Judgment :- 1. Preliminary decree in a suit for realisation of mortgage amount is challenged by the defendants. 2. Ext. Al usufructuary mortgage dated 18-8-1961 involves a lease back by the appellants evidenced by Ext.A2 on the same date. The transaction is, therefore, hit by the provisions of Debt Relief Act 2 of 1970, which converts the mortgage by statutory fiction into a simple mortgage enabling the mortgagee to realise only the mortgage amount with 6% interest. That alone was decreed. Plea of discharge directed to be considered in the final decree is not under challenge before me and hence I am not expressing anything on that aspect on 18-8-1961, the suit was filed only on 27-7-1978. Period of limitation under Art.62 is 12 years from the date on which money became due. Ext Al provides for a term of three years. Therefore, the contention is that the suit ought to have been filed on or before 18-8-1976. Exts.B1 to B4 are the rent receipts, under the lease transaction, issued by the plaintiff and admitted by the appellants. The last one is Ext. B4 dated 16-10-1967 and on its basis enlarged period of limitation was claimed till 16-10-1979 as an acknowledgement under S.19 of the Limitation Act. The contentions are that Ext.B4 cannot operate as acknowledgment because (i) it is not in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by the appellants who were making the payment as enjoined by the proviso to S.19 of the Limitation Act, and (ii) Ext. B4 is not before the expiration of the period of three years provided under Ext.A2 lease back and hence the payment will not come under S.19. 3. Main attack was against rejection of the plea of limitation. Though the mortgage and lease back were Both are untenable contentions. Under S.19 of the Limitation Act, it is the payment made before the expiry of the period of limitation that enables computation of a fresh period of limitation from that date. The acknowledgment in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by the maker, is insisted only by the proviso. That is to prevent fraudulent oral testimony as to payment. It is not the endorsement, but the payment alone that saves limitation. The endorsement need not necessarily be simultaneous with the payment It can be at anytime after the payment, even after expiry of the period of limitation. That is to prevent fraudulent oral testimony as to payment. It is not the endorsement, but the payment alone that saves limitation. The endorsement need not necessarily be simultaneous with the payment It can be at anytime after the payment, even after expiry of the period of limitation. But it must necessarily be before the institution of the suit because the acknowledgment saving limitation will have to be pleaded in the plaint since it is the duty of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that he has brought the suit within time. Even though it is the payment that saves limitation the legislature insists on a written or signed acknowledgment as the only proof of payment and excludes oral testimony. Unless there' is acknowledgment in the required form, the payment by itself is of no avail (Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad and others - AIR 1951 S.C 477 and Arjunlal Dhanji Rathod v. Dayaram Premji Padhiar -AIR 1971 Patna 278). Simultaneous existence of the two conditions of payment within time and acknowledgment in writing either in the handwriting or in a writing signed by the debtor is necessary. 4. But there is the explanation to S.19 in two parts, Clause (a) of which corresponds to sub-section (2) of S.20 of the old Act. Under Explanation (a), when the mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of rent or produce of such land by him itself shall be deemed to be payment under S.19 for saving limitation. It is not necessary that the mortgagee should be in direct physical possession of the land. Constructive possession through lessee or agent is as good as his own possession. It is immaterial whether the lessee is the mortgagor himself or anybody else. Right to possession is the criterion. It applies not only to usufructuary mortgagees, but also to those mortgagees who are otherwise in possession. Rent should be construed ejusdem generis with produce. It is enough if he receives rent though he is not in actual possession if he is in possession and taking the yield that is all the more sufficient. So long as he is in possession and taking the yield it will be considered as payment saving limitation and causing every time the starting of fresh period of limitation. It is enough if he receives rent though he is not in actual possession if he is in possession and taking the yield that is all the more sufficient. So long as he is in possession and taking the yield it will be considered as payment saving limitation and causing every time the starting of fresh period of limitation. That means limitation, so far as realisation