JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—Through this appeal, the State challenges the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi, in Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1984 decided on 17-10-1985, thereby acquitting the accused for offence under section 16 (l)f(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, thereby setting-aside the judgment of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (II), Mandi, sentencing the accused for rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo imprisonment for three months, vide judgment dated 28-10-1984. The State feels aggrieved by the impugned judgment and hence this appeal to assail the same. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Shri B. C. Sharma, Food Inspector, spotted the accused while coming with a canny of milk on 14-7-1982. After disclosing his identity and intention to take sample of milk, the Food Inspector issued a notice to the accused to purchase 660 grams of cows milk, taken out of the bulk for a price against a receipt. The milk so taken, was divided into three parts and transferred into three dry and clean bottles. Formalin was added, bottles were corcked, wrapped and sealed in accordance with law. Signature of the accused were taken on the bottles of the milk as well as on the relevant papers prepared by the Food Inspector in the presence of witnesses. Out of the three sealed bottles, one was sent to the Public Analyst by registered post alongwith Form VII showing the specimen of the seal used by the Food Inspector on the bottles. A copy of Form VII alongwith the specimen of the seal was also sent separately to the Public Analyst under registered cover. On analysis, the Public Analyst reported that the sample was deficient of 28% in milk solids—not fat than the minimum prescribed standard ; so found adulterated ; and prosecution filed in the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (II), Mandi, under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act. Notice was issued under section 13 (2) of the Act with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused under registered cover. 3. Notice was issued under section 13 (2) of the Act with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused under registered cover. 3. The defence of the accused, as it appears from his statement under section313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the trend of the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, is that though his signatures were got on the document in question, including the notice under section 13 (2) of the Act from the Local (Health) Authority, he denied the sample having been purchased by the Food Inspector. He further asserts that on 14-7-1982 he was sitting in the tea-shop of Shri Mukand Lal at Jail Road, Mandi, where the Food Inspector came and demanded the requisite licence from Shri Mukand Lal, who presented the same to the Food Inspector. The Food Inspector, he states, thereafter prepared papers and got his signatures en that as a witness alongwith one Shri Vijay Kumar—who is the only independent witness in the case. He has also denied that he was carrying any milk or any sample was purchased by the Food Inspector from him. In defence, he examined Shri Parma Nand (DW 1). The trial ended in the aforesaid conviction of the accused who successfully assailed the same before the first appellate Court, which gave benefit of doubt to the accused taking into consideration the explanation of the accused, insufficient evidence as to the factum of taking of sample as well as major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. 4. Shri M. S Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, assails the judgment of the first appellate court and contends that the first appellate court went wrong while not accepting the testimony of official witness, the Food Inspector. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on AIR 1.977 SC 56, Prem. Ballab and another v. The State {Delhi Admn.). There is no doubt that the principle enunciated in this judgment is salutary and fundamental, but the Court, speaking through P. N. Bhagwati, J,, as he then was, observed in para 3 as under : "There is no rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of a Food Inspector. It is only out of a sense of caution that the courts insist that the testimony of a Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. It is only out of a sense of caution that the courts insist that the testimony of a Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. This is a necessary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness, but this caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law ......" 5. In the present case, there was obviously a necessity for independent witnesses to support the prosecution version. Although out of two witnesses, namely, Shri Mukand Lal and Vijay Kumar, the Food Inspector associated only Vijay Kumar to witness it, but perusal of the statement of Vijay Kumar (PW 1) indicates that his version runs counter to the statement of Shri B. C. Sharma (PW 3), Food Inspector. This casts a doubt on the whole action of the Food Inspector. His statement remained unchallenged. He was not declared hostile by the prosecution at any stage of these proceedings. The result is, lack of evidence on this aspect of the matter; so the contention of Shri Kedar Ishwar has a force. In order to strengthen this argument, reference is made to 1985 (II) FAC 226, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranchod, where the learned Judge in para 6 said as under: "6. Undoubtedly it is not necessary that the official witnesses are not to be believed because of their being officials but their reliance depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The law requires that ordinarily atleast one or more independent witnesses are to be kept present for that purpose. In the present case, the independent witnesses examined have turned hostile. Therefore in such circumstances it is difficult to rely on the sole testimony of the Food Inspector especially when the learned trial Court thought it proper to rely on the defence version which appear to be probable. The burden of proving the case lies on the prosecution which in the present case it has failed to prove by adducing satisfactory evidence. Whether the sole testimony of the Food Inspector should be relied or not would always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden of proving the case lies on the prosecution which in the present case it has failed to prove by adducing satisfactory evidence. Whether the sole testimony of the Food Inspector should be relied or not would always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, after assessing the evidence the view taken by the learned trial Court cannot be perverse or so absurd that it could not have been reasonably arrived at even though it was also tried to be argued that on the same evidence another view might be possible. The learned Counsel for the appellant was unable to point out that the learned trial Court has ignored or failed to consider any material evidence though he also tried to submit that the view taken by the learned trial Court is wrong. Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of opinion that the respondent is atleast entitled to the benefit of doubts 6. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that there are two versions of the case—one stated by Shri B. C. Sharma (PW 3), Food Inspector, and the other by Shri Vijay Kumar (PW 1). The version of Shri Vijay Kumar (PW 1) is nearer to the version and explanation of the accused. In such a situation, the result is obvious. Failure of the prosecution is evident. The result is, therefore, obvious and as a result of this discussion, the accused succeeds and the appeal fails. 7. Therefore, there is no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed. The bail bond and surety bond, if any, executed at any stage of the case by the accused, are hereby cancelled. Appeal dismissed. -