ORDER The petitioner which is a deity represented by two Shbaits moved this writ application for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect or further effect to the impugned Barga recording in favour of respondent nos. 7 to 14 pursuant to notification dated 12th May, 1981 and 20th July, 1980 and for other reliefs. 2. The petitioner's Case is that without serving any notice or giving any opportunity to the petitioner, the name of the respondent nos. 7 to 14 were recorded as Bargadars in respect of the lands which were under the personal cultivation of the petitioners and in respect whereof the petitioners were in kilos possession or in other word" according to the petitioner there was no bargadar in respect of the land in question but the name of the respondent nos. 7 to 14 had been recorded as bargadurs surreptitiously. 3. The case of the State respondents from their affidavit-in opposition is that the names of the respondent nos. 7 to 14 as bargadar were recorded during Khanapuri-Bhujarat Stage which was started on 15.12.1980 and completed on 24.1.81 and that general notices for the same were duly served and issue of notice individually did not arise as per rules 22 and 23 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules and s. 51 or the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The respondent nos. 7 to 13 also filed an affidavit in which it was stated that "under the Settlement Operation under s. 51 read with Schedule 'A' read with Rule 23 to 27 the names of these respondents have been recorded as bargadar in Khanapuri Bhujarat Stage in respect of the land in Dean - chak mouza and attestation was completed from 26th August, 1981 to 17th September, 1981 and accordingly the attested parcha was delivered to both the owners, raiyats and to the bargadars, the present respondents. Such recording took place after holding local enquiry by the Revenue Officer as per provisions of law". 4. In the supplementary affidavit, it was stated that some of the private respondents whose name, were recorded as bargadars filed application under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 1980 claiming to be the bargadar in the said land on the basis of some false documents and that during the pendency of those criminal cases, the respondent nos. 7 to 14 had set up their false claim as bargadarship in respect of the land in question and collusively got their names recorded in the Record-of Rights and that in the said proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the police authorities on enquiry submitted a report on the petition of Sri Kanai Dalapati, respondent no. 7 which was filed against Smt. Matangini Jana, one of the sebaits of the petitioner deny. The said report was submitted by Circle Inspector L. R. Circle Office to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 5. It would not be out of place to set out the contents of the said police report which were as follows ; "In obedience to your order communicated in your memo under reference I beg to state that I held local enquiry into the matter on 18.7.80, on proper notice in presence of the partied. Many local people including Gram Panchayat member were also present at the time of enquiry. It reveals on enquiry that the agricultural land measuring 0.40 decl in plot no. 197/544' under kha no. 5/1/5 in mouza Gangadharchawk was under the peaceful possession and cultivation or the owners i.e. the o. p. nos. 2 and 3 upto the year 1385 B. S. for about last 15/16 years. Prior to that the recorded bargadar Sri Bharat Ch. Mishra cultivated the same. Sri Mishra relinquished the possession in favour of the owners and he has been residing permanently in mouza Nachindra. But the petitioner wiil1 the help of local Krishak Samity forcibly cultivated the aforesaid land in the year 1386 B. S. The opposite party no. 1 is the owner of the lands in plot nos. 547, 546 and 527 in mouza Gangacharchak. She had been possessing and cultivating the same with the help of her sons i.e. opposite party no. 2 and 3 up to the year 1385 B S. peacefully. But the petitioner with the help of local Krishak Samity forcibly cultivated the agricultural land in plot no. 546 and Dho a land in plot no. 527 total measuring 0.10 dec. in the year 1386 B. S. and grown paddy. The plot no. 547 is a doba land. The petitioner with the help of local Krishak Samity has been trying to cultivate the same forcibly this year also and as such a serious breach of peace is apprehended. 546 and Dho a land in plot no. 527 total measuring 0.10 dec. in the year 1386 B. S. and grown paddy. The plot no. 547 is a doba land. The petitioner with the help of local Krishak Samity has been trying to cultivate the same forcibly this year also and as such a serious breach of peace is apprehended. In view of the above facts, the proceedings (next page begins) under s. 144 Cr. P.c. may be started against the petitioner instead of the opposite party members as prayed for immediately". 6. From the said report it appears that the Chief Inspector Land Reforms Circle Office had stated that the proceeding was started by the respondent no.7 against the sebaits wrongfully and on the contrary, the respondent no. 7 was guilty of trespassing into the land forcefully with the help of local krishak samity for which it was stated that the proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be started against the respondent no. 7. The petitioner's case is that in order to legalise the illegal and forceful possession the name of the respondent nos. 7 to 14 were recorded in the records of rights as - bargadar in collusion with the officers of the' State respondents. 