JUDGMENT Ajit Kumar Nayak, J. The short question that is involved in this appeal is whether a Land Acquisition Judge, having made an award after contented hearing, and thereby finally disposing of a reference case from the Collector under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, can entertain a belated application for setting aside such award under Order 9 Rule 13 read with s. 151 CPC together with a prayer for being impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by a person who was neither a party, nor appeared in the Land Acquisition proceeding before the Collector, nor made any application to the Collector for such reference. Having considered the judicial decisions on this point, and the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act read as a whole-particularly the provisions under part III of the said Act-we are of definite opinion that the Land Acquisition Judge has no jurisdiction to deal with any such objection. Nor the Act contemplates moving such an application for impleadment by such person who was not a party before the Land Acquisition Collector, and to get his right decided either under s. 18 or under s. 30 of the said Act. In other words, a person who has not applied to the Collector and whose name is not mentioned in the reference by the Collector and where the Collector has not made any reference to resolve any such dispute raised by such person by the L.A. Judge, the person concerned cannot come straightway to such court or such Judge for redressing his grievance either under s. 18 or under s. 30 of the said Act. This is exactly the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Judge, Alipore, when he refused to entertain and rejected the prayer of the appellant under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, read with ss. 30 and 53 of the L.A. Act, by his order dated 22.8.85. This appeal is directed to this court against the said order. 2. Briefly stated the facts relating to this appeal are as follows : An application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with s. 151 CPC was made by the appellant before the Special Land Acquisition Judge, Alipore, on 24.5.85, to set aside the award already passed in Case No. 61/75 (V), on a reference under s. 18 of such Act by the L.A. Collector, Calcutta. A Land Acquisition Proceeding for acquisition of about 17 Bighas of land in Tollygunge area of Calcutta, for construction or the Metro Railway System, Calcutta, was initiated by the L.A. Collector, Calcutta, in pursuance of notification under s. 4, and after service of notice under s. 9 of the said Act, inviting applications from interested persons including 1) Reference claimant (opposite party-respondent) Tollygunge Club Ltd., 2) Md. Mobinddin, Mutwally to the Wakf Estate of Prince Golam Md. Shah, 3) The Commissioner of Wakf; West Bengal and 4) The Commissioner of Corporation of Calcutta. The aforesaid 4 interested persons filed statements of claims before the Collector and a joint award under s. 12 of the Act was made in their names on 4.3.75. Possession of said land was taken up on 29.11.76. The aforesaid claimants also filed petition before the Collector for reference to the Land Acquisition Judge both for enhancement of valuation and for apportionment under s. 18 of such Act. The valuation reference case was registered no. 61/75 (V) before the L.A. Judge at the instance of the referring claimant-respondent, Tollygunge Club Ltd. and the apportionment reference case as No. 63/75 (A) at the instance of all the four said claimants. Such apportionment reference ca e No. 63/75 (A) was disposed of by a judgment and decree on 25.5.78 and the Tollygunge Club was awarded the entire amount of compensation less the capitalised value of the proportionate reserved rent which was awarded to claimants 2 and 3 as stated above. The valuation reference case No. 61/75 (V), at the instance of the Tollygunge Club, (claimant-respondent) was disposed of on 30.5.83 by an award enhancing the valuation, Now, it has been urged by the appellant-petitioner, Sahebzada Md. Wasi Ahmed Shah by filing a petition on 24.5.85 that as a descendant of Yasin Sultan. one of the sons of Tipu Sultan, to whom this property originally belonged and having a superior interest as lessor of such leasehold property, leased out by deeds to the Tollygunge Club Ltd., he is an interested person whose right and interest have been vitally affected by the passing of the award behind his back which might be deemed to have been disposed of ex parte against the appellant. It has been urged that the L.A. Collector refused to entertain his prayer and claim and as a matter of fact by practicing conspiracy and fraud by different agencies he is going to be deprived of his valuable right and interest. It has been further urged that no notice of such Land Acquisition Proceeding was served upon him and he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing either before the Collector or before the Acquisition Judge, in the Land Acquisition Case No. 61/73. In continuation of his petition dated 24.5.85 for setting aside such award, appellant also made a petition for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The appellant-petitioner appeared in person and submitted written arguments. 