JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan and P.K. Shamsuddin, JJ. 1. Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1985 is by accused 2, 3 and 4 against their conviction and sentence. In Crl. R. P. No. 61 of 1985, accused 1 and 5 also challenge their conviction and sentence. Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1985 is by the State against the acquittal of accused 1, 2, 4 and 5 for the offences under S.143, 147, 148 and 302 read with S.149 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Accused 1 to 3 are direct brothers. PW 19 is their direct sister. PW 20 is her husband. He is a Head Constable. PW 5 Kuttan is the brother of their father. Accused 4 and 5 are the sons of the first accused. PW 1 and deceased Suresh Kumar alias Boban are the sons of PW 19 and 20. PWs 4 and 11 are the sons of PW 5. PW 15 is the wife of the third accused and PW 16 is the wife of PW 5. The parties are thus close relations. They are neighbours also. 3. Third accused had a dispute with PWs 9 and 20 over a pathway Litigations were also there. Though litigations ended, enmity continued. On 21-12-1980 PW 11 was bitten by the dog of third accused and PW 15. PWs 15 and 16 quarrelled over it. Deceased came and joined the quarrel and gave a slap to PW 15. Next morning, PW 5 was beaten by the second accused. Deceased saw this from the opposite bank of the river and challenged second accused. At 6 30 PM, when the deceased was talking to PW 14 in front of his shop on the other bank of the river, all the five accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and came there with the common object of murdering Boban. Second accused was having a wooden stick and accused 3 and 4 kept concealed two daggers inside the umbrellas carried by them. Fifth accused slapped the deceased after finding fault with him for having beaten PW 15. Deceased returned a slap. First accused beat Boban on his neck. Thereupon, second accused beat him with a stick several times. Third accused took out a sword stick and stabbed Boban on his right shoulder. Fourth accused took out a knife and stabbed him on the left shoulder Deceased ran to the shop of PW 14. Deceased returned a slap. First accused beat Boban on his neck. Thereupon, second accused beat him with a stick several times. Third accused took out a sword stick and stabbed Boban on his right shoulder. Fourth accused took out a knife and stabbed him on the left shoulder Deceased ran to the shop of PW 14. Third accused chased and stabbed him below his left ear. Deceased was taken first to a local doctor PW 9 and then to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam where he died at 11.40 that night itself. This is the prosecution case. 4. Unlawful assembly, rioting and common object to commit murder were found against by the Sessions Judge. Third accused alone was found guilty of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Accused 1, 2 and5 each were convicted only under S.323. Accused 1 and 5 were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one month each and second accused to rigorous imprisonment for six months. Fourth accused was convicted under S.324 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. 5. The fact that these people, though close relations, belong to two rival inimical camps is not in dispute. Enmity was generally spoken to by the witnesses. The incidents, which acted as immediate motive, were spoken to by PW 16, who saw them. PW I has also spoken to it. Further motive is not in serious dispute and it is also irrelevant in view of the direct evidence regarding the incident. 6. PWs 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14 and 19 are the occurrence witnesses. Among them, PWs 8, 10 and 14 are hostile. PWs 1, 4, 5 and 19 are closely related and inimical witnesses. The only independent witness is PW 2. All of them have spoken to the basic features of the actual occurrence with uniformity in accordance with the prosecution case. Except some very minor discrepancies on details such as the exact sequence of events, the nature of the weapon or the exact portion of the body where the injuries were received, there is no contradiction also between them on the substratum of the incident. PW 14. who is also a hostile witness admitted the presence of PWs 1, 4 and 5. The actual incident is to a certain extent corroborated by PW 8, who is also a hostile witness. PW 14. who is also a hostile witness admitted the presence of PWs 1, 4 and 5. The actual incident is to a certain extent corroborated by PW 8, who is also a hostile witness. PW 7 is the doctor who first attended the deceased at 9 PM and issued Ext. P3 wound certificate. Ext. P2 post mortem certificate was prepared by PW 6, who conducted autopsy. There were nine antemortem injuries, of which Six were linear contused abrasions indicating beating by wooden stick. Three were incised injuries which could be caused by MOs 1 and 2 identified by the witnesses. Thus medical evidence also supports the oral evidence. 7. There is no rule of law which says that interested and inimical witnesses should be discarded out right for that reason without considering their evidence on the merits. It is not the source from which the evidence comes that decides credibility, but it is the worth of the matter. Truthful versions could come from interested and inimical sources also. At any rate, such sources may not be interested in exonerating the real culprits for the purpose of implicating innocent persons. It is true that in narrating the incident, there may be possibilities of conscious or unconscious bias and consequent exaggerations or embellishments from interested and inimical witnesses. In such cases, there is only a rule of caution and prudence which warns the court to be careful before accepting the evidence; PWs 1, 4, 5 and 19 were able to 2 withstand such severe test. Further, their evidence is supported by the independent witness PW 2 and the medical evidence also. Deceased was all alone and unarmed. This is clear from the hostile witnesses also. It was evidently an one sided attack by all the accused who came together actuated by the motives mentioned above. 