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1989 DIGILAW 49 (DEL)

RANDHIR KHOSIA v. SHARAN PARSHAD SURI

1989-02-03

Y.K.SABHARWAL

body1989
Y. K. Sabharwal ( 1 ) PLAINTIFFS have filed this suit seeking dissolution of partnership and rendition of account of business which was being carried on in the name and style of M/s. R. S, Electric Works in which they claim that parties to the suit were partners. On 18th August, 1987 defendants/applicants appeared in the suit through counsel and stated that there is an arbitration clause in the partnership-deed and an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act has already been filed, and that they would be filling an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. ( 2 ) ADMITTED facts are that the applicants on or about 12th August, 1987 had filed Suit No. 1697-A/87 being a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act seeking filling of the arbitration agreement and reference of disputes between the parties to arbitration. In the said suit an order was passed on 10th September, 1987 inter alia appointing an Advocate of this court as a Local Commissioner to make inventory of the goods of the erstwhile partnership firm and to sign the books of accounts, etc. The applicants had opposed the prayer of the plaintiffs to appoint a Local Commissioner. The said Local Commissioner had submitted the report on 14th September, 1987. The suit was listed on 15th September, 1987 and was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the statement made by the counsel for the applicants in the said suit and the following order was passed : "counsel for the petitioner states that he wishes to withdraw this petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act because according to the counsel a suit has been filed today. The petition is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn on payment of Rs. 1,000 as costs. " ( 3 ) IT also appears that the suit REFERRED TO to in the aforesaid order was not filed on 15th September, 1987 although a statement was made that "suit has been filed today but it was filed on 18th September, 1987. A copy of the plaint of the suit filed on 18th September, 1987 (Suit No. 608/87) has been placed on record of these proceedings. A copy of the plaint of the suit filed on 18th September, 1987 (Suit No. 608/87) has been placed on record of these proceedings. Suit No. 608/87 was filed by the applicants for declaration and injunction inter alia seeking a decree that the alleged partnership deed dated 7th April, 1981 between the parties particularly clause 8 of the same be declared null and void and not binding on the applicants. One of the pleas taken in the said suit is that the alleged partnership particularly its clause 8 was illegal and without free will and was made under misrepresentation and undue influence and as such is voidable. The application for injunction filed in Suit No. 608/87 praying that defendants (Plaintiffs herein) may be restrained from interferring/dispossessing plaintiffs from premises No. 1313-1314, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi was dismissed by Mr. H. S. Sharma Sub-Judge, Delhi by orders made on 20th October, 1987. ( 4 ) THE defendants/applicants have filed this application (D. A. 7539/ 87) on 14th September, 1987 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act seeking stay of these proceedings on the ground that the subject matter of the suit is covered by arbitration clause 16 in the partnership-deed of 7th April, 1981. The applicants have also averred in the application that they were always and still remain ready and willing to do all these necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration. ( 5 ) THE application is resisted by the plaintiffs and two objections put forth are : (1) that the defendants/applicants have not been ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration which is evidence from their conduct soon after the filling of this application, and (2) that there sufficient reasons to refuse the prayer of the applicants to stay these proceedings. ( 6 ) IN support of the first objection, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has placed strong reliance upon the order dated 15th September, 1987 extracted above whereby applicants withdraw their petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The argument is that the withdrawal of the Section 20 petition by the applicants shows that they were not ready and willing to go ahead with the arbitration. Before an order of stay is passed under Section 34, it is necessary that the following condition should be fulfilled. The argument is that the withdrawal of the Section 20 petition by the applicants shows that they were not ready and willing to go ahead with the arbitration. Before an order of stay is passed under Section 34, it is necessary that the following condition should be fulfilled. " (1) The proceedings must have been commenced by a party to an arbitration agreement against any other party to the agreement; (2) The legal proceedings which is sought to be stayed must be in respect of a matter agreed to be REFERRED TO ; (3) The applicant for stay must be a party to the legal proceedings and he must have taken no step in the proceeding after appearance. It is also necessary that he should satisfy the court not only that he is but also was at the commencement of the proceedings ready and willing to do every thing necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration ; and (4) The court must be satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be REFERRED TO to an arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. " (See : Anderson Wright Ltd. v. Mom and Co. 1 ( 7 ) THE applicants have fulfilled first and second conditions. With regard to third condition, the question, is that upto what stage the applicants have to remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the said readiness and willingness is to be seen at the time when the proceedings are commenced and not at a stage thereafter. The argument is that the applicants were ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration which is evident from the fact that they made such a statement on 18th August, 1987 itself and thereafter filed the present application. The language of S. 34, however, shows THat the readiness and willingness of the party seeking stay of the judicial proceedings has to be shown not only at the commencement of the judicial proceedings or at the time or filling application under Section 34 but till such time the said application is disposed of. The language of S. 34, however, shows THat the readiness and willingness of the party seeking stay of the judicial proceedings has to be shown not only at the commencement of the judicial proceedings or at the time or filling application under Section 34 but till such time the said application is disposed of. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the words still remains in Section 34 refers to the stage of the commencement of legal proceedings or in any case the stage of filling of application under Section 34. I do not agree. If this argument is to be accepted, then the words still remains in Section 34 would become redundant. It would mean that a party who was ready and willing at the commencement of the proceedings and was also ready and willing at the time of filling the application but with-drawns his readiness and willingness thereafter will still be entitled to an order of stay of the judicial proceedings. In my opinion, the interpretation sought to be placed on the provisions of Section 34 by the learned counsel forthe applications is misplaced. Reliance of learned counsel for the applicants on judgment of Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Thakur Shipping Company and others2 is misconceived. The Supreme Court did not hold that an applicant has not to show readiness and willingness after filing of application for stay. In this judgement the Supreme Court has again reiterated its earlier view in Anderson Wright case (supra ). The use of the words was and still remains in Section 34 shows that a person seeking stay has to satisfy the Court, that he was ready and willing to get the subject matter adjudicated by arbitration, both before and after the commencement of adjudicial proceedings. The use of the words still remains do not show that readiness and willingness is to be shown only at the time of filing application for stay and not thereafter. In N. C. Padmanabhan v. S. Srinivasan3 it was held that the readiness and willingness is to be shown for the entire period both before commencement of the suit and thereafter. ( 8 ) THE order withdrawing the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 1679-A/87) shows that the defendants were not ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of arbitration proceedings. ( 8 ) THE order withdrawing the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 1679-A/87) shows that the defendants were not ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of arbitration proceedings. Learned counsel for the applicants have tried to explain the withdrawal made on 15th September, 1987 on the ground that the said petition under Section 20 was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 35 of the Arbitration Act and as such. Suit No. 169-A/87 withdrawn. I fail to see the applicability of Section 35. It does not have any effect on a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. It is also not the case of the applicant that notice in the suit was given to any arbirator. The said question did not arise because no arbitrator had been appointed. Reliance on Section 35 as a ground for withdrawing suit No. 1697-A/87 is wholly misplaced. This suit was withdrawn not because the applicants thought that it will be hit by Section 35. The counsel had sought leave to withdraw suit No. 1697-A/87 because of filling of some other suit. The explanation now given is without substance. ( 9 ) THE defendants showed their un-willingness for the proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings not only by the aforesaid withdrawal but also by filling the suit No. 608/87 REFERRED TO to above. In the said suit they have challenged the legality of the same partnership deed which contains the arbitration clause on which reliance is being placed to seek the stay of these proceedings. In may opinion, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/ applicants has substantiated first objection to the refusal of the stay of the proceedings. ( 10 ) ASSUMING that I am not right, on interpretation of Section 34 of Arbitration Act, in regard to the stage upto which a party is to show readiness and willingness then also the applicants are not entitled to the stay of these proceedings. It is well settled that order of stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is a matter of discretion. It is well settled that order of stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is a matter of discretion. Even if the subject matter of a suit is covered by arbitration clause, the Court in its discretion can refuse stay of the judicial proceedings if there are sufficient reasons for it although a party seeking stay may be ready and willing to all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration. There are sufficient reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to refuse the stay of these proceedings. It is evident from the facts given above that the applicants had withdrawn Suit No. 1697-A/87 and the statement given at the time of withdrawal was not that the said petition was not maintainable in view of Section 35 of the Arbitration Act but was that they had filed some other suit that day. It was an incorrect statement. Admittedly no suit had been filed on 15th September, 1987. The suit (608/87) was filed on 18th September, 1987 by the applicants challenging the same partnership deed containing the arbitration clause on the ground of misrepresentation and undue influence etc. In my opinion, these facts by itself show sufficient reasons to refuse the stay of these proceedings and the second objection of the plaintiffs is also well founded. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, I. A. 7539/87 is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1000.