JUDGMENT S. K. Dhaon, J. 1. On 5th May, 1989, we had dismissed this petition in limine for reasons to be given later on. We are now giving the reasons. 2. This petition, at the instance of a Municipal Board through its President, stems from proceedings initiated by the President of the Board to elect a Vice-President. The President convened the meeting of the Board for the purpose of electing a Vice-President and fixed 23rd February, 1989 as the date of the election. Some one presented a memorandum to the Commissioner, Moradabad Division and upon that memorandum, on 20th February, 1989, the Commissioner directed that the election shall not take place on 23rd February, 1989, as the meeting of the Board for holding an election of the Vice-President had not been called by the District Magistrate in accordance with section 54-A (2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This order of the Commissioner is being impugned in the present writ petition. 3. In the forefront the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in a situation where the President of the Board is functioning and the contingencies enumerated in sub-section (1) of section 54-A are not in existence, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 54-A will have no application and the President alone will have the jurisdiction to conduct the election of a Vice-President. Reliance is placed upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7963 of 1974, decided on 17th January, 1975. This decision fully supports the contention of the petitioner. This decision shall hereinafter called Ballabh Das Agarwal's case. 4. In Ballabh Das Agarwal's case, this court considered section 54 and 54-A before the enforcement of the U. P. Urban Local Self Amendment Act, 1976 (U. P. Act 41 of 1976 with effect from 15th September, 1976). This decision fully supports the contention of the petitioner. This decision shall hereinafter called Ballabh Das Agarwal's case. 4. In Ballabh Das Agarwal's case, this court considered section 54 and 54-A before the enforcement of the U. P. Urban Local Self Amendment Act, 1976 (U. P. Act 41 of 1976 with effect from 15th September, 1976). This court took the view that under the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (9) of section 54-A the District Magistrate, to the exclusion of the President, could conduct the election of a Vice-President only in the situation where a person on being elected President failed or refused to function or otherwise was not able to function, or a casual vacancy occurred in the office of the President within the meaning of section 44-A. Learned Judge laid emphasis on the marginal note to section 54-A. The learned Single Judge emphasised on the fact that by introducing section 54-A the Legislature did not intend to alter the normal procedure for the election of a Vice-President, that procedure being the election by a special resolution as provided by section 54 and the compliance of sections 87 and 88. After the decision of Ballabh Das Agarwal's case, the relevant provisions of the Act were either amended or fresh provisions inserted by the Legislature by the U. P. Act No 41 of 1976 and subsequent legislations. We have, therefore, to find out as to whether the Legislature intended to accept the law as laid down in Ballabh Das Agarwal's case or it intended to deviate from the same. 5. In D. R. Fraser and Company v. The Revenue Minister, AIR 1949 PC 120, it is held that if an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately. Cases are not wanting where the Legislature, not happy with a particular construction placed upon an enactment, has changed the same by an amending statute. On the other hand, change in language is not always indicative of a change in construction. Addition of words may be to make clear a meaning which was already implied. Cases are not wanting where the Legislature, not happy with a particular construction placed upon an enactment, has changed the same by an amending statute. On the other hand, change in language is not always indicative of a change in construction. Addition of words may be to make clear a meaning which was already implied. We must not also forget that when it is contended that the Legislature intended by any positive amendment to make substantial changes in the pre-existing law, it is impossible to arrive at a conclusion without considering what the law was previous to the particular enactment and to see whether the words used in the statute can be taken to effect the change that is suggested as intended. 6. Let us, therefore, have a look at the relevant law as it then stood and the changes made therein. Section 44-A, prior to enforcement of the U. P. Act No. 41 of 1976, did not specify any period within which a casual vacancy occurring in the office of a President was to be filled up. However, the said provision has been substituted by the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 41 of 1976 and the material change introduced is that the President shall be elected, as soon as may be, after the occurrence of the casual vacancy, but not later than three months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy in the manner provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 43, as the case may be. Section 54 had originally three sub-sections. In sub-section (1) it was provided that every Board shall have a Vice-President elected, as the occasion arises, by the board from among its members by special resolution. In sub-section (2) it was provided that the term of Vice-President shall be one year from the date of his election or the residue of his term of office as a member of the board, whichever is less. Sub-section (3) talked about the resignation of the Vice-President. By U. P. Act 41 of 1976 sub-section (2) of section 54 has been substituted and now the provision is that the term of the office of a Vice-President shall be co-terminus with the term of the Board. Sub-section (3) talked about the resignation of the Vice-President. By U. P. Act 41 of 1976 sub-section (2) of section 54 has been substituted and now the provision is that the term of the office of a Vice-President shall be co-terminus with the term of the Board. The newly added sub-section (4) of section 54 is important and it reads :- "The election of a Vice-President under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be completed within three months from the date of the due constitution of the Board as notified under section 56 or from the date of occurrence of the vacancy, as the case may be." Section 54-A laid down that the powers and functions of the President shall be exercised and performed by the District Magistrate or an Officer appointed by the District Magistrate until a President or Vice-President is able to function. Those provisions apparently do not convert the District Magistrate or an Officer appointed by him into the President of a Board. However, the Legislature, in its wisdom now makes it mandatory to apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of 10-AA of the Act to a District Magistrate or an officer appointed by him when exercising and performing the powers and functions of the President. Osborn, in Concise Law Dictionary Fourth Edition, defines "mutatis mutandis" to mean "the necessary changes being made." When a law directs that a provision made for a certain type of case shall apply mutatis mutandis to another type of case, it means that it shall apply with such changes as may be necessary, but not that even if no change be necessary, some change nevertheless be made. Reverting to section 10-AA, we find that in clause (a) of sub-section (I) of that provision it is mandated that all powers, functions and duties of the Board, its President and Committees shall be vested in and be exercised, performed and discharged by any officer appointed in that behalf by the State Government (hereinafter referred to as the Administrator) and the Administrator shall be deemed in law to be the Board, the President or the Committee, as the occasion may require. The District Magistrate, while exercising