A. K. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE suit out of which the second appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff-respondent for a partition of her 1/3rd share of the suit property and the short legal question, we are called upon to answer in this second appeal, is whether the alleged possession of a transferee from a co-owner of the whole property is adverse to the other co-owner. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY, the disputed property measuring 4. 70 acres of land originally belonged to one Mainuddin who died leaving behind a son named. Sk. Abdul Mansur and a daughter, the plaintiff Allarakhi Bibi each inheriting 2/3rd and 1/3rd share respectively in such property. According to the plaintiff, while they were in joint possession of such property, her brother Sk. Abdul Mansur sold his 2/3rd share of such property to one Sk. Moula Bux on 9. 9. 43 by a registered sale deed. Again by another sale deed dated on 6,11. 50, the said Moula Bux and Abdul Mansur acting as the guardian of his minor sister, the plaintiff sold the entire interest in such property to the defendant. The plaintiff being a minor was completely unaware about such illegal and unauthorised sale by her brother and claimed to be in joint possession of such property with the defendant according to their respective shares. Afterwards, such joint possession having been found to be in convenient and difficult, the plaintiff asked for partition and the same having been refused plaint filed the present suit for partition of her 1/3rd share by metes and bounds. Defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff had inherited 1/3rd share in such property from her father but claimed to have purchased such property and to be in possession of the same since such purchase in 1950 openly and adversely to the interest of the defendant. It was not seriously disputed by the defendant before both the courts below that Abdul Mansur, the brother of the plaintiff could neither act, nor transfer any valid interest in such property by a sale deed the share of his sister during the minority of the plaintiff. In other words, it was not seriously disputed that under the Mohammedan Law, Abdul Mansur as the brother could not be a legal guardian of his minor sister and the said transfer by him during such minority of his sister was a void transaction. In other words, it was not seriously disputed that under the Mohammedan Law, Abdul Mansur as the brother could not be a legal guardian of his minor sister and the said transfer by him during such minority of his sister was a void transaction. The defendant thereby claimed to have acquired valid title to such 1'/3rd share of the plaintiff in the suit property by adverse, possession. ( 3 ) BOTH the courts below overruled such plea of defendant of acquisition of title by adverse possession, on a finding that the defendant's possession of the suit property must be deemed to be the possession on behalf of the plaintiff as well, a co-sharer or tenant in common, unless there is a clear case of ouster. Both. The courts below allowed the plaintiff's claim on further that defendant neither pleaded in his written statement nor proved such case of ouster and consequent extinguishment of plaintiff's title by such ouster. ( 4 ) THE contention of Shri Bhaskar Ghosh, the learned Advocate appearing for the defendant-appellant before this Court is that even if it is conceded that no valid title in respect of plaintiff's 1/3rd share passed by virtue of the sale deed executed by the brother of the plaintiff, in favour of the defendant, in 1950, the exclusive possession of the defendant in the entire suit property since then for such a considerable length of time as borne out by overwhelming documentary evidence on record, is inconsistent with the title set up by plaintiff and the court is entitled to draw an inference that there was ouster from the property claimed by the plaintiff. While elaborating his contention in this regard the learned counsel has argued that the. principle of possession between the co-owners is that every co-owner is a tenant in common and that the possession of a tenant in common is not adverse to his co-tenant and a person cannot be a co-tenant with another person whom he has never recognised as a co-tenant. It has been further urged that the defendant never recognised the plaintiff as a co-tenant and that his exclusive possession of the entire property for a considerable period of time on payment of rent as borne out also by the record of rights is enough to entitle the Court to deduce from it that there was ouster of the plaintiff from the suit property. Reference has been made in this connection to a catena of decisions reported in AIR 1931 Madras, page 22; AIR 1949 Allahabad, page 699; AIR 1947 Patina, page 380; AIR 1928-Calcutta, page 396; 39 CWN page 159; AIR 1960 Kerala, page 27 ( 5 ) ONCE the position is conceded that no valid title passed by the sale deed of 1950 in respect of plaintiff's 1/3rd share of the suit property, it becomes unassailable that she remains a co-sharer or a tenant in common in respect of such property unless the same is extinguished by a case of ouster or possession of the defendant adverse to her interest. Every case between co-owners with regard to the question of adverse possession must be decided on the particular facts of that case. ( 6 ) THE principle underlying the rule of adverse possession as between the co-owners has stated by Lord Buck Master in Hardit Singh vs Gurumukh Singh reported in AIR 1918 Privy Council in these terms: - ( 7 ) "uninterrupted possession of such joint property, without more, must be referred to the lawful title possessed by the joint holder to use the joint estate, and cannot be regarded as an assertion of a right to hold it as separate, so as to assert an adverse claim against other interested members. If possession may be either lawful or unlawful, in the absence of evidence, it must be assumed to be the former. " ( 8 ) THEN again adverse