JUDGMENT M.P. Singh, J. - This is defendant's writ petition against an order passed by VII Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr on 1-9-1987 dismissing his appeal in restoration matter. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for specific performance of contract for sale dated 8-12-79 on the basis of an agreement dated 15-10-1976 alleged to have been executed by the petitioner in his favour in respect of certain plots. The sale consideration. I agreed was Rs. 7,000/- out of which an amount of Rs. 3,000/- was alleged to have been paid to the defendant and the remaining amount of Rs. 4,000/- was to be paid at the time of the sale deed. 3. The defendant filed written statement and denied the execution of any agreement for sale or receipt of any earnest money. The validity and genuineness of the thumb impression existing on the agreement was also denied. 4. This Court is not required to record any finding on the merits of the case because at present the Court is confined only to the question of restoration. 5. In spite of the fact that the defendant had knowledge about the date fixed in suit, he did not appear with the result the suit was decreed ex parte on 6-10-1983. On 29-10-1983 an application for restoration was filed by the defendant-petitioner on the ground of his illness. The plaintiff-respondent filed an objection. 6. On 18-5-1984 the restoration application was dismissed on the ground that the defendant has been appearing before the consolidation authorities during these periods and no medical certificate was filed by him in support of the restoration application. 7. In pursuance of the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, he deposited Rs. 4,000/- in Court on 23-7-1984. 8. On 25-9-1984 the defendant filed an appeal. The said appeal was dismissed in default on 24-9-85. On 11-10-1985 an application for restoration of the appeal was filed. 9. Heard Sri R.H. Zaidi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sunil Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. The most important feature of this case is that during the pendency of the appeal on 8-7-1986 the defendant-petitioner executed a sale deed in respect of one of the plots in dispute to Jagdish Prasad. It was done so by the petitioner with a purpose to defeat the decree and create legal obstruction in the plaintiffs way. 10. The most important feature of this case is that during the pendency of the appeal on 8-7-1986 the defendant-petitioner executed a sale deed in respect of one of the plots in dispute to Jagdish Prasad. It was done so by the petitioner with a purpose to defeat the decree and create legal obstruction in the plaintiffs way. This fact alone is sufficient to dis-entitle the petitioner in invoking the equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as he has not come to the Court with clean hands. A person who plays the game of hide and seek in law courts is not entitled for any judicial discretion to be exercised in his favour. 11. It has come on the record that even during argument before the lower appellate Court on the restoration matter no mention was made by the petitioner regarding this sale deed. 12. Before the lower appellate Court an affidavit was filed by the defendant that he never appeared before the consolidation authorities on 23-9-1983 and 3-10-1983. His signature therein was forged. Had it been a fact, then definitely he would have made a mention of these facts in the sale deed executed by him on 8-7-1986. 13. On 1-9-1987 the lower appellate Court dismissed the restoration application as well as the appeal. Against that order the present writ petition has been filed. 14. The learned Munsif disbelieved the case of the defendant-petitioner and recorded a finding that the defendant was not prevented by any sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date fixed. He used to attend his cases before the consolidation authorities during these periods with the result he dismissed the application under O. 9, R. 13 Code of Civil Procedure. The lower appellate Court has also upheld the finding recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 15. There is no dispute that so far the restoration matter is concerned, it is the discretion of the Court whether to allow the same or not. The lower appellate Court has also upheld the finding recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 15. There is no dispute that so far the restoration matter is concerned, it is the discretion of the Court whether to allow the same or not. It has been held in a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1964 All 534 , Babu Ram v. Antarim, Zila Parishad that at p. 535) : "A Court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court below, if the discretion has been exercised in good faith, after giving due weight to relevant matter and without being swayed by irrelevant matters. If two views are possible on the question. then also the Court of appeal would not interfere, even though it may exercise discretion differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong." 16. In the instant case, nothing has been shown that the discretion has been exercised by courts below arbitrarily or was not passed in good faith or it was against the evidence on record. 17. The impugned orders are discretionary in nature. Such orders cannot be interfered with unless it was proved to be manifestly wrong. 18. It is the settled law that this Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not setting as a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence. In a case reported in AIR 1970 SC 61 , Shaikh Mohammad Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab, it has been held (at p. 66) : "Where the evidence adduced before the been allotted, and of former tenure-holder of trial Judge was not so immaculate that another the plots comprising the 'chak' in their Judge might not have taken a different view, respective "Original holdings" Cl. (b) provides it cannot 'be said that there was no evidence that the tenure-holder entering into possession on which the trial Judge could have come to of the chak shall have, in that "chak the same the conclusion he did. When the trial Court rights, title, interests and liabilites" as he had accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising Wherein a suit for specific performance of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227." 19. When the trial Court rights, title, interests and liabilites" as he had accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising Wherein a suit for specific performance of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227." 19. In another case reported in AIR 1975 SC 1297 , Babhutmal Raichand v. Laxmibai, it has been eld (at p. 1301): "The power of superintendence of High Court under Article 227 being extraordinary is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate certiorari jurisdiction, cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power and a Court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or Tribunal final on facts. The High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or Tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it." 20. The same view has been taken in AIR 1977 SC 388 , Beant Singh v. Union of India. 21. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was mainly confined to the question that since on account of intervention of the consolidation proceedings, the number of plots has been changed and as such the suit for specific performance of the contract of sale could not have been decreed. He has relied upon the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 1226 , Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal wherein it has been held (at p. 1228): "While Cl. He has relied upon the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 1226 , Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal wherein it has been held (at p. 1228): "While Cl. (a) of S. 30 provides for the cessation of rights, title, interests and liabilities both of tenure-holder to whom the 'chak' has been allotted, and of former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the 'chak' in their respective "Original holdings" Cl.(b) provides that the tenure-holder entering into possession of the chak shall have, in that "chak the same rights, title, interests and liabilites" as he had in the original holdings." Wherein a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale, the defendant seller (appellant) pleaded that as a new plot had been allotted as a result of the consolidation of his holding under the Act, he could not perform the agreement." It was held by the Supreme Court that the suit for specific performance of contract was liable to be dismissed. 22. On the same point the learned counsel li for the petitioner has made a reference of one more authority reported in AIR 1974 All 358 , Sri Ram v. Dhani Ram Gupta. The view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Piarey Lal (supra) has also been taken in this case. 23. So far this proposition of law is concerned, there is no dispute. But in order to decide this controversy, this Court has to investigate into the disputed questions of fact regarding which there is no finding by the courts below nor the point was agitated there and as such it is beyond the scope of the present writ petition. In my opinion, no finding need be recorded by me. 24. On account of fact that in some cases the courts have shown some leniency in such matters, the litigants have started taking it for granted the Court will proceed according to their (litigants} convenience. Gradually the law of procedure is losing its due importance which cannot be permitted to be done. 25. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that this is a case of gross negligence on the part of the defendant. The defendant is not entitled to any discretionary relief from this Court. The orders passed by the courts below do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record. 26. The writ petition is dismissed with costs.