7. On behalf of the petitioners it was submitted that under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and/or on the basis of decided case laws on this point, the petitioner was entitled to get a notice and/or hearing before anybody's name is recorded as bargadar in respect of land in question in which the petitioners were in actual and physical possession and were under personal cultivation. According to the respondents when such recording was made during Khanapuri Bhujarat stage, there was no question of giving any individual notice to the petitioners. So the admitted fact is that before recording the name of the respondent no. 7 to 14 no notice was given to the petitioner and the petitioner was not given any hearing. 8. According to the respondents when such recording was made during Khanapuri Bhujarat stage, there was no question of giving any individual notice to the petitioners. So the admitted fact is that before recording the name of the respondent no. 7 to 14 no notice was given to the petitioner and the petitioner was not given any hearing. 8. The main question that calls for consideration in this writ application is whether the name of a bargadar could be recorded in the Record of Rights during the preliminary record writing which is known as 'Khanapuri' and local expression which is known as 'Bhujarat' stage without giving any notice and/or hearing to the persons concerned under whom the right to cultivate as the bargadar barga was claimed in an omnibus and wholesale manner. 9 In order to decide this question it is necessary to refer some of the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and the rules framed there under Section 2(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act provides that "Bargadar" means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person and includes a person who under the system generally know as Kisani or by any other description cultivates the land of another person on condition of receiving a share of the produce of such land from that person; Explanation-A bargadar shall continue to be a bargadar until cultivation by him is lawfully terminated under this Act". 10. Chapter III of the said Act provides the rights and duties of the Bargadar, Bargadars are the actual tillers of the soil without any proprietary rights. These Burgadars cultivate the land under a system by sharing produce. Once a bargadar is introduced or inducted, the Bargadar alone gets exclusive right to cultivate the land by giving a share of produce of the land. The owner of the land had no right to termll1ate cultivation by a Bargadar except in accordance with the provisions made under the law. 11. Section 15(2) of the said Act provides that the right of cultivation of land by bargadar shall. subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be heritable and shall not be transferable. The owner of the land had no right to termll1ate cultivation by a Bargadar except in accordance with the provisions made under the law. 11. Section 15(2) of the said Act provides that the right of cultivation of land by bargadar shall. subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be heritable and shall not be transferable. This means, that the rights of a Bargadar to occupy and cultivate land docs not cease on the death of a Bargudar but such rights would pass on to his heirs but such rights could not be transferred by a bargadar. Section 15A of the said Act provides the continuation of right of cultivation on bargador's death. 12. Section 16 of the said Act provides the provisions for share produce to be given by a bargadar. Section 16A of the said Act provides the bargadar entitled to recover his share in certain cases from the rayars. 13. Section 17 of the said Act provides the provisions for termination of cl11tivation by bargadar. Section 18 of the said Act provides the power of the authorities to decide certain dispute between the bargadars and the raiyat concerned. Section 18(2) of the said Act provides that in deciding any dispute referred to in sub-so (1) of S. 18 or otherwise any question arises as to whether a person is a bargadar or not and to whom the share of produce is deliverable, such question shall be determined by the authority mentioned in sub-so (1). Section 19B of the said Act provides the provisions for restoration of land to 'Bargadur in case the bargadar has been forcefully dispossessed from such land by raiyat concerned. Section 20B of the said Act provides the provisions for surrender or abandonment of cultivation by hargadar. 14. Sub-section (4) of s. 8, 20B of the said Act providies that if such officer or authority determines that the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the cultivation of the land which was cultivated by him as such, the person whose land was being so cultivated shall not resume personal cultivation of such land but he may, with the permission of such officer or authority have the land cultivated by any person, referred to in s. 49 who is willing to cultivate the land as a bargadar. 15. 15. Section 21 of the said Act provides that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter mentioned in ss. 17, 18, 19B and 20B of the said Act and in any suit if any question arises whether a person is a bargadar or not, such question should not be decided by the civil court, but the Civil Court has to refer the matter to the Officer or authority mentioned in sub-s. (1) of s.18 of the said Act for its decision and whatever decision that would be given by such authority under s. 18, such decision would be binding upon the Civil Court and the Civil court has to decide the case on the basis of the determination made by an officer or authority under S. 18(1) of the said Act. 16. Section 50 of the said Act provides the provisions for maintenance of Record of Rights. Under this section the prescribed authority shall maintain uptodate in the prescribed manner the village record of rights by incorporation therein the changes on account of, inter alia, alteration in the mode of cultivation, for example, by a bargadar. Section 51 of the said Act provides the provisions for revision of preparation of the record of right. Section 51A of the said Act provides the provisions for draft and final publication of the record of rights. 