8. The attempt of the counsel was, therefore, (i) to discredit PW 2; (ii) to attack the first information statement and first information report as belated and embellished; and (ii) to discredit the evidence relating to discovery under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Undisputedly, PW 2 is an independent witness against whom the only suggestion of interest or enmity was dependence towards PW 20 which he emphatically denied. There is nothing else suggesting that he is inimical or interested. Undisputedly, PW 2 is an independent witness against whom the only suggestion of interest or enmity was dependence towards PW 20 which he emphatically denied. There is nothing else suggesting that he is inimical or interested. The counsel was mechanical in his argument to make out his presence at the exact time improbable by calculation of the various factors regarding time in his evidence. He is one collecting sand in canoe and carrying it for sale. The evidence of DW I that he has not taken out a licence for that purpose cannot discredit his evidence. He is doing that baseness is clear from his evidence and there is nothing to discredit him. 9. First information statement was given by PW 1 at Ramankari Police Station only at 6 PM, the next day. First information report reached the court only on 26-12-1980 as seen from the initials of the Magistrate. In the inquest held on 23-12-1980, no eye witnesses was questioned. Though PWs 1, 4, 5 and 20 were available in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam throughout the night of incident, none of them went and gave intimation to the Gandhi Nagar Police Station. These facts were magnified by the counsel to argue that the first information statement and the first information report came into being after inquest and after deliberations. We do not think that this contention could be accepted. 10. After the incident, the injured was first taken to PW 9. He was taken to the Medical College Hospital and seen by PW 7 only at 9 PM. His evidence shows that he was more interested in saving the patient than intimating the police. The injured died at 11.40 while he was making preparations for an emergency operation. After 7 PM, no intimation is being taken from the hospital to the Police Station and PW 7 has also not informed. Though we are of opinion that such a practice has to be stopped, we cannot blame the relations in such a situation for not having gone to the Gandhi Nagar Police Station to give intimation. There is nothing for us to presume that while the dead body was in the mortuary they were deliberating in the night to concoct a story. PW 1 went from there early morning and gave Ext. P1 at Ramankari at 6 A.M. We do not find any embellishment in Ext. There is nothing for us to presume that while the dead body was in the mortuary they were deliberating in the night to concoct a story. PW 1 went from there early morning and gave Ext. P1 at Ramankari at 6 A.M. We do not find any embellishment in Ext. P1 nor do we think that it was recorded and the case registered later than the records purport to be. Inquest, scene mahazar, questioning witnesses and other procedures in investigation took place on the 23rd itself. It is true that the first information report is seen initialled by the Magistrate only on 26-12-1980 and there is no proper explanation except that 25th is a holiday and it might have been delayed in despatch by post. There is absolutely nothing to suggest any malpractice or prejudice. 11. The learned counsel persuaded us by citing the decisions in Thulia Kali v. State of Tamilnadu (1972 SCC (Crl) 543), Ishwar Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1976 SC 2423 ) and Marudanal Augusti v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1980 SC 638 ) to conclude that the delay is fatal and for that reason, the prosecution has to be rejected. All these are cases in which there were something more than the delay. Even though first information statement and first information report are extremely vital and valuable pieces of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence and they should be recorded promptly and forwarded to the Magistrate forthwith, any delay by itself in that respect without anything else cannot operate as a technical ground to reject the prosecution case even when the explanation for the delay is found not very satisfactory (Ram Murti and another v. State of Haryana - AIR. 1976 S. C 2455). Where first information report was recorded without delay and investigation started on its basis and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the court then, however improper or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned in the absence of prejudice to the accused, it cannot by itself justify the conclusion that investigation was tainted and the prosecution is insupportable Pala Singh and another v. State of Punjab - AIR 1972 SC 2679 ). Therefore, we are rejecting the argument on the ground of delay. Therefore, we are rejecting the argument on the ground of delay. It appears that the Circle Inspector instead of holding the inquest himself deputed a Head Constable, but by chance the Sub Inspector became available. 12. The ocular and medical evidence clearly indicate commission of murder and the offences punishable under S.323 and 324. Added to that, there are the informations conveyed by accused 1, 3 and 4 which relate to the discoveries. The occurrence witnesses identified MO 1 as the sword stick used by the third accused and MO 2 as the knife used by the fourth accused for the attack. PW 29 said that all the five accused were arrested on 15-1-1981. When questioned by him, third accused said that MO 1 and fourth accused said MO 2 was entrusted to first accused. Correctness of these informations was confirmed by questioning the first accused, who disclosed the places of hiding by him. From these places of concealment, MOs 1 and 2 were discovered. Recovery mahazars are Exts. P25 and 26 and the disclosure statements of the first accused are Exts. P35 and 36. The statements given by accused 3 and 4 were also spoken to by PW 29. There is absolutely no reason to discredit the informations and discoveries spoken to by him and corroborated from other sources also. Even without these items of evidence connected with S.27 of the Evidence Act, the prosecution was able to establish its case by direct evidence. The evidence under S.27 only adds to the credibility of the other items of evidence and gives more assurance and corroboration. 