Judgment This petition filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) at the instance of the second and third accused in a complaint case pending before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Pathanamthitta, is for quashing the complaint. There are three accused in the complaint of which the first accused is the son of the other two accused. The offence alleged in the complaint is Sec.420 read with Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention raised here is that the Court before which the complaint is pending has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case. 2. Facts alleged in the complaint, in brief, are the following: The first accused, who is residing in Bombay, sent a letter to the complainant promising to securing a visa and employment in a gulf country. After receiving the letter, the complainant visited the petitioners, who reside at Mu-lakkuzha in Chengannur, to ascertain about the authenticity of the letter. Petitioners, after reading their son’s letter, confimed its contents and assured about the due performance of promise made therein. Petitioners also demanded a sum of Rs.20, 000 for securing visa and employment in the gulf country and further demanded that one half of the amount should be paid in advance to them as the remaining half could be paid to their son when the complainant reaches Bombay. The complainant and some of his companions believed the representations made by the three accused. A sum of Rs.10, 000 was paid to the second accused at Mulakkuzha Village which is within the jurisdiction of Judicial, Magistrate of First Class, Chengannur. The complainant and his companions proceeded to Bombay on 8.2.1988 on getting information from the first accused. The balance amount was directly paid to the first accused and his passport was also handed over to him. But none of the accused honoured their commitment or promise, nor could the complainant even see the first accused since the payment of money. Hence, the complaint and the consequent proceedings. 3. The balance amount was directly paid to the first accused and his passport was also handed over to him. But none of the accused honoured their commitment or promise, nor could the complainant even see the first accused since the payment of money. Hence, the complaint and the consequent proceedings. 3. The contention raised here is based on Sec.l82(1) of the Code which reads thus: “Any offence which includes cheating may, if the deception is practised by means of letter or telecommunication messages, be inquired into or tried by any Court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or were received; and any offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person deceived or was received by the accused person”. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since part of the amount was delivered at Chengannur and the remaining part at Bombay, the complaint could be filed either at Chegannur or at Bombay but never at Pathanamthitta. When any offence of cheating associated with inducement of delivery of property is alleged the only Court having jurisdiction under Sec.l82(1) is the Court within whose limits the property was delivered by the deceived person, contended counsel for the petitioners. 4. Chapter XIII of the Code contains provisions regarding jurisdiction of Criminal Courts in inquiries and trial. Sec.177 is the starting provisions in the Chapters which says that every offence shall "ordinarily" be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This is the general provision as per which jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the single factor as to where the offence was committed. Sec.178 expands the jurisdictional frontiers fixed by Sec.l77, since it deals with the out of ordinary instances when it is uncertain in which of several local areas the offence was committed. Sec.179 clearly shows that it is a further expansion of sec.177 because it confers jurisdiction on two Courts in respect of one offence, either in whose local limits the alleged act was done or in whose local limits for trial of cases involving two different offences which are related to each other and which have been committed in two different places situated within the territorial limits of two different Courts. Sec.181 is to cover cases of certain specified categories of offences such as dacoity, kidnapping, abduction, etc. A reading of that section indicates that more Courts are conferred with jurisdiction over and above the Court of ordinary jurisdiction to the try the offences mentioned in Sec.181. In this context, it is to be noted that among the offences mentioned in Sec.181 the offence of cheating and its alleged or cognate offences are not included. It is to cover the offences of different forms of cheating that Sec.182 is provided. The section is to be read and understood in the sequence and order of arrangement of the provisions in Chapter XIII of the Code. 5. Sub-sea(1) of Sec.182 consists of two limbs. The first limb deals with offences involving cheating in which deception was practised by means of letters or telecommunication messages. Such offences are allowed to be tried in Courts within whose local jurisdiction the letters or telecommunication messages were sent, or were received. The second limb of Sub-sec(1) deals with the offences of cheating involving inducement of delivery of property. The said limb allows the Court, within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered to the accused, to try the offence. Is it to be understood that by Sub-sec(1) of Sec.182 the legislature barred the Courts, within whose local limits the offence of cheating was actually committed, from exercising jurisdiction? Why should be interpretative exercise, the jurisdiction of the Courts be scuttled or narrowed down or curtailed? Does it achieve any object. I find none. It should not be the endeavour in judicial interpretation to curtail Court’s jurisdiction unless the language of the statute is so imperative. From the selling