ORDER Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the award of the first-respondents in I.D. No. 75 of 1978. That industrial dispute related to the termination of the services of one Uma Shankar, here in a after referred to as the workman, by the petitioner. The issue referred for adjudication by the first-respondent read as follows: Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Madras, in terminating the services of Shri. K. Umashankar, Cashier with effect from 5.10.1973 while retaining Shri. Mathia kumar, Junior to him, in the service of the bank, is justified? if not, to what relief is the workmen concerned entitled?. The necessary facts have got to be set down for the purpose of appreciating the Submissions put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the counter submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the workman. On 15.2.1973, the workman was appointed as a temporary clerk by the petitioner and the terms of appointment ran as follows: Sri. K. Umashankar is hereby appointed as a temporary Clerk at this Office for a period of one month from 15th February, 1973 on a monthly salary of Rs. 190 and other allowances applicable to ward staff. His appointment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 1. The appointment is purely a temporary one liable to be terminated subject to 14 days notice or 14 days wages in lieu thereof without assigning any reason there for at the Bank's discretion. 2. If Sri. K. Umasankar wishes to leave the service, he should give 14 days notice in writing, failing which he will be held liable a week's wage. 3. This temporary appointment will not confer on him any right to claim a permanent appointment in the Bank. The initial period of appointment was extended from time to time and the last extention was on 28.9.1973 effective form 6.9.1973 for a period of' one month. After the lapse of the period of one month from 6.9.1973, the workman was not continued in employment. Practically, after the lapse of one year and 9 months, the workman, taking note of a pronouncement of the highest Court in the land, conceived the idea of demanding reinstatement through counsel's notice on 16.7.1975. This was not acceded to by the petitioner, by its reply dated 13.8.1975. Practically, after the lapse of one year and 9 months, the workman, taking note of a pronouncement of the highest Court in the land, conceived the idea of demanding reinstatement through counsel's notice on 16.7.1975. This was not acceded to by the petitioner, by its reply dated 13.8.1975. Thereafter, there was a lull until 2nd March, 1978, on which date the workman through his union raised an industrial dispute over his non-employment. That dispute got conciliated and ultimately it was referred for adjudication to the first-respondent on 3.10.1980. In between, certain events did transpire, which events however, were not brought to the, notice of the first-respondent. The workman got into the services of Bharat Overseas Bank Limited on 4.9.1978. His employment with that bank was confirmed on 4.3.1979. Even today, the workman continues to be in the said employment. The industrial dispute was adjudicated upon by the first-respondent and the first-respondent by the impugned award, came to the conclusion that the termination of the services of the workman by the petitioner was not justified and taking note of the fact that the industrial dispute was raised only on 2nd March, 1978, the first-respondent, while directing reinstatement of the workman, awarded back wages only from March, 1978. 2. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the first-respondent was not consistent in his views on the question of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and in one place in the impugned award, the first-respondent observed that the workman would not be entitled to the benefits under Section 25-F of the Act and in another place the observations of the first-respondent indicate that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act would be applicable and there has been a violation of the same in the matter of terminating the services of the workman by the petitioner. N.G.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the workman, would submit that as per the service details available, the workman must be held to have had put in 233 days of service in the year concerned and adding on the notice period of fourteen days, he must be held to have had been in continuous service for not less than one year, within the meaning of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B(2) of the Act. There is a factual controversy with reference to the actual number of days worked by the workman. As per the calculation put forth by the workman, the actual number of days worked by him come to 233 days, and as per the calculation put forth by the petitioner, the actual number of days worked by the workman would come to 226 days. Even if we take the actual number of days worked by the workman as 233, as advanced by him, apparently there was a shortfall, in the sense, the workman had not actually worked for 240 days as required by Section 25-B(2) of the Act. In this context, Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the workman, would submit that not only the terms of appointment, but also paragraph 522(4) of the Sastri Award contemplate giving of fourteen days notice for the purpose of terminating the services of temporary employee and the period of fourteen days must be held to be period of employment so as to be annexed to the actual number of days worked by the workman. In support of this theory, learned Counsel appearing for the workman, places reliance on the following pronouncements: Workman of American Express v. Management of American Express (1985)2 L.L.J.539 and the Management of Standard Motors Products of India v. Shri. A.I. Parthasarthy and Anr. (1986)1 L.L.J. 34. We have gone through the Pronouncements and what all has been countenanced in the said pronouncements is that the set of expressions 'actually worked under the employer' must comprehend all those days during which the workman was in the employment of the employer and for which he has