13. But the learned counsel says that PW 29 was only adopting a mechanical device to conform to S.27 of the Evidence Act. He is of the view that informations given by accused 3 and 4 that they entrusted the weapons to the first accused cannot be taken as information coming under S.27 for reasons more than one. He says that first accused was arrested along with accused 3 and 4 and he has also in police, custody as an accused when accused 3 and 4 gave the informations and hence finding him out is not discovery of a fact under S.27. He says that first accused was arrested along with accused 3 and 4 and he has also in police, custody as an accused when accused 3 and 4 gave the informations and hence finding him out is not discovery of a fact under S.27. So also, the counsel is of the view that discovery must be the direct result of the informations of accused 3 and 4 and discovery on the basis of the subsequent questioning of the first accused and the informations gathered from him, though it is on the informations of accused 3 and 4, cannot be said to be the direct or proximate result of it. The counsel relied on the decisions in Karam Din v. Emperor (AIR 1926 Lahore 338), Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash ( AIR 1972 SC 975 ) Mohammed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1976 SC 483 ) and Prakash Chand v. State of (Delhi Administration) (AIR 1977 SC 400). We do not think that the decisions are helpful to the counsel in that respect. In view of the question of law raised and the arguments advanced by both sides on it, we feel that the question has to be gone into in detail. 14. It may be a herculean task to consider the legal aspects concerning S.27 of the Evidence Act. That is an aspect often agitated before courts. Decisions are too many and it may be a difficult job to refer to them exhaustively. We propose to refer only to the few decisions cited before us. S.27 of the Evidence Act is intended as an exception S.25 and 26 by making a distinction between a Statement made by a person who is not accused of an offence nor in custody of a police officer and one who is. In the case of the latter, the information, the truth of which is guaranteed by the discovery of facts in, consequence of it is made admissible to extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, whether it amounts to a confession or not. Now it is well settled that the only information that is admissible is the one distinctly relating to the fact thereby discovered. Now it is well settled that the only information that is admissible is the one distinctly relating to the fact thereby discovered. A fact discovered within the meaning of S.27 must refer to a material fact to which the information directly relates So also, the fact discovered must be relevant in the sense that it is incriminating. 15. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Athappa Goundan and others v. Emperor (AIR 1937 Madras 618) held that when the statement of the accused connects the fact discovered with the offence and makes it relevant, even though the statement amounts to a confession of the offence, it must be admitted in full because it is that that has directly led to the discovery. On that basis, a statement by the accused that he committed the theft or murder and concealed the stolen article or the dead body was being accepted in its entirely including the confession of theft or murder. That view was specifically overruled by the Privy Council in the famous decision in Pulukuri Kottaya and others v. Emperor ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ) which is often quoted with approval till now in all the subsequent decisions including those of the Supreme Court. That decision said that the difficulty however great in proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into S.27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence of confession barred by S.26. Except in cases in which the possession or concealment of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. The information proved under S.27 in such cases is only one link in the chain of proof and the other links must be proved in the manner allowed by law. The information proved under S.27 in such cases is only one link in the chain of proof and the other links must be proved in the manner allowed by law. For example, when an accused says "I committed the murder and concealed the dead body behind the bush" or "that is the dagger with which I committed the murder and the dagger is kept concealed behind the stone" or "That is the watch stolen by me and I entrusted it to Ram", the informations "I committed the murder", "That is the dagger with which I committed the murder" and 'That is the watch stolen by me' are hit by S.26 and not admissible under S.27. The rest alone are admissible because they alone distinctly relate to the fact thereby discovered. Rest are matters to be proved by the prosecution by other items of evidence. On the other hand when murder is proved, concealment of the dead body by itself is the gist of an offence coming under S.201 of the Indian Penal Code. Even then, information regarding admission and authorship of concealment coupled with the place where it is concealed is provable as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered even though it amounts to confession. 16. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Karam Dm v. Emperor (AIR 1929 Lahore 338) said that the word 'information' in S.27 cannot be used as synonymous with the word 'statement' since 'information' as distinguished from 'statement' connotes two things namely, statement or other means employed for imparting knowledge possessed by one person and the knowledge thereby derived by the other person. Even more important is the word 'discovered' which is used in a peculiar sense. The test is that the fact discovered must be discovered in the sense,; that proof of existence of that fact no longer rests on the credibility of the accused's statement, but on the credibility of the witnesses who depose to the existence of that facts. The nest of the inform admissible. If the accused wishes to challenge the veracity of the statement that it was on his information that the fact was discovered, he may ask the deponent to depose the exact words used by him. The nest of the inform admissible. If the accused wishes to challenge the veracity of the statement that it was on his information that the fact was discovered, he may ask the deponent to depose the exact words used by him. The difference in this context between the Indian law and English law is that in the latter it is assumed that the prisoner confessed and the only question is whether he was warned or not and hence to be excluded because of being improperly obtained, whereas in India the confession is excluded not on the ground of lack of warning and thus improperly obtained, but because, if to the police officer it might have been invented or if in custody it might have been induced. The possibility of such misuse tempted two decisions to issue a note of warning (T. N. Jayadeesh Devidas v. State of Kerala - 1980 Crl. L. J. 906 and another decision) to delete S.27 itself, but on account of the usefulness of that section the warning was not followed in other decisions. If misuse is the criterion for deletion, almost all the statutory provisions will have to be deleted. What would be rendered admissible under S.27 is that which the Court would find necessary in order that the statement may be intelligible. 17. A Full Bench of seven Judges of the Lahore High Court in Sukhan v. Emperor (AIR 1929 Lahore 344) said that the two limitations prescribed in order to define the scope of the informations provable against the accused under S.27 are (i) the information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and (ii) the information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered. Anything, which is not connected with that fact as its cause, or is connected with it, not as its immediate or direct cause, does not come within the ambit of the section and should be excluded. That decision also said that the expression 'fact' as defined in S.3 of the Evidence Act includes not only the physical fact but also the psychological fact or mental condition of which any person is conscious, but it is only in the former sense that the word is used in S.27. Though this decision was approved in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ), the approval was not in full on all aspects. Though this decision was approved in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ), the approval was not in full on all aspects. It was only with a reservation as to the connotation of the word 'fact' used in S.27. That decision emphatically said that it is fallacious to treat the Tact discovered within the section as equivalent to the object produced, I the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced, and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate to this fact directly. That decision considered a case in which the accused said "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house", but the knife was not there since it was discovered many years ago. If the information leads to the discovery of the fact that the knife was concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. These principles laid down in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ) were only confirmed and not dissented to any later decision even though one or two decision may give an apparent impression that discovery of a physical fact is necessary for the acceptance of the information as its corroboration. 18. In re Vellingiri (AIR 1950 Madras 613) and The Public Prosecutor v. India China Lingiah and others (AIR 1954 Madras 433) took the view that the information by an accused leading to discovery of a witness to whom he had given stolen articles is a discovery of a fact within the meaning of S.27. Basing on the decision in Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash A T R.1972 S C. 975), the learned counsel for the appellant said that in such a situation, the information of the accused is admissible under S.27 only if the stolen article is actually and physically found and recovered from that person himself. According to him, if it changed hands and recovered from somebody else or not recovered at all, the information cannot be accepted even if its truth is ensured because discovery of the fact is not the immediate or direct outcome of the information but only remote. We do not think that the decision is capable of such a narrow interpretation. According to him, if it changed hands and recovered from somebody else or not recovered at all, the information cannot be accepted even if its truth is ensured because discovery of the fact is not the immediate or direct outcome of the information but only remote. We do not think that the decision is capable of such a narrow interpretation. The facts will make it clear. In that case, the information given by the accused was not in any way connected with the crime or discovery of any 'fact' which is relevant. The information was only regarding the person from whom the accused purchased the article and identity of his shop. What was relevant in that case was not the article or the person from whom or the shop from which it was purchased, but the article in its concealment and the authorship and knowledge of concealment of the accused which is incriminating and which is otherwise not known to the police. The information did not relate to any of these aspects. 