3. The learned Special Land Acquisition Judge rejected such prayer of the appellant-petitioner on the findings that such petition is not entertain able as beyond his scope and jurisdiction, not being referred to by the L.A. Collector under s. 18 or 30 of the L.A. Act. The learned Special Land Acquisition Judge has further found that that the remedy of the petitioner appellant lies in a different forum by filing a suit before the proper court and not in the form as he has prayed for. 4. Undisputedly, the proceeding for acquisition of the aforesaid land was started after due notification under s. 4 on 8.2.74, and service of notice under s. 9 on aforesaid four persons including the respondent, Tollyguange Club Ltd. It is also an undisputed fact that Tollygunge Club was in occupation of the acquired lands on the relevant, day allegedly claiming to have leasehold interest with permanent heritable and transferable mourashi right in perpetuity and for ever. This has been denied by the appellant-petitioner according to whom the right to receive a portion of such compensation was reserved in favour of the lessor by deeds of lease executed in favour of the claimant-respondent, Tollygunge Club. It has been also alleged by the appellant-petitioner that all his attempts and efforts to move the Hon'ble Court under Article 226 and the L.A. Collector subsequently failed as the Hon'ble Court directed him to get the matter settled at the level of the L.A. Collector who, in his turn, kept silent and subsequently pleaded inability to do anything as the matter had already been disposed of by passing an award in the aforesaid L.A. Case no. 61/75. 61/75. It has been asserted, therefore, by the appellant-petitioner that his remedy lies only in getting the said award passed by the L.A. Judge set aside and his being impleaded as a party thereto and hearing afresh of the claims of the respective claimants. The learned Judge, according to the appellant, went wrong and misdirected himself by not impleading him as a party on a misreading of s. 53 of the L.A. Act and such power can be invoked by the Judge concerned without reference to s. 30 of the L.A. Act. 5. The aforesaid submission as made by the petitioner-appellant, who appeared in person and argued his case before this court, raises a vital question of jurisdiction, to entertain any such objection by reference Judge, either before or after passing of an award, without his case being referred to by the L.A. Collector, either under s. 18 or under s. 30 of the L.A. Act. While laying down the principle of law on this point the Privy Council observed in its decision in Nusserwanji Pestonji v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan reported in 6 MIA 134, 135. "Where ever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms, it is an universal principle that these terms must be complied with in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, for, if they are not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise." There must be at least a substantial compliance of such specific terms or requirements which govern the making of such reference. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that the right to be treated as a claimant to file objection in a L.A. Case depends only on a reference being made by the L.A. Collector and not otherwise. We find from relevant provisions of part III of this Act, that the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with objections except those made by the persons who were partins to the proceedings before the L.A. Collector or who have since within 6 months applied to the Collector for making a supplementary reference in their case. The Act does not contemplate any decision by the court of reference in the absence of a reference by the Collector. The Act does not contemplate any decision by the court of reference in the absence of a reference by the Collector. Such view finds judicial endorsement as early as in the decision in Prabal Chandra Mukherjee v. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherjee, 12 CWN p. 937. The scheme of the Act read as a whole shows that the Act does not contemplate for moving an application for impleadment by a person who was not a party before the Collector and to get his right decided by reference Judge under s. 30 of the said Act. If any judicial decision is needed to support such view, we find the same in Tejdhari and others v. Baul and others, AIR 1981 All page 47. Such a party, even though aggrieved, "as a person interested", cannot straightway come to the reference Court to have his grievance adjudicated by such Court. The same is supported by the decision in Desraj v. Mausa Ram, AIR 1981 J & K, page 87. Under s. 18 of the L.A. Act, a Collector cannot make any reference to the Court unless invited to do so by an application by the claimant for determination of four questions relating to 1) measurement of land, 2) amount of compensation, 3) person to whom payable and 4) apportionment of compensation amongst persons interested. When so invited a Collector has no option left in the matter and must make such a reference. Under s. 30 of the Act a Collector can act suo moto and refer for decision to the Court a dispute relating to apportionment of compensation and the persons to whom the same is payable. As such, a reference by the L.A. Collector either under s. 18 or under s. 30 CPC is a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s special jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters covered by the reference. The essential principle involved in the proceedings under both the sections is that parties to these proceedings are parties to the said proceedings under Special Act before Special Tribunals constituted under the Act to deal with the matters specified under the Act itself and it is in these proceedings before these Tribunals and not in the Civil Suits that the claims and disputes between the parties are to be settled. The Jurisdiction so conferred on such tribunals are exclusive and special in nature and cannot be enlarged otherwise, which the Act does not contemplate. 