JUDGMENT H. Suresh, J. - This is an application for bail in the two cases bearing C.R. No 257 of 1988 and C.R. No 422 of 1988. In the first case, the petitioner has been charged under Sections. 302, 149, 143, 147 and 148 of Indian Penal Code and under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act In die other case, namely, C.R. No 422 of 1988 the Petitioner has been charged under Section 307 read with Sections 149, 332 read with 149, Section 224 read with 149 Section 333 read with 149, Section 341 read with 149, Sections 143, 147 and 148 of Indian Penal Code and under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act. The Petitioner surrendered to the Police on 18-10-88. The Petitioner was produced before the learned Magistrate on 19-10-88 and he was remanded to the police custody. On 5-1-89, which was the 79th day of his being in custody the learned Magistrate remanded the Petitioner to the judicial custody till 19-1-89, which would be the 93rd day. Mr. Ponda says that that order remanding the Petitioner to the custody beyond 90th day is illegal. 2. However, on the 9th of January 1989, a charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the. Metropolitan Magistrate27th Court, Mulund Bombay. The learned Magistrate on that day took note of the fact that the petitioner-Accused was absent and the learned Magistrate adjourned the case to 19-1-1989. On 17th January 1989, which was the 91st day of the Petitioner being in custody an application was made before the learned Magistrate under Section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of releasing him on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate thought proper. This was opposed to by the prosecution and the learned Magistrate by his order dated 19th January, 1989 rejected the application for bail. In that order, the learned Magistrate observed that even though charge-sheet was filed on 9th of January 1989 nothing was done with respect to the case till that date. The learned Magistrate proceeded on the assumption that mere filing of the charge-sheet within 90 days was sufficient to remand the Accused to the further custody. 3. As against that, the Petitioner filed an application before the Sessions Court of Greater Bombay. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 30th January 1989 rejected the application made by the Petitioner. The learned Magistrate proceeded on the assumption that mere filing of the charge-sheet within 90 days was sufficient to remand the Accused to the further custody. 3. As against that, the Petitioner filed an application before the Sessions Court of Greater Bombay. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 30th January 1989 rejected the application made by the Petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the assumption that Section 167, sub-section (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted if there are more than two or three cases as against the accused. He also opined relying on the decisions of the Patna High Court one in the case of Rabindra Rai v. The State of Bihar1 and the other one in the case of Shamoha Nath Singh v. The State of Bihar2 wherein there a reference to a Supreme Court decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Brahman3 and held that mere filing of a charge-sheet within 90 days would amount to taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Magistrate and on that basis it was open to the learned Magistrate to remand the accused to further custody. 4. Mr. Ponda has challenged these two orders passed by the learned Magistrate as also by the learned Sessions Judge and he submitted that both the orders are contrary to law and that having regard to the fact that the learned Magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence the Petitioner becomes entitled to bail as provided under Section 167, sub-section (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Undoubtedly under Section 167, subsection (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code if no charge sheet has been filed within 90 days the petitioner accused becomes entitled to be released on bail. However, if a charge-sheet is filed it is open to the learned Magistrate to remand him to further custody if it could be said that the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 309, sub-section (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore the question is what is the meaning of the words "taking cognizance of an offence" Mr. Solkar submitted that when the learned Magistrate took the charge-sheet on record and kept the matter on 19-1-1989, it could be said that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. Mr. Therefore the question is what is the meaning of the words "taking cognizance of an offence" Mr. Solkar submitted that when the learned Magistrate took the charge-sheet on record and kept the matter on 19-1-1989, it could be said that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. Mr. Ponda, on the other hand, has drawn my attention to the case of Gopal Das v. State of Assam4 wherein it has been expressly held that it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind, not for the purpose of proceedings under the various sections of Chapter XVI, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. In fact there is a passage in this Judgment, which can usefully be quoted and it is as follows: "The following observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 437. "What is taking cognizance has not been denied in the Criminal procedure and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognisance of any offence under Section 190 (1) (a) Criminal Procedure Code he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter- proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter but for taking action of some other kind e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156 (3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he can not be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." were approved by this court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 S.C.R. 312 : (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 207)." 6. Therefore, what is required is the application of mind on the part of the learned. Magistrate for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence and there is a purpose behind such an interpretation. Therefore, what is required is the application of mind on the part of the learned. Magistrate for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence and there is a purpose behind such an interpretation. If on application of mind, the offence disclosed is an offence triable exclusively by the Sessions Court then obviously the learned Magistrate will have to commit the case to the Court of Sessions. On the other hand, if on such application of mind, the learned Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the case is not exclusively triable by the Sessions Court or that the offence disclosed is such as cannot be punished with death or life imprisonment, then it becomes a bailable offence and in that case the accused automatically get a right to seek bail. Mere mechanical adjournment of a case after a charge-sheet is filed is neither an enquiry nor taking cognizance of the case within the meaning of Section 309, sub-section (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure or within the meaning of Section 2(g) of Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. In fact, Mr. Ponda is right when he pointed out that in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Brahman, (supra) the Supreme Court has categorically stated that it is not open to the learned Magistrate to commit the case straightaway to the Sessions Court, unless he applies his mind and an enquiry is held. It has been stated in that case that mere filing of a charge-sheet would not automatically result in committing the case to the Court of Sessions. 8. Mr. Solkar submitted that in this case when the charge-sheet was filed on 19th January 1989, the accused, were not brought before the learned Magistrate. The accused were also not given the statements of witnesses as required under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The case was just adjourned to 19th January 1989. It is for the learned Magistrate to be satisfied that the statements of the witnesses and the police report were all supplied as required under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Accused. That is how the learned Magistrate still retains the matter with him and begins an enquiry for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence. Mr. That is how the learned Magistrate still retains the matter with him and begins an enquiry for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence. Mr. Solkar submitted that in the present case, the statements have been given to the accused on 17-1-1989, which submission has been disputed by Mr. Ponda. But I think that that should not make any difference, inasmuch as on 17-1-1989 the detention of the Accused had crossed the limit of 90 days and as on that day the Accused was entitled to go on bail, for which he made an application on that very day. 9. In the result I will have to grant the present application. However, I make it clear that I have not gone into the merits of the case and the case has been argued purely on questions of law. It is an admitted position that the case has not yet been committed to the Court of Sessions. I, therefore, pass the following order: The Petitioner be released on bail in the sum of Rs. 5000/- with one surety in the like amount. He shall report to Bhandup Police Station everyday between 5.00 P.M. and 7.00 P.M. till the case is committed to the Sessions Court. Thereafter he shall report at the Police Station once in a fortnight. 1. 1984 Cri. L.J.P. 1412. 2. 1987 Cri. L. J. 810. 3. 1983 Cri. L. J. 839. 4. 1961 (2) Crl. L.J . 39.