JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The order passed by the Additional Judge Court of Small Causes Nagpur on 17-10-1987 below Exhibit-1 in M.J.C. No. 92/86 rejecting the petitioner's application for restitution has been challenged in this revision. 2 The facts in this case are admitted. The respondent Ramaji Bind instituted a suit for eviction of the petitioner in the Court of Small Causes at Nagpur. It was Civil Suit No. 1146 of 1983. The suit came to be decreed on 16-10-1984. Civil Revision Application No. 1096 of 1984 was filed against that judgement in this Court and it was dismissed on merits on 15-2-1985. Regular Darkhast No. 817 of 1985. While the Darkhast was pending a pronouncement reported in (1986 Mh.L.J. 882)1 declaring the notificating issued under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order and Part III of the said order ultra vires was made. This pronouncement was made on 29-8-1986. In the Darkhast the plaintiff- respondent obtained a warrant of possession from the Court and the property covered by the decree came to be put in possession of the respondent on 8-9-1986. On 12-9-1986 the present petitioner filed M.J.C. No. 92 of 1986 for restoration of possession. The application was styled as one under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This application was contested and it came to be rejected on hearing both the side on 17-10-1987. It is the order, which has been the subject matter of challenge in this revision. 3. The case of the petitioner put forth before the Court in M.J.C. No. 92 of 1986 was that though decree in Civil Suit No. 1146 of 1983 became final after this Court rejected the Revision Application No. 1096 of 1984, the possession was not delivered. Due to the pronouncement of this Court reported in 1986 Mh.L.J. 882, all the decrees for eviction, though final, became vulnerable where possession was not delivered in pursuance thereof. Thus on 8-9-1986 (when the possession was delivered to the respondent through the warrant issued by the Court) the decree in itself became unexecutable. It was the contention raided by the petitioner that the possession came to be delivered to the respondent under an unexecutable decree. He, thereof, applied to the Court for restoration of possession under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was the contention raided by the petitioner that the possession came to be delivered to the respondent under an unexecutable decree. He, thereof, applied to the Court for restoration of possession under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This claim was opposed by the respondent on the ground that the decree had become final and in due execution thereof the possession was delivered. It was also his contention that there was neither any reversal, nor any variance nor any modification in the decree and, therefore, there could be no restitution possible under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This claim was opposed by the respondent on the ground that the decree had become final and in due execution thereof the possession was delivered. It was also his contention that there was neither any reversal, nor any variance nor any modification in the decree and, therefore there could be no restitution possible under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The learned Judge of the trial Court on hearing both the parties, held that the application was not maintainable under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this ground he rejected the application. 5. Mr. Parchure, the learned advocate for the petitioner, strenuously urged before me that the trial Court was not justified in rejecting the application. His contention was that though his application may not fall technically within the four corners of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still the relief could have been granted to him either under section 47 or under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He urged before me that in view of the pronouncement of this Court reported in 1986 Mh.L.J. 882, the decrees for eviction (with the permission of the Rent Controller) became the decrees passed without jurisdiction and, therefore, the Court could not validly execute the decree. There is no dispute that the premises covered by the decree being constructed after 1-1-1967 were exempted from the operation of the Rent Control Order in view of the notification issued under clause 30 of the said Order. According to Mr. There is no dispute that the premises covered by the decree being constructed after 1-1-1967 were exempted from the operation of the Rent Control Order in view of the notification issued under clause 30 of the said Order. According to Mr. Parchure, once this Court declared that the notification is ultra vires the Constitution, the exemption clause automatically vanished and all the tenements irrespective of the date of construction (whether before 1-1-1967 or after 1-1-1967) were governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order. Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order created a prohibition against the Civil Court in entertaining the eviction suits without the prior permission of the Rent Controller. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court was necessarily restricted by the conditions imposed by the statute particularly in clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. Thus the decree in Civil Suit No. l146 of 1983 was passed, inspite of the bar created by clause 13 and, therefore, this decree is without jurisdiction. What Mr. Parchure contended was that the decree being without jurisdiction, it was not executable buy the Execution Court and consequently if the Executing Court executed the decree that became illegal. It was also his contention that it is under this unexecutable decree that the petitioner came to be dispossessed of the tenements and those tenements came to be put in possession of the respondent and this was done under the warrant issued by the Court. It is on this ground, according to Mr. Parchure, that the petitioner is entitled in law as well as equity to have restoration of the tenements which have been lost to him. 6. There is definitely a considerable force in what Mr. Parchure says. Even Mr. Chandurkar, the learned advocate for the respondent, conceded the position that as the decree, though passed long before the pronouncement, was unexecutable and therefore it become vulnerable because of the pronouncement. This Court has already held in 1987 Mh.L.J. 445 (Namdeo Borkar v. Prakash)2, that the decrees for eviction passed by the Court in contravention of the bar created by clause 13 of the Rent Control Order were without jurisdiction. It was also held that the restrictions were placed upon the plaintiff. This Court has already held in 1987 Mh.L.J. 445 (Namdeo Borkar v. Prakash)2, that the decrees for eviction passed by the Court in contravention of the bar created by clause 13 of the Rent Control Order were without jurisdiction. It was also held that the restrictions were placed upon the plaintiff. He could not come to the Court except clothed with the permission from the Rent Controller and if he came to the Court without the permission of the Rent Controller, the Court had no other alternative but to refuse the entertainment of the proceedings. This being the legal position, the consequences of the pronouncement in 1986 Mh.L.J. 882 were simple. The decree itself was without jurisdiction so that it could not be executed. 