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1989 DIGILAW 5 (GAU)

Mahendra Kishor Paul v. State of Tripura

1989-01-09

B.P.SARAF, S.N.PHUKAN

body1989
Phukan, J. — This is a petition under Article 226 of the Cons­titution. The petitioner joined as a Constable in the Police Depar­tment in 1952, promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector on 1.2.57 and thereafter to the post of Sub-Inspector on 1.5.67. He was confirmed as Sub-Inspector on 1.1.74. Thereafter he was promoted initially on ad hoc basis to the post of Inspector of Police for a period of six months on 8.4.82 which period was extended upto 31.12.83. By the impugned order dated 20.10.83 (Annexure-VII to the petition), the petitioner was reverted to the substantive rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. As the order is relevant, we quote below the said im­pugned order :- “Whereas the reply of Shri M. K. Paul, Inspector of Police, D.D. Cell, Udaipur on the show cause notice served upon him vide PHQs No. 18801/O.II(272)/Police/82 dated 23.8.83 for delay in disposing off as many as nine cases which are long pending with him, has not been found satisfactory. It clearly indicates that despite of instructions and guidance given by his senior officers from time to time, he has not improved his efficiencies & considered him not fit to continue in the post of Inspector of Police. As such, Shri M. K. Paul appointed temporarily on ad hoc basis as Inspector of Police (U/B), is hereby reverted to his substantive rank of Sub-Inspector of Police (U/B) with immediate effect. Sd/-(C.Z. OHAFOOR)20/10 Inspector General of Police, Tripura”. The above order was passed by the Inspector General of Police, Tripura. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Governor vide Annexure-VIII to the petition which was returned by the DIGP (CID) Tripura at Agartala vide Annexure-IX on the ground stated in the said order. This order is also relevant and it is quoted below : “Copy of letter No. 4009/DIG/CID/83, of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. Tripura, Agartala addressed to the Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Tripura, Agartala. Sub : Representation of Shri Mahendra Kishore Paul, S. I. of Police, C.I.D. addressed to the Governor, Tripura. In returning herewith the representation of S. I. Shri Mahendra Kishore Paul, of C.I.D. addressed to the Governor, Tripura, seat vide your Memo No. 9735/SP/CID/83, dated, 8.12.83, I would like to state that petition to the Governor, on such matters under rule 882 of the PRB were made in pre-independence days in terms of Government of India Act, 1935. In returning herewith the representation of S. I. Shri Mahendra Kishore Paul, of C.I.D. addressed to the Governor, Tripura, seat vide your Memo No. 9735/SP/CID/83, dated, 8.12.83, I would like to state that petition to the Governor, on such matters under rule 882 of the PRB were made in pre-independence days in terms of Government of India Act, 1935. The said Act has become obsolete after independence and Governor of the State has ceased to have such functions under the Constitution of India. The petitioner may accordingly be intimated.” The aforesaid appeal was preferred before the Governor under Rule 882 of Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943. On perusal of the said Regulation 882, we find that if the punishment is in­flicted by the Inspector General of Police, the appellate authority is the Governor. 2. Now the first question which needs our consideration is whether there was any illegality in returning the appeal by the DIG? on the ground stated in the said order, interalia, that petitions to the Governor under Regulation 882 of Police Regulation of Bengal were made in pre-independent days in terms of Govt. of India Act, 1935 and the said Act has become obsolete after independence and the Governor of the State has ceased to have such functions under the Constitution of India. There is no dispute at the Bar that the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943 are applicable to the members of Police Force in Tripura. Mr. Majumdar, Govt. Advocate states that these are statutory Regulations framed under the Police Act, 1861. 3. In this connection we would like to refer to Article 372 of the Constitution which provides for continuance of all existing laws (notwithstanding the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 by Article 395) until they are repealed by a competent authority under the Constitution. It is not the case of the respondents that the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943 or Regulation 882 thereof have been repealed, As such the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943 con­tinues to apply even after the coming into force of the Constitution and a petition under Regulation 882 cannot be rejected on that score. 4. The stand taken in Annexure-IX is not, therefore legal and valid. 4. The stand taken in Annexure-IX is not, therefore legal and valid. We are, however, surprised to find that such a stand was taken in Annexure-IX in view of the fact that entire police organis­ation of the State is governed by these Regulations even today. It may be mentioned that in view of the Constitutional provision the Governor as mentioned in the said Regulation 882 means the State Government, the State Government should have disposed of the appeal in accordance with Jaw. 5. Normally it is a fit case to issue direction to the appellate authority to consider the appeal and dispose of in accordance with law. But as the present petition was filed in the year 1984 we are of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship if that course is adopted. As we are satisfied more particularly in view of the fact that as the impugned order is not tenable in law, we pro­pose to dispose of the present petition by passing final orders. 