JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - Phool Chand son of Kalika Prasad had, through the instant petition, sought issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to set him at liberty under Section 2 of the U. P. Prisoners' Release on Probation Act, 1938. The facts about which there is no dispute between the parties are as follows :- The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in Sessions Trial No. 393 of 1971. Till 20th November, 1987 he had undergone actual sentence of 7 years 2 months and ten days. His under trial period of detention is 7 months 27 days. After giving him remission for 2 years 5 months and 24 days, his total period of sentence undergone comes to ten years 4 months and 1 day. The petitioner made an application for release under Section 2 of the Act in the prescribed form 'A'. It appears from the averments made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner's release was recommended by the District Magistrate as well as by the Probation Board but the State Government did not accept the recommendation and rejected the application for release by order dated 20th April, 1985. By this order the State Government had directed that the question of petitioner's release may be considered after he had undergone imprisonment for a further period of three years. However, before the expiry of the period of three years the petitioner's case was reconsidered by the Probation Board on 15th January, 1986. The Board was of the opinion that the petitioner's case be considered after two years and his behaviour in jail may be watched during this period. The State Government by order dated 14th February, 1986 rejected the petitioner's application for release on the ground that the period of imprisonment already covered was not sufficient. In other words the State Government was of the opinion that considering the nature of the crime committed by the petitioner it was not desirable to release him from jail after barely 8 years. 2. On behalf of the petitioner it is urged that the ground on which his application has been rejected is irrelevant. It is also pleaded that in worse cases the Government has already released prisoners from jail. It is pleaded that the State Government has thus practised discrimination. 2. On behalf of the petitioner it is urged that the ground on which his application has been rejected is irrelevant. It is also pleaded that in worse cases the Government has already released prisoners from jail. It is pleaded that the State Government has thus practised discrimination. The names of the alleged hardened and habitual criminals have been mentioned in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the writ petition. There persons are Vinod Kumar, Sadiq Khan and Salman Khan who are alleged to have been released after they had completed only 5 years of sentence. It is asserted that the offences committed by these persons were more grave than the offence committed by the petitioner. It is claimed that the petitioner has not previous history. another names mentioned is of Dr. Vinai Kumar Saxena who was allegedly released after only 4 years of sentence although he had also committed murder of his wife in a planned manner. In paragraph 24 the names mentioned are Jai Narain Tewari alias Jagga, Ram Vinod Tewari, Vinod Mohan Awasthi, Shamim Rahmani, Shamim Khan, Kalia Khan and Yunus Khan. In paragraph 25 it has been mentioned that Sadiq Khan and Salman Khan, referred to in paragraph 23, were released from jail when they had served out less than five years of sentence. 3. In support of the petitioner's claim his learned counsel has cited :- 1. 1983 Cri LJ 1166 (All) Peoples Union of Civil Liberties, Allahabad v. State. 2. 1986 Cri U 566, (Delhi), Rakesh Kaushik v. Delhi Administration. 3. AIR 1982 SC 1391 : (1982) 3 SCC 209 Shri Niwas v. Delhi Administration. 4. AIR 1977 SC 1926 : (1977) 3 SCC 287 Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 4. Sri Abdul Matin the learned counsel for the State has opposed the petition on several grounds. He has submitted that it is under the orders of the Court that the petitioner is undergoing imprisonment and therefore, the said imprisonment cannot be said to be arbitrary. According to him the petitioner was found, on the judicial side, to be deserving of life imprisonment and once that sentence has been imposed, the petitioner normally has to remain in jail throughout his life and it is only when the administrative authorities consider it expedient to release him, he may be released. According to him the petitioner was found, on the judicial side, to be deserving of life imprisonment and once that sentence has been imposed, the petitioner normally has to remain in jail throughout his life and it is only when the administrative authorities consider it expedient to release him, he may be released. It is pressed that Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked in cases of this nature. He submits that the persons released were not co-accused with the petitioner and that the case of each prisoner has to be considered on its own facts. On this premise it is submitted that the plea of discrimination raised by the petitioner is misconceived. The learned counsel has invited our attention to- 1. AIR 1961 SC 600 , Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra. 2. AIR 1980 SC 2147 , Maru Ram v. Union of India. 3. 1983 SCC (Cri) 536: ( AIR 1983 SC 855 ), Naib Singh v. State of Punjab. 4. 1987 Cri U 606 (Punj & Har), Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab and Haryana. 5. The judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 527 of 1988, decided on 20th January, 1989, Bharosey v. State. 5. Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners' Release on Probation Act, 1938 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 1938), for short Act, reads as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), where a person is confined in prison under a sentence of imprisonment and it appears to the State Government from his antecedents and his conduct in the prison, that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life, if he is released from prison the State Government may by licence permit him to be released on condition that he be placed under the supervision of authority of a Government Officer or of a person professing the same religion as the prisoner or such secular institution or such society belonging to the same religion as the prisoner as may be recognised by the State Government for this purpose provided such other person, institution or society is willing to take charge of him." 6. The above provision does not confer arbitrary power of release on the State Government. The power can be exercised only after acquisition of certain satisfaction by the State Government. The above provision does not confer arbitrary power of release on the State Government. The power can be exercised only after acquisition of certain satisfaction by the State Government. The satisfaction to be acquired is that the prisoner on release is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life. This follows from the clause "and it appears to the State Government ..........that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life." The section also lays down the factors which the State Government shall consider in order to acquire the requisite satisfaction. The material required to be considered is prisoner's "antecedents and his conduct in the prison". The Statute, therefore, not only confers powers upon the State Government : it also lays down the conditions for the exercise of the power. This makes the exercise of power quasi judicial. The power must, therefore, be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice, one of the incidents of which is that the order should be a speaking one, we are not suggesting that while dealing with an application under Section 2, the State Government is required to pass a detailed order. In order to comply with the requirement of speaking order, it will be sufficient if the order indicates the reason which operated with the State Government for rejecting the application under section 2. 7. In the present case, State Government has given reason for the order and, therefore, the order cannot be said to be violative of principles of natural justice. We have of course to see whether the reason given is relevant or irrelevant, but before we do so, we must point out that the State cannot justify rejection of application under Section 2 merely on the ground that the petitioner is undergoing sentence of imprisonment under order of the Court. As stated above, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the petitioner is undergoing sentence under orders of the Court. Legislature has the jurisdiction to create rights even in favour of judicially condemned prisoner. He may be granted pardon or he may be granted remission in sentence, partly or wholly. Such power has been specifically reserved under Articles 161 and 72 of the Constitution and under Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Legislature has the jurisdiction to create rights even in favour of judicially condemned prisoner. He may be granted pardon or he may be granted remission in sentence, partly or wholly. Such power has been specifically reserved under Articles 161 and 72 of the Constitution and under Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Act with which we are dealing regulates the exercise of the power available under these provisions. The power is exercise only after the guilt has been established o the judicial side and the Court has impose sentence against the accused. Release o licence is, in fact, suspension of the sentence of imprisonment awarded by the Court. The Act is a legislative measure to enable the executive to suspend the execution o sentence of imprisonment of a prisoner who appears to be remorseful and whose conduct shows that he will abstain from crime. Sometimes, the conduct may be a camouflage; to cover this, there is provision for re-arrest. 8. Section 2 does confer jurisdiction upon the State Government to order premature release of a prisoner. Implicit in this jurisdiction is a right vested in the prisoner to apply for release. In fact, the State Government itself has framed rules prescribing the 'procedure for making the application. Under Rule 6, the application is to be made in prescribed pro forma 'A'. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the action of the State Government cannot be challenged on the ground of arbitrariness in as much as the petitioner is undergoing the imprisonment in pursuance of sentence imposed by Court of law. 9. Now, the authorities cited at the bar may be referred to. 10. In Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (1983 Cri LI 1166) (All) (supra), the petition had been filed in this Court by a social service organisation as a public interest litigation for premature release of 24 persons convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 I.P.C. The release was sought primarily on the ground of parity. It was pressed that the principal offender had been prematurely released after serving the sentence of barely 6 years. The Court found that the said offender was released on humanitarian and compassionate grounds as his wife was suffering from dry plesuresy. It was pressed that the principal offender had been prematurely released after serving the sentence of barely 6 years. The Court found that the said offender was released on humanitarian and compassionate grounds as his wife was suffering from dry plesuresy. No near relation of the other convicts was said to be suffering from any serious disease. Therefore, the claim for release on the grounds of parity was not entertained. During the pendency of the petition, the State Government granted premature release to some of the convicts. The Bench examined the case of each convict who had been granted release and found that the continued detention of all but two convicts was justified. The two whose premature release was recommended had served 181/2 and 191/2 years with remissions which were considered to be sufficiently long periods. Both of them had over-stayed the period of parole, but in the last meeting of the Probation Board, the only recommendation was that they may not be given parole for one year and by the time the matter came up before the Court that period had expired and nothing adverse had hap pended in between. This judgment is authority for two propositions - (1) In dealing with the question of premature release, the concerned authority cannot act arbitrarily and its action must stand the test of reason (see page 1176 Column 1) and, (2) overstay of the period of parole is a relevant factor which may weigh adversely against the convict seeking premature release, but that factor alone cannot be treated as decisive and other facts and circumstances