Judgment :- Radhakrishna Menon, J. 1. The second respondent in O.P.(M.V.) 584/80 of M.A.C.T. Trivandrum, is the appellant. 2. The predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 and 2, a doctor by profession, while proceeding to Amboori along the Perumkadavila-Ottasekharamangalam public road on his motor cycle on 22-10-1979 was knocked down by the bus owned by the appellant and sustained multiple injuries. He was hospitalised for sometime. As a result of the accident he was completely disabled from practicing his profession. Alleging that the accident was occasioned due to the negligence of the bus driver, he filed the petition for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs as compensation from the appellant and its driver. The appellant filed a written statement wherein he, inter alia contended that the accident was due to the negligence of the claimant himself, that no negligence can be attributed to the bus driver and that the claim in any event, is excessive. 3. The Tribunal after considering the various aspects of the competing contentions, has found that the case of negligence against both drivers stands established and accordingly distributed the loss between them in the proportion made mention of in the judgment. The said finding reads: "Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, it has to be held that for the accident the bus driver contributed 25% negligence and the original petitioner who was riding his motor cycle contributed 75% negligence". The Tribunal accordingly fixed the compensation amount, the claimants are entitled to get, at Rs.50,000/-. It is this award that is under challenge in this appeal. 4. That the appellant is only vicariously liable, is beyond challenge. Without proof of negligence on the part of the driver of the appellant, no compensation making the appellant liable, therefore could be awarded. A reference in this connection to the well established principle namely, 'the concept of vicarious liability without any negligence is opposed to the basic principles of law' is profitable. (See the decision in Minu B. Mehta v. Balakrishna Ramchandra Nayan,1977 ACJ.1218). This principle therefore shall be kept in view while considering the competing contentions of the parties involved in this appeal. 5. The question thus arising for consideration is whether the driver of the appellant alone was negligent or could the victim also be said to have contributed to the causation. This principle therefore shall be kept in view while considering the competing contentions of the parties involved in this appeal. 5. The question thus arising for consideration is whether the driver of the appellant alone was negligent or could the victim also be said to have contributed to the causation. To get at the answer to this question, we have to consider the evidence adduced in the case. It has come out in evidence that the motor cycle, the respondent was riding, went to the wrong side and hit at the left side headlight of the bus. That means, the respondent has contributed to the causation. Has the driver of the appellant also contributed for the causation is the further aspect that requires to be considered. A reference in this connection to the evidence of the driver as DW1 is relevant The driver has deposed that immediately after he negotiated the curve saw the motor cycle coming from the opposite direction at a distance of 150 feet. That the bus was negotiating an upgradient and it was not being driven at a high speed has been found by the court below. That means, the driver who saw the motor cycle at a distance of 150 feet, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 contends, could have averted the accident by using ordinary care which is expected of any driver. The driver must therefore be made solely liable for the accident. 6. "The rule of last opportunity' introduced by judicial pronouncements to the Law of Torts requires to be considered in this context. What then is this doctrine? This a well recognised rule of law applicable over the whole Meld of contributory negligence. Applying this principle the sole liability can be imputed to one party even though there was a prima facie case of negligence against both parties. Fastening the liability solely on one in a case of contributory negligence, applying this principle, however is difficult in modern times because it is rather difficult to draw a clear line between the faults (of the parties) which form part of the dispute that crops up as a result of collision between two fast moving vehicles. Fastening the liability solely on one in a case of contributory negligence, applying this principle, however is difficult in modern times because it is rather difficult to draw a clear line between the faults (of the parties) which form part of the dispute that crops up as a result of collision between two fast moving vehicles. But in a case where it is possible to find 'a sufficient separation of time, place or circumstance' to enable 'a clear line to be drawn' between the faults of the two parties', the sole liability can be imputed to one party. This rule, provided the above requirements are satisfied, is a sound rule although it does no longer exists in the country of its origin, England. It is pertinent in the context to note the observation of Lord Ellen borough C.J. (See Butterfield v. Forrester -(1809) 11 East 60) namely 'one person being at fault does not dispense with another using ordinary care of himself. (See also Rehana v. Ahmedabad Munpl. T. Service, A.I.R. 1976 Guj. 37). It should in this connection, be remembered that in a case where negligence can be attributed to both parties, the normal rule is that the loss shall be distributed between the parties in some proportion taking into account the probative value of the evidence adduced in the case. 'The rule of last opportunity' however, would enable a victim to recover the full compensation notwithstanding the charge of contributory negligence against him. 7. Coming to the facts of the case: It can be said that the driver of the bus could have averted the accident. But the evidence available on record would show that contributory negligence could be attributed to the victim also. If that be the case the sole liability cannot be imputed to the driver of the bus. This therefore is a case where loss requires to be distributed between the parties in some proportion. Now the further question that arises for consideration is, is the decision of the court below that the bus driver contributed 25% negligence and the claimant contributed 75 % negligence is liable to be varied. The above finding cannot be said to be perverse. The claimant who was examined as PW.2 has conceded that his cycle hit against the left headlight of the bus. This can happen only if the claimant has been driving the vehicle on the wrong side. The above finding cannot be said to be perverse. The claimant who was examined as PW.2 has conceded that his cycle hit against the left headlight of the bus. This can happen only if the claimant has been driving the vehicle on the wrong side. It is also relevant in this context to note yet another admission discernible from the evidence that the bus was negotiating upgradient at a slow speed. In these circumstances, we do not find our way to interfere with the said findings. 8. There is therefore little scope to interfere with the judgment under attack. The appeal fails. Accordingly the same is dismissed. For the reasons stated in this judgment, we are of the view that the cross appeal also should foil Accordingly the cross appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.