17. Section 51A(4) of the said Act provides that an officer specially empowered by the State Government may on application within three years from the date of publication of the record of rights under sub-s.(2) of S.51A revise an entry in the record finally published in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (2) after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefore. 18. Section 51 B of the said Act provides that any Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may on an application or on his own motion, at any stage of revision or preparation of the record of rights under the said Chapter but before final publication of any such record of rights, revise or correct any entry in such record of rights after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording the reasons therefor. The scopes of an application under s. 51A (4) and 51B of the said Act are quite different. Section 51A(4) could be invoked for correction of the record of rights after the date of final publication of the record of rights within certain time and under s. 51B of the said Act the power of could be exercised by the record of rights but before final publication of any such record of rights. 19, Under the provisions of s. 51A(4) and 51B of the said Act, it is crystal clear that whether before or after revision of the final publication of the record of rights if any change, is to he made, a notice has to be given to the person concerned who is likely to be affected by such revision or in other words, to persons interested. In this background it has to be decided whether during the general revision of the Record-of-Rights, the names of a bargrdar could be entered into the Record of rights for the first time Without giving any individual notice or hearing to the persons concerned in whose land the name of a bargadar is recorded recognising the right of one person to the exclusion of others in an administrative manner. 20. So from the scheme of the Act it appears that bargadar's interest and/or right have been fully protected and that once a person becomes a bargadar he remains to be a bargadar for all times subject to certain conditions. The owner of the land had no right to terminate such rights or a bargadar except on Certain specified grounds in accordance with the s. 17 of the land Reforms Act. 21. The owner of the land had no right to terminate such rights or a bargadar except on Certain specified grounds in accordance with the s. 17 of the land Reforms Act. 21. The grounds of such termination are "a) that the bargadar has without any reasonable cause failed to culivate the land or has used it for any purpose other than agriculture; b) that the land is not cultivared by the bargardar personally c) that the bargadar has failed to tender or deposit to the full extent the share of the produce as required by sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (4) as the case may be, of S. (4 as the case may be, of s. 16; Provided that no order for the termination of cultivation made on the ground specified in this clause, shall be given effect to if the bargodar delivers to the person, whose land he cultivates, the share of the produce due to such person or pays to him the market price thereof, within such time and in such instalments as the officer or authority making the order may, having regard to all the Circumstances of the case, specify in this behalf; d) that the person owing the land requires it bona fide for bringing it under personal cultivation; Provided that the person owing the land shall be entitled to terminate cultivation by a bargadar of only so much of land as together with any other land in the personal cultivation of such person, does not exceed 3.00 hectares; Provided further that such person shall not be entitled to so terminate cultivation by a bargadar as to reduce the aggregate area of the land cultivated by the bargadar to less than 1.00 hectars. Explanation-In determining the areas specified in the foregoing provisions no transfer of land made after the commencement of the West Bengal land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be taken into account. Explanation-For purposes of clause (b), a bargadar who cultivates the land with the help of members of his family shall be deemed to cultivate it personally". Explanation-In determining the areas specified in the foregoing provisions no transfer of land made after the commencement of the West Bengal land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be taken into account. Explanation-For purposes of clause (b), a bargadar who cultivates the land with the help of members of his family shall be deemed to cultivate it personally". and that the proceeding for termination of cultivation by bargadar can only be made by an officer or authority appointed by the State Government in this behalf and that after it is found that one or more of the grounds specified thereunder are fulfilled and after an order of termination of bargadarship is passed by the Competent authority, the same has to be executed and on execution such termination becomes final and effective. 