are also required to be taken into consideration. As a corollary to the first proposition, it may be taken as laid down that where all the factors are identical, the authority cannot pick one for release and the other for continued detention. In respect of the two convicts whom the Bench found deserving of release, it was observed that the Bench could have itself ordered their released but it refrained from doing so by way of propriety and decorum and, therefore, it merely recommended to the State Government to pass order for their release on obtaining bonds etc. from them. 11. In respect of the two convicts whom the Bench found deserving of release, it was observed that the Bench could have itself ordered their released but it refrained from doing so by way of propriety and decorum and, therefore, it merely recommended to the State Government to pass order for their release on obtaining bonds etc. from them. 11. BY the judgment in Rakesh Kaushik's case (1986 Cri U 566) (supra), the Delhi High Court disposed of writ petitions directed against orders of the Sentence Revising Board of Delhi Administration rejecting the petitioners' applications under Section 432 Cr.P.C. filed for premature release from prison. The continued detention was challenged as being violative of Articles 14 and 19(i)(d) and 21 of the Constitution as also paragraph 516-B of Jail Manual and Section 432 Cr.P.C. While opposing release of one of the prisoners, the superintendent of Police had stated that there was party faction and mis-happening could take place if the petitioner was released. Dealing with this objection, the learned Judges of the Delhi High Courts observed that the objection was vague in as much as it had not been spelt out as to what type of party faction existed and how the concerned petitioner was involved therein. With these observation, the learned judges of the Delhi High Court themselves passed order of release. This judgment is authority for the proposition that the High Court need not send back the case again to the State Government and it is permissible for the High Court to pass a final order of release. This judgment is authority also for the proposition that the objections against premature release should not be vague and unspecific. 12. In Shri Niwas's case ( AIR 1982 SC 1391 ) (supra), their Lordships were disposing of several petitions filed by different convicts. No proposition of law has been discussed. In one bunch of petitions, a decision had been taken to prematurely release the convicts on the completion of 10 years imprisonment inclusive of remissions, as each one of the petitioners was less than 20 years in age at the time of commission of the offence. But they had not been actually released as proof of their age was lacking. In one bunch of petitions, a decision had been taken to prematurely release the convicts on the completion of 10 years imprisonment inclusive of remissions, as each one of the petitioners was less than 20 years in age at the time of commission of the offence. But they had not been actually released as proof of their age was lacking. Their Lordships pointed out that proof of age should have been available on the record of the trial court and also of the jail, as under relevant rule, age of the convict was required to be entered at the time of his entry in jail. Their Lordships, therefore, felt that there was no' justifiable ground to continue the detention. Their lordships accordingly issued mandamus commending their release reserving right in the administration to approach the Court for fresh orders if it was later found that any convict was not less than 20 years in age at the time of the commission of the offence. So far as other petitions decided by the same judgment are concerned, the petitioners therein had completed more than 14 years in jail and had become entitled to be considered for premature release. Each case was considered on its own merits. Some petitions were dismissed as the reason for refusing premature release was found to be valid. In certain petitions, the Sentence Revising Board had not been able to take decision for release of the petitioners on account of non availability before it of some material or the other. In such cases, their Lordships directed either outright release or release on bail or personal bond reserving right in the administration to apply for fresh order if on the availability of the relevant material, the administration came to the conclusion that the detention of the convict was required to be continued. This judgment can be treated to be an authority for the proposition that in appropriate cases, the Court may itself pass orders for release instead of directing the administration to pass order in that behalf. 13. The case of Mohammad Giasuddin ( AIR 1977 SC 1926 ) (supra), was not one for premature release. In this case, the question for consideration before their Lordships was whether the sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment imposed upon the appellant before their Lordships under Section 420 I.P.C. was liable to be reduced. 13. The case of Mohammad Giasuddin ( AIR 1977 SC 1926 ) (supra), was not one for premature release. In this case, the question for consideration before their Lordships was whether the sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment imposed upon the appellant before their Lordships under Section 420 I.P.C. was liable to be reduced. After reviewing authorities and laying down that deterrent component of punishment is not irrelevant, their Lordships reduced the sentence of imprisonment from 3 years to 18 months and also imposed the fine of Rs. 1200/- which was directed to be paid to the victim of the occurrence. In this judgment, stress has been had for the reformative aspect of sentencing. However, this judgment does not say that deterrent theory in sentencing is irrelevant. 