ORDER The present Rules have been assigned to this Bench for early disposal since the Rules are very old, being of 1971. 2. As agreed by the learned Advocates for the respective parties; all the Rules were taken up for hearing analogously on merit. 3. The Rules were issued at the instance of the petitioners main]y chal1enging the amended provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, as by Notification dated 20th September, 1969 (Notification no. S.O 838) in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 6B of the Cess Act, 1880 (Bengal Act IX of 1880), the Governor of Bihar was pleased to determine the rate of local cess on notified mines for the year 1969-70 at the rate of 28 paise per ton of annual despatches of coal and coke in the districts of Ranchi, Hazaribagh, Palamau, Dhanbad and Santhal Parganas, and prayed for consequential reliefs on the ground that it will appear from the provisions of ss. 6A and 6B of the Cess Act that discrimination is patent regarding imposition of cess upon 3 classes of properties, i.e. (a) land, (b) mines and quarries other than notified mines and (C) notified mines. It is the specific case of the petitioners that under the Mines & Minerals (Regulations & Development) Act, 1948 and also under the 1957 Act the Rules thereunder express provision has been made for regulating grant pf mining leases in respect of minerals and for purposes connected thereto, and also for fixing and collection of dead rents, fines, fees and other charges in respect of (i) prospecting licences, (ii) milling lease, (iii) Mineral Mines and quarries excavated or collected. It is further placed on record that sub-rule 27(1)(d) of the Mineral Concession Rules provides that the lessee was also to pay for the surface area used by him for the purpose of mining operation, surface rent and water rate not exceeding land revenue, water and cess assessable on the lands as may be specified by the State Government in the leases. Elaborately pointing out all those points, tile petitioners in all the Rules have challenged the vires of the said Cess Act and the Notification dated 20th September, 1969 as arbitrary, unreasonable and without any basis whatsoever. 4. Mr. Elaborately pointing out all those points, tile petitioners in all the Rules have challenged the vires of the said Cess Act and the Notification dated 20th September, 1969 as arbitrary, unreasonable and without any basis whatsoever. 4. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners in support of the Rules has argued that that, ugh there is a decision of the Patna High Court relating to the challenge of the Cess Act as involved in the present Rules, the decision of the Patna High Court mainly relied on the decision reported in AIR 1965 SC Page 177. Unfortunately, the attention of the Hon'ble Court at Patna was not drawn to an important decision on the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1970 SC Page 1436 (Baijnath Kedia etc. v. The State of Bihar & ors.). Attention of this Court has been drawn to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the said case reported in AIR 1970 SC 1436 (supra) wherein it has been held that the pith and substance of the amendment to s. 10 of the Bihar Reforms Act falls within entry 23 of the State List although incidentally touches land and not vice versa and therefore this amendment was subject to the over riding power of Parliament as declared in Act 67 of 1957 in s. 15. Entry 18 of the said List, therefore, is of no help therein. It was made clear that the entire Legislative field in relation to minor minerals had been withdrawn from the State Legislature by the enactment of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act (67 of 1957) vested rights could only be taken away by law made by a competent legislature. Mere rule-making power of the State Government was not able to reach them. The authority to do so must, therefore, have emanated from Parliament. As no such Parliamentary law had been passed, the second sub-rule to Rule 20 was ineffective. It could not derive sustenance from the second proviso to s. 10(2) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act since that proviso was not validly enacted. 5. Relying on the said decision Mr. The authority to do so must, therefore, have emanated from Parliament. As no such Parliamentary law had been passed, the second sub-rule to Rule 20 was ineffective. It could not derive sustenance from the second proviso to s. 10(2) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act since that proviso was not validly enacted. 5. Relying on the said decision Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners has laid emphasis on the fact that the ratio of the said Supreme Court decision in AIR 1970 SC 1436 (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Court at Patna, while delivering the judgment, and it is immaterial that notwithstanding the disposal of the Special Leave petitions by the Supreme Court against the judgment delivered by the Patna High Court, the present writ petitions are quite maintainable and the matter can be gone into in view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (19893 SCC 211 (Buxa Dooors Tea Company Lid & ors. v. The State of West Bengal & ors.). Attention of the Court has also been drawn to the relevant portion of the said judgment inasmuch the Supreme Court has found that the rural employment cess is a tax and if the levy of a tax on goods has the direct and immediate effect of impeding the movement of goods throughout the territory of India, there is a violation of Article 301. If, however, the impact of the levy is indirect or remote, no valid complaint can be made in relation to Article 301. There is no violation of Art. 301, if the legislature of a State enacts a law which imposes such reasonable restrictions, on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourses with or within that State as may be required in the public interest and further the Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause b) of Arc. 304 has been introduced or moved in the legislature of a Slate with the previous sanction of the President, such enactment will not offend Article 301. If the impugned levy imposes a cess in respect of tea estates, the free flow of tea will be impeded in consequence of an indirect or remote effect of the levy and accordingly Art. 301 will not be contravened. 