6. The first contention of Mr. Majumdar is that the petition is not maintainable as all other police officers subordinate to the petitioner have not been impleaded as parties. In our opinion this contention has no force as the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of termination and this is not a case for refixation of senioriy, more particularly because the petitioner has not claimed any relief against other senior or junior police officers promoted on ad hoc basis to the post of Inspector of Police. Mr. Majumdar, learned Govt. Advocate has strenuously urged that as the appointment was on ad hoc basis and for a fixed period the reversion of the petitioner does not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In this connec­tion Mr. Majumdar has drawn our attention to the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in S. K. Verma vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 P & H 149, wherein it was held that the term ''ad hoc employee is conveniently used for a wholly temporary employee or for a particular purpose and one whose services can be terminated with the maximum of case." According, to Mr. Majumdar as the promotion of petitioner to the post of Inspector is purely an ad hoc basis reversion of the petitioner to the post of S. I. will not amount to reduction in rank as no evil penal conse­quences are there, and as such, Article 311 is not attracted. Mr. Majumdar has also drawn our attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in R. S. Sial vs. State of U. P. & Ore, AIR 1974 SC 1317 , and Union of India vs. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 1982 SC 773 . In support of his contention Mr. Majumdar has also drawn our attention to the Single Bench decision of the A.P. High Court in V. Sivkamyya vs. Secretary, Govt. of India AIR 1968 A. P. 283. 7. The law relating to the status of ad hoc or temporary Govt. servant vis a vis reduction in rank or termination of service is by now well settled. In Purshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , it has been held that Article 311 of the Constitution makes no distinction between permanent and temporary posts, its protection must be held to extend to all Govt. servants holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them. But this protection is limited in case of three major penalties, viz, dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. 8. On perusal of the impugned order it is absolutely clear to our mind that reversion of the petitioner to the post of SI of Police was not an order of reversion simpliciter but it was imposed due to inefficiency. In this connection Mr," Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors, AIR 1986 SC 1626 . In that case also, as we find from para 2 of the report the appointment of petitioner was on ad hoc basis. Their Lordships found in that case that there were allegations of serious misconduct and also adverse entries in the service record which were taken into consideration without giving any opportunity of hearing and without following the procedure provided under Art, 311(2) of the Constitution. Their Lordships found in that case that there were allegations of serious misconduct and also adverse entries in the service record which were taken into consideration without giving any opportunity of hearing and without following the procedure provided under Art, 311(2) of the Constitution. Their Lordships held : “In other words, the Court, in such a case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct/inefficiency or not." On the facts and circumstances of the case their Lordships found in that case the order of reversion to be by way of punishment and accordingly it was set aside. 9. In the instant case, the order is clear and unambiguous and it is not even necessary for us to lift the veil. In the order, it is clearly stated that the petitioner was found inefficient and not fit to continue in the post. That apart, before passing the order a show cause notice was served on the petitioner. In normal course after the show cause notice and on perusal of the reply by the petitioner it was the legal duty to continue the departmental proceedings and complete it. 10. It was also stated by the petitioner that the impugned order is arbitrary and discriminatory as the petitioner alone was reverted retaining others who were promoted along with him on ad hoc basis, and on this ground also the impugned order is not tenable. 11. To satisfy ourselves whether the reversion of the petitioner was arbitrary or not, we examined the record and we found that the persons who were promoted along with the petitioner were not reverted to the post of S. I. On this point also following their Lordships in para 35 of the report in Jarnail Singh (supra) we are satisfied that the impugned order is arbitrary. 12. For what has been stated above, we set aside and quash the impugned order dated 20. 10. 83 which was communicated by Memo No. 25864-8 l/G.II(272)/POLICE/8 2 (Annexure - 7 to the petition). The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. Further we are of the opinion that this is a fit case for awarding costs. We. therefore, quantify the same to be Rs. 500/-. Dr. Saraf, J. — I agree.