Usha Raha v. State of U. P — 1989 DIGILAW 485 (ALL)

ORDER M.P. Singh, J. - It is really a very unfortunate case where a poor widow has been dispossessed from her house in a most illegal manner by a very high police officer. 2. These are two connected writ petitions filed by the landlady. Points raised are practically common. 3. The main relief sought by the petitioner is for the restoration of possession of her house from where she has been dispossessed in the night of 5-12-1983. The disputed house is C-1001, Sector-E, Mahanagar, Lucknow. 4. The petitioners husband was a Captain in the Indian Army. While he was serving the nation away from Lucknow, the house was let out to one Ashok Jalpuri. He was a medical representative in a Pharmaceutical concern. On his transfer from Lucknow to Srinagar, he did not deliver the possession to the petitioner but inducted one Vishwanath Bose as an unauthorised occupant. This resulted in declaration of vacancy on 4-5-1983. 5. However, on 15-10-1983, Vishwanath Bose handed over the possession of the house to the petitioner. Since then she remained in possession. 6. On 26-9-1983 the petitioner moved an application for release under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that she was living with her husband's sister as a caretaker of a house in Risaldar Park, Lucknow. She had no other house of her own to live in after the retirement of her husband. He died during the pendency of the writ petition. A number of allotment applications were also filed. 7. The allotment application of the contesting respondent was at serial No. 6. At this stage only this fact is to be high lighted that her husband was Superintendent of Police, Lucknow at the relevant time. At present he is posted as Deputy Inspector General of Police in the same city. 8. On 30-I 1-1983 by means of a composite order, the petitioner's release application was rejected and the accommodation was allotted in the name of the contesting respondent. 9. The petitioner filed a revision on 5-12-1983 before the learned District Judge. Lucknow. On the same day the court stayed the operation of the order dated 30-11-1983. The effect was that the order of allotment in favour of the respondent was suspended. 10. On 2-12-1983 the contesting respondent got the notice in Form C issued. It was never served on the petitioner. Lucknow. On the same day the court stayed the operation of the order dated 30-11-1983. The effect was that the order of allotment in favour of the respondent was suspended. 10. On 2-12-1983 the contesting respondent got the notice in Form C issued. It was never served on the petitioner. On the basis of the notice, the contesting respondent along with her husband Sri Mahendra Lalka who was a Senior Superintendent of Police. Lucknow, walked into the premises in the night of 5-12-1983. A number of police constables also accompanied them. The petitioner along with her family members and the house-hold goods was thrown on the street. According to the respondent the petitioner has been dispossessed by her on 4-12-1983 but there is no convincing evidence on record. 11. The petitioner sent telegrams to the Chief Minister. Uttar Pradesh Deputy Inspector General of Police; Inspector General of Police and Home Secretary, Lucknow about the high handedness of Sri Mahendra Lalka. The next morning i.e. on 6-12-1983 a first information report was also lodged against them. 12. The petitioner could not get any response from the said authorities. Feeling helpless, she filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6876 of 1983 (now numbered as Writ Petition No. 5067 of 1989) praying for a writ of Mandamus directing the opposite parties to restore possession forthwith to her, inter alia other reliefs which are not material at this stage. 13. For full four long years i.e. from 5-12-1983 to 8-5-1987 she had been knocking the doors of the Courts for justice but no orders could be passed in the case. Ultimately on 8-5-1987 this Court only directed the learned District Judge to dispose of the revision filed against the order dated 30-11-1983. 14. On 15-5-1987, the learned District Judge allowed the revision of the petitioner in part and set aside the order rejecting the release application. The case was remanded to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) for reconsidering the release application afresh. The operative portion of the order was as follows :- The revision is allowed and the order dated 30.11-1983 passed by the learned A.D.M.(CS) Lucknow so far as it relates to rejecting of release application of the revisionist-landlady is hereby set aside. The case was remanded to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) for reconsidering the release application afresh. The operative portion of the order was as follows :- The revision is allowed and the order dated 30.11-1983 passed by the learned A.D.M.(CS) Lucknow so far as it relates to rejecting of release application of the revisionist-landlady is hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the learned A.D.M.(CS) Lucknow for reconsidering and deciding the release application of the revisionist-landlady according to law in the light of the observations made above. The second part of the order dated 30-11-1983 passed by the learned A.D.M. (CS) Lucknow relating to allotment of the house in question in favour of the opposite party No. 1 shall be subject to decision of the release application after remand. There will be no order as to costs. Parties are directed to appear before the learned A. D. M.(CS) Lucknow on 15-6-1987." 