JUDGMENT A. K. Sengupta, J.: These two revisional applications are directed against the proceedings initiated, inter alia, against the petitioners under s. 220(2) read with s. 162(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance on the basis of the complaints filed by the Registrar of Companies. 2. Shortly stated the facts are that the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the Company, being the petitioner no. 1, for the years ending 31st December, 1979 and 31st December, 1980 were not prepared and accordingly were not placed at the respective Annual General meeting of the Company held in 1980 and 1981. Accordingly resolution was taken at the respective Annual General meeting for the year ending 31st December, 1979 and 31st December, 1980 that as soon as the balance sheet and profit and loss account were made ready, the same would be circulated to the members along with directors report for being placed before the members at the subsequent date to be fixed by Board for which due notice would be given to the members. Accordingly respective Annual General meeting had been adjourned to a future date. 3. The Registrar of Companies lodged two separate complaints, one on 7th January, 1983 in respect of the year ending on 31st December, 1979, and the other on 10th January, 1983 in respect of the year ending 31st December, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta, inter alia against the petitioners under s. 220(3) read with s. 161(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. The respective Annual General meeting of the Company for the aforesaid period should have been held on or about 30th June, 1980 and 31st June, 1981 respectively and the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the company for the year ending on 31st December, 1979 were required to be filed under s. 210(1) of the Company Act on or before 30th July, 1980 and the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the year ending 31st December, 1980 were required to be filed on or before 30th July, 1981. Until lodging of the complaints, no such balance sheet and profit and loss account had been filed with the Registrar. Thus, the Company, and its officers have allegedly contravened the provision of s. 220(1) of the said Act. Until lodging of the complaints, no such balance sheet and profit and loss account had been filed with the Registrar. Thus, the Company, and its officers have allegedly contravened the provision of s. 220(1) of the said Act. It has also been alleged that such contravention is a continuing offence and accordingly the company and 'its' officers are liable for punishment under s, 220(3) read with s. 162(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. At the hearing, Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the proceedings are barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained in s. 162 read with s. 159 of the Companies Act, 1956. He has submitted that cases out of which the present revisional applications have arisen were filed on 7th January and 10th January, 1983. The due date for filing of balance sheet and profit and loss account were on 30th July, 1960 in one case and in another case 30th July, 1981. The proceedings have been initiated two to three years after the due dates have expired. He submits that in view of the provision of s. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation. The limitation for an offence punishable with fine only is six months. It is, therefore, contended by Mr. Dutt that the leaned Magistrate could not have, in view of the bar of limitation taken cognizance of the offence in this case. 4. The contention of the State is that the offence being a continuing offence bar of limitation would not be attracted in this case. The question, therefore, is whether the offence in this case is a continuing offence or not. At this stage we may, however, mention that the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of the company for the year ending 31st December, 1979 and 31st December, 1980 were filed on 27th May, 1983 and 6th April, 1984 respectively. 5. Mr. Dutta appearing for the petitioners has relied on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. D. Mundhraa v. Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, reported in 1979(1) CHN 27 . 5. Mr. Dutta appearing for the petitioners has relied on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. D. Mundhraa v. Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, reported in 1979(1) CHN 27 . In that case the Division Bench held that when the accounts of the company were not ready for laying at the annual general meeting and the meeting was adjourned by an appropriate resolution after transaction of some business to a subsequent date for laying of the accounts, the adjourned meeting must be deemed to be continuation of the earlier general meeting and not a new meeting. 6. Admittedly in this case the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts were not filed within 30 days from the holding of the respective adjourned annual general meeting of the Company. This decision does not therefore, advance the case of the petitioners. 7. A similar issue was raised and decided in National Cotton Mills & ors. v. Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, reported in 56 Company Cases 222. In that case on a complaint made by the Assistant Registrar of Companies alleging violation of the provisions of s. 159 of the Companies Act, 1956, viz. failure to file return within sixty days from the date on which the annual general meeting was held, the Magistrate prosecuted the petitioner-company and its officers. On the revisional application filed by the petitioner, the Division Bench (B C. Chakrabarti and J. N. Chaudhuri, JJ.) held as follows :- "On a careful review of the legal position, it is difficult for us to agree with the view expressed by the learned single judge in the above case (Ajit Kumar Sarkar v. Asstt. Registrar of Companies (1979) 49 Comp. Case 909 (Cal). As pointed out by the Supreme Court, in order to constitute a continuing offence, the offence must arise "out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with." Section 159 of the Companies Act does not impose any liability which so continues. The offence on the breach thereof is complete with the failure to furnish the return in the manner or within the time stipulated. Such an offence is committed once and for all as and when one commits the default. The offence on the breach thereof is complete with the failure to furnish the return in the manner or within the time stipulated. Such an offence is committed once and for all as and when one commits the default. That provision does not contemplate that the obligation to submit such return continues from day to day until the return is actually submitted not does it provide that continuance of business without filing of such return is prohibited so that non-fulfilment of a continuing obligation or continuing of business without filing of such returns becomes a continuing offence. When s. 162 of the Companies Act prescribed the penalty of fine "which may extend to fifty rupees for every day during which the default continues, it merely prescribed the measure of penalty such a prescription being made with the object of enforcing strict compliance with the requirement of s. 159 under the threat of enhanced penalty and getting relief from such penalty on enhanced scale by early submission of return even after the default. That does not render the initial default a continuing one. It cannot be said that the offence is repeated or committed from day to day after the initial default. It is only where the offence is committed from day to day or repeated from day to day that it can be called a continuing offence. There being no express provision in s. 162 in that behalf as there are in ss. 234, 598, etc. of the Companies Act, it will not be proper to hold that the offence under s. 162 is a continuing offence. When the statute itself provides for continuance of offence irrespective of initial default in some, case but does not make similar provisions in respect of some other offences, it would not be correct to say that the latter class of cases also would, be continuing offences." Identical question came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Eastern Paper Mill Machinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State reported in 1988 C. Cr. L.R. (Calcutta) 176. There the .Assistant, Registrar of Companies filed a complaint against the Company and/its directors by reason of their failure to file a balance sheet and profit and loss account within time fixed by statute. In that case also the question was whether the proceeding was barred by limitation. L.R. (Calcutta) 176. There the .Assistant, Registrar of Companies filed a complaint against the Company and/its directors by reason of their failure to file a balance sheet and profit and loss account within time fixed by statute. In that case also the question was whether the proceeding was barred by limitation. There the point for consideration was whether the offence complained of would be deemed to be continuing offence or not. After considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Dewkaran Nansi & anr. reported in AIR 1973 SC 908 the Division Bench (Padma Khastgir and A. C. Sengupta, JJ.) held as follows: After keeping in mind the principles enunciated above, we find that in our present case the offence cannot be said to be a continuing offence. The offence arising for violation of the provisions of s. 220(1) of the Act was complete on the petitioners' failure to furnish the balance sheet and the profit and loss accounts by the due date. The Act does not lay down that the company and its officers concerned would be guilty of an offence if they continue to carryon the business without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the returns are furnished. The Act does not render the continuing disobedience or non-compliance of the provisions of s. 220(1) of the Act an offence. There is nothing in the Act which renders the continued non-compliance of the provisions of s. 220(1) of the Act an offence until its requirement is carried out. It has nowhere been stated in the Act that running the business of the Company without furnishing the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of the relevant year is an offence. The purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular Act as offence is for avoiding undue delay in preparation and furnishing of balance sheet and profit and loss account of the Company. Our finding that running the business without furnishing the balance sheet and profit and loss account by the due date has not been made an offence is also supported by the provisions of s. 614A of the Act under which a