been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service, or by compulsion of statute, standing orders, etc. The controversy in both the pronouncements stemmed out of a contention put forth by the management to exclude Sundays and other holidays for which the workman were paid wages and during which they did not actually work. We do not think that we can extend this principle with reference to the bare period of notice for termination of the services of an employee when, in fact, the employee was not in employment at all, but had been sent out of service, as happened in the present case. The breach of any of the requirements regarding period of notice has also no relevance at all on this question. The breach of any of the requirements regarding period of notice has also no relevance at all on this question. All said, factually we find that the workman had not worked for the required number of 240 days, so as to attract the provisions of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B(2) of the Act. Hence, the workman could not complain of violation of Section 25-F of the Act. 3. The above answer does not practically settle the controvercy. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that there was no violation of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act, as thought about and expressed by the first-respondent. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that though the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H could be worked out independent of Section 25-F of the Act, yet the case on hand would not fall within the ambit of a retrenchment as defined in Section 2(OO) of the Act. The? definition of 'retrenchment', as found in Section 2(OO) of the Act, before the introduction of Clause (bb) there into by Act 49 of 1984, was subject matter of scrutiny by the pronouncements of the highest Court in the land and as per the proposition which stands exemplified by the said pronouncement, there could not be any ambiguity in our mind that the present case will come within the ambit of retrenchment, as defined in Section 2(OO) of the Act before the introduction of Clause (bb) there into by Act 49 of 1984. It is one thing to say that there was a violation of Section 25-F of the Act, which we have found against the workman and it is another thing to say that there had been a violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The latter ground of attack is also being put forth by the workman. However, Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act, when it excludes from the purview of definition of retrenchment, the termination of services as a result of non-renewal of contract of service, must be held to be retrospective. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would say that such being the position in the present case, the concept of retrenchment would not come in, so as to attract Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would say that such being the position in the present case, the concept of retrenchment would not come in, so as to attract Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In answer, N.G.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the workman, would draw our attention to the following pronouncements to say that such could not be the correct concept with reference to the retrospectively of Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act. In Arun Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (1986)1 L.L.N. 528, a learned single Judge of the High Court of Patna rejected the arguments that Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act must be held to be retrospective. In Principal, Maya College, Ajmer v. Labour Court and Anr. (1988)1 L.L.N. 724, a Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan referred in extenso to the pronouncements of the highest court in the land with reference to the principles governing the question of giving effect to certain provisions of the Act retrospectively and ultimately opined that the aforesaid clause could not have retrospective effect. We are in respectful agreement with the above views and we are not persuaded to take a different view. In this context, we must state, M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, drew our attention to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, which dealt with the question as to the retrospectively of the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 45 of 1988. The reasons that weighed with the highest court in the land for holding the provisions of the said Act-retroactice, certainly cannot be imported for the purpose of holding Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act as retrospective. The said Act was held to be declaratory in nature and hence the presumption against retrospectively was held to be not applicable. Such could not be the position in the case of introduction of Clause (bb) into Section 2(OO) of the Act by the Act 49 of 1984. Hence, we reject the suggestion that by looking into Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act, we must held that it is not a case of a retrenchment, so as to attract the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. 4. Hence, we reject the suggestion that by looking into Clause (bb) introduced into Section 2(OO) of the Act, we must held that it is not a case of a retrenchment, so as to attract the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. 4. That leads us to the question as to whether, in fact, there had been a violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. There is a considerable discussion of this, factual aspect by the first-respondent in the impugned award. The categoric finding of the first-respondent is that one Mathia Kumar, a junior to the workman, was retained while the services of the workman were terminated, we did not hear any submission much less persuasive from the learned Counsel for the petitioner to dislodge this finding of fact. Once we accept this finding of fact with reference to the violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, then the workman gets a lever to ask for appropriate reliefs at the hands of the first-respondent and equally at our hands. 