Judgment This is a petition under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the two accused in C.C.No.11584 of 1986 on the file of the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, to call for those records and quash the same. 2. The 1st petitioner is working as Nurse in the Maternity Hospital for Women and Children, Egmore, Madras and her husband the 2nd petitioner is working in the Government Press, Madras. They have no children of their own. The 2nd respondent Ambujammal, who had been impleaded as per the order of this Court dated 8.9.1988 in Crl.M.P. No.5389 of 1988 is the elder sister of the first petitioner’s mother. She is a resident of Tiruchirapalli. She had an adopted son by name Rajasekar alias Sekar. About two years ago, the said Rajasekar came to Madras and stayed with the petitioners. He was studying Siddha Medicine at the Anna Hospital, Madras. 3. On the evening of 12.2.1986, the petitioners left their house viz. No.22, Sami Reddy Street, Egmore, Madras, leaving Rajasekar in the house. When the 1st petitioner returned home at about 8.00 P.M. she noticed Rajasekar in an unusual condition with an iron box in his hand with electricity connection. Immediately, she disconnected the electricity supply and took Rajasekar to Dr.Surendran, who is having clinic at Gengu Reddy Street, Egmore, Madras, along with her neighbours. The doctor examined Rajasekar at about 8.15 P.M., and certified that he died due to cardiac failure due to electrocution. The 1st petitioner took the body of Rajasekar to her house and informed her husband, the 2nd petitioner, who by then returned home. They gave telegram to the 2nd respondent and other relatives. The body of Rajasekar was kept till 9.00 P.M., the next day i.e., on 13.2.1986. As the 2nd respondent did not come, the petitioners had buried the dead body of Rajasekar at Kilpauk burial ground at 9.00 P.M. on 13.2.1986. 4. Subsequently, on the same night, the 2nd respondent came and took part in the second day ceremonies. She was informed of the happenings on 12.2.1986, about the disposal of the dead body etc. The 2nd respondent did not express any suspicion about the death of Rajasekar till she left for Tiruchirapalli after a few days. 4. Subsequently, on the same night, the 2nd respondent came and took part in the second day ceremonies. She was informed of the happenings on 12.2.1986, about the disposal of the dead body etc. The 2nd respondent did not express any suspicion about the death of Rajasekar till she left for Tiruchirapalli after a few days. After a lapse of seven months on 26.9.1986 the 2nd respondent lodged a complaint before F-2, Egmore Police Station suspecting foul play in the death of her adopted son Rajaksekar and requesting enquiry to be conducted in this regard. The Inspector of Police, Egmore, who conducted an enquiry found that there is only fault on the part of the petitioners in not reporting the suspicious death of Rajasekar to the police immediately and as such, they are liable to be prosecuted for such lapse under Sec.176, I.P.C. Sec.176, I.P.C. being a non-cognizable one, after obtaining permission from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, to investigate the case, the Inspector of Police investigated the case and filed charge-sheet against the petitioners before the 14the Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, as under: “That on 12.2.1986 between 18.00 hours and 20.00 hours at No.22, Sami Reddi Street, Egmore, Madras-8, in the residence of accused 1 and 2 noted in the charge-sheet, one Sekar alias Rajasekar (22 years) died due to electric shock while he was ironing the clothes. The body of Sekar alias Rajasekar was buried in Kilpauk burial ground, on 13.2.1986 without informing to police even though the death was unnatural one. The accused 1 and 2 noted in the charge-sheet who are legally bound to give information to police about the unnatural death of Sekar alias Rajasekar have intentionally omitted to give information to police as they arc legally bound to give it and buried the body. Hence, accused 1 and 2 are liable to be punished under Sec.176, I.P.C.” In the above circumstances, the petitioners have filed the present petition to call for the records and quash the impugned proceedings. In this petition, the 1st respondent is the Inspector of Police, Egmore. The adopted mother of the deceased has been impleaded as 2nd respondent, on her own application. 5. In this petition, the 1st respondent is the Inspector of Police, Egmore. The adopted mother of the deceased has been impleaded as 2nd respondent, on her own application. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have committed no offence much less than an offence under Sec.176, I.P.C. According to the learned counsel, under Sec.176 of the I.P.C, only when a person who is legally bound to give notice or to furnish information on any subject or to furnish information on any subject to any public servant and if he intentionally omits to give such notice or to furnish such information, he will be liable. It is pointed out that in the death of Rajasekar, there is no suspicion and it is purely a case of accident by electrocution. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution has not placed any material to show as to how the petitioners are legally bound to give information. Further, in the absence of any violation of any specific provision of law or statute, no offence under Sec.176 of the I.P.C, is made out. It is pointed out that under Sec.39 of the Crl.P.C, a list of cases where a public servant has to give information is furnished. This incident did not fall under any of the offences under the I.P.C, mentioned in that section. Further, under Sec.195, of the Crl.P.C, no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sec.176 of the I.P.C, except on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The charge-sheet does not mention any public servant to whom the petitioners are legally bound to give information. He also cited a number of authorities to the proposition that in order to make a person liable under Sec.176 of the I.P.C, there must be failure to give notice or information of a public servant with reference to any specific provision of law or statute and in the absence of such specific provision, no offence is made out under Sec.176 of the I.P.C. He further pointed out that even the report made by the Inspector of Police after investigation does not show that the petitioners had intentionally failed to report about the death of Rajasekar to the police. 6. 6. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, as well as the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the very fact that Rajasekar died due to electric shock while the petitioners were away from the house itself is a suspicious circumstance and the petitioners are duty bound to report the death to the police. 7. In the decision reported in Budh Singh v. Emperor, (1926)27 Crl.L.J. 1367, a zemindar collected more than the recorded rent from the tenant without giving information to the officials of the Revenue Department. He was sought to be prosecuted under Sec.176, of the Indian Penal Code. In that decision it was held as follows: “The mere fact that a zemindar realised more than the recorded rent from his tenant for a long time without giving information about it to the officials concerned does not render him liable to be convicted for an offence under Sec.176 of the Penal Code, read with Sec.46 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, inasmuch as under the latter provision he is not legally bound to give the information to the public servants concerned in the absence of a requisition for such information from a public servant.” The decision reported in Emperor v. Ram Banm Singh, 42 Crl.L.J. 708, is also on the same lines. 