Nirode Baran Mondal v. Commissioner of the Corporation of Calcutta
1989-11-20
MAHITOSH MAJUMDAR
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 9th Court, Alipore, District 24-Parganas in Title Appeal No. 1332 of 1970 dated 14th March, 1973 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Sealdah, in Title Suit No. 272 of 1970 dated 22nd August, 1970. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for decleration and injunction. The plaintiff's case is that the plaintiff is the owner of the structure at Premises No. 165/H/37, Beliaghata Main Road. The plaintiff purchased the suit premises by registered kobals dated October 18, 1943 and he has been possessing the structure as aforesaid. The Commissioner of the Corporation of Calcutta, the defendant herein, served a notice dated May 3, 1963 upon the plaintiff to the effect that "if the plaintiff provides 4 ft. wide space on the north and paye necessary Corporation charges within one month from the date communication of the order the case may be dropped otherwise the structure will be demolished". It is claimed by the plaintiff that the demolition order passed as aforesaid is illegal, without jurisdiction and as such not binding upon him. He has further contended that the structures are very old and have been in existence for more than 12 years. He made necessary repairs of the structures and the walls of the structures remain in the same position as before and the structures thus made relate back to the period more than 12 years and he has been residing there with his family. The proforma defendants are his name-lenders and have no right title and interest in the suit property. He further claimed that be would suffer irraparable loss if the defendant is not restrained by an order of perpotual injunction from demolition of the structure. 3. The Commissioner for the Corporation of Calcutta filed a written statement and claimed that the structures are not old and have been recently erected without any sanctioned plan in violation of the building Rules and that is the reason of passing the order of demolition after giving the plaintiff an opportunity of being heard. It is further claimed by the Commissioner that unauthorised construction, as carried out by the plaintiff, was detected on April 7, 1955 and it bas been emphatically denied that the structures have been in existence for more than 12 years as stated by the plaintiff. 4.
It is further claimed by the Commissioner that unauthorised construction, as carried out by the plaintiff, was detected on April 7, 1955 and it bas been emphatically denied that the structures have been in existence for more than 12 years as stated by the plaintiff. 4. Upon the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed :- 2) Is the suit barred under sections 586 and 87 of the C. M. Act? 4) Is the order of the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta, illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction? 5) Is the plff. entitled to a decree for permanent injunction as prayed? 6) To what relief, if any is the plff. entitled? Issue No.2 was not pressed and was answered in favour of the plaintiff. Issue Nos. 4. 5 and 6 and were taken up together. 5. The trial Court, after careful consideration of Ext. 1, Ext. C. and Ext. 2 series, came to the finding that the walls having fallen down, the construction was effected during the offending period when the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 came into force and accordingly the proceedings were started rightly, validly and in accordance with law. The trial Court relied on the decision reported in 74 CWN 733 and also the decision reported in 59 CWN 599. After considering the oral and documentary evidence the trial Court came to the finding that notice under section 414 of the Municipal Act, 1951 was rightly issued and order passed therein did not suffer from any infirmity either factually or otherwise on the ground that the proceeding could not be sustained by the reason of the fact that the construction took place at the time when the 1951 Act is in force. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 6. Against the said judgment and decree of the trial Court an appeal was preferred. The first appellate Court before dealing with the case of the parties referred to the dismissal of the suit by the first Court of the Munsif on June 20, 1967 and against the said Judgment the plaintiff came up on appeal where the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif, first Court, Sealdah were set aside and the suit went back on remand to the trial Court for disposal upon the evidence on record and further evidence that might be adduced by the, parties regarding the time of construction.
The suit was dismissed by the Munsif, 2nd Court, and the appeal was preferred and beard by the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court considered the following points for determination:- 1. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the work of demolition of the structures complained of at Premises No. 1651 H/37, Beliaghata Main Road, Calcutta? 2. To what other reliefs is the plaintiff entitled? The first appellate Court after careful consideration of the materials on record as also the findings of the trial Court came to the finding that the appellant did not execute the work of construction more then 12 years before the issue of notice served on him under section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and hence be has no right to retain the unauthorised construction made be him and the first appellate Court held that the order of the Commissioner is not illegal and without jurisdiction. The prayer of the plaintiff for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from proceeding with the demolition of the construction at 165/H/37, Beliaghata Main Road bas been refused and the appeal was dismissed. The first appellate Court, while considering challenge of the appellant that the proceeding under section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is wholly without jurisdiction. considered the matter in depth and thereafter held in the manner following :- “...........it is upon the plaintiff to prove that the structures and the walls complained of was constructed by him more than 12 years before the issue of notice under section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951." Previously under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 the period was five years. The first appellate Court further held that the plaintiff did not acquire any vested right under the old law when the present Act, i. e., Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 came into force and the plaintiff did not and cannot have any vested right to retain the structures under the old Act or under the new Act. At the time when the proceeding was initiated under section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 the period of limitation did not shift inasmuch as Chat not before the period of 12 years the construction was completed. 7. Mr. Delip Mr.