15. Against this later part of the order dated 15-5-1987 regarding allotment, the petitioner filed another writ petition No. 3872 of 1987 (now numbered as Writ Petition No. 5066 of 1989) praying for quashing of the same. She repeated her request for restoration of the possession in this writ petition also. 16. In pursuance to the remand order, the authority concerned again rejected the release application on 10-7-1987. This order has been challenged by means of a revision which is still pending before the learned District Judge, Lucknow who will decide the same on merit on the basis of evidence on record. 17. Heard Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava for the petitioner and Sri K.B. Sinha for the respondent. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the possession of the contesting respondent in breach of Rule 14 framed under the Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) was illegal and the petitioner was entitled to regain the same. He further contended that so long as the release application is not disposed of finally, the passing of allotment order is against the provisions of law. During the pendency of release application the petitioner is entitled to continue in possession of the house. 19. He further contended that so long as the release application is not disposed of finally, the passing of allotment order is against the provisions of law. During the pendency of release application the petitioner is entitled to continue in possession of the house. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that since the respondent has entered into possession on the basis of valid allotment order, for breach of Rule 14 of the Rules the possession of the allottee cannot be held to be illegal. It was only an irregularity, at the most, Rule 14 is ultra vires the provisions of the Act. Another point raised by him is that since the petitioner has filed a revision before the learned District Judge and is pursuing that remedy, she cannot be permitted to proceed with the present writ petition. It may be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 20. The main question to be decided in these writ petitions are (is) whether the entry of the contesting respondent was in accordance with law and the possession is legal. 21. Section 16(1)(a) of the Act provides for the allotment of a building. The enforcement of that allotment order is to be done under Rule 14 which is quoted below :- "14. 21. Section 16(1)(a) of the Act provides for the allotment of a building. The enforcement of that allotment order is to be done under Rule 14 which is quoted below :- "14. Enforcement of order of allotment or release (Section 16(4)) Where any building about to fall vacant is allotted or released under Section 16(1), proceedings for putting the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, in possession shall be taken by the District Magistrate only after the building has actually fallen vacant or is held by him through an inquiry conducted in that behalf to have fallen vacant and an order in Form C shall be served upon the person or persons found in unauthorised occupation of the building directing him or them to.vacate the same and deliver vacant possession thereof to the person named in the order within such period as may be specified in the order, which shall in no case be less than a week from the date of service of the order upon him, and on his failure to comply with the order within the time allowed, the District Magistrate shall issue an order to the Officer in charge of the Police Station in Form D directing him to get the building vacated and to put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building." Thus after obtaining the allotment order, the allottee has to obtain the order from the District Magistrate in Form C. Notice of this is to be served on the person found in possession directing him to vacate and hand over the possession to the allottee. In case of resistance, the District Magistrate is required to pass another order in Form D directing the officer-in-charge of the Police Station to get the building vacated and put the allottee in possession. This is a complete procedure for delivery of possession to the allottee. In no case the possession can be taken by the allottee before the expiry of one week from the date of service of notice in Form C. 22. Notice in Form C issued on 2-12-1983 was never served on the petitioner. Facts reveal that there was resistance from the side of the landlady. In no case the possession can be taken by the allottee before the expiry of one week from the date of service of notice in Form C. 22. Notice in Form C issued on 2-12-1983 was never served on the petitioner. Facts reveal that there was resistance from the side of the landlady. Even then no recourse was taken to Form D. In spite of the fact that the operation of allotment order has been stayed on 5-12-1983 by the learned District Judge, the petitioner was dispossessed in the night of the same date. It is a glaring instance of disrespect to the stay order passed by the court and the high handedness on the part of the contesting respondent. 23. It is a matter of regret that the husband of the contesting respondent, who is a responsible Police Officer, has behaved in such a manner as to bring down the image of the police force as a whole in the eyes of the general public. Police is considered to be the protector of the rights of the citizens. They are not expected to snatch the same in violation of law, particularly from a poor and helpless person like the petitioner. 