8. In the decision reported in Emperor v. Suraj Baksh Singh, 6 Crl.L.J. 301, it was held that the failure to give information to the Patwari or Jamabandi on demand is an offence falling under Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. This is on the basis that under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, a Zamindar is under an obligation to give information on demand. The decision reported in Emperor v. Janki Singh, (1905) 2 Crl.L.J. 307, is also on the same lines. 9. In the decision reported in Lal Mohan Paul v. State of Tripttra, 1952 Crl.L.J. 1642, it was held that a person selling mill-made cloth at his shop is bound under the conditions of licence to disclose the places where he had stocked cloth other than those stated in the licence and when a licensee was asked to submit a list of mill made cloth with him, the licensee omitted to mention cloth which he had stored in a place other than his shop. So, he was prosecuted under Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code for not disclosing the places where he had stored cloth other than his shop. His contention that he was not legally bound to furnish information was rejected and his conviction was sustained as under the licence he was bound to disclose the places where he had stocked cloth besides the shop, and his failure to disclose the place attracts the general provisions of Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to a number of enactments wherein obligation is cast under the statute and the failure to comply with that obligation attracts the penal provision of Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Sec.10 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector can, in the course of land acquisition proceedings, call upon from any person interested in the land, particulars about the ownership of the land, tenants, nature of such interest, etc. Sub clause (2) of the section says that when a person is called upon to do so, he is legally bound to do so within the meaning of Sec.176, of the Indian Penal Code. Under Sec.317 of the Indian Succession Act, an administrator of the estate, after the probate or letters of administration is granted is bound to exhibit an inventory and account of the estate of required by the Court and as per sub-clause (3), of that section, failure to do so will attract the provisions of Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Sec.8 of the Explosives Act IV of 1884, when an accident by explosion occurs, attended with loss of human life or serious injury to person or property, in a place where explosive is manufactured the occupier of that place is bound to give forthwith notice to officer in charge of the nearest police station. He also referred to similar other enactments and other decisions. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the above decisions and enactments to canvass his contention that in order to attract Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code, there must be a legal obligation on the part of the person concerned to give information to any public authority and only in such a case if he failed to furnish that information, he will be liable under Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. I agree with the contention. 11. In the instant case, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the charge does not disclose that under what provision of law, the petitioners are bound to report the incident to the police. Though the death of Rajasekar was due to electric shock, investigation by the police does not disclose that there was suspicion about the death, which alone will necessitate the petitioners to report the matter to the police. In the absence of any obligation cast upon the petitioners under any statute, the failure to report about the death of Rajasekar to the police will not attract the provisions of Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Admittedly, the failure of the petitioners to report to the police did not fall under any of the categories mentioned under Sec.39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to make them liable under Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. On a plain reading of Sec.176 of the Indian Penal Code the following ingredients are necessary to proceed against a person under this section. He must be legally bound to give information or notice to a public servant and that the failure to give such information must be intentional. As already pointed out the prosecution has not placed any material to show how the petitioners are legally bound to give notice or information. The charge does not disclose any such material. Further, the charge did not contain the second ingredient viz., even assuming that the petitioners are bound to give such information the failure to give such information is an intentional one. In fact, the investigation done by the police shows that the deceased was looked after by the petitioners for more than 1-1/2 years, and that immediately when the 1st petitioner came to the house and saw the deceased in an unusual condition with an iron box in his hand and electricity connection, she took him to the doctor immediately with the help of neighbours. No attempt was made by her to secrete the information from neighbours. The petitioners kept the body for more than 24 h5urs awaiting the arrival of the 2nd respondent, the adopted mother of the deceased. The report further says that the enquiry discloses that Rajasekar died electrocution while he was ironing the cloth. No attempt was made by her to secrete the information from neighbours. The petitioners kept the body for more than 24 h5urs awaiting the arrival of the 2nd respondent, the adopted mother of the deceased. The report further says that the enquiry discloses that Rajasekar died electrocution while he was ironing the cloth. The investigation does not disclose any mala fide act on the part of the petitioners. The report further says that the petitioners are bound to give information. It cannot be contended that they intentionally failed to give information, which is vital to sustain the charge under Sec.176 of the I.P.C. In those circumstances, the charge is not sustainable on that ground also. Mere adding of the word ‘intentionally omitted to give information’ in the charge-sheet, in the absence of any material, will not lead to the presumption that the petitioners intentionally omitted to give information. In the absence of a charge that the petitioners violated any specific provision of law by not giving information to the police about the death of Ra-jasekar and in the absence of any material gathered by the prosecution to show that the failure to give information was intentional, the impugned charge is not sustainable though it is mentioned in the charge-sheet that the failure to give information was intentional. In the circumstances, I feel, the impugned proceedings against the petitioners under Sec.176 of the I.P.C., on the basis of a belated complaint given by the 2nd respondent, are not sustainable. 13. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned proceedings are quashed.