6. On behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed upon the ruling reported in AIR 1983 Karnataka page 6. The same was also referred to and relied upon before the reference Judge who did not attach any importance to the same as because the case therein related to a petition under s. 30 of the L.A. Act. The other rulings mentioned in the written argument submitted by the appellant viz. AIR 1988 Allahabad, page 221 (F.B.), AIR 1983 SC page 353, AIR 1980 page 319 and 318 have very little bearing upon the facts or questions of law involved in this case. In the decision reported in 1980 SC page 319, the question involved is one of bona fide of the acquisition for public purpose and it has been held therein that there must be a sense of real urgency to show the bona fide of such acquisition. It has also been held therein that non-application of the mind on the part of the authority in issuing notifications is an indication of the mala fide nature of such acquisition. The ruling reported in AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana, page 107, as mentioned in the written argument relates only to a question of filing a written application against an award, as a must, for a reference under s. 18, which is absolutely wanting in this case. It has been held also in that ruling that High Court's directions to file a fresh application under s. 18 of the L.A. Act cannot override the legislative mandate and in the absence of written application, no right can flow therefrom. 7. This brings us to the next question whether a person whose interest has been vitally affected as alleged by the petitioner-appellant in this case-can have no remedy where compensation is determined or awarded without reference to such person or without his knowledge. Obviously, all such proceedings taken, determining such compensation, without the knowledge of such person or behind his back are ineffective against him and doubtless, he can seek his remedy either by a suit challenging the validity of such determination or by invoking in aid the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Obviously, all such proceedings taken, determining such compensation, without the knowledge of such person or behind his back are ineffective against him and doubtless, he can seek his remedy either by a suit challenging the validity of such determination or by invoking in aid the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. We find a line of decisions supporting such a view in Mohamad Ibrahim v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1958 AP 226 ; Manjur Ahmed v. Raj Lakshmi, AIR 1956 SC 263 : 60 CWN 702. 8. In the matter of consideration for the purpose of present appeal, L.A. Case No. 61/75 (V) was started on a reference made by the L.A. Collector under s. 18 of the L.A. Act, at the instance of Tollygunge Club Ltd. for enhancement of valuation of the land in question. The appellant-petitioner was not a party to the proceeding either before the L.A. Collector or before the L.A. Judge who heard the reference adjudicating and disposing of the same by an award enhancing the valuation by an order dated 30.5.83. We find from record that the other reference case being registered as 63/75 (A) for apportionment of the amount of compensation, at the instance of the reference claimants in that case including Tollygunge Club Ltd. was disposed of by judgment and decree dated 25.5.78, whereby, Tollygunge Club Ltd. was awarded the entire amount of compensation less the capitalised value awarded to the claimants 2 and 3 in that case. As because the appellant-petitioner was not a party to such proceedings either before the L.A. Collector or before the L.A. Judge, the L.A. Judge has no jurisdiction, now, on a petition filed on 24.5.85, two years after the reference case was disposed of by an award to assume jurisdiction afresh to entertain the petitions under Order 9 Rule 13 or under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to set aside such award, already passed and to have a fresh hearing of the matter by enlarging the scope of such dispute. The jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition court either under s. 18 or under s. 30 CPC, on a reference, is strictly confined to the disputes mentioned therein as regards the parties involved therein and the same cannot be enlarged by addition of parties at the instance of a person who desire to be so added long after the said proceeding has been disposed of. It is true, had an ex parte order, in a reference either under s. 18 or under s. 30 CPC been passed holding the petitioner in a case as entitled to the amount awarded, treating it as a decree, an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside such ex parte decree