AJIT KUMAR SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) IN this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have questioned the validity of a Notification dated 28-2-1985 issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as LA Act) and a Declaration dated 18-3-1987 made under S. 6 of the LA Act. The Notification and the Declaration are in respect of eastern portion of ground floor along with mezzanine floor at premises No. 7/1-D Lindsay Street, Calcutta. ( 2 ) I will briefly refer to the facts. The petitioners are the trustees of Seth Mannalal Surana Memorial Trust. The trust is the owner of the land and building situate at premises No. 7/1-D, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. The building is 6 storeyed. The entire building has been leased out by the Trust to Smt. Jiwani Kumari Parakh who has been impleaded as respondent No. 6. The respondent No. 6 has let out a substantial portion of the building to a number of tenants. There are a number of shops in the ground floor of the building. One of these shops is known as 'manjusha'. Manjusha is one of the retail shops run by the West Bengal Handicraft Development Corporation Limited which is respondent No. 4. The impugned Notification and Declaration are in respect of that portion of the building which is occupied by "manjusha". ( 3 ) THE very area which is the subject matter of the impugned Notification and Declaration was requisitioned by the Government of West Bengal by an order of Requisition No. 21/58 REQN. dated 25-2-1958 which was substituted by Requisition Order No. 123/60/reqn. dated 10-11-1960 issued under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1947 for establishing the main sales show room of the respondent No. 4. This is how Manjusha came to Lindsay Street. ( 4 ) ON the 25th year of the requisition, the respondent No. 6 (i. e. the lessee of the building) filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for de-requisition of the premises. After a contested hearing the Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition by a judgment dated 30-8-1984 in Jiwani Kumari Parakh v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612 at p. 622 and made the following order:". . . . . . . . . After a contested hearing the Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition by a judgment dated 30-8-1984 in Jiwani Kumari Parakh v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612 at p. 622 and made the following order:". . . . . . . . . In the circumstances after having heard counsel on either side fully we feel that the following would be an appropriate order to be made in the instant case : (1) The impugned requisition order is upheld but the continuance of the requisition of the premises in question is permitted subject to the conditions mentioned hereinafter. (2) The Government is directed to take steps to acquire premises in question by complying with the conditions mentioned and by following the procedure prescribed in S. 49 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as substituted for the State of West Bengal by the West Bengal Act 32 of 1955 and if possible issue an appropriate order acquiring the same if Government wants the continued use of the premises. Such steps should be completed within a period of three years from today. (3) If, however, there are insurmountable difficulties in acquiring the premises under S. 49 (1), the Government will be at liberty to apply to this Court for appropriate directions. (4) We also hope that the Government would take steps to acquire any alternative property or premises under Land Acquisition Act 1894 in view of the fact that the purpose of the Government is more or less permanent and such steps should also be taken not beyond a period of three years as aforesaid. (5) If the aforesaid conditions or directions are not complied with, the petitioner will also be at liberty to apply to this Court for appropriate directions in accordance with law. (6) In the mean time, the parties are at liberty to make any appropriate application for the enhancement of rent or compensation in accordance with law, if they are so entitled to, and this will also not prejudice the parties from proceeding with any suit for damages etc. that may be pending. 25. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. 26. The application is disposed of accordingly. that may be pending. 25. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. 26. The application is disposed of accordingly. " ( 5 ) A few days after the judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court, a review petition was filed drawing the attention of the Supreme Court to the fact that S. 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was amended not in relation to the State of West Bengal but the amendments which had been taken into consideration by the Supreme Court were with reference to Calcutta Improvement Trust Act 1932. After hearing the parties, the Supreme Court disposed of the review petition by the following order on 15th April 1985:"since it has been brought to our notice (which should have been done when the matter was heard) that the West Bengal Act 31 of 1944 is not applicable to the facts of the case, we direct that any reference to that Act wherever it occurs shall be deleted and in particular, in para 2 of the order portion of our judgment we delete the words "as substituted for the State of West Bengal by the West Bengal Act 32 of 1955". The rest of the order stands. The review petition is disposed of accordingly. " ( 6 ) THE Government of West Bengal then issued the impugned Notification dated 28-2-1985 which is quoted hereinbelow :"govt. of West Bengal Notification calcutta No. 987-LA (II)/4b-3/84 dt. 28-2-85. Whereas it appears to the Governor that land is likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely, for permanent accommodation of Emporium and Head Office of the West Bengal Handicrafts Development Corporation, it is hereby notified that Eastern portion of ground floor, along with its mezzanine floor at Pr. No. 7/1-D, Lindsay Street, Calcutta, and measuring altogether more or less 0. 