14. In Gopal Vinayak Godse's case ( AIR 1980 SC 600 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that a sentence of life imprisonment means imprisonment for the remaining period of life. 15. In Maru Ram's case ( AIR 1980 SC 2147 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the question of vires of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which fixed the minimum period of 14 years imprisonment before a prisoner became entitled for premature release. Their Lordships have laid stress on the reformative aspect of sentencing but their. Lordships have not held that deterrent aspect is irrelevant. In respect of the deterrent component of sentencing, it has been observed in paragraph 52 thus- "52 ................Deterrence as one valid punitive component has been accepted in Sunil Batra by a five-judge bench. So, a measure of minimum incarceration of 14 years for the ghast class of crimes like murder cannot be-considered shocking, having regard to the escalation of horrendous crime in the country and the fact that this Court has upheld even death penalty (limited though to 'the rarest of rare cases'). So, a measure of minimum incarceration of 14 years for the ghast class of crimes like murder cannot be-considered shocking, having regard to the escalation of horrendous crime in the country and the fact that this Court has upheld even death penalty (limited though to 'the rarest of rare cases'). The time has not perhaps arrived to exclude deterrence and even public denunciation altogether." Again, in paragraph 52, it is observed - "52..........In the current state of things and ethos of society, we have to content ourselves with the thought that personal opinions apart, a very long term in prison for a murderer cannot be castigated as so outrageous as to be utterly arbitrary and violative of rational classification between lifers and lifers and as so blatantly barbarous as to be irrational enough to be struck down as ultra vires." This judgment is authority for the proposition that insistence on long period of incarceration for serious crimes cannot be said to be arbitrary. 16. In Naib Singh's case ( AIR 1983 SC 855 ) (supra), the petitioner had been sentenced to death. On mercy petition being preferred by him, the sentence of death was commuted to imprisonment for life by the Governor of Punjab. After having served the sentence for slightly above 22 years inclusive of remissions, he filed petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging his continued detention in jail. One of the grounds of challenge was that the sentence should be deemed to have been commuted by the State Government either under Section 55 I.P.C. or under Section 432(b) Cr.P.C., 1973 without a formal order in that behalf. The plea was rejected with the observation that a life convict had to remain in jail for the remainder of his life until an order for premature release was passed. 17. In Jagtar Singh's case (1987 Cri LJ 606) (supra), it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that in a case to which Section 433-A Cr. P. C. is applicable, life convict must actually serve 14 years sentence and that no order of bail could be passed by the Court before the expiry of that period as it would be violative of Section 433-A. 18. P. C. is applicable, life convict must actually serve 14 years sentence and that no order of bail could be passed by the Court before the expiry of that period as it would be violative of Section 433-A. 18. In Bharosey v. State of U.P. (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the possibility of eruption of some criminal act or commission of crime on the prisoner being released on Form 'A' can be taken into consideration by the Court and that on that basis, the application can be legally rejected. In this case the District Magistrate had submitted report to the effect that tension still prevailed in the locality. The report of the District Magistrate was found to be a relevant document and the refusal to grant premature release was held to be valid. 19. From a survey of the above authorities, it transpires that despite the reformative theory of imprisonment gaining ground, the deterrent theory continues to be relevant. When there is escalation of horrendous crimes in the country, it may be permissible for the administration to detain prisoners convicted of serious crimes for comparatively longer periods. For crimes like murder, insistence on compulsory incarceration for 14 years has been held to be not arbitrary or unconscionable. 20. In the present case when the State Government rejected petitioner's claim for premature release by order dated 5-1-1986, the petitioner had not undergone actual sentence of even 7 years. Murders are on the increase in our State. Every day, the newspapers contain news of murder or murders at some place or the other. If in such a situation, the State Government comes to the conclusion that the period of 7 years of actual detention undergone by the petitioner was not sufficient, we cannot say that the State Government acted arbitrarily. After all, maintenance of law and order is the prime duty of the State Government. Indiscriminate premature release of prisoners by the Courts may hamper the efforts of the State Government in maintaining law and order and checking crimes. 21. Antecedents of the prisoner are also relevant for purposes of release under Section 2 of the Act. The nature of crime for which the prisoner is undergoing sentence forms part of his antecedents. Indiscriminate premature release of prisoners by the Courts may hamper the efforts of the State Government in maintaining law and order and checking crimes. 21. Antecedents of the prisoner are also relevant for purposes of release under Section 2 of the Act. The nature of crime for which the prisoner is undergoing sentence forms part of his antecedents. Accordingly, the State Government cannot be said to have acted on irrelevant considerations in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner did not deserve premature release as the period undergone was not sufficient. 22. As already stated, the petitioner has invoked Article 14 of the Constitution also by pointing out that certain other prisoners were prematurely released although they had undergone sentence for lesser periods. We are unable to entertain the objection under Article 14 of the Constitution. Under Section 2 of the Act, the case of each petitioner is to be considered individually. Simply because the petitioner was also convicted for life imprisonment under Section 302 I.P.C. he cannot claim parity with others who were also similarly convicted and sentenced. Each crime has got its own setting and each criminal has got his own antecedents. The persons who were allegedly prematurely released were not co-accused with the petitioner. 23. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed. However, as and when fresh application in Form 'A' is moved by the petitioner, the same shall be considered on its own merits. There shall be no order as to costs.