JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs' second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and damages. The trial court decreed the suit, but on appeal by the defendants the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate court. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are these : One Shital Prasad was admittedly the owner of the disputed house. Parmanand Singh was its tenant. The plaintiff appellants claiming to be the sous of the sister of Shital Prasad instituted the present suit no. 417 of 1972 on 4-11-1972 for the ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent etc. against Parmanand Singh. The allegations in the plaint were that Shital Prasad their maternal uncle had determined the tenancy of Parmanand by means of a notice dated 26-6-1972. Shital Prasad, however, died according to the plaintiffs on 6-7-1972 whereupon the plaintiff appellants sent another notice dated 26-9-1972 determining the tenancy of Parmanand Singh. Parmanand having failed to vacate the house, the present suit was brought for the reliefs mentioned above. After the institution of the suit, Parmanand is stated to have vacated the house and handed over possession to Harakh alias Ram Harakh on 7-1-1972. Accordingly, he was also impleaded as a defendant in the suit. Consequential amendments were made in the plaint. During the pendency of the suit Harakh died and his legal representatives were brought on the record. The suit was contested by the heirs and legal representatives of Harakh and Parmanand Singh. These contesting defendants denied the relationship between the plaintiff appellants and Shital Prasad. It was asserted that the plaintiffs were not the sister's son of Shital Prasad. They claimed that Harakh was the husband of the sister of Shital Prasad who died in the month of April 1972. They also denied that Shital Prasad had issued any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Their defence further was that Parmanand Singh was paying rent to Harakh and had later delivered possession to him on 1-10-1972. The contesting defendants were thus in possession after 1-10-1972 as the rightful owners of the property being the heirs of Shital Prasad. 3. Their defence further was that Parmanand Singh was paying rent to Harakh and had later delivered possession to him on 1-10-1972. The contesting defendants were thus in possession after 1-10-1972 as the rightful owners of the property being the heirs of Shital Prasad. 3. On a consideration of the evidence on the record the trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs and not the legal representatives of Harakh were the heirs of Shital Prasad and that the tenancy of Parmanand Singh having been duly determined the suit was liable to be decreed for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent etc. 4. On appeal by the defendants (other than Parmanand Singh), the lower appellate court reversed the decree of the trial court and the findings on which the same was based and dismissed the suit. Three questions were formulated by the lower appellate court for its decision. These were : (1) Whether the court below had no jurisdiction to try the suit ? (2) Whether the plaintiff respondents nos. 1 to 4 are the sister's sons of late Shital Prasad ? Either way its effect ? (3) Whether the tenancy of the defendant respondent no. 5 Parmanand Singh was validly determined under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act ? The first question was answered by the lower appellate court in favour of the plaintiffs and inasmuch as finding was not assailed before me by the defendant respondents, I am not commenting on the same. I, however, perused the finding and am of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court is correct. 5. The crucial question, which was the subject of main debate at the Bar, was whether the finding of the lower appellate court on the second question set out is legally correct and sound. It is hardly necessary to stress that the issue raised under the second question formulated by the lower appellate court is essentially one of fact. It is equally unnecessary to repeat that the inferences to be drawn from the facts established on the record upon this issue would also raise a question of fact and not of law unless in reaching the ultimate conclusion upon this issue of fact, lower appellate court is found to have committed any error so as to produce a substantial error of law. 6. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and given the matter a careful consideration I am of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court, namely, that the plaintiff appellants have failed to prove that they are the sister's son of Shital Prasad is perfectly sound and is not only fully supported by the evidence on the record but the same does not suffer from any error of law much less a substantial error of law. The issue turned mainly on appraisal of oral evidence. Three witnesses were examined of both sides. The lower appellate court scrutinised the statement of every single witness examined on behalf of the plaintiff and rejected that testimony on the grounds which to my mind are perfectly legitimate. The lower appellate court was also right in observing that the onus to prove that the plaintiffs were the sister's sons of Shital Prasad lay heavily on the plaintiffs. The lower appellate court began with the consideration of the testimony of Bhagai PW 2 and rejected the same on the ground that he hailed from a different village and also belonged to a different caste. The source of information claimed to have been derived by him regarding the relationship of the plaintiffs with Shital Prasad is the allegation that he worked as a mason during the construction of the house in dispute. These facts the lower appellate court rightly considered as insufficient to constitute legal evidence for the purpose of proving the relationship under Section 50 of the Evidence Act It is indisputable that before an opinion as to relationship of one person to another can be read in evidence, it must be established that the person expressing the opinion has special means of knowledge on the subject. Bhagai had obviously no such special means. He was neither a permanent employee nor a relation of Shital Prasad. Neither was he visiting Shital Prasad regularly. He is alleged to have worked as a mason during the construction of the house in dispute. Such a casual connection with Shital Prasad could not have invested him with that special means of knowledge as to be able to depose about the relationship of the plaintiffs with Shitai Prasad. 