0345 hectare (. 0852 acre) and bounded on the north by - Lindsay Street. East by - Madge Lane. South by - Pr. No. 7/1-C, Lindsay Street. West by - Remaining portion of Pr. 7/d, Lindsay Street, (Ruby's sari and readymade garment shop) is likely to be needed for the aforesaid public at the public expense within the aforesaid Ward No. 54 of the Calcutta Municipality in the City of Calcutta. This notification is made under the provisions of S. 4 of the Act I of 1894 to all whom it may concern. 7/d, Lindsay Street, (Ruby's sari and readymade garment shop) is likely to be needed for the aforesaid public at the public expense within the aforesaid Ward No. 54 of the Calcutta Municipality in the City of Calcutta. This notification is made under the provisions of S. 4 of the Act I of 1894 to all whom it may concern. A plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta at No. 5, Bankshall Street, Calcutta. In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section, the Governor is pleased to authorise the officers for the time being engaged in the undertaking, with their servants and workmen, to enter upon and survey the land and do all other acts required or permitted by that section. Any person interested in the above land, who has any objection to acquisition thereof, may within thirty days after the date on which public notice of the substance of this notification is given in the locality, file objection Yin writing before the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, at 5, Bankshall Street, Calcutta. By order of the Governor sd/- p. C. Chakravorty, deputy Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal. ICAI 309 (2)/ 85/a" ( 7 ) THE Trust objected to the impugned Notification by its letter dated 13-4-1985, 14-10-1985 and 9-12-1986. The crux of the objection raised by the Trust in its letters was that by reason of the provisions of S. 49 of the LA Act it was not permissible for the State to acquire part of a building if the owner of the building desired that the whole of it should be acquired and since the trust expressed such desire the authorities concerned had no power to proceed with the proposed acquisition. The authorities concerned did not respond to these objections. A writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned notification. The Supreme Court was of the view that the petitioner should first approach the High Court and accordingly the application under Art. 32 was not pressed. ( 8 ) ON 13th April, 1987 this writ petition was moved challenging the validity of the impugned notification. A supplementary affidavit being the affidavit of Kharag Singh Singhee (being petitioner No. 6) affirmed on 4th June, 1987 has been filed. ( 8 ) ON 13th April, 1987 this writ petition was moved challenging the validity of the impugned notification. A supplementary affidavit being the affidavit of Kharag Singh Singhee (being petitioner No. 6) affirmed on 4th June, 1987 has been filed. In this supplementary affidavit it has been stated that the petitioners for the first time came to know about the impugned declaration from the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in the course of hearing at the interim stage on 20th May, 1987. In the supplementary affidavit the petitioners challenged the validity of the impugned declaration. ( 9 ) THIS application has been opposed by the State respondents (respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3) as well as respondent No. 4 and separate affidavits in opposition have been filed on their behalf. ( 10 ) MR. R. N. Bajoria. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners has made two principal submissions, namely:- (a) The acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed since in spite of the insistence of the writ petitioners that the whole of the building be acquired, the respondents Nos. 1, and 3 are not doing so in violation of S. 49 of t he LA Act. (b) The alleged public purpose of providing accommodation to the respondent No. 4 could easily be met by the State Government from various other accommodations available to it. ( 11 ) MR. Somnath Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (i. e. State respondents) has submitted as follows : (a) Section 49 has no application inasmuch as the area which is the subject matter of the impugned notification and impugned declaration is by itself a building. (b) The impugned notification and declaration have been issued duly and in accordance with law. ( 12 ) MR. Dipankar Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 in effect adopted the submissions made by Mr. Chatterjee. ( 13 ) IT will be necessary to refer to the submissions of the parties in some detail and I have done so later in the course of evaluating their merits. ( 14 ) SINCE the controversy in this case revolves around S. 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, it is necessary to set out this section. The section reads as follows :"49. ( 14 ) SINCE the controversy in this case revolves around S. 