19. That decision also approved Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ) and said that what should be discovered is the material fact and the information that is admissible is that which has caused the discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with each other as the cause and effect. That information which is not distinctly connected with the fact discovered or that portion of the information which only explains the material thing recovered is not admissible under S.27 and cannot be proved. If the information leading to discovery of a fact is relating to the concealment of an incriminating object it can be by concealment in a place or by entrustment with a person. Information concerning the where - abouts of a person who is not in any way connected with the concealment or entrustment is not a relevant in formation at all coming under S.27. What makes the information leading to the discovery of the witness admissible is the discovery of the 'fact', the connotation of which has been clearly laid down in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ). What makes the information leading to the discovery of the witness admissible is the discovery of the 'fact', the connotation of which has been clearly laid down in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ). That is what Jaffer Husain Dastogir v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1970 S C 1934) also said In that case, the police already knew that the diamond was with the third accused but did not know where he was to be found. The information which led to the discovery of third assured was held to be not information under S.27 because it could at the best only amount to information as to the where - abouts of A3 which is not a relevant fact under S.27. The fact discovered must be connected with the crime charged and discovery of the fact must be the direct outcome of the information, the truth of which is thereby accused. Only then the embargo on the statement of the accused to the police is removed. For the application of S.27, there is practically no difference between the information that the article is kept concealed in a particular place and the information that the article is given to a particular person. The only difference is that the named person is substituted for the place. In neither case the article is the fact discovered. That decision also accepted the connotation of 'fact' as interpreted in Pulukuri Kottaya's case ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ). 20. The word 'distinctly' used in S.27 of the 'Evident Act has been interpreted in Mohammed Inayatullai's case ( AIR 1976 SC 483 ) and other decisions as meaning "directly", "indubitably", "strictly" and "unmistakably". The word has been used advisedly to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase "distinctly" relates to the fact thereby discovered'. It is the linchpin of the provision. It refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. It is that part of the information which is the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery which partially lifts the ban against confessions and statements made to the police because the consequent discovery affords some guarantee of truth of that part of the information and that part only. It is that part of the information which is the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery which partially lifts the ban against confessions and statements made to the police because the consequent discovery affords some guarantee of truth of that part of the information and that part only. Normally cases coming before courts may be instances where the physical objects themselves are shown or produced by the accused, thereby assuring the truth of the information. But other instances also may arise. 21. Discovery of the fact need not be necessarily the material physical fact. Discovery of the 'fact' as a direct consequence of the information is made a relevant aspect under S.27 because it gives assurance to the correctness of the information without further reference to the maker of the information. Information given by the accused regarding concealment of the object in a particular place by itself may not in all cases because it may be capable of two interpretations, (i) that he only knew that somebody else concealed it without his involvement; and (ii) he himself concealed it and thereby he knows about the concealment. In appropriate cases authorship of concealment could be inferred from the information and the surrounding circumstances even if it is not so specifically stated. 22. Narayana Pillai Vasudevan Pillai and another v. State of Kerala (1968 CrlLJ 1362) dealt with a case in which the accused gave information that he threw away the knife near a tank. When the police went the knife was not there. When they were searching, a girl said that she took the knife from that particular place and gave it to another person. That person when questioned confirmed the knife to have been given to him by the girl. The information given by the accused was found on the evidence to be correct and it was acted upon under S.27. In doing so, reliance was placed on In re Ravipalli Ramamurthy (AIR 1941 Madras 290) where the position was this. Knife was not at the place mentioned by the accused. The police officer on the spot announced that if anybody took the knife he must produce it, otherwise houses will be searched for recovery. One among those collected there came forward and produced the knife stating that he took it from the same place. The information given by him was found correct. The police officer on the spot announced that if anybody took the knife he must produce it, otherwise houses will be searched for recovery. One among those collected there came forward and produced the knife stating that he took it from the same place. The information given by him was found correct. As a consequence the statement of the accused was accepted as information on the basis of which the relevant fact was discovered. If the knife is proved to have been used for commission of the offence, the fact of the accused throwing away that knife is a relevant fact. Discovery was the direct follow up of the information given by the accused. That decision considered a position were the accused told the police that he dumped the dead body in a particular place. But the dead body was not seen at that place when the police went there. But the police knew from the Village Officer that he found the dead body at the place itself and he removed it to the mortuary. Discovery was held to be directly consequent to the information of the accused and it is a relevant fact if the identity of the body is established. 