22. In the Act the provisions for recording the name of bargadar is specifically provided under s. 18(2) of the said Act which provides that in deciding any dispute referred to in s. 18(1) or otherwise, any question arises whether a person is a bargadar or not, such question shall be determined by an officer or authority mentioned in s. 18(1) of t he said Act and s. 18(1) of the said Act provides that in such proceeding the authority after giving opportunity of being heard and adducing evidence will pass the order. Section 18 is an enabling provision. From the scheme of the Act it is clearly evident that there is no bar for unrecorded bargadar to remain as bargadar and that it is not necessary to record the name of the bargadar at all as a bargadar whether recorded or unrecorded are equally entitled to get protections under the Act except that-recording made in favour of a bargadar creates a statutory presumption regarding correctness of the entries, in view of the provisions of s 51A (9) of the Act. So the recording of the name of a bargadar practically amounts to final and conclusive determination of such a right. So the recording of the name of a bargadar practically amounts to final and conclusive determination of such a right. From the scheme of the Act it is provided that incase of dispute between the bargadar and the persons concerned whose lands to cultivate regarding division or delivery of produce or recovery of produce under s. 16A of the said Act and termination of cultivation by bargadar, if any, the question arises whether a persons concerned is a bargadar or not, the same may be adjudicated and on adjudication it may be found in either way. 23. The system of unrecorded bargadar was prevailing and still permissible under the law. 24. Section 50 of the said Act provides that the prescribed authority shall maintain upto date in the prescribed manner the village record of rights by incorporating therein the changes on account of among, other things, alteration in the mode of cultivation for example by a bargadar. This provision in so many clear words provides that In case there had been any change in the mode of cultivating by a bargadar or otherwise in respect of the land in question. it only provides whether the land in question is under personal cultivation of a raiyat or by a bargadar. In any event, this provision alone does not authorise recording the name of the bargadar in the garb of alteration in the moue of cultivation without giving any notice or opportunity to the persons concerned under whom such right is claimed. 25. It was submitted that schedule A to the West Bengal Land Reforms Act provides provision for the revisional and preparation of record of rights and which provides that when an order has been made under s. 51 of the said Act directing that a record of rights be revised or prepared by a revenue officer in respect of the land of any district or part thereof the record of rights shall be revised the following particulars namely: i) Traverse survey ii) Cadastral survey; iii) Preliminary record writing (or Khanapuri) iV) Local explanation (or Bhujarat) v) Attestation Vi) Publication of the draft record of rights vii) Disposal of objections viii) Preparation and publication of the final record of rights. 26. 26. The second proviso to clause (1) of Schedule 'A' inter alia provides: "Provided further a Revenue Officer who has been appoin1ed with the additional designation of Settlement Officer may either on his own motion or on receipt of application from others at any time before final publication of the record of rights direct- (i)............ ...... (ii) that names of bargadars shall be incorporated in the record of rights by the Revenue Officer subordinate to him after holding such enquiry and after giving the persons claiming as bargadars and the owners of the land concerned such opportunity of being heard as the Revenue Officer may deem fit". (iii) that the persons claiming as bargadars and persons claiming as owners of the land concerned shall be deemed to have been given an opportunity of being heard as required under item (ii), if, within one week, before the enquiry, the Revenue Officer publishes a notice of his intention of inquiry by affixing a notice to some conspicuous part of the village/mouza in which the land affected is situated and by affixing a notice to a conspicuous place in the office of the Gram Panchayat within whose jurisdiction the land affected is situated.". 27. The provisions for notice as provided in clause (iii) to second proviso as set out above have been provided in so many clear and express words, that notice should be given personally on the raiyat concerned or the persons concerned under whom such right of bargadarship is claimed. This deemed service may lead to non-service at all. There would be scope for passing order in Barga proceeding without notice and by this process persons' interest may be kept in absolute dark about such proceeding. It is not understood why the rule making authority thought it fit not to provide a suitable provision for direct service upon the persons likely to be affected. It was not necessary to make an elaborate procedure for the purpose of providing a provision for such deemed service. The provision for deemed service could have been made in case the authority prescribed a particular mode of personal service fails, in that event, the proceeding cannot be allowed to be frustrated and under such circumstances, there could have been some justification for providing deemed service as have been provided in Order 6 Rule 20 of CPC. The provision for deemed service could have been made in case the authority prescribed a particular mode of personal service fails, in that event, the proceeding cannot be allowed to be frustrated and under such circumstances, there could have been some justification for providing deemed service as have been provided in Order 6 Rule 20 of CPC. The question is whether an ad verse order can be passed by such a deemed service. The principle of natural justice is to be followed. It is now firmly established principle that unless there is express bar or prohibition under the statute that no notice has to be served, the principle of natural justice should be read in the statute and must be observed. In the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the schedule in question, there is no express bar or prohibition for personal service of such notice and under such circumstances, it must be held reasonable opportunity of being heard is denied if there was no personal service upon the persons concerned who are likely to be affected including the persons concerned in whose land, the person is claiming to be a bargadar. Personal Notice has to be served and failure to serve such notice would render the proceeding as void and ab ini litio. 28. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India & ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 wherein the Supreme Court observed that unless natural justice is expressly prohibited by this statute, natural justice had to be complied with when the State has in question did not exclude expressly the right of being heard in that event, it was not open to the rule making authority to do away that right by laying down a rule which is inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and/or to make the same nugatory. 29. The vires of the provision of rule 21(3) of the Bengal Land Reforms Rules was challenged before me in the case of Samijan Bewa v. State of West Bengal reported in 1986(1) CLJ page 161 wherein I held that......... 29. The vires of the provision of rule 21(3) of the Bengal Land Reforms Rules was challenged before me in the case of Samijan Bewa v. State of West Bengal reported in 1986(1) CLJ page 161 wherein I held that......... "The provision of Rule 21 (3) is only applicable and/or limited to cases of alteration only made in the mode of cultivation as provided under s. 50 of the ,aid Act and that, secondly, such wide power as conferred bi Rule 21 (3) of the said Act would result in gross abuse of the power by the officer concerned and that on the strength of that provision anybody may get his name recorded as bargadar without affording any opportunity to the person affected. This is neither the scheme nor the purpose of the Act. The object and/or the purpose of the Act is to reform the land relating to land-tenure consequent on the vesting on the Slate and of certain rights therein in the State. It appears that the Rule was amended after this Court struck down the provision of Operation Barga and that after the provision of Operation Barga was stuck down by this Court, this amendment in the rule had been made to get the names of the persons claiming to be bargadars in a most perfunctory manner. It was observed in Bernard Schwartz's "Administrative Law" at page 151 that Ultra vires doctrine is of particular importance in the field of rule-making. Agency power to make rules extend no further than the authority given by the relevant statutory delegation. On review, the court will determine whether the challenged rule's are within the power conferred........." At page 152 of the book it was observed that "But even a The which deals with the subject matter within the agency's delegated authority may be invalid if it is arbitrary or unreasonable, not only must a regulation, in order to he valid, be consistent with the Statute, it must be reasonable. The validity of a regulation will be sustained only if it is 'reasonably related to the purpose of enabling legislation'. It is for the court to say whether or not there is a rational relationship between a particular regulation and governing statute". The validity of a regulation will be sustained only if it is 'reasonably related to the purpose of enabling legislation'. It is for the court to say whether or not there is a rational relationship between a particular regulation and governing statute". It is also stated in the Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition) at page 324 that "There are five main grounds on which the by-laws may be treated as ultra-vires.........(c) That they are repugnant to the Statute under which they are made, (d) that they are uncertain, (e) That they are unreasonable". Lord Russel C. J. in t he case of Kruse v. Johnson reported in (1898) 2 QB 91 at page 99 said: "Unreasonable in what sense ? If, for instance they the byelaws) were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust, if they disclose bad faith ; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds or reasonable men, the court might well say "parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and Ultra vires. But it is in this sense and in this sense only, as I conceive that the question of reasonableness can properly be regarded......" Applying the tests laid down as mentioned above, it is clear that the impugned sub-rule 13) of Rule 21 of the said rules is wholly unreasonable and oppressive to the rights of the persons whose land is the subject matter of Barga recording. There is no sense of making a rule for affixing the notice regarding Barga recording on the land in question or affixing such a notice in the office of the gram panchayat. Here the person under whom Barga cultivation is claimed is a known person and the Bargadar who claims to be cultivating the land as Bargadar and delivering or tendering a share of the produce to the person under whom the bargadar claims such right, knows the name and address of such person and there is no difficulty to find out such person who mayor may not reside in the same village where the land is situated and to serve a notice upon such a person. The introduction of such a Rule had given scope to make barga recording behind the back and without the knowledge of the person in whose land such barga right is claimed and the question of rights and interests of the parties in respect of lands cannot be allowed to be decided which have far reaching consequences on the basis of such an unreasonable rule. In the instant case after examining the scheme and purpose of the Act and the object of the Rule 21(3) it is clearly evident that the Rule is unreasonable and 'not reasonably related' to the purpose of the Act in question. The purpose of the Act as it appears, is to protect the interests of the bona fide bargadars, several provisions have been made to safeguard the interests of the bargadars and that at the same time in the name of safeguarding the interests of the bargadars, the interests of the person under whom the bargadars are cultivating, cannot be ignored altogether. In the instant case, in my view, the provision of Rule 21, 31 of the said Rules is violative of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it is on the face of it bad, unreasonable', oppressive and further, the said Rule is ultra vires the provision of the said Act". 