possession as between strangers has, only to be in the language of the Privy Council in Radharani Devi vs. Collector of Khulna, ILR 27 Cal. page 943, "adequate in, continuity, in publicity and the extent, to show that it is adverse to the competitor, it is sufficient that such possession was overt, and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time was running, ought, if he exercised due diligence (vigilance), to be aware of what was happening. ( 9 ) THE question is whether the possession of a transferee from one co-owner is adverse to the other co-owner or owners from the moment of taking possession. ( 9 ) THE question is whether the possession of a transferee from one co-owner is adverse to the other co-owner or owners from the moment of taking possession. This has been answered in the affirmative in the Full Bench decision reported in ILR 23 Bombay, page 137 (Bhabrao vs Rakhmin) and also in the Full Bench Madras decision reported in AIR 1942 Madras, page 622, (Palamia Pillai vs. Amjath Ibrahim Shred Rowther ). The aforesaid Madras Full Bench decision followed earlier cases of the same court including the decision reported in AIR 1931 Madras, page 22, holding that the possession of the transferee of a property from one co-owner is adverse to the other co-owner from the moment of taking possession. The ratio of the Catena of the decisions cited above is the same as stated above. In other words, it has been held that the sole possession of a transferee of a property from one co-owner by virtue of a transfer or otherwise must be treated for this purpose as really the possession of a stranger to the other co-owner. Having carefully gone through the decisions as referred to above, it may be said that such principle as enunciated therein are not strictly speaking applicable to the facts of the instant case. Unlike in the decisions relied upon there was no case of valid transfer in the instant case. The fact remains therefore that the plaintiff continued to remain as a co-sharer of the defendant in respect of the suit property. It is an admitted case of the defendant that P. W. 2 Abdul Gaffur is the Bargadar in respect of the disputed land and the defendant has claimed possession through such Bargadar. P. W. 2 Abdul Gaffur has however, supported the case of the plaintiff stating that she is in the possession of the suit land by realising share of the produce of such land. In view of this clear and categorical evidence of the man in actual cultivation of such land, no such reference can be drawn that the plaint is not in possession of such land for less, a case of ouster of plaintiff from such land. In view of this clear and categorical evidence of the man in actual cultivation of such land, no such reference can be drawn that the plaint is not in possession of such land for less, a case of ouster of plaintiff from such land. So, unlike the cases reported above and relied upon by the defendant-appellant, this is not a case of acquisition of valid title by transfer by a transferee from a co-owner or of setting up of a better title inconsistent with the title set up by the plaintiff. Nor it is a case of sole possession as in the case reported in AIR 1960 Kerala, page 27, by a person who is not infact a co-owner but who has obtained possession of the whole property from one who was a co-owner by virtue of a transfer or otherwise. Had the defendant been able to prove his exclusive and sole possession with regard to the suit property he might be treated to be stranger to the plaintiff and his uninterrupted possession adequate in continuity and publicity and extent might be considered to be adverse to that of the plaintiff but the facts on record dispute the same. So the defendant cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be either a purchaser or stranger having possession adverse to that of the plaintiff. ( 10 ) SO, it is not a case of constructive possession by one tenant in common through another but of actual physical possession through one's-agent or Bargadar which was overlooked by the courts below. The reference by the learned counsel for the appellant to the decision reported in AIR 1977, S. C. page 7 showing that possession of a trespasser, by no stretch of imagination, can be deemed to be the possession of the owner is not at all helpful or applicable to the facts of this case. ( 11 ) FURTHER reference by the learned counsel for the appellant to the statement of the plaint that there had been partition of the suit property by metes and bounds between her and her brother is of no consequence, inasmuch as, it is not the case of any party that there had been partition of such property by metes and bounds. Moreover, plaintiff admittedly was a minor when the suit property was sold and there cannot be any question of such partition which has also been belied by other facts and circumstances of this case and contention of the plaintiff that she remained a cosharer with the defendant even inspite of the disputed male in favour of the defendant. ( 12 ) MR. Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the appellant has lastly assailed the judgement of the court below for its failure to examine and consider the entire relevant evidence on record particularly on the point of alleged possession of the entire suit property as evidenced by the rent receipts showing payment of rent and the entry in the record of rights and there-by committing an error having direct bearing on the disputed issue of adverse possession. Reliance has been placed in this connection upon the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1988 S. C. page 858. In view of our finding that the plaintiff is in actual possession of such property through P. W. 2 Abdul Gaffur an admitted Bargadar, no amount of documentary evidence as produced by the defendant can tilt the scale in favour of the defendant. ( 13 ) THE result is the appeal fails. The judgment and decree of the court below are hereby affirmed. L. M. Ghosh, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.