23. Kapur Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1919 Lahore 184) took the same view. Accused said that that the knife was kept in a particular place. But the police could not find it out at that place. Then they knew that the knife was taken from there by another person and given to a third person from whom it was recovered. It was hold that the in formation of the accused led to the discovery of fact. We are of the view that even if the object is not actually recovered but information is found to be correct, it amounts to discovery of the 'fact' provided it is the direct follow up of the information. If the accused says that the dead body is buried in a particular place and it was not found there by the police, but there were clear indications that a dead body was buried there and it was proved to be that of the man whose murder was in question it could be said that the relevant fact is discovered on the basis of the information as its direct follow up. The position will not be different when the accused says that the stolen ornament was given to a particular goldsmith if that goldsmith admits the entrustment and says that he melted the ornament and produces the ingot. So also discovery of the material object need not necessarily be from the place or person mentioned by the accused. We have already referred to cases where the objects were not found in the place of concealment mentioned by the accused Position will be the same if the place is substituted by a person. 24. Recovery at the instance of the accused may not by itself in all cases prove that it was he who pointed out the weapon or wielded it in offence. Even if the statement accompanying the discovery is vague as to identify the authorship of concealment, the pointing out of the weapon may in some cases prove the accused's knowledge as to where the weapon was kept (Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U. P - AIR 1981 SC 911 ), Earnabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka (1983 SCC (Crl) 447) and Bubudin and another v. State (1978 CrlLJ NOC 155 - Page 83) also emphasised the position that the fact discovered takes in the place, person and knowledge. It is not the requirement of the section that the declarant should actually lead to the police to the place or personally take out the object. In cases were the declarant personally leads the police or points out the place or the object, evidence in that regard is relevant as an item of conduct under S.8 of the Evidence Act (State v. Ram Avtar - 1980 CrlLJ NOC 100 Page 42). 25. There is clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under S.8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by S.162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is excluded by S.162 is the statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement). What is excluded by S.162 is the statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement). For example, the evidence of the circumstance simpliciter that the accused led a police officer and pointed out the place or article kept hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under S.8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously wither antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of S.27. 26. From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that informations given by accused 3 and 4 that they entrusted the weapons concerned to the first accused would fall under S.27. The correctness of those informations was confirmed when the first accused was questioned. The information given by the first accused and the recoveries were so inextricably connected with each other as cause and effect that the recoveries were the direct consequence of the information of accused 3 and 4. Entrustment to the first accused was an information exclusively known to accused 3 and 4 separately. Truth of these facts was known for the first time when the first accused was questioned and recoveries were made pursuant thereto. These recoveries were the direct out come of the informations received from accused 3 and 4. All these facts were deposed to and there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence. The weapons were identified and the complicity of accused 3 and 4 is further confirmed. 27. Though we are not fully convinced of the reasons which weighed with the Sessions Judge in rejecting the case as regards offences punishable under S.143, 147, 148 and 149, we do not propose to interfere, this being an appeal against acquittal. Third accused is not made a party to the appeal filed by the State. Further, there is the circumstance relied on by the Sessions Judge that accused 1, 4, and 5 committed only an offence punishable under S.323 and the second accused inflicted only one stab injury which is not grievous. When the third accused chased the deceased arid inflicted the fatal injury the others were only keeping quiet. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the acquittals because the grounds cannot be said to be unreasonable. When the third accused chased the deceased arid inflicted the fatal injury the others were only keeping quiet. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the acquittals because the grounds cannot be said to be unreasonable. Against the third accused the medical and oral evidence clearly indicate the requisite intention and knowledge for an offence punishable under S.302. The convictions entered against the respective accused under S.323, 324 and 302 and the sentences do not require any interference at all. Both the criminal appeals and the criminal revision petition are dismissed.