might be said to be competent, even though, such a decree may not be treated as an award against him to warrant an appeal under s. 54 of the L.A. Act. There are cases where rejection of such application for setting aside such decree have been held to be appeal-able (AIR 1948 Madras, page 416); but the facts of the instant case are distinct and different from the aforesaid example, in-as-much as, no reference was made by the appellant-petitioner and a contested award was passed by the reference Judge on the application of the respondent, Tollygunge Club Ltd. Quite obviously therefore, petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC at the instance of the appellant-petitioner for being impleaded as a party could not be entertained by the L.A. Judge for the simple reason that there was no pending proceeding as the case had been finally disposed of on adjudication by passing an award long before the petition was made. 9. It has been argued and emphasised on behalf of the appellant-petitioner that by virtue of s. 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act, apply to the proceeding under the Act before the Court, and, therefore, the reference Judge is competent enough to implead the appellant-petitioner as a party under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC when there are reasons to believe that he is a proper party or necessary party on further application of the provisions of Order 9 CPC which is not also inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. There are authorities no doubt in support of such a view as expressed in decision in Hashim Ibrahim Saleji v. Secretary of State, reported in 1927, Calcutta 352, 31 CWN 384; but as we have already seen the scheme of the Act read as a whole shows that the Act does not contemplate for moving an application for impleadment by a person who was not a party before the Collector and to get his right decided either under s. 18 or under s. 30 L.A. Act, AIR 1981 Allahabad, 47 (supra). It was also held much earlier in the Calcutta Case, Mahananda Roy v. Girish Chandra, 7 IC 10 that the Court of reference under the present Act is not competent to add new parties as the enquiry before him is limited to the parties to the reference. If a person has not joined in the reference, the addition of a new party and the award of compensation in his favour would be circumventing the plain provisions of s. 118 CPC and would thus be circumventing the provisions of the Act. 10. We have already seen that the reference case of 61/75 (V) was disposed of on contest by passing an award on 30.5.83. No appeal was preferred under s. 54 of the L.A. Act by any of the parties to such proceeding. As the scheme of the Act contemplates, the rig ht of appeal arises only in case of awards being passed and there should be no appeal from the reference Court except where the reference Court makes an award. It is also a settled principle of law that in the absence of special statutory authority, there is also no right of appeal. Appeal, from awards under s. 54 of the L.A. Act, are governed, in respect of the procedure, from the date of their filing to the date of disposal, by the provisions of CPC. Therefore, dismissing a petitioner's application for restoration of his application dismissed for default, is not covered by this section and is not appealable as such notwithstanding the words "in any proceedings in this section". A petition for revision under s. 115 CPC is of course competent against an order rejecting an application to be added as a party as no appeal lies against such order (Sundar Lal v. Param Sukhdas, AIR 1968 SC 336). A petition for revision under s. 115 CPC is of course competent against an order rejecting an application to be added as a party as no appeal lies against such order (Sundar Lal v. Param Sukhdas, AIR 1968 SC 336). Similarly, it has been held as well in the decision Golap Khan v. Bhola Nath Manik, 7 IC 481 : 12 CLJ 545, that an order rejecting the application by a person to be made a party, on the ground that he has no locus standi, is not open to appeal, The expression "in any proceeding" in s. 54 of the L.A. Act cannot be construed to be comprehensive enough to extend the right of appeal under s. 54, to orders which are not awards or parts of an award (54 Calcutta page 312). The position has become more stringent after the amendment of this section by the amending Act of 1921. The position of law as it stands now is that an appeal shall lie only from the award or any part of the award. Every order against which the petitioner wants to appeal cannot be said to be an award within the meaning of s. 26 of the Act. It was held in the decision in Hassam Molla v. Tasiruddin reported in 87 IC 10, that no appeal lies from an order refusing to restore a case by setting aside a decree, passed ex parte for default of the petitioner. 11. In the instant case the appellant-petitioner has not moved this Court against the award as such, but against the order rejecting his petition under Order 9 Rule 13 read with s. 151 CPC for setting aside the award and the decree passed long back on 25.5.83. In view of our findings above the appellant is not entitled to any relief. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The order passed by the learned Land Acquisition Judge is hereby affirmed. A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.