Judgment :- Arunachalam, J. This petition is for the issue of writ of habeas corpus to quash the order of detention made by the respondent in G.O.No.S.R.I/336 -586 of Public (S.C.) Department, dated 12.6.1986 and for production of the petitioner, who is the detenu before this Court and for setting him at liberty. The petitioner is confined in Central Prison at Madras. 2. The detenu has been detained by the respondent by virtue of the powers conferred under Sec.3 (1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974), hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods. 3. The brief facts which led to the detention can be summarised as follows: On 24.10.1985, the detenu, holder of Indian Passport, arrived at Madras International Airport from Abudhabi with luggage comprising of one maroon colour prince suit case and one small green coloured zip hand bag. The detenu orally declared at the customs counter that the luggage contained goods worth Rs.2,450 and sought clearance. On suspicion, the luggage of the detenu was searched, after the detenu denied possession of any gold concealed in the luggage. Soon after the suit case were emptied, the bottom portion was found to be unusually heavy. The yellow coloured lining cloth was removed and a brown coloured paper was found affixed to the bottom of the suit case. On removal of the brown coloured paper, one yellow coloured card board sheet was found attached to the bottom of the suit case. On removal 36 numbers of black coloured adhesive tape packs were found, which on scrutiny, contained 36 gold bars weighing 10 tolas each and three small gold pieces, weighing totally. 15 grams. The gold was recovered. The detenu had no valid permit to import gold into India. 4. On 25.10.1985 the detenu made a voluntary statement before the customs officer, wherein, among other things, he confessed have committed the offence for monetary consideration. The details of the confession form part of the ground of detention and, therefore, need to extraction, in this order. The residential premises of the detenu was searched; but nothing incriminating was seized. The statement of Abdus Salam was also recorded by the Customs Authorities on the statement made by the detenu. The detenu was arrested and later remanded to judicial custody. The residential premises of the detenu was searched; but nothing incriminating was seized. The statement of Abdus Salam was also recorded by the Customs Authorities on the statement made by the detenu. The detenu was arrested and later remanded to judicial custody. Later the detenu was enlarged on bail. 5. The detaining authority, on being satisfied that further recourse to normal criminal law would not have desired effect of effectively preventing the detenu from indulging in smuggling activities, clamped the impugned order of detention, with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods. 6. In the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition, several grounds have been raised. But Mr.S.Shanmughavelayutham, the learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his arguments to grounds (c) and (d) viz.., the delay in passing the detention order, namely 8 months after the alleged criminal activity and the extraordinary delay in effecting the arrest of the writ petitioner. 7. We have already noticed that the occurrence took place on 24.10.1985. The order of detention was made on 12.6.1986. The seizure of the gold was made on the date of occurrence and on the next day the confessional statement of the detenu has been recorded. The house search of the detenu was also made on 25.10.1985. On the question of delay, we have elaborately considered this often raised the question in W.P.Nos.15653, 15661 and 16041 of 1988. It may be relevant to refer the dictum of the Supreme Court in T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others, (1989)3 S.C.C. 444, wherein it was observed as follows: “..the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.” 8. With regard to delay in the arrest of the detenu, it was brought to our notice that though the order of detention was passed on 12.6.1986, the detenu was arrested on 6.1.1989 of his surrender before the Collector of Customs, Madras, on seeing an advertisement in a Malayalam daily. According to the learned counsel, the detenu was not absconding since he had been prosecuting through counsel the adjudication proceedings and further the sponsoring authority had not declared him as an absconding accused and effectively proceeded under Sec.7 of the Act. It was further submitted that the respondent or the sponsoring authority did not make a report in writing of the factum of absconding of the accused to a Metropolitan Magistrate and obtain a warrant for his arrest and for attachment of his property. It is also contended that Sec.7(1)(b) of the Act was also not followed. Therefore, the long and explained delay of 2 1/2 years in executing the order of detention was contended to be sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. 9. Thelearned Government Advocate Thiru G.Krishnamurthy, submitted that grounds (c) and (d) have been countered in Paras 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary to Government. In para 6 which relates to the delay in passing of the order of detention, the transmission of the file from one Department to another Department is detailed to justify the absence of avoidable delay in passing of order of detention. The proposal itself for detention had been made 4 months after the release on bail of the detenu. In respect of the delay in apprehending the detenu, it is stated in para 7 that several reminders from 13.8.1986 to 11.2.1988 were sent to them, till about 1987. It is also stated that the whereabouts of the detenu was not known inspite of the visit of the Assistant Collector of Customs to the Village of the detenu in October, 1987. Inspite of these details, no explanation has been offered as to why the notification under Sec.7(1)(b) of the Act was issued only on 28.3.1988 and why no steps were taken under Sec.7(1)(b) of the Act. The publication in the dailies was made in December, 1988, and soon thereafter the detenu has surrendered. The averment in the counter that there is no delay in execution of the detention order appears to be contrary to facts. The publication in the dailies was made in December, 1988, and soon thereafter the detenu has surrendered. The averment in the counter that there is no delay in execution of the detention order appears to be contrary to facts. The law is clear that the burden is on the detaining authority to explain the delay in the arrest of the accused and a casual and vague explanation will not satisfy the constitutional requirement. The detaining authority has also not taken note of crime and the impugned order, while passing the orders of detention. 10. Regarding the delay between the commission of offence and the impugned order of detention, though there is substantial force, in the argument advances, we need not have to consider it in detail in view of our intended decisions on the next aspect regarding the long delay in the arrest of the detenu. 11. On the question of delay in the arrest of the detenu, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Kantha Bai v. K.K.Dwivedi, Joint Secretary to Government of India, etc., 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 47, can be usefully extracted: “The submission of Mr.Veeraraghavan, explaining as to why no action under Sec.7(1)(a) has been taken is beside of the point, because it is the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to explain satisfactorily as to why such a delay had occasioned and what were the actions primarily taken by the detaining authority to secure the detenu. The other argument, that because the petitioner has not raised any contention on the basis of Sec.7 (1)(a), the respondent has not given any reply on this point, is misconceived, since whether discretionary action under Sec.7(1)(a) was taken or not, the respondent cannot shirk its obligation of satisfying the Court about the reasons for the delay, which in this case, as we have repeatedly pointed out, runs for period of one year and eleven months. The action taken under Sec.7(1)(b) is not a sufficient step for explanation of the delay. Further, in the counter affidavit, no such explanation for not taking any action under Sec.7(1)(a) is mentioned, and the counter also does not speak of the action taken under Sec.7(1)(b).” 12. The action taken under Sec.7(1)(b) is not a sufficient step for explanation of the delay. Further, in the counter affidavit, no such explanation for not taking any action under Sec.7(1)(a) is mentioned, and the counter also does not speak of the action taken under Sec.7(1)(b).” 12. It is settled law that when there is an unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest of the detenu, such delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and that it will be a legitimate inference to draw that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu. We find on facts that the respondent has not come forward with the details regarding steps taken under Sec.7(1)(a) of the Act and regarding the extraordinary belated action under Sec.7(1)(b) of the Act. 13. We arenot at all satisfied that the detaining authority has applied his mind to arrive at a real and genuine subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. There must be a live and proximate tie between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention. In this case we have to hold that such a link has been snapped due to the long and unexplained delay between the date of order detention and the date of effecting the arrest of the detenu. We hasten to make it clear that where such a delay is adequately explained and is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, it cannot be stated that such a link has been snapped. 14. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned order of detention is set aside and the detenu is directed to be set at liberty, unless required in any other case.