GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) APPLICANTS feel aggrieved by the order date 29-11-1986 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jagdalpur in Criminal Case No. 1148/83 joining these applicants as accused persons in the said case, and seek interference of this court by filing this application u/s 482, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) IT appears that on a report lodged on 15. 1. 1980 an offence U/s 379 I. P. C. was registered at police station, Kondagaon against Non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 and one Vinod Kumar, now dead. It was alleged that the forest wood of lot No. 996/1022 was dishonestly removed by the accused persons on the basis of alleged forged document. The police subsequently filed the charge-sheet alleging commission of offences under Sections 420/467/468, I. P. C. , before the Judicial Magistrate. The learned Magistrate while considering the question of framing of charge held that there was material on record which prima facie indicates involvement of applicants in the said offence. The learned Magistrate, therefore, passed the impugned order joining the applicants as accused persons. The applicants feel aggrieved by this order and have rushed to this Court for getting the same quashed. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicants, in the main, is that powers of a Magistrate to proceed against a person, not being an accused, are regulated by provisions of Section 319, Cr. P. C. and are available to the Magistrate only after some evidence has been recorded during the trial from which involvement of other persons may prima facie be inferred. The learned counsel submitted that since no evidence has been recorded during the trial and the matter was at the stage of consideration of framing of charge, the impugned order is illegal. It is further submitted that the learned Magistrate has exercised the power light-heartedly, whereas Section 319, Cr. P. C. , is intended to be sparingly used and only when there are compelling reasons for the same. The learned Government Advocate, supported the impugned order and submitted that it is not referable to Section 319, Cr. P. C. but is referable to Section 240, Cr. P. C. which entitles the Magistrate to issue process against others not made accused in the case. It is otherwise submitted that the word evidence appearing in Section 319, Cr. The learned Government Advocate, supported the impugned order and submitted that it is not referable to Section 319, Cr. P. C. but is referable to Section 240, Cr. P. C. which entitles the Magistrate to issue process against others not made accused in the case. It is otherwise submitted that the word evidence appearing in Section 319, Cr. P. C. cannot be given a restricted meaning and includes even the evidence collected during investigation. ( 3 ) FACTUALLY speaking, the trial in the instant case has not reached the stage of evidence. The case was fixed for framing of charge for which the learned Magistrate looked into the material on record. He apparently felt that the applicants were involved in forging document, which formed the basis of transport of the stacked wood. He, therefore, held that there was sufficient ground to issue process against them. The question for consideration is whether the learned Magistrate had the jurisdiction to do so? Section 319, Cr. P. C. which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants, reads as under: S. 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence: (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry in to, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any more for which such persons could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detain by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence Which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then: (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced a fresh, and the witnesses reheard. (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. ( 4 ) THE Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab interpreted this provision in the light of 41st Report of the Law Commission and held that it applies to all courts and gives them power to proceed against any person not being the accused before it but against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried alongwith other accused. The Court approved and indeed relied upon its earlier decision in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar to support the aforesaid view. The Supreme Court, in this case, did not clarify the meaning of the word evidence appearing in Section 319, Cr. P. C. but there are observations to indicate that the word would include evidence led during the trial. In spite of it, this case is not the authority from the proposition that the word evidence appearing in Section 319 (1), Cr. P. C. would mean evidence recorded during trial and not otherwise. Sections 160 and 170, Cr. P. C. which deal with the stage before the matter is sent to the Magistrate, also use evidence indicting that the material collected by the investigating officer during investigation of an offence is also treated to be evidence. In spite of it, Gauhati High Court in Gunaram Tanti v. State of Assam has interpreted this word to mean evidence recorded during the trial and hence the Magistrate would not be justified in acting on the Report of the Investigating Officer. The said Court, however, has not considered the use of this word in Sections 169 and 170, Cr. P. C. If the provision is interpreted in the context of report of the Law Commission as done by the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh's case (Supra), there would be no justification whatsoever for restricting the meaning of the word evidence, in this provision. Section 319, Cr. P. C. would in view of the Report of the Law Commission be comprehensive in nature, permitting addition of a new person as an accused during the proceeding. Section 319, Cr. P. C. would in view of the Report of the Law Commission be comprehensive in nature, permitting addition of a new person as an accused during the proceeding. Restricted meaning given to the word evidence, in the opinion of this Court, defeats this object and purpose. This Court, cannot forget that punishment of an offender in the interest of society is one of the objects behind penal statutes which are enacted for larger good of the society and hence there would be no justification whatsoever for whittling down, circumscribing or fettering the right of a Court by initiating proceedings in any manner except as provided in the statute itself. It was this logic prompted the Supreme Court to reject the argument based on locus standi in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak (D. A. Desai, J. ). This Court would therefore respectfully disagree with the view taken by Gauhati High Court and hold that the word evidence appearing in this provision would have the same meaning as appearing in Sections 169 and 179, Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) EVEN otherwise this Court finds no justification for finding any fault with the order of the learned Magistrate. In Raghubans Dubeys case (Supra) the report was lodged against 15 persons including the petitioner but the charge-sheet submitted by the police did not include all of them. The Magistrate noticed that Raghubans Dubey was not only mentioned in F. I. R. but also named by five witnesses in their statements recorded U/s 161, Cr. P. C. He, therefore summoned the said Raghubans Dubey as an accused to stand trial alongwith others. This order was challenged in the High Court but was held valid. (See Raghunath Dubey v. State of Bihar. Thereafter the matter was taken to the Supreme Court where it was held as under: In our opinion, once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence. (Para 9) This case arose under the old code but was followed in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna and Hareram v. Tikaram. In Harerams case (Supra) the Supreme Court held that the point is no longer resintegra. With reference to the facts of the case, the Court held that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and from perusal of the record he appears to be satisfied himself that there were prima facie grounds for issuing process against others not joined as accused. In so doing the Magistrate did not exceed the power vested him under law. Under the circumstances, there is enough authority for the proposition that ge Magistrate while issuing process to a person not already an accused, does not exceed his authority or jurisdiction provided: he finds a prima facie case existing against him. In the instant case, there is no challenge to the Magistrate's view about the existence of prima facie case. Since putting a person to trial is the important object of Criminal Law and the said object would be frustrated if such a person is not so pur on trial, summoning such a person should be held to be in the interest of justice. There is, therefore, no scope of any interference with the said order in exercise of power U/s 482, Cr; P. C. The said power, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicants, is to be sparingly used and only under compelling circumstance. These basic requirements being absent, the application fails and is dismissed.-Petition dismissed .