5. M.R. Narayanaswamy, leaned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the first-respondent's thinking that the termination of the services of the workman was not in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, is not correct, in view of the pronouncements saying that the said Act is not applicable to Nationalised Banks like the petitioner. This submission is correct and the reasoning of first-respondent on these lines to frown upon the termination of services of the workman must be eschewed. But, that is not of any help to the petitioner because we have sustained the case of the workman that there had been a breach of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. 6. Mr .M.R.Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that this Court should not at al countenance the case of the workman for frowning upon the termination of his services because he did not disclose the details of his taking up another employment even prior to the date of reference. 6. Mr .M.R.Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that this Court should not at al countenance the case of the workman for frowning upon the termination of his services because he did not disclose the details of his taking up another employment even prior to the date of reference. Mr.N.G.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the workman, would say that the management never raised an issue so as to oblige the workman to disclose the details of his subsequent employment and therefore this aspect need not be taken note of with reference to the question as to whether the termination of the services of the workman by the petitioner is justifiable or not. We are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the workman. The workman taking up employment subsequent to his termination, which has been found to be not sustainable, will only be an aspect on the question of moulding the reliefs and not for sustaining the order of termination, which is otherwise improper. Equally so, we are of the view that the question of laches on the facts of this case, is relevant only for the purpose of considering the reliefs that could be accorded to the workman. We say this, because learned Counsel for the petitioner wants us to throw out the case of the petitioner is toto on the ground of laches. We are not inclined to do so. 7. On the question of reliefs to be granted to the workman, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the workman had, even before the date of reference, namely, 3.10.1980, secured employment elsewhere, namely Bharat Overseas Bank Limited. Then the question is, on the ground of violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act, should there be an order of reinstatement of the workman into the services of the petitioner. It is not disputed before us that the reinstatement if to be effectuated, in favour of the workman could be done only so as to place him in the same position as he was at the time of the termination of his services, namely, as a temporary hand. That was and could be admittedly a nebulous position. He has to claim through services rules so as to acquire permanency. From September, 1978 till date, the workman is usefully employed elsewhere. That was and could be admittedly a nebulous position. He has to claim through services rules so as to acquire permanency. From September, 1978 till date, the workman is usefully employed elsewhere. The question of the workman getting permanency is not a certainty, when we take note of the service rules and the exigencies consequent thereto. Emoluments-wise, we do not find that there is much difference between the services with the petitioner and the services with the bank in which the workman has secured employment, it is stated that there would be the additional benefit of pension and family pension if the workman should become permanent employee under the petitioner. That is a contingency which may or may not happen. In this context, we should not also forget the laches on the part of the workman in agitating for his rights. His services got terminated as per the letter of appointment with the end of 5.10.1973. The whole matter was forgotten until 16.7.1975 when there was a demand for reinstatement, of course taking note of the pronouncement of the highest court in the land. This demand was not acceded to by the petitioner by its reply dated 13.8.1975. The workman once again forgot the issue and the dispute as such came to be raised only on 2.3.1978. It is not as if in all cases where there is a violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there should be reinstatement without any exception. There could be exceptional circumstances and, In our view, the facts of the case go to constitute such an exceptional circumstance. In Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, New Delhi (1981)1 L.L J.386, while delineating the exceptional circumstances, which make" it impossible or wholly inequitable to direct reinstatement, the highest court in the land has stated that the case of the workman securing better or other employment elsewhere will also be one such exceptional circumstance. Such is the factual position in the present case. Hence, we are inclined to award only compensation as the appropriate relief for the workman. Making an overall and a practical assessment of the fact of the case, as per our discussion supra, we consider that a compensation of Rs. 12,000 (Rupees, twelve thousand only) would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly we order as follows: 1. Hence, we are inclined to award only compensation as the appropriate relief for the workman. Making an overall and a practical assessment of the fact of the case, as per our discussion supra, we consider that a compensation of Rs. 12,000 (Rupees, twelve thousand only) would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly we order as follows: 1. The workman shall be paid by the petitioner a compensation of Rs. 12,000 (Rupees twelve thousand only) in lieu of reinstatement and other benefits within a period of eight weeks from today. 2. If there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to make the payment as aforesaid, the compensation will carry on interest of twelve per cent per annum.