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, it is necessary to set out this section. The section reads as follows :"49. Acquisition of part of house or building : (1) The provisions of this Act shall not be put in force for the purpose of acquiring a part only of any house, manufactory or other building, if the owner desires that the whole of such house, manufactory or building shall be so acquired : provided that the owner may, at any time before the Collector has made his award under S. 11, by notice in writing, withdraw or modify his expressed desire that the whole of such house, manufactory or building shall be so acquired : provided also that, if any question shall arise as to whether any land proposed to be taken under this Act does or does not form part of a house, manufactory or building within the meaning of this section, the Collector shall refer the determination of such question to the Court and shall not take possession of such land until after the question has been determined. In deciding on such a reference the Court shall have regard to the question whether the land proposed to be taken is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the house, manufactory or building. (2) If, in the case of any claim under S. 23, sub-sec. (1), thirdly, by a person interested, on account of the severing of the land to be acquired from his other land, the [appropriate Government] is of opinion that the claim is unreasonable or excessive, it may, at anytime before the Collector has made his award, order the acquisition of the whole of the land which the land first sought to be acquired forms a part. (3) In the case last hereinbefore provided for, no fresh declaration or other proceedings under Ss. 6 to 10, both inclusive, shall be necessary; but the Collector shall without delay furnish a copy of the order of the [appropriate Government] to the person interested, and shall thereafter proceed to make his award under S. 11. " ( 15 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Bajoria it is not open to the respondents to contend that "manjusha" shop room or the area in question is itself a building and not part of a building. " ( 15 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Bajoria it is not open to the respondents to contend that "manjusha" shop room or the area in question is itself a building and not part of a building. According to him it is a matter of record that the area sought to be acquired is a part of the building situate at 7/1d, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. This submission is based on the contention of the respondents recorded by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated 30th August 1984 to which I have already referred earlier. This judgment of the Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta is reported in (1984) 4 SCC 612 . In paragraph 18 of the judgment at page 620 (of SCC) of the report the Supreme Court recorded the following contention made on behalf of the respondents : "it was further contended on behalf of the respondents that part of the premises i. e. one room as in the instant case before us, cannot be acquired. " my attention has also been drawn to the photographs of the building which have been annexed to the writ petition to show that the area sought to be acquired is a small part of the building. Mr. Bajoria has also relied on the impugned notification and the impugned declaration for establishing that the area in question cannot but be considered to be a part of the building. ( 16 ) THERE is substance in each of these submissions. In recording the contentions made on behalf of the respondents which have been quoted above, the Supreme Court has noted the statement of fact made on behalf of the respondents, namely, that the shop room was part of the building situate at 7/1d, Lindsay Street. In fact in paragraph 19 of the judgment in Jiwani Kumar Paraki, (1984) 4 SCC 612 , the Supreme Court after noting that the argument on behalf of the respondents in relation to S. 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 observed as follows : "in other words it was urged that this provision almost prevents the acquisition of a part of a house or building. " ( 17 ) IT is not the case of the respondents that this factual stand was taken before the Supreme Court by reason of any mistake or misapprehension. " ( 17 ) IT is not the case of the respondents that this factual stand was taken before the Supreme Court by reason of any mistake or misapprehension. From the photographs annexed to the Writ Petition it is crystal clear that "manjusha" shop room is a very small part of the building. The impugned notification and the impugned declaration also refer to the area sought to be acquired as part of a building. Both the impugned notification and the impugned declaration refer to this area as "eastern portion" of ground floor along with its mezzanine floor at premises No. 7/1d, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. Furthermore, they say that the area in question is bounded on the west by remaining "portion" of premises No. 7/1d, Lindsay Street. The language of the impugned notification and the impugned declaration is clear and the meaning of the relevant word i. e. "portion" is plain. There can be no doubt that the impugned notification and the impugned declaration are in respect of an area which is a part of the building situate at 7/1d, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. ( 18 ) IN aid of his submission that S. 49 of the LA Act is not applicable, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee had argued that the expression "house or building" in that section must today be construed differently in the context of the recent proliferation of multi-storeyed buildings and the concept of apartment ownership. He also submitted that since the shop room has itself an independent access is another factor for considering the area in question as a separate building and not part of the building at premises No. 7/1d, Lindsay Street. These are innovative and interesting arguments. But I find it difficult to discern any substance in them. My reasons follow. ( 19 ) FIRST, the language of S. 49 of the LA Act is clear, it says that part of any house or building cannot be acquired if the owner desires that the whole of such house or building should be acquired. There is nothing in