of the mortgage amount is concerned, will not run against him so long as he is in possession and enjoyment either directly or constructively. But constructive possession must be live. 5. Explanation (a) is separate and subsequent to the proviso and it is not governed or controlled by the proviso which governs the main section. In order to save limitation in a case coming under the proviso, it is not necessary that there should be an acknowledgment appearing in the handwriting or writing signed by the debtor. Insistence on such a condition will work hardships and render the explanation absurd. When the mortgagee is in direct possession, there will not be any acknowledgment from the mortgagor that he has taken yield. Acknowledgment to the lessee or agent will only be by the mortgagee and not mortgagor. Even though under Exts. Al and A2 together the transaction is now statutorily treated as a simple mortgage under which 6% interest alone could be claimed, that is only by fiction of law. For the purpose of S.19 of the Limitation Act, it is a mortgage with possession. 6. The mere fact of receiving rent or profits is sufficient to save limitation. Sant Lal Mahton's case (AIR 1951 S.C 477) and Arjunlal Dhanji Rathod's case (AIR 1971 Patna 278), relied on by the appellants for contending to the contrary, are not applicable because they did not consider the applicability of S.20(2) which is now Explanation (a) to S.19. Kumari Ittaman v. Bhaskara Menon (AIR 1953 T.C 63) is authority for the position that a mortgagee who leased out the property will come within the ambit of the explanation. But the provision is confined to cases where the mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee who claims the mortgage amount and not to cases of redemption. Padmanabhan Pankajakshan v. Ayyappan Narayanan (1966 KLJ 559) and the decisions and authors cited therein are apt to the point. 8. But the provision is confined to cases where the mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee who claims the mortgage amount and not to cases of redemption. Padmanabhan Pankajakshan v. Ayyappan Narayanan (1966 KLJ 559) and the decisions and authors cited therein are apt to the point. 8. Explanation (a) makes the receipt of rent or produce by the mortgagee a payment for the purpose of S.19 including the proviso. When rent is received by the mortgagee, then, in the eye of law, the conditions of the section and proviso are satisfied without anything more. Receipt of rent is as good as if the mortgagor made the payment and it appeared in his writing or a writing signed by him. The object of Explanation (a) to S.19 is to dispense with actual payment evidenced by an acknowledgement and it is not controlled by the other provisions. A suit by the mortgagee for sale is a suit to recover a debt and in such a suit, the mortgagee is entitled to rely on the receipt of produce for saving limitation. Exts.B1 to B4 are admitted. 9. There is no force in the argument that Ext.B4 is not acceptable for the reason that the payment or receipt is after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is true that in Ext. A2 lease back there is a period of three years and Ext.B4 was after that. But, admittedly, the appellants continued in possession with liability to pay rent and they paid rent. Expiry of the term of Ext.A2 is not a relevant factor. I fail to understand how the counsel thought it fit to argue that Ext.B4 evidences a payment made after the debt is barred. The debt is the mortgage debt and it survives so long as the mortgagee is in possession either directly or constructively. 10. Equally untenable is the contention that the award of 6% interest is wrong in the absence of contract to that effect in Ext. Al. Liability for rent under Ext. A2 is much higher than 6% interest. That was reduced to 6% interest only by a statutory provision. That is only a benefit to the appellants. After having received the money and enjoyed the profits also, it was really uncharitable to raise these frivolous contentions in an attempt to avoid payment, especially when they had the benefit of statutory reduction of liability. That was reduced to 6% interest only by a statutory provision. That is only a benefit to the appellants. After having received the money and enjoyed the profits also, it was really uncharitable to raise these frivolous contentions in an attempt to avoid payment, especially when they had the benefit of statutory reduction of liability. There is also no point in the argument that the mortgage amount cannot be claimed under S.68 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence the suit is bad. Ext Al is a usufructuary mortgage statutorily converted into a simple mortgage enabling realisation of the mortgage amount with interest Rent cannot be realised and property cannot be recovered. There must be some fairness in contentions. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.