JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendants appeal from the order of Sri Prakash Chandra, Special Judge, Mathura, dated 3-5-1988 whereby interim injunction granted to the plaintiff on 21-10-1987 has been confirmed. 2. Necessary facts for consideration in this appeal is to the effect that plaintiff got interim injunction confirmed on 3-5-1988. Thereafter the plaintiffs suit was dismissed on 5-7-1988. It appears that the aforesaid suit was restored to its original number on 7-9-1988. 3. In view of the above mentioned facts, defendant-appellant suggests that the appeal has become in fructuous and it should be dismissed as such. But it should be specifically indicated in the order that the injunction order passed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party does not subsist any longer. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant should not be accepted and some time may be granted to the contesting opposite party to ascertain the truth mentioned in the rejoinder-affidavit. The defendant-appellant in rejoinder has stressed that the counter-affidavit had been served upon the counsel for the contesting opposite party long long back, therefore, no further time should be granted to the contesting opposite party and the first appeal from order should be decided as the appellant has to come time without number to attend the case. 5. During the course of arguments my attention has been drawn to the ruling of this Court reported in AIR 1973 All 67 Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux. In the aforesaid case the majority opinion expressed in para 8 is to the following effect... "that most of the High Courts are of the opinion that an attachment before judgment ceases after the dismissal of the suit even though no express order is passed. According to the majority view an attachment would terminate no sooner the suit is dismissed by the trial Court. The view of this Court throughout has been that an attachment before judgment ceases of the dismissal of the suit. According to the majority view an attachment would terminate no sooner the suit is dismissed by the trial Court. The view of this Court throughout has been that an attachment before judgment ceases of the dismissal of the suit. In AIR 1970 All 264, Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow v. Ved Prakash, a learned Single Judge of this Court has also observed in para 4 of his judgment as below : "It has, thus, been a consistent view of this Court that an interlocutory order like an order passed on an application for temporary injunction or for attachment before judgment would cease on the dismissal of the suit and would not automatically be revived nor can be deemed to be in force without any further order by the court after the suit is dismissed. It is always open to the plaintiff to move the court if the suit which has been dismissed for default is restored, to grant temporary injunction. But the earlier interim injunction order which had ceased to be operative on the dismissal of the suit for default, would not automatically revive on the setting aside of the dismissal order and the restoration of the suit." In Civil Revision No. 421 of 1984, decided on 25-1-1985, Karam Ilahi and others v. Narendra Kumar Jain and others, another learned Single Judge of this Court has indicated as below vide para 4 : "It clearly mean that the law as laid down by this Court, has consistently j been that an interlocutory or ancillary order is not revived by the restoration of a suit which had been earlier dismissed for default. For a revival of the interlocutory or ancillary order, a specific order has to be obtained from the court. There is no distinction except regarding the consequences, between an order of injunction, order of attachment before judgment and order of stay of the proceedings." 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted before me that the High Court of Mysore in Shivaraya and others v. Sharnappu and others, AIR 1968 Mys 283 has observed that in similar circumstances ancillary orders passed in the suit get revived when the suit is restored to its original number. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted before me that the High Court of Mysore in Shivaraya and others v. Sharnappu and others, AIR 1968 Mys 283 has observed that in similar circumstances ancillary orders passed in the suit get revived when the suit is restored to its original number. In Nandipati Rami Reddi and others v. Nandipali Padma Reddy and others, AIR 1978 AP 30 , a Division Bench of that court has indicated as below vide paras 7 and 8 of the judgment : "Once the order of dismissal is set aside the plaintiff must be restored to the position in which she was situated when the court dismissed the suit for default. Therefore, it follows that the interlocutory orders, which had been passed before the order of dismissal, would also be revived along with the suit when the order of dismissal has been set aside and the suit has been restored," In Ranjit Singh v. Dr. Sarda Ranjan Prasad Sinha, AIR 1981 Pat 102 , a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court has observed as below in para 4 of his judgment: "It is well settled that on the restoration of a suit dismissed for default, all ancillary orders passed therein also revive. Reference may be made to the Division Bench decision of our court in Bankim Chandra v. Chandi Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 271 where several decisions of other High Courts were considered." 7. After weighing the contention raised on behalf of the appellant and the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent in this appeal, I think that the view of other High Courts support the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party. Whereas the views of this Court support the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant. 1 am bound by the decisions of this Court, therefore, I accept the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant. In the facts and circumstances of this case as mentioned above, the impugned order of the Special Judge, Mathura, dated 3-5-1988 does not subsist as the suit had been dismissed on 5-7-1938. However, if the plaintiff-respondent succeeds in getting fresh injunction order, the appellant will have his own remedy against that order In the facts and circumstances of this case I accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that this appeal has become in fructuous. However, if the plaintiff-respondent succeeds in getting fresh injunction order, the appellant will have his own remedy against that order In the facts and circumstances of this case I accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that this appeal has become in fructuous. It is note-worthy that unusual stand has been taken by the opposite-party appellant in this case and the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to revise the contention on the basis of the decisions of the other High Courts. 8. In the result, I indicate that the injunction order issued in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and confirmed through the impugned order, dated 3-5-1988 does not subsist any longer in accordance with the views of this Court mentioned supra. 9. During the course of argument, the defendant-appellant has pressed his application, dated 1-2-1989 whereby he has prayed for framing issues in the case and then referring the suit for trial to the District Judge, Mathura. It has been emphasised that the Special Judge, Mathura is not proceeding fairly, therefore, the case should be transferred to the District Judge, Mathura. Similar allegations were made by the appellant against the Civil Judge, Mathura. A learned Single Judge of this Court on 21-3-1988 acceded to his request by observing that the suit pending before the Civil Judge, Mathura shall stand with drawn from his file and taken on the file of the District Judge, Mathura who will either dispose of the injunction application himself or transfer the suit to one of the Additional District Judges for disposing of the injunction matter within a period of three weeks in accordance with law. 10. After the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court on 21-3-1988, the injunction application has been disposed of by the Special Judge, Mathura through the impugned judgment, dated 3-5-1988. Now the suggestion of the appellant that a specific direction be made to the effect that the District Judge, Mathura himself may decide the case does not appear to me as proper but 1 leave this question to the discretion of the District Judge, Mathura or even to the discretion of the Special Judge, Mathura to grant the relief if the equity and justice warrants the prayer made by the appellant. 11. For the foregoing discussion, this appeal is dismissed as in fructuous. 11. For the foregoing discussion, this appeal is dismissed as in fructuous. It is made clear that the injunction order passed by the Civil Judge, Mathura on 21-10-1987 and confirmed by the Special Judge, Mathura through his impugned judgment, dated 3-5-1988 does not subsist any longer in view of the decided case of this Court. Parties are directed to bear their ow n costs.