the section to justify a special or artificial meaning to be attributed to the word building to include part of the building. Such a construction would make a nonsense of the section. The proliferation of multi-storeyed buildings or the concept of apartment ownership were and are well known to the legislature. There is nothing in the section to justify a special or artificial meaning to be attributed to the word building to include part of the building. Such a construction would make a nonsense of the section. The proliferation of multi-storeyed buildings or the concept of apartment ownership were and are well known to the legislature. If a new meaning is to be given to S. 49 or if the application of S. 49 is to be excluded in the context of modern developments as suggested by Mr. Chatterjee, it can be done only by the legislative process and not be activist judicial interpretation. Judicial activism has its limits. It must function within the legitimate, recognised and reasonable parameters of rules of interpretation. Judicial activism cannot usurp legislative function -it would be a constitutional hearsay. Since reference has been made to the concept of apartment ownership it may be useful to note the definition of the words "apartment" and "building" in the West Bengal Apartment Ownership Act 1972. Section 3 (a) and (c) of the West Bengal Apartment Ownership Act 1972 defines these words in the following terms - "apartment" means part of a property having a direct exit to a road, street or highway or to a common area leading to such road, street or highway which together with its undivided interest in the common areas and facilitates forms an independent residential unit; "building" means a building containing four or more apartments or more than one building each containing four or more apartments comprised in the same property. " ( 20 ) THESE definitions do not in any way support the contention that the word building should be understood in the manner contended on behalf of the respondents. ( 21 ) MR. Chatterjee relied on two decisions, namely, Brook v. Manchester, Sheffields and Lincolnshire Railway Company, (1895) 2 Ch D 571 and Venkataratnam v. The Collector of Godawari, (1904) ILR 27 Mad 350. In my view these decisions are of no assistance to the respondents. In Brook (supra) the plaintiffs claimed an injunction against the Railway Company founded on the rights which they asserted were vested in them under S. 92 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. Section 92 of 1845 Act is similar to S. 49 of the LA Act [see the observation in (1904) ILR 27 Mad 350]. In Brook (supra) the plaintiffs claimed an injunction against the Railway Company founded on the rights which they asserted were vested in them under S. 92 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. Section 92 of 1845 Act is similar to S. 49 of the LA Act [see the observation in (1904) ILR 27 Mad 350]. The Railway Company had given notice to take a part of property. The plaintiffs had given them a counter notice to take whole of the property. The Railway Company said that the counter notice to take whole of the property. The Railway Company said that the counter notice was bad because it required them to take more than they were to take under S. 92. Part of the house was used for the purposes of manufactory and the other part was let to an under tenant and not used for the purposes of the manufactory. It was held that the portion which was let to the under tenant was a part of manufactory and the Railway Company proposing to take it was bound under S. 92 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 to take the whole of the manufactory. In Venkataratnam (supra) the Municipality of Rajahmundry had originally proposed to acquire an extent of 40-54 square yards of house etc. , together with the edifice and walls standing upon it for widening the Training College Street. As, however, that would have affected the main building and would have caused damage to it, the Municipality had resolved to acquire only 38-95 square yards so as to leave the main building unaffected. The site so proposed to be acquired contained a coach-house and a brick wall. The Sub-Collector made an award in respect of this acquisition. The owner filed a petition complaining that if any potion of the site should be acquired the whole house should be taken as the house would be of no use, if a portion of it were taken. The case was referred to the District Judge under Ss. 18 and 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The District Judge decided the reference against the owner. The owner appealed to the Madras High Court under S. 54 of the LA Act. The case was referred to the District Judge under Ss. 18 and 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The District Judge decided the reference against the owner. The owner appealed to the Madras High Court under S. 54 of the LA Act. The question which arose before the High Court has been posed in the judgment of the High Court itself as follows:- "the question raised is whether a strip of land with the building thereon can be compulsorily acquired under the Act without the adjacent main building, with which the building proposed to be acquired are structurally connected so as to form one block being also acquired. " after noticing S. 49 of the LA Act and the provisos thereto the High Court came to the following conclusion :"it may be that, under the Act of 1894, a portion of a block of buildings is a part of a house in the sense that it is structurally connected with the rest of the block, but at the same time, is not necessarily required for the full and unimpaired use of the house, so as to impose on the public body which seeks to exercise compulsory powers of acquisition, the obligation to acquire the whole block. But when the public