24. Coming to the first point it may be stated that when the law provides an act to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the same manner and in no other. As discussed above, there is no doubt that the provisions of Rule 14 have been completely violated. Since there was resistance, the allottee should have obtained the order in Form D from the District Magistrate. The law of procedure has its own importance. It has not been incorporated only for ornamental purposes. Where was the occasion for such a haste on the part of the allottee to take the possession without complying with the provisions of the Rules. Under Rule 14 the petitioner could not have been dispossessed before the expiry of one week from the date of service of Form C. Since there was no service of the notice of Form C the allottee could not have entered into possession. There is no difficulty in my way in holding that Rule 14 is mandatory in nature and it has been violated in the instant case. 25. There is a definite purpose behind the said rule. There is no difficulty in my way in holding that Rule 14 is mandatory in nature and it has been violated in the instant case. 25. There is a definite purpose behind the said rule. The person found to be in possession is given an opportunity to either file an objection or to find out an alternative accommodation where he can shift and hand over the vacant possession to the allottee. 26. In the case reported in 1981 All Rent Cas 482 Ram Deo Singh v. II Addl. Dist. Judge, Varanasi, it has been held :- "Rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Act provides the procedure to be followed where an order of release is to be enforced by the District Magistrate. Form C is a notice which has to be issued by the District Magistrate to any unauthorised occupant. This notice in Form C is issued to enable an unauthorised occupant to place his case before the District Magistrate and say whatever he wants to say in respect of possession. It is only after Form C has been issued and unauthorised occupant has been heard, that the District Magistrate gets jurisdiction to issue an order of eviction in Form C prescribed by the Rules." 27. There is another important aspect of the case. On 5-12-1983 the operation of the order of allotment was stayed by the learned District Judge. By disobeying this order, the respondent has entered into possession of the accommodation. The petitioner could have initiated proceedings for contempt but she was pitted against a strong person and, therefore, she did not choose to proceed with the same. 28. Non-compliance of the mandatory provisions makes the possession of the contesting respondent illegal. 29. The conduct of the respondent has been deplorable from the very beginning. The manner in which the contesting respondent walked into the premises is liable to be condemned by this Court. One who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands. This maxim applies equally well to the respondent. The respondent has failed to justify her conduct. Under these circumstances it will be in the interest of justice that the possession of the premises may be restored to the petitioner until the matter for release and the allotment is finally adjudicated upon. 30. This maxim applies equally well to the respondent. The respondent has failed to justify her conduct. Under these circumstances it will be in the interest of justice that the possession of the premises may be restored to the petitioner until the matter for release and the allotment is finally adjudicated upon. 30. This conduct of the respondent disentitles her to raise an objection about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that a revision is pending before the learned District Judge, Lucknow. 31. Now I come to the next question whether the allotment order could subsist in this case after the revisional court has set aside the order of Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) rejecting the release application. The effect of the remand order was that the release application revived for consideration again. 32. This naturally leads to the examination of the validity of the second part of the order dated 15-5-1987 passed by the revisional court. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of Rule 13(4) unless the release application is disposed of finally, no order of allotment could be passed. Sub- rule (4) of Rule 13 is as follows :- "(4) Every application under this rule shall, as far as possible, be decided within one month from the date of its presentation, and no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under this rule shall be made unless such application has been rejected." 34. The object of the Rules appears to be that when a building falls vacant; then either it has to be released in favour of the landlord or it can be allotted to some other person. This sub-rule gives a priority to the claim of the landlord. The use of the word "shall" is a mandate to the competent authority. So long the release application is pending no order of allotment can be passed. This rule is mandatory in nature. 35. The revisional court, while allowing the revision of the petitioner, set aside the Order of Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) rejecting her release application. In this case while doing so it was necessary for the revisional court to have set aside the allotment order also. Rule 13(4) should have been followed in its true spirit. 35. The revisional court, while allowing the revision of the petitioner, set aside the Order of Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) rejecting her release application. In this case while doing so it was necessary for the revisional court to have set aside the allotment order also. Rule 13(4) should have been followed in its true spirit. On the basis of the facts of the present case there was no justification to permit the allottee to remain in possession. The consequence of the revival of release application was the cancellation of allotment order ipso facto. 