6. If the impugned levy imposes a cess in respect of tea estates, the free flow of tea will be impeded in consequence of an indirect or remote effect of the levy and accordingly Art. 301 will not be contravened. 6. it is submitted that looking to the said decision in depth, it has to be found that the present writ petitions have merit there is no bar and/or impediment to grant the reliefs to the petitioner;, in the manner prayed for. 7. Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate for the respondents, has strongly opposed the writ petitions and has submitted that after the adjudication by the Hon'ble Patna High Court; and since there is dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions by the Apex Court, nothing remains for further adjudication. In support of his contention, he has drawn Court', attention to a reported decision being AIR 1989 Sc 621 (M/s. Shenoy & Co, Bangalore & ors. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle-II, Bangalore & ors) wherein it has been observed that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a private party and it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court. A mere reading of Art. 14. brings into sharp focus its all pervasive nature. In cases where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed, the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by the Supreme Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment. In the fitness of things, it would be desi able that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before the Supreme Court by them and the fault cannot be found with the State for having filed only one appeal. Mr. Bagchi learned Advocate for the respondents further had drawn Court's attention to another reported decision 'in AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1353 (Anil Kumar Neotia & ors. v. Union of India & ors.). Mr. Bagchi learned Advocate for the respondents further had drawn Court's attention to another reported decision 'in AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1353 (Anil Kumar Neotia & ors. v. Union of India & ors.). In paragraph 18 thereof it has been observed that It is no longer open for agitation by the petitioners that certain points had not been urged and the effect of the judgment cannot be collaterally challenged. By referring to the case of Govindraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973) 3 SCR 222 , Supreme Court observed clearly that the argument of the appellants is that prior to the decision in Rustom Caasjee Cooper's case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) it was not possible to challenge the Chapter-IV-A of the Act owing to the decision of this Court that Article 19(1)(f) could not be invoked when a case fall within Article 31 and theft was the reason why the Court in all the previous decisions relating to the validity of Chapter IV-A proceeded on an examination of the argument whether there was infringement of Article 19(1)(g), and Clause (f) of that Article could not possibly be invoked. It was also observed that there is no question of any acquisition or requisition in Chapter IV-A of the Act. Main thrust of the argument of Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate for respondent is that looking to the judgment of the Patna High Court on the self-same points as to the challenge to the vires of the Cess Act, nothing remains to be decided by this Court again and the petitioners cannot be permitted to argue the case any further that some grounds were not available and on new grounds, the matter can be investigated afresh. 8. Having heard the submissions of the respective parties and going through the materials on record and the decisions cited, this Court finds that the main challenge of the writ petitioners as to the vires of the provisions of the Cess Act have been gone into by the Patna High Court and a detailed judgment was delivered by dealing with all the points comprehensively. It is in material whether the attention of the Hon'ble Patna High Court was drawn to the judgment reported in AIR 1970 SC 1436 (supra). It is in material whether the attention of the Hon'ble Patna High Court was drawn to the judgment reported in AIR 1970 SC 1436 (supra). Since adjudication has been taken in the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave petition, the matter remained open so long it was not disposed of there. But, after the disposal of Supreme Court case, it is futile for the petitioners to urge the present writ petitions drawing inspiration from the judgment reported in (1989) 3 SCC 211 (supra). This Court is also of the clear view that the judgment disposing of the writ petitions before the Patna High Court sets at rest the controversies as to the point of vires. It is no longer open to the petitioners that since all the grounds as raised by the present writ petitioners have not been pleaded or not being considered by the Patna High Court, there will be another round or spate of litigation to pursue the matter. 9. Unfortunately, law is very clear that even though certain points were not taken to the earlier writ petitions disposed comprehensively, there cannot be raised by filing a writ petition afresh to canvass such points in the proper perspective. Unless the points are again reopened in the Supreme Court and the High Court decision is reopened and/or reviewed, there cannot be another round or spate of litigation in this regard. 10. Considering all such aspects of the matter, this Court is of the clear view that after the adjudication before the Patna High Court in the case of : Associated Cement Companies Ltd. & ors v. The Stale of Bihar & ors in CWJC nos. 635, 636, 1991 and 2585 of 1976, 1382 and 2273 of 1977 and 660 of 1978, disposed of on 5th October, 1978 by Sushil Kumar Jha and Uday Sinha JJ., it is no longer open to the writ petitioners to maintain the present writ petitions. On such findings, the Rules are discharged without costs and interim order, if any, is vacated. Rules discharged.