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1989 DIGILAW 475 (MP)

PUSHPA ALIAS HEMPUSHPA v. PRADUMAN KUMAR OJHA

1989-12-05

R.C.LAHOTI

body1989
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE trial Court has passed a decree of judicial separation between the parties, a Hindu spouse. The wife has come up in appeal. However, the office reports that the appeal is barred by time as having been filed beyond 48 days of the period prescribed. ( 2. ) AN application under Section 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal has been filed along with the appeal memo. It is stated that the appellant, resident of a village and less educated, ignorant of law, was advised by her local counsel that the prescribed period of limitation for filing an appeal to the High Court against the impugned decree was 90 days. She acted on the legal advice. She contacted the counsel at Gwalior within the suggested period of limitation. She was told that the period of limitation was 30 and not 90 days and hence the appeal was barred by limitation. The appellant in her application, duly supported by an affidavit, contends that the legal advice bona fide acted upon by her, though given by a counsel mistaken and misinformed about the correct provision as to limitation applicable to such cases, should not come in her way of seeking justice from this Court. The fact stated in the application have been controverted by the respondent but without filing a counter affidavit. On behalf of the appellant, affidavit of her trial Court counsel has been filed. The counsel candidly admits his ignorance by explaining that he had put in only a brief tenure of practice which contributed to the misadventure. ( 3. ) THE short question arising is whether in the facts and circumstances the delay in preferring the appeal deserves to be condoned as based on sufficient cause. ( 4. ) ORDINARILY, the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing an appeal to the High Court as against a decree of District Court is 90 days. Section 28 (4) of the Hindu Marriage Act prescribes a shorter period of Limitation for filing an appeal against a decree or order under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. ( 4. ) ORDINARILY, the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing an appeal to the High Court as against a decree of District Court is 90 days. Section 28 (4) of the Hindu Marriage Act prescribes a shorter period of Limitation for filing an appeal against a decree or order under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It is well known that the litigants while managing their litigation depend mostly on the legal advice and although ignorance of law is no excuse for breaking it, the fact remains that the litigants rarely know the niceties of procedural law specially a technical law like, that of limitation. It sounds natural that the appellant chose to act on the advice of her counsel that the period of limitation for her was 90 days. ( 5. ) IN G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 , their Lordships emphasised the necessity of the expression sufficient cause in Section 5, Limitation Act receiving liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and also of generally condoning delays in preferring appeals in the interest of justice unless "gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides" was imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay; though their Lordships also observed that "mistake of counsel could not be used as general saving by a party to the litigation". ( 6. ) IN Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , their Lordships warned that refusing condonation of delay could result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the threshold resulting in cause of justice being defeated, and called upon the judiciary to guard against the technicalities, emphasising substantial justice to be preferred to technical considerations. ( 7. ) IN Concord of India Ins. Co. v. Nirmala Devi, AIR 1979 SC 1666 , a company relied on the legal advice which was mistaken on account of miscalculation as to period of limitation. Extending the benefit under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, their Lordships observed: -" a company relies on its legal adviser and the Managers expertise is in company management and not in law. There is no particular reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel. There is no particular reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel. Of course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is incomprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be vulnerable". Their Lordships approved the view taken by Kerala High Court in AIR 1971 Kerala 211 to the following effect:- "the law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or as merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation. " ( 8. ) IN the opinion of this Court, there was neither negligence, nor deliberate or gross inaction nor lack of bona fides on the part of either the appellant or her counsel. None would gain by permitting the appeal to be barred by time. It does not appear to be a case where the appellant is fishing about a cause to act as sufficient for seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. A trial Court lawyer, with not-so-long standing at the Bar, overlooking a special period of limitation prescribed by an Act and going by the popular belief as to the period of limitation being 90 days for preferring an appeal to the High Court, though found to be mistaken cannot be said to have been so negligent or deliberately or grossly inactive or lacking in bona fides so as to deprive his client of entry to the superior Court at its very threshold, the door being shut out on her face in the name of time-barred appeal. So also, the appellant bona fide acting on the advice of her trial Court lawyer cannot be said to be negligent, inactive or lacking in bona fides. So also, the appellant bona fide acting on the advice of her trial Court lawyer cannot be said to be negligent, inactive or lacking in bona fides. There is no reason to disbelieve the affidavits of the appellant and her counsel. ( 9. ) ACCORDINGLY, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned.