JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. The suit properties and other items belonged to deceased PadmanabhaIyer. He executed Ext. A1 will bequeathing life estate to his wife and reversionto his two daughters. Respondent plaintiff is one of the daughters and ParvathiAmmal is the other. Padmanabha Iyer died in 1955 and his widow in 1962.Daughters settled their claims by two release deeds of 1963 executedbetween them. When Padmanabha Iyer died in 1955, Krishnan and Chamiwere in possession as tenants. They surrendered to the widow in 1957. Plaintschedule items are the properties obtained by the plaintiff, who is one of thedaughters, and the other items were obtained by Parvathi Ammal after thedeath of the widow on the basis of the release deeds. So much facts are not indispute. 2. O. S. No. 114 of 1974, which gave rise to A. S. No. 188 of 1979, was filedfor recovery of possession on the strength of title. Sole defendant, deceasedNatesa Iyer was the father of the appellants, who were impleaded asadditional defendants after his death. Natesa Iyer and DW 2 Kalyana SundaraIyer are the brothers of plaintiff and Parvathi Ammal. Case of the plaintiff isthat from 1957, DW 2 was managing the properties till 1964 under a power ofattorney jointly executed by the father and mother and after he surrendered in1964, she was in direct possession and Natesa Iyer was assisting her. Herfurther case is that she executed a power of attorney in favour of thedefendant in 1971 when she went to Benarus and on her return, the defendantrefused to surrender the properties even though the power of attorney wascancelled. But the case of the defendant is that DW 2 himself was cultivatingas tenant of the mother after the previous tenants surrendered in 1957 for anannual rent of 500 paras of paddy and he surrendered in 1960. The motherthen entrusted him on oral lease for the same rent. After her death, heattorned to the plaintiff and is even now continuing as tenant. Managementunder the power of attorney was denied by him. 3. On the same allegations, he filed an O. A. before the Land Tribunal forpurchase of the rights of the plaintiff in 1972 In 1976, plaintiff also filed an O. Ato purchase the rights of the ultimate jenmi. Managementunder the power of attorney was denied by him. 3. On the same allegations, he filed an O. A. before the Land Tribunal forpurchase of the rights of the plaintiff in 1972 In 1976, plaintiff also filed an O. Ato purchase the rights of the ultimate jenmi. Reference to the Land Tribunalfrom the civil suit was decided against the defendant on the basis of theevidence in the O. A. Accepting that finding, the suit was decreed. A. S. No188 of 1979 is against that decision. C. R. P. No 2019 of 1980 is by theappellants against the dismissal of O. A. No. 4370 of 1972 confirmed by theAppellate Authority. C. R. P. No. 1996 of 1980 is also by them against theorder of the Appellate Authority confirming the order allowing O. A. No 3136 of1976 filed by the plaintiff. They were heard together. 4. Land Tribunal and the Trial Court seem to have overlooked material itemsof evidence and circumstances, including clear admissions of the plaintiff andher sister. Trial Court was bound to accept the finding of the Land Tribunal.Deposition of the original defendant before the Land Tribunal is Ext. B6 andthat of the plaintiff is Ext. B10. She was not examined before the Civil Courtwhere she did not let in any other oral evidence. Defendant died before thesuit came up for trial. One of the appellants was examined as DW 1 and theprior lessee as DW 2. DW 3 is not of much use. DWs 1 and 2 and Ext. B6proved the lease transactions even though Ext. B6 and the evidence of DW 1could be said to be interested. That stigma cannot be attached to DW 2 who isequally related to both though he was also branded as an interested witness.The oral evidence was amply supported by the admissions in Ext. B10 andother admissions of the plaintiff and her sister in various documents. 5. There was Ext. P8 power of attorney jointly executed by the father andmother in favour of DW 2 providing that even on the death of one of them it willcontinue. But the contention and evidence is that after the death of the father,nobody treated Ext. P8 as in force. 5. There was Ext. P8 power of attorney jointly executed by the father andmother in favour of DW 2 providing that even on the death of one of them it willcontinue. But the contention and evidence is that after the death of the father,nobody treated Ext. P8 as in force. The evidence is that from 1957, when thetenants surrendered, DW 2 was cultivating as the tenant of the mother and onhis surrender in 1960, defendant was put in possession as lessee and hesubsequently attorned to the plaintiff after the death of the mother afterexecution of Ext. A2 release by the sister in favour of the plaintiff and Ext. B4release by plaintiff in. favour of the sister on 26-2-1963. Ext. A3 power ofattorney by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant in 1971 when she went toBenarus seems to have been treated by all concerned only subject to theleasehold right of the defendant. That is so even though the plea of ignoranceof Ext. A3 in the written statement was relaxed to a certain extent in Ext. B6. 6. Though in this part of the country the word 'pattom' is ordinarily understoodto mean rent payable by a tenant to the landlord, it is having otherconnotations also depending on facts and circumstances. Burden of proof isone of the factors to be taken into account in considering the connotation.When the owner of the land seeks possession on the strengthof title alleging that the possessor has no title and his title is proved oradmitted, he can claim a decree unless the defendant proves the existence ofa tenancy which entitled him to retain possession (Marimuthu Goundan v.Thambi 1960 KLJ 1304 - followed in Kochu Ouseph v. Joseph and others - 1976 KLT 512 FB). The word 'pattom' may sometimes be used as asubstitute for 'mesne profits' never intending to admit a landlord and tenantrelationship (Hussain Thangal v. Ali - 1961 KLT 1033 ). The word 'rent' is notalways indicative of a lease. In the context in which it is used it can also meanthe rental estimate of the property (Mrs. M. N. Clubwala and another v. FidaHussain Saheb and others, AIR 1965 SC 610 ) and Balakrishnan and others v. Parameswar in Namboodiri alias P. N. Kakkat - 1968 KLT 128 ). The word'rent' or 'pattom' may be loosely used for 'fee' also. M. N. Clubwala and another v. FidaHussain Saheb and others, AIR 1965 SC 610 ) and Balakrishnan and others v. Parameswar in Namboodiri alias P. N. Kakkat - 1968 KLT 128 ). The word'rent' or 'pattom' may be loosely used for 'fee' also. That does not mean thatthe word 'pattom' or 'rent' cannot by itself be considered as indicating alandlord tenant relationship. It has to be understood and interpreted in areasonable manner in the background of other statements, evidence andsurrounding circumstances. 7. A reading of Ext. B10 as a whole indicates that the plaintiff herself wasadmitting some sort of entrustment and cultivation by the defendant. Her casethat she was in possession from 1964 to 1971 and defendant was onlyassisting her in cultivation is not proved. DWs 1 and 2 and Ext. B6 proved thefact that from 1957, DW 2 and from 1960 the defendant were in possessionand cultivation as tenants on payment of rent of 500 paras of paddy. Theseare periods during which no tenancy arrangement is admitted and plaintiff waspleading that DW 2 was managing as power holder till 1964 and thereafterdefendant was assisting her. But in Ext. B11 rent receipt issued by the ultimatejenmi defendant is shown as 'nadappu kudiyan', which means cultivatingtenant. In Ext. A2 release deed executed by the sister to the plaintiff and Ext.B4 release by plaintiff to her sister in 1963, specific reference is there not onlyto pattom, but they refer to arrears of pattom received by the mother from thetenant also. Directions are there to attorn to the tenant in possession, collectrent from him after adjusting the rent received from her by the mother andevict him. When all the recitals in Exts. A2 and B4 are taken together, 'pattom'could only be rent from the cultivating tenant in possession and cannot besomething else. In coming to that conclusion, reliance could be placed onExts. B2 and B3 also. They relate to a portion of one of the suit propertieswhich was acquired by the State for which there was a reference to court forapportionment. Ext. B2 is a joint statement filed by plaintiff and defendantadmitting the defendant to be the cultivating tenant and agreeing that aftergiving the share of the ultimate jenmi the balance may be given to them jointlyby payment to the defendant. That was allowed by Ext. B3 award. Plaintiff hasno explanation to this. 8. Though plaintiff executed Ext. Ext. B2 is a joint statement filed by plaintiff and defendantadmitting the defendant to be the cultivating tenant and agreeing that aftergiving the share of the ultimate jenmi the balance may be given to them jointlyby payment to the defendant. That was allowed by Ext. B3 award. Plaintiff hasno explanation to this. 8. Though plaintiff executed Ext. A3 power of attorney in favour of thedefendant in 1971 when she went to Benarus, she admitted that defendantwas not present when it was executed and registered and it was intended as apower to sell properties. Though she said she has accounts, none wasproduced. It is true that Exts. A7 to A10 letters and Ext. B6 deposition of thedefendant may show that Ext. A3 was handed over to him subsequently bysomebody and he was writing to the plaintiff regarding properties andrendering accounts in some connection. But none of his statements oradmissions will go against his tenancy claim. Though plaintiff said in Ext. B10that Ext. A3 was executed as directed by defendant, he did not admit so. Heonly said that he directed some documents to be executed before going. Henever admitted that he accepted or acted upon Ext. A3 though he admittedhaving received it. Even the conduct of the plaintiff shows that even after Ext.A3 she was treating the tenancy of the defendant as subsisting. Anyhow inview of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, In November 1971defendant could hot have surrendered the lease to the plaintiff even if asurrender could be inferred from Ext. A3. Ext. B12 is a letter admittedly writtenby the plaintiff to the defendant from Banarus in 1972. In it she made specificreference to the amount received from the defendant being adjusted towardsarrears of rent and balance rent for the current year. That cannot beaccounting claimed from a power of attorney holder. Plaintiff had noexplanation to this also. That may be why she did not enter the box when trialstarted. It is clear that cultivation was only through tenants and the mother andplaintiff were only receiving rent. 9. It is true that while construing deeds and other records, which speak forthemselves in a manner affecting the rights of parties, the court should takeprecaution in seeing that they are not only technically proved, but the recitalsare proved to be true. It is clear that cultivation was only through tenants and the mother andplaintiff were only receiving rent. 9. It is true that while construing deeds and other records, which speak forthemselves in a manner affecting the rights of parties, the court should takeprecaution in seeing that they are not only technically proved, but the recitalsare proved to be true. If there is some genuine doubt on the truth of recitals byreason of circumstances and evidence courts should insist on better standardof proof (Manickathammal and others v. Nallasami Pillai and others AIR 1977Madras 83) So also, before rights of a party can be considered to have beendefeated on the basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of thestatement made by him must be clear and conclusive. There should be nodoubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission (Chikkam Koteswara Rao. v.Chikkam Subbarao and others, AIR 1971 SC 1542 ). At the same time, anadmission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, andadmissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether theparty making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that partywhen appearing as witness was confronted with these statements in case itmade a statement contrary to those admissions (Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd. and others AIR 1977 SC 409 ). Here, the plaintiffwas confronted with the statements and she had no acceptable explanationwhich could go against a lease arrangement. In fact, her evidence onlyconfirms the lease borne out by the admissions in these documents. As held in Kesavan Namboothiri Krisknaru Namboothiri v. Padmanabhan Velayudhanand others, AIR 1971 Kerala 234), a compromise decree like Ext. B3 createsan estoppel by judgment and a judgment by consent is as effective anestoppel between the parties as a judgement in a contested case. 10. Loan on the security of the property, evidenced by Exts. B14 and B.15,cannot improve the case of the plaintiff especially in view of her statement inthe box that she does not know the society and she has not availed any loan.Levy in her name also cannot improve her case in view of her admission thatin spite of the records the defendant was the person responsible for paymentof levy, water tax and land tax and he was paying. That evidence probabilisesthe case of the defendant that levy records, etc. That evidence probabilisesthe case of the defendant that levy records, etc. were made in the name of theplaintiff with a view to lessen his burden of tax and facilitate transport of paddyto the plaintiff. 11. It is thus clear that defendant was in possession as lessee and theattempt of the plaintiff was only to see whether the tenancy could be avoidedon the strength of Ext. A3 which was executed with ulterior purpose. 12. A. S. No 188 of 1979 is allowed and in reversal of the decree of the TrialCourt, the suit is dismissed. Both the civil revision petitions are also allowedand the judgments of the Appellate Authority, confirming the orders of theLand Tribunal, are set aside. O. A. No. 4370 of 1972 filed by the revisionpetitioner is allowed and O.A. No. 3136 of 1976 filed by the respondent isdismissed. No. costs. Land Tribunal will pass appropriate orders.