prayer has also been made in the complaint case in question. Our finding that running the business without furnishing the balance sheet and profit and loss account by the due date has not been made an offence is also supported by the provisions of s. 614A of the Act under which a prayer has also been made in the complaint case in question. As running the business of the Company without furnishing balance sheet by the prescribed day has not been made an offence, the infringement of the provisions of s. 220(1) cannot be held to be a continuing offence only because the offence has been made punishable with daily fine during which the default continues. The principles enunciated in 1984 decision already referred to which we have quoted do not show that the nature of the penalty provided should be taken into consideration for determining as to whether an offence is a continuing offence or not." 8. It appears that the Division Bench consisting of A. M. Bhattacherjee and A. K. Nandi, JJ, in Criminal Revision no. 292 of 1984 (Ramnugger Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd. & ors. v. Assistant Registrar of Companies) discharged the rule on 12th July, 1989 where an identical question came up for consideration. Without however, going into the merits of the case, the Division Bench observed that "there is nothing on record to warrant intervention at this stage." Accordingly the rule was discharged. 9. The same Division Bench in Criminal Revision no. 844 and 845 of 1984 (Luxmi Printing Works Ltd. v Assistant Registrar of Companies) by the judgment rendered on 26th July, 1989; held that the non-submission of return and other documents as required under ss.159, 160, 161 and 220 of the Companies Act, 1956 is a continuing offence. 10. In Luxmi Printing Works & Ors. (supra), the Division Bench considered both the National Cotton Mills (supra) and the Eastern Paper Mills (supra) and observed as follows :- "The Division Bench decision in National Cotton Mills (1984-56 Company Cases 222) appears to be one directly on the point holding that an offence under s. 162(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 is not a "continuing offence" within the meaning of s. 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore a complaint therefor would be barred by limitation under s. 462 (2), if filed beyond the period prescribed. The Division Bench appears to have relied mainly on the Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi (supra) and also two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court in Wire Machinery Manufacturing Corporation (1978 Cal. HN 293) and in Krishna Kumar Dalmia (1981-2 Cal. HN 301), both decisions under the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Act, 1952. In both these earlier Division Bench decisions, the offence for the failure to deposit the Employer's contribution within the time prescribed was, no doubt, held to be not a continuing offence. But this view has now been fully overturned by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) and, therefore, this Division Bench decision of this Court in National Cotton Mills (supra) being based to a great extent on the ratio of the aforesaid two earlier Division Bench decisions must be taken to have lost good deal of its force." The Division Bench then proceed to hold :–– 'The observations in the later Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra, at 1692, paragraph 18) would a fortiori make the offence punishable under s. 162(1) or s. 220(3) a continuing offence. As already indicated, that was a decision under the Employees' Provident Funds and family Pension Act, 1952, the provisions whereof require the employers to deposit the contribution within the period prescribed, but the penal section does not expressly provide that non-compliance thereof would render the employer liable to any continued or further penalty until payment. But still the Supreme Court observed thus (at 1692, paragraph 19) : "The appellants were unquestionably liable to pay their contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date and it was within their power to pay it, as soon after the due date had expired had they willed. The late payment could not have absolved them of their original guilt, but it would have snapped the recurrence. Each day that they failed to comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the Fund, they committed a fresh offence". "We have no manner of doubt that these observations would apply to an offence under s. 162(1) or s. 220(3) with all their rigour. True, the late submission of the documents beyond the period prescribed would not absolve the offenders of their initial guilt under those sections, but would at once snap the occurrence of the offence made punishable from day to day. True, the late submission of the documents beyond the period prescribed would not absolve the offenders of their initial guilt under those sections, but would at once snap the occurrence of the offence made punishable from day to day. In view of the principle enunciated in Deokaran Nenshi (supra, at 909, paragraph 5 and at 910, paragraph 18) and amplified further in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra, at 1692, paragraph 19), we would have to hold the offence under s. 162(1) and s. 220(3) to be continuing offence and would hold further, and this we say with all respect, that the decision of the Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra) can no longer be taken to be good law, particularly in view of the earlier Division Bench decisions in Wire Machinery (supra) and in Krishna Kumar (supra), relied on in National Cotton Mills (supra), having been overturned by the Supreme Court and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), referred to therein, having been duly explained and distinguished by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra). The Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra) could not obviously consider the Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) as the latter was decided later." "But there appears to be yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in Eastern Paper Mills (supra, 1988 Calcutta Criminal Law Reporter (Cal) 176), where after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi (supra) as well as in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra), a view has been taken contrary to what we propose to take here, though on the basis of those very two Supreme Court decisions, but without any reference to any of the Division Bench decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore and it has been held that the offences under s. 162(1) or s. 220(3) are not continuing offences. "It is trite to say that a Bench of this Court should normally accept a decision of a co-equal Bench as binding. But there are high authorities for the view that, even though the same should be the normal practice, there are circumstances, where a Bench may not follow and may have to depart from a precedent of co-ordinate jurisdiction. "It is trite to say that a Bench of this Court should normally accept a decision of a co-equal Bench as binding. But there are high authorities for the view that, even though the same should be the normal practice, there are circumstances, where a Bench may not follow and may have to depart from a precedent of co-ordinate jurisdiction. To borrow from the announcement of the House of the Lords on July 26, 1966, while the use of precedent is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases and the same provides some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules, too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of law. While certainty in the field of law may be, and in fact is, most desirable, the craze for certainty cannot be allowed to stultify the proper and logical development of law. We have also the high authority of Sir Asutosh speaking for a Division Bench of this Court in Virjiban Dass Moolji (AIR 1921 Calcutta 169 at 171), where the eminent Judge, after referring to various English decisions on the point, ruled thus :- "The answer to the question, what regard is to be had to an earlier decision of this court of co-ordinate jurisdiction must depend upon a variety of circumstances. One important factor is the length of time during which it stood unchallenged. Another factor, possibly of greater importance, is whether the decision gives adequate reasons for the conclusion embodied therein. But the position is indefensible on principle, that although a Judge may feel absolutely convinced that the decision produced before him is erroneous in law, he is still bound to decide against his own opinion. Another factor, possibly of greater importance, is whether the decision gives adequate reasons for the conclusion embodied therein. But the position is indefensible on principle, that although a Judge may feel absolutely convinced that the decision produced before him is erroneous in law, he is still bound to decide against his own opinion. To take such a view is to hold that the Judge may be reduced to an automaton by the production of an earlier judgment." "We would accordingly, with great respect, regret our inability to follow the decision Eastern Paper Mills (supra) and, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, we would, to use a Jurisprudential phrase, hold the decision to have been arrived at sub silentio––a decision passed sub silentio ceases to have, as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edition, pages 153154), any binding efficacy. That is also what was held by Sir Asutosh in Virjiban Das Moolji (supra). To borrow from Salmond (supra) a decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. The Court may consciously decide in one way because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the Court should not have decided in that manner unless it also decided point B in the same manner : but that point B was not adverted to and considered in the manner it was necessary and there point B is said to pass sub silentio." 11. It has been contended by Mr. Dutt, learned Counsel for the petitioners that we should follow the earlier two Division Bench decisions on this identical issue where it has been held that delay in filing the return is not a continuing offence. He has also submitted that in view of the conflicting Bench decisions we should refer the matter to the larger Bench. 12. In our view the learned judges of the Division Bench who decided Luxmi Printing (supra) should have either followed the earlier Bench decisions in National Cotton Mills (supra) and Eastern Paper Mills (supra) or referred the question to a larger Bench. 