30. Relying upon the determination made by me in the case of Samijan Bewa supra) I hold that the provision of clause (iii) of second proviso, rule 1 or Schedule A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is ultra vires and invalid and that on the strength of such deemed service if any, recording of bargadar has been made, the same would be void and ab initio. Turning to the main question whether during the Khanapuri Bhujarat Stage such recording of bargadars could be made without serving any personal notice and/or without giving any opportunity of being heard. Turning to the main question whether during the Khanapuri Bhujarat Stage such recording of bargadars could be made without serving any personal notice and/or without giving any opportunity of being heard. It is not a case of deciding the mere change in the nature and character of the land and/or to give effect to the order already passed for recording the name of a Bargadar in any proceeding according to law wherein the Bargadar has established right of cultivation of such land which was under the personal cultivation of the raiyat concerned and the other particulars of the land which could be done merely on visual inspection of the land in question. When a name of bargadur would be recorded for the first time in whatever stage it may be, it is implicit that such recording should be made after serving personal notice upon the persons concerned under whom such claim of bargadarship is made. In my view, at Khanapuri Bhujarat stage which is a part of revision or preparation of record of rights, if anybody's name is recorded for the first time as bargadar, it is implicit that before recording the name of bargadars the persons concerned under whom such right is claimed, must be- given an opportunity and/or hearing otherwise the valuable right of the persons concerned under whom such right of cultivation is claimed, would be denied. At such stages only the name of a Bargadar who was admittedly or indisputably a Bargadar but whose names was not recorded in the record of rights, could be recorded. 31. In construing 'such a provision which directly and seriously affects the interest of the parties, it has to be borne in mind the object of such a provision. The object of such provision is to give opportunity, but in the instant case, no specific provision was made for giving personal notice but providing giving notice to the villagers by hanging such a notice in any part of the village and secondly by hanging such a notice in a some conspicuous part of the Panchayat office. The object of such provision is to give opportunity, but in the instant case, no specific provision was made for giving personal notice but providing giving notice to the villagers by hanging such a notice in any part of the village and secondly by hanging such a notice in a some conspicuous part of the Panchayat office. It is the cardinal principle of rules of interpretation that a Court seeks to avoid a construction of any provisions that produces an unworkable and impracticable results for it is unlikely to have been intended by the legislature and further a Court seeks to avoid a construction that cause, unjustifiable inconvenience to persons who are the subject matter of the enactment. (See para 321 and 322 of Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation). 32. If the said provision is construed according to its literal meaning that would also result in anomalous and illogical result and it is also provided at para 323 Bennion's Statutory Interpretation that the Court seeks to avoid a construction that creates an anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational and illogical result. 33. It is the duty of the court that a provision has to be given a purposive construction. A construction which promotes the remedy, the legislature has provided to cure the particular mischief is known as purposive construction. It cannot be disputed that it was not the intention of the legislature to deprive the persons under whole land the person is claiming to be a Bargadar their right of hearing in the proceeding. The golden rule of construction was that The words of statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioner v. Adamson (1877) 2 App. Cases. 743 at page 764 expressed this so called rule as follows:" ...... that we are to take the whole statute together and construe it altogether give the word their ordinary significance, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary significance........." 34. In the instant case, the words in the statute could not be given their ordinary and natural meaning as that would result in an absurd position. In the instant case, the words in the statute could not be given their ordinary and natural meaning as that would result in an absurd position. There cannot be any bona fide reason for not providing a provision for serving a personal notice upon the raiyat concerned but provisions have been-made to give notice to the villagers through the Panchayat office. There was no necessity of providing such a provision which had the effect of resulting manifest absurdity and resulting a wholly illogical, unworkable and absurd result. Para 142 of the said book on Statutory Interpretation (supra) provides that it is presumed that the legislature intends the court is to apply a construction which rectifies any error in the drafting of the enactment where this is required to give effect to the legislator's intention. 