7. Neither was he visiting Shital Prasad regularly. He is alleged to have worked as a mason during the construction of the house in dispute. Such a casual connection with Shital Prasad could not have invested him with that special means of knowledge as to be able to depose about the relationship of the plaintiffs with Shitai Prasad. 7. Sri S. N. Misra learned counsel for the appellant, however, sought to sustain the statement of Bhagai on the strength of Section 32 (5) of the Evidence Act. It may be mentioned that though several questions were formulated in the memorandum of the appeal, none related to the application of Section 32 (5). The second appeal having been admitted only on the questions formulated, the appellants cannot be permitted to raise the point which undeniably depends on facts. It is noteworthy that no attempt was made before the courts below to prove the statement of Shital Prasad, whether written or oral under Section 32 (5). In any case, the lower appellate court was not prepared to place reliance on the statement of Bhagai on the issue of relationship because he belonged to another village and another caste and was a casual mason who had worked only on a single occasion. This coupled with the fact that elder members of the family had abstained from the witness box the lower appellate court rightly rejected his testimony. 8. The second submission was that the lower appellate court was wrong in treating the statement made by Bhagai in his cross-examination that Behari and others were also the sister's son of Shital Prasad as an admission inasmuch as in the preceding line he had denied that relationship. I am unable to agree. The admission made by Bhagai that Behari and others were also the sons of the sister of Shital Prasad is so explicit and categorical that the lower appellate court could legitimately rely on the same as an admission of the witness. The lower appellate court has in any case committed no error in reading the statement made by Bhogai in cross-examination as lending support to the evidences led by the defendants. 9. The lower appellate court has in any case committed no error in reading the statement made by Bhogai in cross-examination as lending support to the evidences led by the defendants. 9. Sri S. N. Misra next contended that the lower appellate court was wrong in rejecting the statement of the plaintiff Chiranjilal on the ground that he was the youngest of the brothers among the plaintiffs and the elder brothers had not chosen to enter the witness box to prove their relationship with Shital Prasad. In my opinion, the lower appellate court was perfectly right in rejecting the testimony of Chiranjilal. The ground of rejection was legitimate and proper. Further where the issue was as to the relationship of the plaintiffs with Shital Prasad, it is apparent that the reluctance of the older members of the family to enter the witness box assumed great importance in assessing the veracity of the plaintiff's case. As a final court of fact, the lower appellate court was perfectly entitled to reject the statement of Chiranjilal on that ground. In any case, the submission relates to the realm of appraisal of evidence and cannot, therefore, be permitted to be raised in a second appeal 10. Learned counsel for the appellants then placed reliance on various decisions, viz. 1982 Allahabad Law Journal 427, 1952 Supreme Court 120, 1985 Allahabad Civil Journal 54 in support of his contention that the appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with the assessment of the oral evidence made by the trial court inasmuch as the trial court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. It was urged that the appellate court should have left the assessment made by the trial court of the oral evidence untouched. I regret my inability to accept the contention. It is true that where the assessment of evidence of the credibility of witnesses depends on their demeanour, the lower appellate court generally does not interfere with the opinion of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses. That, however, does not mean that the appellate court as a court of fact is not free to form its own opinion on the issue whether in view of the inherent inconsistencies or contradictions in the statement of witnesses, they should be believed. That, however, does not mean that the appellate court as a court of fact is not free to form its own opinion on the issue whether in view of the inherent inconsistencies or contradictions in the statement of witnesses, they should be believed. In the present case the lower appellate court has offered specific reasons for differing with the trial court on the issue whether the plaintiffs' evidence should be believed. These reasons as commented above being sound and cogent call for no interference in a second appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants also invited my attention to various documents like paper no. 66-A, 67-A, 70-A, 75-A and 78-A which according to the learned counsel were considered by the trial court but not by the lower appellate court. He submitted that failure of the appellate court to consider the same has produced a substantial error of law. 12. The submission is devoid of any merit. In the first place the documents referred to by the learned counsel were admittedly not proved and were, therefore, not exhibited by the trial court. The lower appellate court hence rightly attached no importance to the same. In the second place as mentioned above, the issue as to the relationship between the plaintiffs and Shital Prasad turned entirely on the oral evidence led by the parties and once the oral evidence led by the plaintiffs was rejected and that adduced by the defendant respondents, accepted by the lower appellate court, the very edifice of the plaintiffs' case collapsed. The finding of the lower appellate court on the third point formulated by it is a finding of fact which the learned counsel for the appellants was unable to demonstrate to be erroneous or unsustainable in law. The same is accordingly affirmed. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.