powers under section 54-A, shall for the purposes of section 10-AA be treated as an Administrator (mutatis mutandis). As already seen section 10-AA provides that the District Magistrate shall be deemed in law to be the President. The District Magistrate, while exercising powers under section 54-A, shall for the purposes of section 10-AA be treated as an Administrator (mutatis mutandis). As already seen section 10-AA provides that the District Magistrate shall be deemed in law to be the President. It is apparent that the Legislature was not satisfied with the mere exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President by the District Magistrate during the continuance of the situation as envisaged in section 54-A. It went ahead in enacting that the District Magistrate shall be the President. The crucial words are : "shall be deemed in law to be the President. " At once, we are faced with a legal fiction which has been deliberately created by the Legislature by using a deeming provision. A deeming provision is intended to enlarge the meaning of a particular word? or include matters which otherwise may not fall within the main provision. It is trite that for giving effect to a provision creating a legal fiction we have to first ascertain the purpose for which the fiction is created. Once the purpose has been ascertained, a court has to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. Certain consequences and includents flow from the deeming clause that in law the District Magistrate shall be treated as the President. To us, it is clear, that when the Legislature says that in the eye of law the District Magistrate shall be the President, it clearly intends to convey that for the purposes of section 54-A read with section 10-AA there is no distinction between an ex- officio President and an elected President. The Legislature has obliterated the distinction between an elected President and in the absence of such a President, the person treated by law to be the President. Any other construction will not only defeat the purpose of creating a fiction but will also run counter to the oft quoted dictum of Lord Asquith in East Dwellings Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All. E. R. 587 : "If one is bidden to treat an imaginery state of affairs as real, one must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it...... E. R. 587 : "If one is bidden to treat an imaginery state of affairs as real, one must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it...... The statute says that one must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not say that having done so, one must cause or permit the imagination to boggle when it comes to inevitable corollaries of the state of affairs." We will be allowing our imagination to boggle if we take the view that inspite of the fiction created in Sec. 10-AA the District Magistrate will not be entitled to convene a special meeting of the Board for holding the election of a Vice-President and preside over the same. Such a duty or power will be exercised by the District Magistrate under section 51 of the Act. It follows that the District Magistrate, while presiding over such a meeting will have the right of giving a second or casting vote as envisaged in sub-section (2) of section 92. 7. The interpretation given by us to the status of a District Magistrate while exercising powers under sub-section (1) of Section 54-A read with the provisions of Section 10-AA leads to the inevitable conclusion that the procedure for holding the election of a Vice President when an elected President is functioning and when an elected President is not fuctioning for any reason whatsoever or when there is a casual vacancy in the office of the President will be the same. In both the situations a meeting will have to be convened in accordance with Section 51-A and the provisions of Sections 87, 88 and 92 will have full play. We have already indicated that such a construction cannot be avoided in view of the strong language employed by the Legislature in Section 10-AA-shall be deemed in law-read with the relevant provisions as contained in Section 54- A. We are also not oblivious of the fact that the construction which we have given will immediately render the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 54-A redundant. It is noteworthy that the Legislature, while making the changes referred to above in subsection (1) of Section 54-A, not only retained the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 54-A, but also added some words while opening that provision. Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Legislature deliberately retained sub-section (2) of Section 54-A. It did so with an avowed object. The object being to provide for a special procedure for the election of a Vice President. Such a procedure has to be followed whenever an election of a Vice President takes place and in whatever situation. To put it differently, such a procedure has to be followed in a situation where an elected President is available to convene and preside over a meeting to be held for electing a Vice President and also in a situation where for one reason or the other an elected President is not able to function as a President or a casual vacancy has occurred in the office of the President. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that by enacting U. P. Act No. 41 of 1976 the Legislature did away altogether with the dual procedure for conducting the election of a Vice President of a Board. 8. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 54 lay down three situations in which the election of a Vice President of a Board has to take place. One such occasion is where an elected President is in existence. SUB-section (4) prescribes a common period of limitation within which an election of a Vice President in all the three situations has to take place. The opening words of sub-section (2) of Section 54-A enjoin that the meeting for the election of a Vice President shall be held subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 54, namely, within a period of three months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy. Thus, the legislative intendment is that in all situations a Vice President is to be elected in accordance with the procedure provided in sub-sections (2) to (9) of Section 54-A. A fortiori, the said sub-sections of Section 54-A will have full play even when an elected President is available to convene a meeting for electing a Vice President and for presiding over the same. By U. P. Act 41 of 1976 the Legislature amended the Act and simultaneously prescribed a period of three months within which a casual vacancy occurring in the office of the President under section 44-A has to be filled up and the election of a Vice President in all situations has to take place. The same amending Act provides that a meeting for the election of a Vice President under sub-section (2) of Section 54-A has to be convened within a period of three months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy. The prescription of the limitation of a period of three months in the aforesaid mentioned provisions also gives a clue to the legislative intend that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 54-A and the provisions thereafter have been made uniformally applicable to an election of a Vice President of a Board in all situations or contingencies. 9. Having considered the matter from all anlges, we are satisfied that the Legislature deliberately changed the procedure to be followed in the case of the election of the Vice President of a Board after the decision of this Court in Ballabh Das Agarwal's case. We are also satisfied that the Legislature changed the language with a view to change the construction of the relevant provisions. It did not add words to make clear what was implicit in the law as it stood prior to the enforcement of U P. Act No. 41 of 1976. We have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that on account of the change in law, the decision in Ballah Das Agarwal's case has lost its efficacy.