12. In our view the learned judges of the Division Bench who decided Luxmi Printing (supra) should have either followed the earlier Bench decisions in National Cotton Mills (supra) and Eastern Paper Mills (supra) or referred the question to a larger Bench. In National Cotton Mills Bench considered the Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), whereas in Eastern Paper Mills both the Supreme Court decisions in Deokaran Nenshi and Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) had been considered. Both the earlier bench decisions directly governed the question raised in Luxmi Printers i.e. whether an offence under s. 162(1) of the Companies Act, 1966 is a continuing offence within the meaning of s. 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a Division Bench, they were bound by the decision of another Division Bench. Supreme Court in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey reported in AIR 1962 SC 83 observed : "Then there is question of the practice to be followed when there is a conflict among decisions of Benches of the same High Court. When a Bench of the High Court gives a decision on a question of law, it should in general be followed unless they have reasons to differ from it, in which case the proper course to adopt would be to refer the question for the decision of a Full Bench." 13. Supreme Court then quoted with approval the observation of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Seshamma v. Venkata Narosimharao ILR 1940 Mad. 454 at p. 474 : "If a Division Bench does not accept as correct the decision on a question of law of another Division Bench the only right and proper course to adopt is to refer the matter to a Full Bench, for which the rules of this court provide. If this course is not adopted, the courts subordinate to the High Court are left without guidance. If this course is not adopted, the courts subordinate to the High Court are left without guidance. Apart from the impropriety of an Appellant Bench refusing to regard itself bound by a previous decision on a question of law of an appellate Bench of equal strength and the difficulty placed in the way of subordinate courts administering justice, there are the additional factors of loss of money and the judicial time." Supreme Court then proceeded to hold: "Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled." 14. In Sri Venkateswara Rice, Ginning and Groundnut Oil Mill Contractors Co. etc. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & ors, reported in AIR 1972 SC 51 , the Supreme Court observed: "It is strange that a coordinate Bench of the same High Court should have tried to sit on judgment over a decision of another Bench of that court. It is regrettable that the learned Judges who decided the latter case overlooked the fact that they were bound by the earlier decision. If they wanted that the earlier decision should be reconsidered, they should have referred the question in is due to a larger bench and not to ignore the earlier decision. In Ram Jivan v. Phoola reported in AIR 1976 SC 844 , the Supreme Court case again reiterated that "the rule of judicial precedent is a very salutary one and is aimed at achieving finality and homogeneity of judgments. In case the Division Bench under appeal wanted to differ from the previous decision of the Division Bench at the same Court it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench but it was not open to it to ignore completely the previous decision on illogical and unintelligible grounds as given by the High Court." 15. Unfortunately, the course to be adopted as laid down by the Supreme Court has not been followed in Luxmi Printing Works (supra). The Division Bench in Luxmi Printing Works (supra) in not following Eastern Paper Mills, which considered the Supreme Court decisions, relied on an authority from the Bench decision in Virjiban Dass Moolji, reported in AIR 1921 Cal. Unfortunately, the course to be adopted as laid down by the Supreme Court has not been followed in Luxmi Printing Works (supra). The Division Bench in Luxmi Printing Works (supra) in not following Eastern Paper Mills, which considered the Supreme Court decisions, relied on an authority from the Bench decision in Virjiban Dass Moolji, reported in AIR 1921 Cal. 169, but having regard to the principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, the aforesaid Bench decision must be held to be no longer good law. The Division Bench in Luxmi Printing Works (supra) observed that the decision in Eastern Paper Mills was arrived at sub silentio. The same decisions of the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi (supra) and Bhagirath Kanorio (supra), which were relied on in Eastern Paper Mills to hold that the offence in question is not a continuing one, had been relied on in Luxmi Printing Works (supra) to come to contrary view. 16. In Luxmi Printing Works (supra) the Division Bench is not following the earlier decision in Eastern Paper .Mills, quoted from Salmond (Jurisprudence, 12th. Edition), where Salmond says that "a decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind." In all these three cases construction of s. 162(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 and s. 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was involved. The Division Bench in Luxmi Printing Works (supra) virtually sat on an appeal over the decision in Eastern Paper Mills, which in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the Division Bench was not competent to do. It may also be mentioned that "here the fact that the earlier Court misconstrued a statute or ignored a rule of construction is no ground for impugning the authority of the precedent. A precedent on the construction of a statute is as much binding as any other and the fact that it was mistaken in its reasoning does not destroy its binding force." (Salmond 12th. Edn. Page 151). 