36. On the basis of the above discussion, I hold that the possession of the contesting respondent was illegal and the order of allotment became invalid after the case was remanded to the competent authority for reconsidering the release application. 37. In the case reported in (1982) 2 All Rent Cas75, Shanti Chand Rastogi v. VI Addl. Dist. Judge, this court while interpreting the provisions of Rule 13(4) has laid down as under :- "It was incumbent on the delegated authority to have first disposed of the release application before passing an order of allotment. Rule 13(4) makes this obligatory......Once it is found that the petitioner had moved an application for release before the delegated authority prior to passing of the order of allotment." 38. In another case reported in 1984 All Rent Cas 626 Smt. Manju Duggal v. The II Addl. District Judge Lucknow and others, again this Court has held that: "The Rent Control & Eviction Officer was under statutory duty to follow procedure laid down in Rule 13(4) i.e. to dispose of the release application first, in remand order." 39. The same view has been taken in another case reported in (1982) 2 All Rent Cas 592 Madhukar Digha v. VII Addl. Dist. Judge, Gorakhpur. 40. Now I come to the question of vires of the Rule 14. The learned counsel for the respondent has challenged the same on the ground that this Rule is in excess of rules making power conferred under Section 41 of the Act. His contention is that a reading of Section 16(4) shows that there was no intention on the part of the Legislature of fixing any period for taking possession in pursuance of the order of allotment. Had it been so then some indications would have been made in the Act itself. 41. His contention is that a reading of Section 16(4) shows that there was no intention on the part of the Legislature of fixing any period for taking possession in pursuance of the order of allotment. Had it been so then some indications would have been made in the Act itself. 41. The submission further is that the purpose of the Act was to handover the possession to the allottee as soon as the order of allotment was passed putting any sort of rider or restriction on the said allotment order is against the spirit of the Act itself. Rule 14 was invalid because of excessive delegation of legislative function. 42. In order to appreciate the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, the aims, objects and purpose of the Act are to be considered. 43. The main object of enacting the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1970 was to control letting so that the most needy of several could be selected and the vacant premises could be made available to him. One who establishes his bona fide need, would be entitled to get the order of allotment. 44. U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been passed as shown from its long title "to provide in the interest of general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of and eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas and for matters connected therewith". There are as many as seven Chapter's in the said Act. The Chapter which is relevant for the present case is Chapter No. III which provides for regulation of letting Section 16 under Chapter III deals with the allotment and release of the vacant building. 45. In order to carry out the scheme the purpose and object of the Act. Section 41 gives power to the State Government to frame rules by notification in the official Gazette. 46. Rule 14 has been framed for enforcing the allotment order passed under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act. The object of the rule is to enable the allottee to obtain the possession of the premises so allotted. The purpose of this rule is to achieve the object of the Act. It has been framed within the strict limits of the rule making power and ensure the carrying out the policy and purpose of the Act. 47. The object of the rule is to enable the allottee to obtain the possession of the premises so allotted. The purpose of this rule is to achieve the object of the Act. It has been framed within the strict limits of the rule making power and ensure the carrying out the policy and purpose of the Act. 47. It is well settled that if the power is conferred to make rules in general terms, the enumeration of topic is construed merely an illustration and does not limit the scope of general rules. This rule is only to facilitate the working of the allotment order. Neither the rule offends the provision of the Act not has the over-riding effect. 48. This rule has been framed to eliminate any mischief which might have come into play at the instance of a person in an unauthorised occupation of the premises. 49. Rules framed under Section 41 have got statutory sanction and sufficient value should be attached to it. This rule does not enlarge the meaning of the section nor it goes beyond what Section 16 itself contemplates. 50. In the case reported in AIR 1965 SC 1885 State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abduila & Co. it has been held as under (At p. 1589) :- "When power to frame rules is conferred by the Act upon the State Government that power may be exercised within the strict limits of the authority conferred. If in making a rule, the State transcends its authority, the rule will be invalid, or statutory rules made in exercise of delegated authority are valid and binding only if made within the limits of authority conferred, validity of a rule whether it is declared to have effect as if enacted in the Act or otherwise is always open to challenge on the ground that it is unauthorised." 