in which Sec.182 is placed, the sequence in which the provision comes and the absence of any indication otherwise I am inclined to think that Sec.182 has provided a further expansion of jurisdictional frontiers over and above the scope provided by Secs.177 to 180. In other words offences involving cheating of the kinds mentioned in Sec.l82(1) can be tried in the Courts indicated in the sub-section, besides the Courts envisaged in Secs.177 to 180 of the Code. 6. The contention of the petitioners is sought to be supported on the principle that general provisions should yield or give way to special provisions. In other words offences involving cheating of the kinds mentioned in Sec.l82(1) can be tried in the Courts indicated in the sub-section, besides the Courts envisaged in Secs.177 to 180 of the Code. 6. The contention of the petitioners is sought to be supported on the principle that general provisions should yield or give way to special provisions. There cannot be any hard rule that whenever a statute contains special provision the same has the effect of foreclosing the application of general provisions. It is well neigh settled that the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (express mention of one thing implies exclusion of another) is not of universal application. The scope of special provision, whether it has the effect of supplanting the general provisions or whether it only supplements to them has to be gathered or understood from the context, objective and policy of different provisions in the statute by giving accentuation to the intention of the legislature as far as possible. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred me to the decision of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court who took the view that jurisdiction in cases falling under Sec.182(2) is confined to the Court within whose local limits the property was delivered. (Vide Krishna Narain v. M/s.Mahabir Agencies Satti Bazar, 1984 Crl.L.J. 1682 The learned single Judge after referring to the ingredients of the offence of cheating (Sec.145 of the Indian Penal Code) observed that "the object of the latter part of Sec.182 was to get over a doubt whether or not the Courts of place, whether delivery of goods is made, would have jurisdiction in the matter of an offence of cheating by letters and communications messages". The Objects and Reasons for introduction of Sec.182 in the Code was also quoted by the learned single Judge and held that the jurisdiction in such a case is confined to the Court within whose local jurisdiction the goods were delivered. The relevant portion in the statement of Objects and Reasons as set forth by the Law Commission in its 41st Report is the following: "The application of Sec.179 (now Sec.178) or Sec.182 (now Sec.179) might be regarded as of doubtful validity. The relevant portion in the statement of Objects and Reasons as set forth by the Law Commission in its 41st Report is the following: "The application of Sec.179 (now Sec.178) or Sec.182 (now Sec.179) might be regarded as of doubtful validity. There should however, be no objection in principle to the person accused of cheating from a distance being triable for the offence, not only at the place where his victim was deceived and/or made to part with property, but also at the place where the accused had been carrying on his dishonest practices and reaping the benefits." In my view the aforesaid portion adds strength to the conclusion that the Court where the property was delivered is also given jurisdiction in addition, to the Court within whose local limits the offence was committed as well as the Court within whose territorial limits the victim was deceived. With great respect to the learned single Judge I am not persuaded to adopt the view that the latter part of Sec.182(1) is intended to confine the jurisdiction to one Court alone. In this context it is advantageous to refer to another decision rendered by a single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Bhola Nath v. State, 1982 Crl.L.J. 1482. In that case, the offence of cheating was involved and the defence raised objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the property was delivered within the local jurisdiction of another Court. Jain, J. who considered the said argument referred to the provisions in Chapter XIII of the Code particularly under Sec.l77and observed that it is the duty of the Court to give a harmonious construction to both the provisions so that full effect may be given to both without one excluding the other, there being no seeming conflict or repugnancy in the two. Learned Judge further observed that "when Sec.177 conveys a clear meaning it is not permissible to construe the same with reference to another section i.e. 182 for the purpose of controlling or diminishing the efficiay of the former, more so, when there is nothing in the language of the latter which control impinge upon the effect of Sec.177. Surely, it is not intended to abrogate the general rule of jurisdiction with regard to the trial of criminal offences and it is merely supplemental thereto". Surely, it is not intended to abrogate the general rule of jurisdiction with regard to the trial of criminal offences and it is merely supplemental thereto". After referring to the relevant portion of the 41st Report of the Law Commission, the learned Judge held that there is no escape from the conclusion that the Court, where deception was practised or inducement to deliver property was made has jurisdiction to try the offence in addition to the Courts mentioned in Sec.182. With great respect, I am inclined to accept the reasoning adopted by Jain, J. in Bhola Nath’s case, 1982 Crl.L.J. 1482. Hence, I conclude that the Court at Pathanamthitta has also jurisdiction to try the offence involved in this case. 8. The objection raised by the petitioners regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Court below is unsustainable and is therefore overruled. 9. Criminal Miscellaneous Case is accordingly dismissed.