body seeks to acquire any portion of a block which is structurally connected with the main block, the onus is certainly on that body to show that the portion is not "reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the house. " On the evidence in the present case, we are of opinion that the Municipality failed to discharge this onus. We allow the appeal and set aside the award with costs throughout. " ( 22 ) BOTH these decisions are not only of no assistance to the respondents but cannot even be considered to be remotely relevant to the question in controversy in this case. ( 23 ) IT is also difficult to accept the other submission made on behalf of the respondents based on independent access to the shop room. The rooms in a building may have independent access. From this it would be unreasonable to conclude that each of the rooms constituted independent buildings. The shops which are situated in the ground floor of the building would normally have their access or opening on the road. The rooms in a building may have independent access. From this it would be unreasonable to conclude that each of the rooms constituted independent buildings. The shops which are situated in the ground floor of the building would normally have their access or opening on the road. There is no logical justification for taking such a view. ( 24 ) THERE is no dispute in this case that the trust expressed the desire that the entire property should be acquired. In my view the impugned notification and the impugned declaration are ultra vires S. 49 of LA Act and the acquisition proceedings are without jurisdiction. ( 25 ) THE other principal submission made by Mr. Bajoria is that the State Government could have provided accommodation to the respondent No. 4 from various other accommodations available to it. This submission is inspired by the fourth direction contained in the order of the Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki dated 30th August 1984 [ (1984) 4 SCC 612 at p. 623 ] which is as follows : "we also hope that the Government would take steps to acquire any alternative property or premises under Land Acquisition Act 1894 in view of the fact, that the purpose of the Government is more or less permanent and such steps should also be taken not beyond a period of three years as aforesaid. " ( 26 ) IT is submitted that the respondents have not disclosed any material to show whether any efforts were made by them for obtaining any suitable alternative accommodation. It was also submitted that the power of eminent domain by way of requisition or acquisition should be exercised by the State only when its needs cannot be met save by requisition or acquiring a particular property. If the needs can be met with properties at the command and/or disposal of the State itself, it would be unjust or illegal exercise of power to requisition or acquire the property of a citizen. ( 27 ) MY attention has been drawn to paragraph 15 of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the writ petitioner being the affidavit of Kharag Singh Singhee affirmed on 4th June 1987. ( 27 ) MY attention has been drawn to paragraph 15 of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the writ petitioner being the affidavit of Kharag Singh Singhee affirmed on 4th June 1987. In this paragraph it has been said that no effort has been made by the respondents and no steps have been taken by the respondents in accordance with the wish or the desire of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to acquire any alternative property or premises under the Act and the respondents have acted mala fide. This has not been effectively disputed in the affidavits filed on behalf of the state Respondents being the affidavit of Taraknath Bhattacharyya affirmed on 18th June, 1987. There is some justification in this complaint. When the apex court of the Land expresses a wish or a desire and particularly when such wish or desire is addressed to the State Authorities it is only fair and proper on the part of such authorities to respect such a wish or desires Precatory words of the Supreme Court are not to be treated lightly by any person or authority. The person who are entrusted with the administration should set examples of good conduct and behaviour. In this case the State respondents are totally silent as to what efforts were made or steps were taken to fulfil the hope of the Supreme Court noted above. this smacks of mala fides. ( 28 ) MR. 1 Bajoria has pointed out that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that in the New Market which is overlooking the disputed building, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has constructed new multi-storeyed building where the Corporation could have easily accommodated the respondent No. 4. He has also submitted that the needs of the No. 4 could be met with properties at the command/ordisposal for the State itself. Since this submission is not backed by any material on record, I am unable to accept this submission. ( 29 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid this application succeeds. The impugned notification dated 28th February, 1985 being Annexure "a" to the writ petition and the impugned Declaration dated 18th March, 1987 being Annexure "b" to the Supplementary Affidavit Kharag Singh Singhee affirmed on 4th June 1987 are hereby set aside and quashed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 30 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has asked for stay. There will be no order as to costs. ( 30 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has asked for stay. The prayer for stay is refused. However, be it recorded that Mr. Samar Banerjee counsel for the petitioner has stated that his client will not take any step in terms of the judgment and order till December 1, 1989. Petition allowed.