17. A precedent on the construction of a statute is as much binding as any other and the fact that it was mistaken in its reasoning does not destroy its binding force." (Salmond 12th. Edn. Page 151). 17. However, the question before us is, in view of the conflicting decisions in National Cotton Mills and Eastern Paper Mills on the one hand and Luxmi Printing Works on the other, what would be the correct procedure for us to adopt. In Jaishree (supra) the Supreme Court noted the observation made in Virayya v. Venkatasubbayya, reported in AIR 1955 AP 215 , where it has been held that in these circumstances the Bench is free to adopt that view which is in accordance with justice and legal principles after taking into consideration the views expressed in the two conflicting Benches. The Supreme Court then observed that the better course would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the matter to full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without taking upon itself to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other. We would no doubt have followed this course, but in view of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Maya Rani Punj (supra) on a similar question, which was not considered by Eastern Paper Mills or Luxmi Printing Works, we are inclined to agree with the view taken in Luxmi Printing Works. 18. Section 220(1) of the Companies Act requires laying of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account before the Annual General Meeting and filing of copies of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account with the Registrar within the time prescribed. The provision is mandatory. If default is made in complying with the requirement of s. 220(1) in that event the Company or its officer who is in default is liable to pay fine of Rs. 50/- for every day for which the default continues. A continuing wrong or continuing offence is a breach of duty which itself is continuing. The penalty which is provided for non-filing of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account would indicate that not only the omission or default to file so makes it punishable but the penal liability would continue till the default continues. Therefore, it is a continuing offence. The penalty which is provided for non-filing of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account would indicate that not only the omission or default to file so makes it punishable but the penal liability would continue till the default continues. Therefore, it is a continuing offence. In Deokaran Nenshi (supra), the Supreme Court held that a continuing offence is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. Similarly, it is not only the non-filing of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account within the stipulated time is an offence but the failure to furnish such Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account continues to be an offence till such Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account are filed with the Registrar. The plain meaning of 'continuing' is carrying on and not ceasing to be the default does not cease until compliance with the statute has been made. The intention of the legislature is manifest in s. 160(1) that not only the default in submission of the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account within the stipulated time is an offence but the offence would continue so long as the default is not made good by filing the Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account. In Deokaran Nenshi (supra) and Bhagirath Kanoria (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that the liability continues so long as compliance is not made with the requirement of that section. In Maya Rani Punji v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi reported in (1986) 157 ITR 330 ( AIR 1986 SC 293 ) where the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Suresh Seth reported in (1981) E 129 ITR 328. In both the cases before the Supreme Court the question was as to whether the default for non-filing of the return under the Income-Tax Act, 1961 and Wealth Tax Act, 1951 within the time stipulated by Jaw is a continuing offence. In both the cases before the Supreme Court the question was as to whether the default for non-filing of the return under the Income-Tax Act, 1961 and Wealth Tax Act, 1951 within the time stipulated by Jaw is a continuing offence. In Suresh Seth (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the provisions for imposition of penalty with reference to several months during which default continued indicated legislative intention that a multiplier had to be adopted in determining the quantum of penalty and did not have effect of making the default a continuing one. There Supreme Court observed as follows:- "When the default is the filing of a delayed return, the penalty may be co-related to the time lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purpose of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however, is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day." 19. But in Maya Rani Punj the Supreme Court referring to the aforesaid conclusion in Suresh Seth observed as follows: "This conclusion has been seriously disputed by learned counsel for the Revenue and, according to him, the amended Wealth Tax Act, and s. 271 (a) of the 1961 Act provide for a continuing default. A Bench of this Court in Stale of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1973) 1 SCR 1008; AIR 1973 SC 908 , while examining the provisions of s. 66 of the Mines Act, very appropriately drew the distinction between continuing offences and the offences which take place when an act of omission is committed once and for all. Shelat, J, speaking for the court, stated at p. 909 of AIR 1973 SC; "A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 20. Under regulation 3, read with s. 66 of the Mines Act, failing to file the annual return by the appropriate date becomes an offence. There was no scope for applying the rule of de die in diem. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold :- "In "Words & Phrases", permanent edition, under the head "Continuing offence", instances have been given which indicate that as .long as the default continues, the offence is deemed to be repealed and, therefore, it is taken as a continuing offence. As has been appropriately indicated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 85, p. 1027, accrual of penalty depends upon the terms of the statute imposing it and in view of the language used in s. 271(1)(a) of the 1961 Act, the position is beyond dispute that the Legislature intended to deem the non-filing of the return to be a continuing default the wrong for which penalty is to be visited, commences from the date of default and continues month after month until compliance is made and the default comes to an end. The rule of de die in diem is applicable not on daily but on monthly basis." The Supreme Court then observed as follows :- "The imposition of penalty not confined to the first default but with reference to the continued default is obviously on the footing that non-compliance with the obligation of making a return is an infraction as long as the default continued. Without sanction of law, no penalty is imposable with reference to the defaulting conduct. Without sanction of law, no penalty is imposable with reference to the defaulting conduct. The position that penalty is imposable not only for the first default but as long as the default continues and such penalty is to be calculated at a prescribed rate on monthly basis is indicative of the legislative intention in unmistakable terms that as long as the assessee does not comply with the requirements of law, he continues to be guilty of the infraction and exposes himself to the penalty provided by law. 21. There are several statutory provisions where such default is stipulated to be visited with daily penalty. For instance, case of Ajit Kumar Sarkar v. Asstt. Registrar of Companies, (1979) 49 Comp. Cases 909 (Cal), where the Calcutta High Court, dealing with the provisions of ss. 159 and 162 of the Companies Act of 1956, held the liability to be a continuing one; In United Savings and Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Chief Officer, Reserve Bank of India; (1980) Cr. LJ 607 while referring to s. 58B(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, it was held that refusal to comply with the terms of the said section created an offence and continued to be an offence so long as such failure or refusal persisted. In Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority, (1982) Crl. LJ 2230, while referring to the provisions of the Delhi Development Act of 1957, the court held that the offence was a continuous one. In G. D. Bhattar v. State, AIR 1957 Cal. 483 , it was pointed out that a continuing offence or a continuing wrong is after all a continuing breach of the duty which itself is continuing. If a duty continues from day to day, the non-performance of that duty from day to day is a continuing wrong. We are of the view that the legislative scheme under s. 271 (1)(a) of the 1961 Act in making provision for a penalty coterminous with the default to be raised provides for situation of continuing wrong." 22. It appears to us that the questions raised in these revisional applications are concluded by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. We are of the view that the legislative scheme under s. 271 (1)(a) of the 1961 Act in making provision for a penalty coterminous with the default to be raised provides for situation of continuing wrong." 22. It appears to us that the questions raised in these revisional applications are concluded by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. It may be mentioned that the Supreme Court in Maya Rani Punj approved the Single Bench decision of this Court in Ajit Kumar Sarkar (supra) which was expressly disapproved by the Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra). In our view having regard to that latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court the decision in National Cotton Mills and Eastern Paper Mill (supra) must be held to have been overruled. 23. For the reasons aforesaid, these applications must fail. The applications are dismissed. Rules discharged. All interim orders are vacated. 24. Let the records be sent down forthwith. Let the proceedings be completed as expeditiously as possible. J. N. Hore, J. : I agree. Rule discharged.