition is applied in cases where It is shown that the original relief claimed has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the court un the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties (Vol. XX CLJ 107, Raicharan Mondal v. Biswanath Mondol). In this connection, Mr. Chatterjee relied on a decision reported in 1984 (1) SCC 369 (Satish Chand Makhan & ors. v. Gobardhan Das Byas & ors.), 1988 (11) CHN 128 (Uma Roy v. Sm. Meghamala Dey & anr) and AIR 1980 Cal, 435 (Krishna Chandra Pramanik v. Harisadhan Sahena). This submission is based on an application filed by the Badiuzzaman Farooqui and Aminuzzaman Farooqui under Order 1 rule 10 of the CPC for being impleaded as a plaintiff, He asserted that they have obtained permission of the Commissioner of Wakf to institute the suit. Mr. Chatterjee submits that this subsequent development which ought to have been taken note of by the learned Judge and without having disposed of the application filed by them, he was wrong in deciding the issue with regard to the maintainability. We have already noted the provision of s. 73(2) of the Bengal Wakf Act. The condition contemplated by s. 73(2) appears to be a mandatory provision. The language used is that no suit to obtain any of the relief mentioned in s. 14 of the R. E. Act and s. 92 of the CPC relating to a Wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Commissioner without the consent in writing of the Commissioner. The language of Section indicates a mandate that if any Such suit filed without the consent of the Commissioner by any other person will not be maintainable. Mr. Chatterjee's submission that it is directory in nature cannot be accepted. A decision relied on by Mr. The language of Section indicates a mandate that if any Such suit filed without the consent of the Commissioner by any other person will not be maintainable. Mr. Chatterjee's submission that it is directory in nature cannot be accepted. A decision relied on by Mr. Chatterjee himself reported in 58 CWN 458 (Khalilar Rahaman v. Moulobi Abdul Gaffur) clearly lays down that s. 731(2) of the Bengal Wakf Act imposes prohibition viz. that a suit under s. 92 of the CPC or s. 14 of the R. E. Act can only be filed after the consent in writing of the Wakf Commissioner had been obtained by the person suing. We respectively agree with this view taken by the Division Bench of this Court. Accordingly, even if we assume that the applications filed by both the Farooquis are allowed even then the defect in filing the suit cannot be removed as the consent of the Commissioner is a condition precedent in instituting a suit covered by s. 73(2) of the Bengal Wakf Act. In this connection, the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties has drawn to our attention a decision reported in AIR 1989 SC 1540. The Supreme Court held that an authority to sue given by the Advocate General under s. 92 several persons is a joint authority and must be acted upon by all jointly. A suit by some of them only cannot be in conformity with the Divisions of s. 92(2). Suit by persons excluding any of them is not competent. Relying on this principle we also hold that even if the Farooquis were granted consent of the Commissioner for instituting a suit that will not cure the defect as at the time of filing of the suit there was no consent obtained from the Commissioner as contemplated by s. 92(2) of the Bengal Wakf Act. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee in this connection. 9. Mr. Chatterjee had also drawn our attention to a decision reported in 1986 (1) CHN 58 (Smt. Sulachana Debi Bubna v. Sri Gobinda Nag) to impress on us that since this case involved the determination of fact and after such determination the law has to be applied the learned Judge erred in law in determining the issue without arriving at a conclusion as to the relevant facts. We have already discussed this point earlier. Mr. We have already discussed this point earlier. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to us a decision reported in Vol. L Indian Appeals 247 (Mr. Solaiman v. Birendra Chandra Singh). 'The Privy Council held that the court ought to have decided all the issues arising in a suit. We have also discussed this aspect of the matter earlier. 10. In view of our findings as above we are unable to find any merit in this application. The application is dismissed with costs, to be paid by the petitioner to the opposite party assessed at 10 Gms. Haridas Das, J.: I agree. Application dismissed.