S. B. Wad ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions raise the question of legality of the escalation of price of the Maruti Cars booked by the petitioners and nondelivery of the cars in the month of February 1987 in view of the impending budget. The grievance is mainly against the agents who had demanded the escalated price and who had refused to release the cars. CW. 987/87 is a typical writ petition representing the broad facts and averments common to all connected writ petitions. We are of the opinion that these petitions raise disputed questions of fact for which detailed evidence is necessary. So also the averments are in the nature of the alleged broach of contract and the prayers in the writ petitions are for the protection of the contractual rights of the petitioners. The facts ncessary for our said findings are common to all the writ petitions. Hence, it is sufficient to describe in detail the facts and averments only in one writ petition, viz. CW. 987/87. ( 2 ) IN CW. 987/87 the additional grievance of the petitioner is that be was being allotted a green car, (which was not the colour of his choice) and that too was diverted to manufacturer s quota. The main allegations are contained in paras 13and14 of the petition, they are re-produced below:- "13. The petitioner apprehends that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 jointly and severally had acted in omission and commission so that the Maruti car allotted to the petitioner on 2. 2. 1987 was delivered to some other persons whom the respondents wished to oblige. In the alternative, the petitioner apprehends that despite the respondents assertions to the effect that a seniority list is prepared on the basis of the date of payment, this list was not adhered to and persons below the petitioner (i e. persons who had made full payment after 2. 2. 1987 were delivered their cars prior to the petitioner in order to oblige and curry favour which such persons. The petitioner believes that even green Maruti cars (which colour choice had been added by the petitioner to his initial colour choice of brown and blue on the advice of respondent No. 3) have been delivered by respondent No. 2 through respondent No. 3 and its other Agents/dealers in Delhi to customers who had made full payment after the petitioner. " "14. " "14. Without prejudice to the foregoing paragraphs the petitioner further states that he was informed by respondent No. 3 (and shown the relevant record) that the green Maruti car allotted to the petitioner had been despatched to respondent No. 3 vide release order No. 1182 dated 28. 2. 1987. Accordingly, even if it is assumed that the petitioner was not allotted a specific car on 2. 2. 1987, this allotment and delivery was effected on 28. 2. 1987 as per the respondents own records. The petitioner further states that respondent No. 3 had shown that this release order contained nine cars. Out of these eight cars were delivered in March 1987 but at the old rate i. e. at the price paid by the petitioner on 2. 2. 1987. " ( 3 ) THESE allegations are fully and substantively controverted in paras l8and 19 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited. After going through the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that the vehicle meant for the petitioner was not delivered to anyone else. As a matter of fact, in the seniority list the petitioner s number was 29 while only 28 green cars were issued. Respondent No. 2 has also annexed the seniority list with the counter affidavit. Respondent No. 2 has pointed out that the responsibility for the delivery of the car was not of resopondent No. 3 the Dealer. It is categorically denined in the counter-affidavit that the green car meant for the petitioner was diverted and was supplied to someone else. It is further averred that one green car bad to be given on the basis of the preferential quota laid down by the Supreme Court. Each of these statements controverting the allegations in the writ petition are supported by documents. As a matter of fact the respondents have not only substantively denied the allegations, but have put the petition through strict proof. But even if we look at the allegations in paras 13and14 of the petition themselves, they are not definite allegations, but only "apprehen- sions" It is, thus, clear that the petition raises serious disputed questions of fact and these allegations can be ascertained only on the oral and documentary evidence possible in a civil suit and not in the writ petition. ( 4 ) THE petition must also fail because the allegations and the reliefs sought are in the realm of pure commercial contract. There is a contract between the petitioner and the dealer and between the dealer and the Maruti Udyog Limited. In the writ jurisdiction the Court cannot go into the questions as to what are the mutual rights and obligations in a contract and whether there is any breach of them obviously such averments cannot be established without the oral and documentary evidence available with both the parties. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh and Others (1989 2 SCC Pg. 116 ). In that case substantial enhancement incost and rate of instalments was made by the appellant for built houses, after the contract was concluded. The appellant Authority was admittedly a State or other Aurhority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Even then the Supreme Court held that where a State or an Authority within the meaning of Article 12 enters into an ordinary commercial contract with private persons, the parties are governed by the contract and they cannot seek redress under Article 226 of the Constitution for breach of Contract. The Supreme Court has REFERRED TO to Radha Krishana Aggarwal, ( 1977 3 SCC 457 : Ramana Shetty v. international Airports Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ); and a number of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) ON the contrary the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Dwarka Dass Marfatia v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay. (1989) 3 SCC Pg. 293. In that case the appellant, who was the