JUDGMENT : P.R. Gokulakrishnan, J. Both these petitions raise a common question in respect of the Wealth-tax Act. The parties have come before this court under article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of quashing the notice issued by the Commissioner of Wealth-tax on January 21, 1989, and February 20, 1989, respectively. In and by the notice dated January 21, 1989, issued to the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1887 of 1989, the Commissioner has stated : ". . . 2. On perusal of the records, it is observed that your claim of income-tax liability of Rs. 44,09,723 for the assessment years 1975-76 to 1981-82 and wealth-tax liability of Rs. 47,893 for the assessment years 1979-80 to 1981-82 are allowed as a deduction while computing the net wealth. This deduction was allowed on the basis of your claim of self assessment taxes having been paid under the Income-tax and Wealth-tax Acts for the above years. The above liabilities which are claimed by you and allowed while computing the net wealth for the year under consideration are the liabilities considered as outstanding for more than 12 months. These liabilities are, therefore, not allowable while computing the net wealth for the assessment year 1982-83 in view of the provisions of section 2(m)(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act. To the above extent, I consider that the assessment order passed is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. 1, therefore, propose to revise the order of the Wealth-tax Officer dated March 30, 1987, under section 25(2) of the Wealth-tax Act . . ." 2. In and by the notice dated February 20, 1989, issued to the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1888 of 1989, the Commissioner has stated : "On perusal of the records, it is seen that the original return in your case was filed on March 7, 1983, admitting a net wealth of Rs. 20,16,379. Subsequently, a revised return was filed on October 24, 1985, showing the net wealth of Rs. 19,96,030 ; again, the said return was revised under the Amnesty Scheme on March 27, 1987, and the net wealth was declared at Rs. 22,19,400. 3. 20,16,379. Subsequently, a revised return was filed on October 24, 1985, showing the net wealth of Rs. 19,96,030 ; again, the said return was revised under the Amnesty Scheme on March 27, 1987, and the net wealth was declared at Rs. 22,19,400. 3. The return filed under the Amnesty Scheme on March 27, 1987, was accepted and an order under section 16(1) of the Wealth-tax Act was passed on March 27, 1987, and the net wealth was determined at Rs. 22,19,400. While finalising the above assessment, income-tax liability of Rs. 8,46,078 and wealth-tax liability of Rs. 1,15,233 for the assessment years 1978-79 to 1981-82 are allowed as per the claim made by you. However, the above liabilities are not allowable in view of the provisions of section 2(m)(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act as these are liabilities outstanding for more than 12 months on the valuation date for the assessment year 1982-83. To the above extent, I consider that the assessment order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. 1, therefore, propose to revise the order of the Wealth-tax Officer dated March 27, 1987, under section 25(2) of the Wealth-tax Act." After stating so, the notice has requested the parties to appear either in person or through their authorised representative on March 8, 1989, at 3.30 p.m. and to show cause as to why such order or any other order as deemed fit be not passed. It is as against these notices issued under the Wealth-tax Act that the present special civil applications have been filed. 4. Mr. J. P. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in each of these petitions, pointed out that the notices proceed on a wrong basis when they state that a certain amount has been wrongly deducted in computing the wealth-tax for the year mentioned in that notice. Section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act defines "net wealth". Section 2(m)(iii)(b) reads as follows : "2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-. . . (m)(iii) the amount of the tax, penalty or interest payable in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act or any law relating to taxation of income or profits, or the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 (29 of 1957), or the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958),-.... . . (m)(iii) the amount of the tax, penalty or interest payable in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act or any law relating to taxation of income or profits, or the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 (29 of 1957), or the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958),-.... (b) which, although not claimed by the assessee as not being payable by him, is nevertheless outstanding for a period of more than twelve months on the valuation date ; Explanation 1. A building or part thereof referred to in clause (iii), clause (iiia) or clause (iiib) of section 27 of the Income-tax Act shall be includible in the net wealth of the person who is deemed under the said clause to be the owner of that building or part thereof." 5. According to this section, Mr. Shah states that it is patent and clear that the show cause notice is patently wrong and that the order of assessment made already is clear and correct and cannot be reopened. For this purpose, learned counsel pressed into service the decision in the case of CWT v. J. K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd., 1984 (146) ITR 552 (SC). In this case, the Supreme Court has clearly stated (headnote) : "The expression 'outstanding' in section 2(m)(iii)(a) and (b) has to be construed in the background of the phrase 'amount of tax ... payable in consequence of an order, and in that context it must mean remaining unpaid after the obligation to pay is incurred." 6. According to this decision, Mr. J. P. Shah states that the notice has to be construed as not valid and the parties should not be driven to the hierarchy, of proceedings before the wealth-tax authorities. Both the section and the Supreme Court decision, according to Mr. J. P. Shah, are clear enough to uphold the assessment already made and there is no question of reassessing the same by issuance of the present show-cause notice which is being impugned in the present special civil application. 7. Both the section and the Supreme Court decision, according to Mr. J. P. Shah, are clear enough to uphold the assessment already made and there is no question of reassessing the same by issuance of the present show-cause notice which is being impugned in the present special civil application. 7. When we asked learned counsel as to whether he could not explain all these things before the Commissioner in response to the notice issued, learned counsel submitted that the authorities concerned are bound by the audit report, that the audit report has given an opinion which goes contra to the Supreme Court decision and that, as such, no useful purpose would be served by appearing before the Commissioner of Wealth-tax in pursuance of the notice. It is hardly a reason which can be entertained for the purpose of admitting these special civil applications. No doubt, Mr. J. P. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in these petitions, pointed out the decision in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, 1961 (41) ITR 191 (SC) (headnote), wherein the Supreme Court has held : ". . . that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari would not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts had power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjected, or was likely to subject, a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts would issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. The existence of such alternative remedies as appeals and reference to the High Court was not, however, always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. When the Constitution conferred on the High Courts the power to give relief, it became the duty of the courts to give such relief in fit cases and the courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief were refused without adequate reasons." 8. We are not able to appreciate this submission made by Mr. J. P. Shah. This is not a case where the Commissioner has no jurisdiction at all. We are not able to appreciate this submission made by Mr. J. P. Shah. This is not a case where the Commissioner has no jurisdiction at all. We are definite that if the section and the Supreme Court decision cited before us are brought to the notice of the Commissioner, he will look into the matter and if the principles laid down in that Supreme Court decision are acceptable, the Commissioner, who will be hearing the parties concerned, will definitely follow the decision of the Supreme Court which, by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution, is binding on all concerned. Simply because the matter can be decided under article 226 of the Constitution by invoking the special jurisdiction of the High Court, the matter, which is at the stage of show cause notice, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be entertained. If that be so, flood-gates will be opened and there will be innumerable writ petitions on the ground that there are binding decisions which the authorities have to follow and which they have failed to appreciate. As it is, we are of the view that the petitioners may be well advised to go before the Commissioner in response to the show cause notice issued and convince him with regard to the points the petitioners have raised before us. 9. With these observations, these special civil applications are dismissed. 10. An oral prayer is made by Mr. J. P. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both these petitions, for issuance of a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in these cases and, accordingly, the prayer is rejected.