51. The Supreme Court while considering the vires of provisions of Rule 14A has laid down the guideline to the effect that it is w ell settled that subordinate provision, if inconsistent with the Act, must give way to the Act. Though when there is apparent conflict between a section of the Act and a rule made thereunder, an attempt should be made to reconcile them, that is to say, the rule may be so construed if the phraseology so permit, as to make it consistent with the Act. Though when there is apparent conflict between a section of the Act and a rule made thereunder, an attempt should be made to reconcile them, that is to say, the rule may be so construed if the phraseology so permit, as to make it consistent with the Act. If it is not possible, rule must be struck down. Relying on this decision it can be said that in the instant case there is no conflict between Section 16 and Rule 14. Both of them are quite consistent. 52. While considering the vires of Rule 11 of the Act, a Full Bench of this court in the case reported in 1979 All Rent Cas 311 : 1979 All LJ 718 Dr. Shamsuddin v. Smt. Zaibunnisan has held as under :- "The general power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, however, cannot be used to widen the scope or the purpose of the Act and to add new and different means for carrying out or to depart from and vary its term (See Shanahan v. Scott, 96 Com WLR 245 at p. 246). This case has been approved by the Privy Council in Utah Construction v. Patkey, (1965) 3 All ER 650 at p. 653. Subject to the above limitation the power to make rule is liberally construed and the opinion of the rule making authority that a rule made by it is to carry out the purposes of the Act is generally accepted. A rule made by an authority in exercise of its power for carrying out the purposes of the Act can be declared invalid only on the following grounds :- (1) Bad faith, i.e. that powers entrusted for one purpose has been deliberately used with the design of achieving another; (2) That it shows on its face a misconstruction of the enabling Act or a failure to comply with the conditions which that Act has prescribed for the exercise of the powers. (3) That it is not capable of being related to any o f the purposes mentioned in t he Act." 53. This Full Bench decision also does not help the respondent. (3) That it is not capable of being related to any o f the purposes mentioned in t he Act." 53. This Full Bench decision also does not help the respondent. This case has laid down that a rule cannot be invalid or ultra vires in case if the State has not transgressed the powers and if the rules have been made for effecting the purpose of the Act, to avoid unfairness and unequality. If these conditions are fulfilled, the provisions cannot be said to be ultra vires. I have already given my own reasons in the preceding paragraphs after disclosing the aims and objects. There is no use repeating the same again. 54. In the case reported in AIR 1976 All 328 Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge, a Full Bench of this Court while examining the rule making power contained in Section 41 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 has laid down certain guidelines : "In the new Act rule making power is contained in Section 41. It obviously enables the State Govt. to make rules "to carry out the purposes of this Act." It certainly does not give carte blanch to enact independent legislation. The expression "to carry out the purposes of the Act" means to enable its provisions to be effectively administered. The connote that the rules are to be confined to the same field of operation as that marked out by the Act itself. Carbines v. Powell (supra) The State v. Murtaza Ali, 1961 All LJ 287 : AIR 1961 All 477 (FB) and R.S. Singh v. R.C. & E.O., 1964 All LJ 412 : AIR 1965 All 49 . This power will authorise the provisions of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is incidental to the execution of its specific provisions. But such a power will not support attempts to widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and different means of carrying them out or to depart from or vary the plan which the legislature has adopted to attain its ends Shanahan v. Scott, 96 Com WLR 245. In other words a subordinate law cannot. substantially modify the scheme or policy of the Act." 55. In other words a subordinate law cannot. substantially modify the scheme or policy of the Act." 55. On the question of vires, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case reported in 1964 All LJ 412 : AIR 1965 All 49 (FB) Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control & Eviction Officers. In that case vires of Rule 6 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 was challenged on the ground that it was beyond the rule making power of the Government. The Full Bench rejected the objection and held Rule 6 to be valid and not beyond the rule making power conferred on the State Govt. under Section 17 o f the Act. It was also held that Rule 6 was mandatory in nature. This case does not help the respondent. 56. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is reported in AIR 1967 SC 1823 Sales Tax Officer. Ponkunnam v. K.I. Abraham where third proviso to Rule 6(1) of Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules 1957 was held to be ultra vires the rule making power under Section 8(4) read with Section 13(4) (c) of the Central Sales Tax Act. It was held in that case "The Phrase "in the prescribed manner" occurring in S. 8(4) of the Act only confers power on the rule making authority to prescribe a rule stating what particulars are to be mentioned in the prescribed form, the nature and value of the goods sold, and to which authority the form is to be furnished. But it does not authories the rule making authority to prescribe a time-limit within which the declaration is to be filed by the registered dealer. The language of S. 13(4) (g) which specifically mentions the time element also makes it clear that the Legislature was conscious of the fact that the expression "in the manner" would denote only the mode in which the act was to be prescribed for the doing of the act, specific words as "the time within which" were also necessary to be put in the statute. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary the words manner and form refer only to the mode in which the thing is to be done, and do not introduce anything from the act referred to as in the thing which is to be done or the time for doing it. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary the words manner and form refer only to the mode in which the thing is to be done, and do not introduce anything from the act referred to as in the thing which is to be done or the time for doing it. This interpretation of Section 8(4) of the Act is also supported by the `Note' to the form of declaration Form C - prescribed by Rule 12 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. The Note states that the form is to be furnished to the prescribed authority in accordance with the rules framed under Section 13(4)(c) by the appropriate State Government." The rule was held to be ultra vires and in excess of the power given by the Act. While holding rule 6(1) Third Proviso as ultra vires of Section 8(4) read with Section 13(4) (c) the main reason which has weighed with the Supreme Court was that Section 8(4) does not authorise rule making authority to prescribe time limit within which a declaration is to be filed by the registered dealer. The language of Section 13(4) which specifically mentions time limit also makes it clear that the legislature was conscious of the fact that the expression "in the manner" would denote the mode in which the act was to be done and if any time limit was to be prescribed for doing the act, specific words could have been used. In the instant case the position is entirely different. Rule 14 only provides the mode of delivering the possession. It is to be in pursuance of the order of allotment under Section 16(l)(a). Rule 14 cannot be said to be ultra vires the provisions of the Act. Thus this authority of the Supreme Court gives no benefit to the respondents. 57. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is reported in AIR 1971 Assam 110, P.K. Basu v. Extra Asstt. Commr., in charge the District Transport Officer. In this case it has been held :- "There is nothing in Motor Vehicles Act limiting qualification of a registered medical practitioner in the matter of granting fitness certificate to applicants for motor driving licence. What is not found in parent Act, cannot be introduced by the State Government in the shape of a rule. In this case it has been held :- "There is nothing in Motor Vehicles Act limiting qualification of a registered medical practitioner in the matter of granting fitness certificate to applicants for motor driving licence. What is not found in parent Act, cannot be introduced by the State Government in the shape of a rule. That portion of the rule is, therefore, excess of the rule making power conferred upon the State Government by Section 21(2) (g) of the Act." 58. In that case since the Act itself was silent on limiting any qualification of the registered medical practitioner by means of the rules, that qualification could not he added. It amounted to overriding the Act itself. 59. In the instant case Rule 14 has been framed for enforcing the order of allotment passed under Section 16 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. Had this rule not been there, then the allottee could not have obtained the possession of the accommodation though having an allotment order in his favour. In the case of P.K. Basu (AIR 1971 Assam 110) (supra) the State Government has introduced something more which was not found in the parent Act itself. On this ground alone the said rule was held to be ultra vires. This authority has no application to the facts of the present case. 60. Rule 14 can be held to be ultra vires only if it had been framed in bad faith and was not made to achieve the purpose of the Act or on its face it shows a misconstruction of the enabling Act or failure to complying with the condition which that Act has prescribed for the exercise of powers or that it is not capable of being related to any of the purposes mentioned in the Act. Rule 14 is in consonance with the Act and does not suffer from any legal infirmity. I hold the rule to intra vires the provisions of the Act. 61. After close of the arguments, an objection was raised by Sri K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents that since in this case, the vires of the Rules have been challenged, no order can be passed without hearing Advocate General. The procedure is not disputed. I hold the rule to intra vires the provisions of the Act. 61. After close of the arguments, an objection was raised by Sri K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents that since in this case, the vires of the Rules have been challenged, no order can be passed without hearing Advocate General. The procedure is not disputed. But in the instant case after hearing counsel for the respondent, since I am not satisfied that the rule is ultra vires, there is no need to issue notice to the Advocate General for hearing at this late stage. If I was to take a contrary view, then of course the learned Advocate General should have been heard. Moreover, the