At the time when the proceeding was initiated under section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 the period of limitation did not shift inasmuch as Chat not before the period of 12 years the construction was completed. 7. Mr. Delip Mr. Seth, learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal, claimed and contended that the proceeding could not be initiated under section 414 of the said Act inasmuch as the entire construction was completed long before the said Act came into force. In support of his submission Mr. Seth referred to the provisions as contained in section 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 and also section 414 of the said Act. Mr. Seth referred to the decision of this Court in the case of (1) Ramani Ranjan Bose v. The Corporation of Calcutta reported in 59 CWN 599 Mr. Seth strenuously stressed on the said Judgment and in particular where their lordships held that there is nothing in the Act to give the provisions of section 414 a retrospective operation. Mr. Seth further claimed that section 414 is to be read along with section 608A of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Mr. Seth, while referring to section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 claimed that section 8 thereof contemplates the needs where the repealing enactment repeals the substantive right as well as the procedure by which it was enforced and is such cases if the rights are saved in respect of transactions completed prior to the repealing of the statute, the remedies in respect of such rights, as laid dawn in the repealed statute, are also saved and the litigant can institute or continue proceedings in the same way for the enforcement of his rights as if the repealing Act had not come into force. 8. After referring to the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Deth claimed that the proceeding, initiated under the provisions of section 414 of the said Act, is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as the construction was completed in the year 1948 and therefore the provision under section 414 of the said Act would have no manner of application. 9. Mr.
8. After referring to the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Deth claimed that the proceeding, initiated under the provisions of section 414 of the said Act, is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as the construction was completed in the year 1948 and therefore the provision under section 414 of the said Act would have no manner of application. 9. Mr. Seth further (2) Dhirendra Nath Roy v. where Mukherjee, J. while observed as follows: - “Where an Act merely alters the procedure without altering the substantive rights of the parties, the new procedure would be retrospective in operation and extend to rights accrued before the change were made and to pending actions.” Mr. Seth further referred to the decision of this Court in the case of (3) Mahadeb Shaw v. Corporation of Calcutta reported in 74 CWN 733, where P. N. Mookerjee, J. while speaking for the Court held that It was not a case where a suit or legal proceeding for the demolition in question bad either been instituted or might have been instituted, as contemplated under section 608A of the said Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) and accordingly, this will not be a case covered by the said subsection (2), thus plainly indicating that the procedure, prescribed by the new Act of 1951 bas to be followed for the purpose of the disputed demolition. Sub-section (2) of section 608A of the said Act reads as follows :- "For the purposes of such suit or legal proceeding and of all matters incidental thereto, the powers and duties of the Corporation and of the Chief Executive Officer under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, shall vest in the Corporation and the Commissioner constituted and appointed respectively under this Act and when any action bas been taken under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, such action shall be deemed to have been taken by the corresponding authority under this Act, and the corresponding provision d this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with." 10. The findings reached by the first appellate Court records that the appellant did not execute the work of construction more than 12 years before the issue of the notice under section 414 of the said Act. If that be so, the claim of Mr.
The findings reached by the first appellate Court records that the appellant did not execute the work of construction more than 12 years before the issue of the notice under section 414 of the said Act. If that be so, the claim of Mr. Seth, appearing for the appellant, as founded upon the construction of the provisions of section 414 read section 608A(2) of the said Act could not be accepted inasmuch the inspection of the disputed premises took place on 27. 4. 55 and violation of the Municipal Rules by the plaintiff was detected in the matter of construction of C. I. sheds providing brick walls. On the basis of the evidence the first appellate Court came to the finding that the construction was completed sometime in the year 1949. That being so, initiation of proceeding under section 414 of the said Act could be assailed on the ground that it is wholly without jurisdiction. 11. The decision cited by M. Seth in the case of Ramani Ranjan Bose v. The Corporation of Calcutta (Supra). does not help Mr. Seth inasmuch in the aforesaid case the proceeding under section 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was initialed. So, recourse to section 414 of the said Act was found to be wholly without jurisdiction. 12. In the instant case no suit or proceeding under section 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 was initiated Apart from the above, detection of the alleged violation as aforesaid took place before the expiry of the period of limitation. So the finding of the first appellate Court could not be assailed on the ground that the proceeding suffered from lack of jurisdiction. Apart from the above, initiation of such proceeding, as found by this Court in the case of Mahadev Shaw v. Corporation of Calcutta (Supra), is saved by sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 608A of the said Act, inasmuch as it was not a case where the legal proceeding for demolitions has either been instituted or might have been instituted as contemplated in sub-sec. (a) of section 414 of the said Act, which provides the procedure that bas to be followed for the purpose of disputed demolition. In the instant case, exactly such recourse, which is otherwise legal and valid, was effected. The decision cited by Mr.
(a) of section 414 of the said Act, which provides the procedure that bas to be followed for the purpose of disputed demolition. In the instant case, exactly such recourse, which is otherwise legal and valid, was effected. The decision cited by Mr. Seth in the case of Ramani Ranjan Bose v. The Corporation of Calcutta (Supra), does not apply at all. The decision of this Court in the case of Mahadev Shaw v. Corporation of Calcutta (Supra), applies in full force. The decision of this Court in Dhirendra Nath Roy v. Ijjetali Miah (Supra), in my view, is not applicable to the case on hand. The proceeding under section 414 of the said Act, in my view, was rightly initiated and the decisions of the courts below could not be assailed on such grounds as are advanced by Mr. Seth. The appeal, therefore, fails. The appeal, accordingly, is dismissed. The judgment and the decree of the court of appeal below are affirmed. There will be no order as to costs.