7. Mr. Chandurkar, the learned advocate for the respondent, urged before me that a decree passed in Civil Suit No. 1146 of 1983 by the Small Causes Court on 16-10-1984 became final when this Court rejected Civil Revision Application No. 1096 of 1984 on 15-2-1984 and this decree was binding on both the parties. It may be binding in the ordinary sense of the term, but the legal consequences flowing from the adjudication of this Court were definite. The legal consequence was that on the day the possession came to be delivered under the warrant of the Court, the decree assumed the character of a decree passed without jurisdiction. It was, therefore necessary for the Court to apply its mind to this aspect and to take further proceedings as were permissible in-law. As already pointed out, the possession came to be delivered on 8-9-1986. In law it was the possession taken through the intervention of the Court in pursuance of a decree which no longer remained executable. It is true that before the delivery of possession, the defendant could have approached the Executing Court and agitated about the legality of the decree. He has not done so, by immediately on 12-9-1986, he filed an application before the Court vide M.J.C. No. 92 of 1986 and in that application, he has brought it to the notice of the Court that the decree was without jurisdiction and, therefore, whatever tenements the landlord obtained in execution of such a decree should be restored back to him. It appears from the order that the lower Court was also aware of this legal position when it specifically observed that the decree was without jurisdiction inasmuch as there was a bar created against the Court in taking cognizance of this suit. What the Court found was that as there was no formal reversal, variance of modification of the decree, the matter could not fall within the four corners of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, it was unable to grant the relief against the petitioner. 8. The real question which poses for decision at this stage is whether the Court could reject the prayer for restoration on such a ground. We take it for the time being that the case does not fall within four corners of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure as there is no formal reversal, variance or modification of the decree passed by the trial Court by the Appellate or the Revisional Court. The revision came to be dismissed on merits. Thus the case could not technically fall within the four corners of section 144. However, the principle underlying section 144 is equitable. It contemplates that whatever tenements the other party has received due to the execution of the decree, those tenements should be returned back to the deprived party and the parties could be kept in position which they occupied earlier. This is the principle under lying the restitution. 9. Looked at from this angle, the Court had ample powers to restore the tenements to the defendant and to put him in the position in which he was prior to his dispossession. Mr. Chandurkar, however, urged before me that the only remedy available to the present petitioner is by way of a separate suit, in case it is held that his application does not fall within the ambit of section 144, Civil Procedure Code. Thus I am unable to agree with this argument. This is a matter relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of a decree and section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code bars a separate suit. There is no dispute at this stage that the restoration is itself related to the execution, discharge and satisfaction. If it is so, then the principles of sub-clause (i) of section 47 would definitely bar a separate suit for the same remedy. 10. There is no dispute at this stage that the restoration is itself related to the execution, discharge and satisfaction. If it is so, then the principles of sub-clause (i) of section 47 would definitely bar a separate suit for the same remedy. 10. It is interesting to note at this stage that even after the plaintiff was put in possession of the property, the application remained pending before the Court during the pendency of the M.J.C. through which this revision arises. Thus when the execution was pending, a separate suit for possession could not have been legitimately filed. As a matter of fact, it would have been proper for the Court to treat this application as one under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and to restore the property to the petitioner because that property was put in possession of the plaintiff by the Court itself knowing fulwell that the decree was without jurisdiction. 11. The undisputed position that prevails at this stage is that the plaintiff has been put in possession of the property in view of the decree which was on that relevant date unexecutable. The part placed by the Court in delivery of the possession was not in execution. It was only because of the warrant issued by the Court that the plaintiff came to be put in possession of the property. When the Court found that the decree was without jurisdiction, it could very well use its inherent powers flowing from section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code because it was the obligation on the Court to correct the wrong. When the plaintiff had put in possession wrongly, the Court could have legitimately restored the tenements to the defendant in its powers flowing under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. 12. Mr. Chandurkar, the learned Advocate for the respondents (sic) powers under section 144. He has obtained a decree in 1964. He had to contest the revision petition also before this Court. He succeeds in giving the decree a finality. However there was a change in the interpretation. The result was that whatever he obtained from his efforts, he has been deprived due to this pronouncement. What he urged was that equity was completely in his favour and therefore the restoration would be unequitable, under the circumstances of the case. I am not much impressed with this agreement of Mr. Chandurkar. The result was that whatever he obtained from his efforts, he has been deprived due to this pronouncement. What he urged was that equity was completely in his favour and therefore the restoration would be unequitable, under the circumstances of the case. I am not much impressed with this agreement of Mr. Chandurkar. What is involved in this case is not a pure question of equity. On the other hand, what has been involved is a substantial question of law. If on that particular date the possession could not have been delivered lawfully, the delivery thereof becomes unlawful and it is obligation on the Court to correct its wrong. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the restitution is inescapable in the circumstances that are brought on the record. 13. In the result, the order passed by the trial Court rejecting the application for restoration on very technical grounds is wrong and it needs to be corrected at the hands of this Court. The revision application deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The trial Court is directed to put the petitioner-defendant in possession of the tenements which the plaintiff took in possession in pursuance of the warrant issued by the Court in Regular Darkhast No. 817 of 1965. The rule is made absolute in terms above. There shall be no orders as to costs. Application allowed. ------