objection at this belated stage does not appear to be bona fide. 62. Sri K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent has made a statement in court that his client has started constructing her own house. It has been raised upto plinth level. It may take about one and a half years to complete the same. The possession of the respondent may not be disturbed till then. She would quietly vacate the same after that period. It is all admitted fact that the present accommodation consists of two rooms, a bathroom and a kitchen. If the respondent is serious then two rooms, bath-room and a kitchen can be completed within three months where she can easily shift and complete the remaining construction thereafter. To me also one and a half year's time does not appear to be reasonable. This proposal of the respondent is not acceptable to the petitioner. 63. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent brought to the notice of this court the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1987 SC FG RC 166 : AIR 1987 SC 1771 Rusi Dinshawji Deboo v. Cawasji Rustomji Patel; 1988 SC FB RC 632 (2) Gopal Karup v. S.A. Abdul Rahim; and 1987 SC FB RC 76 : AIR 1987 SC 406 Duggi v. Sakia, where the aggrieved persons were allowed to continue from one year three months to four years. The facts of each and every case are different. In the instant case the conduct of the respondent has disentitled her to continue any more in possession. The facts of each and every case are different. In the instant case the conduct of the respondent has disentitled her to continue any more in possession. Initially I was not inclined to grant any time but in the interest of justice one month's time is being granted which in my opinion is quite reasonable, to the contesting respondent to hand over the possession of the accommodation to the petitioner. 64. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the case reported in 1981 All Rent Cas 482 Ram Deo Singh v. II Addl. District Judge, Varanasi and others on the basis of which it has been said that the possession of the respondent may not be disturbed till the matter is finally disposed. The facts of the instant case do not make out any case of such indulgence. Since the respondent has dispossessed the petitioner by using force, she must hand over the possession to the petitioner immediately. 65. Another case relied upon is reported in AIR 1966 SC 1206 Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne on the basis of which it was argued that procedural rights are not vested rights. The submission appears to be irrelevant. In that case it was held that the person accused of commission of the offence under Section 23(1) and 230 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act has no vested right to be tried by a particular court or a particular procedure except in so far as no constitutional objection by way of discrimination, violation of any fundamental right is involved. There is no principle underlined in Article 20 of the Constitution which makes a right to any court or procedure a vested right. The case of the Supreme Court does not touch the controversy involved in the present case. 66. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs I hold that Rule 14 is not in excess of the rule making power. It is mandatory in nature. Non-compliance of the same makes the possession of the contesting respondent unauthorised. 67. The peculiar facts of the case reveal that in case if the respondent, who entered into possession illegally against the rules and by disobeying the stay order passed by the revisional court, is allowed to stay in the accommodation, it will shake the confidence of the general public from law courts, which cannot be permitted at any costs. 68. 67. The peculiar facts of the case reveal that in case if the respondent, who entered into possession illegally against the rules and by disobeying the stay order passed by the revisional court, is allowed to stay in the accommodation, it will shake the confidence of the general public from law courts, which cannot be permitted at any costs. 68. Why should this court feel hesitant, while exercising its equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in undoing a wrong which has been done by violating the mandatory provisions of law. I direct the contesting respondent Smt. Mema Lalka to hand over the peaceful vacant possession of the accommodation to the petitioner by 7-8-1989. 69. The concerned authorities are directed to ensure that the possession is restored to the petitioner landlady by 7-8-1989 any time after sun-rise and before sun-set. The District Magistrate, Lucknow is directed to look into the matter personally and see that the petitioner is put into possession by the date so fixed. Any lapse on their part would not be taken lightly by this Court. 70. The husband of the contesting respondent is a senior Police Officer posted as Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow. He may apply to the Government for allotment of an official accommodation within a week from today. The Government is expected to allot a suitable accommodation to him by 5-8-1989 so that the contesting respondent may shift to that accommodation. Though the contesting respondent is not entitled for even this indulgence, but I am doing so the interest of justice. 71. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. The second part of the impugned order of the District Judge, Lucknow dated 15-5-1987 is quashed. Consequently the order of allotment dated 30-11-1983 also stands set aside. 72. Looking to the facts of the case I award Rs. 1000/- as costs to be paid by the contesting respondent to the petitioner by 7-8-1989.