35. In view of the principle of interpretation referred to above, in my view, the right of the raiyat to get a personal notice could not be denied and that it could not be presumed that it was an intention of the legislature to deprive the raiyat an opportunity of being heard before anybody's name is recorded as bargadar, or in other words, a permanent right would be created On the land in question of a raiyat where the raiyat would lose his right of personal cultivation without getting any notice and/or opportunity of being heard. Supreme Court in the case of Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Kumari Chitra Srivastava reported in AIR 1970 SC 1039 observed: "Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price is a small price indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law". 36. In the Case of Swadeshi Cotton Mill v Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 Supreme Court observed relying upon the case of Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case reported In AIR 1978 SC 597 (ibid) and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 (ibid) "The further question to be considered is: What is the effect of the non-observance of this fundamental principle of fairplay? Does the non observance of the audi alterem partem rule, which in the quest of Justice under the rule of law, ha, been considered universally and most spontaneously acceptable principle, render an administrative decision having civil consequences, void and voidable? Does the non observance of the audi alterem partem rule, which in the quest of Justice under the rule of law, ha, been considered universally and most spontaneously acceptable principle, render an administrative decision having civil consequences, void and voidable? In England, the outfall from the watershed decision, R. v Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 brought with it a rush of conflicting opinion on this point. The majority of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin held that the non-observance of this principle, had rendered the dismissal of the Chief Constable void. The rationale of the majority view is that where there is a duty to act fairly just like the duty to act reasonably, it has to be enforced as an implied statutory requirement, so that failure to observe it means that the administrative act or decision was outside the statutory power, unjustified by law (See Wade's Administrative Law, ibid, page 448). In India, this Court has consistently taken the view that a quasi judicial or administrative decision rendered in violation of the audi alterem pariom rule wherever it can be read as an implied requirement of the law, is null and void". 37. In my view, when a claim is lodged by a person to be a bargadar for the purpose of recording his name as bargadar before the authorities concerned, there exists a lis between the applicant and the raiyat. The raiyat mayor may not oppose such a claim, the claim and the counter-claim mace by the parties had to be adjudicated on the basis of evidence and/or material and/or on local inspection. When there is lis between the parties the matter could not be taken so lightly and it is also a cardinal principle that if any determination is required to be made for the purpose of adjudication of the right of the parties, particularly right in the property, it is imperative that the other party must be given an opportunity of being heard. No administrative authority, quasi judicial authority and/or statutory authority is entitled to make such determination without observing the principle of natural justice. 38. Accordingly, in my view, whenever the claim is lodged by any person for recording his name as bargadar before the authorities concerned, the other affected party namely the persons under whom such right is claimed, must be given an opportunity of being heard. 38. Accordingly, in my view, whenever the claim is lodged by any person for recording his name as bargadar before the authorities concerned, the other affected party namely the persons under whom such right is claimed, must be given an opportunity of being heard. Such an opportunity has also to be given at the time of Khanapuri Bhujarat Stage. Simply because it is bneing done at Khanapuri Bhbujarat Stage, it cannot be said that personal notice need not be given, inasmuch as, such Barga recording even at Khanapuri Bhujarat stage had the same effect of determining the rights of the parties. Under the scheme of the Act, i am of the view that any recording name of the bargadar without notice is void and inoperative. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, admittedly, the petitioner was not given any notice before recording the name of bargadar at Khanapuri Bhujarat stage and the respondents could not produce any materials before this court that the petitioner has been given any personal notice and/or hearing before such final adjudication on the rights of the parties. The barga recording made in the instant case in the name of the respondent nos. 7 to 14 cannot therefore stand and the order of this nature created a permanent encumbrances in the land and passed involution of the principle of natural justice is void and ab initio. 39. In the result, the impugned barga recording made in favour of the private respondents cannot stand and the same is quashed. Let a writ in the nature of Cetiorari do issue quashing the recording name of the private respondent nos. 7 to 13 as Bargadar in respect of the land in question. This order is passed without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. 40. This order will govern the other two Rules, namely, C.R. 18000 (W) of 1984 and C.R. 18001(W) of 1984, which were also treated as on the hearing day’s list. Learned Advocate for the petitioners is permitted to correct the cause title of the main writ petitions in the Rules. Impugned order quashed rule made absolute.