tenant of a portion of the plot of land from the Port Trust (which is a Corporation constituted under the Madras Ports Act) was evicted by the Port Trust and the plot was let out to the person occupying the major portion of the plot under its policy. The appellant filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, which dismissed the suit on the ground of invalidity of notice. The appellant filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, which dismissed the suit on the ground of invalidity of notice. The Appellate Court reversed the order of the Trial Court, upholding the validity of the notice, but it dismissed the suit on the ground that the malafides or arbitrariness in the evictton of the appellant were not relevant for deciding the legality of the action. The appellant preferred TO a writ petition to the Bombay High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writpetition and confirmed the order of the Appellate Court. Before the Supreme Court the appellant contended that the action of the Port Trust was arbitrary, malafide and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Counsel for the petitioner in the present case relies on the observation of the Bench in para 27 of the Judgment, viz "if a governmental policy or action even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional". But we do not think that the said proposition can be taken in isolation from the other observations made in the same paragraph. They are, "we are inclined to accept the statement that every activity of a public authority, especially in the background of the assumption of which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act must be informed by reason and guided by public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondents in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption thet they would not act as private landlords must be agitated by that standard. " The Supreme Court was more concerned with the special discretion conferred on the public authority by exempting it from the operation of the Rent Act. Termination of the lease by the Port Trust is to be understood in that context. We do not feel that the Supreme Court laid down as a categorical proposition that contractual obligations can in all cases be enforced through the remedy of a writ petition. In the said para 27 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has relied upon two of its earlier decision viz. Kasturi Lal Laxmi Reddy v. State of Jandk. (1980)4 SCC Pg. 1; and R. D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India (supra ). In the said para 27 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has relied upon two of its earlier decision viz. Kasturi Lal Laxmi Reddy v. State of Jandk. (1980)4 SCC Pg. 1; and R. D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India (supra ). It may be noted that in both the cases the stage for the challenge before the Court was one of awarding the contract and not a grievance of a breach of contract after the contract was concluded between the parties. In both the cases the grievance of the petitioner was that they were denied equal opportunity of competing with the respondent in whose favour the contract was given. The International Airport Authority case, which for the first time propounded that the State cannot act arbitrarily in the distribution of largesse is an authority for the proposition that the question of arbitrariness or discrimination arises only at the initial stage of awarding the contract, ( 7 ) IN Dwarka Dass (para 22) the Supreme Court has REFERRED TO to ao observation of its decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 , but it appears that the crucial observation in the Escorts decision was not brought to the notice of the Court by the Counsel. Chinnappa Reddy J. speaking for the Constitution Bench said, "if the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it". The Court further observed. "when the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, dons the robes of shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder". Thereafter, the Court observed, "while we do not for a moment doubt that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reason and that, in appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution, we do not consider Article 14 as a charter for Judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions". ( 8 ) IT may. thus, be seen that the contract of supply of Maruti Car in the present case and the alleged breach was entirely in a private law area of contract and had no aspect of public law involved in it at all. Althogh the decision in Dwarka Dass is by a Bench of Three Judges of the Supreme Court, the proposition relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner expresses the view of only two Hon ble Judges Sabyasachi Mukharji and M. H. Kania JJ. , as Ranganathan J. refrained from expressing any final and concluded opinion, on the issue. It may also be noted that Dwarka Dass is a peculiar case of its kind where the Port Trust was exempted from the application of the rigour of Rent Act and were, thus, conferred with special discretion. As against this the decision of the Supreme Court in Bareilly Development Authority is more apt and to the point involved in our case. In both the cases the Court was called upon to protect the contractual rights of the petitioner in a normal commercial contract. The decision in Barellly Development Authority although rendered by two hon ble Judges of Supreme Court is, thus, directly on the point and we follow the same. In the decision cited above, admittedly all authorities were the instrumentality of the State. Even assuming that Maruti Udyog Limited is (without so holding) an instrumentality of the State, no relief can be granted to the petitioners since the petitioners are seeking the relief of protection against the breach of a concluded contract between the parties. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above we hold that the writ petitions are not maintainable and dismiss the same. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule in each of the cases is discharged.