ORDER S.K. Seth, J. 1. The Advocate General made the present petition on 23-6-1988 for taking action for contempt against the four Respondents under Section 15 (7) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was stated in the petition that the allegations made by one of the Respondents i e. Respondent No. 1 Union Carbide Corporation in an interlocutory application (I. A. No. 33) made by the said Respondent in C. S. No. 1113 of 1986 (Union of India v. Union Carbide Corporation) pending in the Court of Shri M. W. Deo, District Judge, Bhopal were meant to scandalise the said Court, interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings, and obstruct the administration of justice. It was mentioned that Respondent No. 2 Mr. Robert D. Kennedy was the Chairman of the Union Carbide Corporation and Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 i. e. Mr. Fali S. Nariman and Shri Vijay Gupta were advocates appearing for the Union Carbide Corporation in the Bhopal suit. 2. On the motion of the Advocate General in the above regard, a case was registered by this Court against the Respondents for taking action under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and notices were issued to them 10 show cause why they should not be punished under the said Act. The Respondents submitted a detailed reply to the show cause notice. The case was heard on 15-2-1989. 3. It may be mentioned that C. S. No. 1113 of 1986. referred to by the Advocate General, was the well known Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster suit for damages instituted by the Union of India for and on behalf of the gas victims and pending in the Court of Shri M. W. Deo, District Judge, Bhopal at the relevant time. It was after the order of interim relief dated 17-2-1987 passed by District Judge Shri Deo was modified by this Court vide its order dated 4-4-1988 passed in C. R. No. 26 of 1988 that the Defendant-Union Carbide Corporation made the application in question i.e. I. A. No. 33 to District Judge Shri Deo to dissociate himself from the suit. It was clear that the said application was one made Under Section 24 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of the suit pending in his Court to any Court subordinate to it and competent to dispose of the same. It was clear that the said application was one made Under Section 24 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of the suit pending in his Court to any Court subordinate to it and competent to dispose of the same. The ground on which the transfer was sought from his Court was alleged to be 'likelihood of bias' in view of the earlier order of interim relief dated 17-12-1987 passed by him. The I. A. was turned down by District Judge Shri Deo vide his order dated 16 6-1988. 4. Now, it may be mentioned that before the Advocate General moved the present application for taking action for contempt against the Respondents, the Respondent No. 1 Union Carbide Corporation filed a revision in this Court against the order dated 16-6-1988 passed by District Judge Shri Deo rejecting their application in question (I. A. No. 33) for transfer of the suit from his Court to any other Court subordinate to him, The said revision (C. R. No. 229 of 1988) was heard by one of us (Seth, J.) and was allowed vide order dated 11-10-1988. The order dated 16-6-1988 passed by District Judge Shri Deo was set aside and the application (1. A. No. 33) made by the Union Carbide Corporation for the transfer of the suit was allowed. The Civil Suit was transferred from the Court of District Judge Shri Deo to the Court of senior most Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Bhopal for further trial and disposal according to law. 5. It may also be mentioned that while allowing the above said revision (C. R. No. 229 of 1988) made by the Union Carbide Corporation vide its order dated 13-10-1983, one of us (Seth, J.) had an occasion to deal with the propriety of the Union Carbide Corporation making such an application for transfer of suit to District Judge Shri Deo himself. In the said connection, this Court had also an occasion to deal with the allegations made by the Union Carbide Corporation in the said application. It is useful to refer to the conclusions reached by the Single Judge in regard to the abovesaid matters. 6. In the said connection, this Court had also an occasion to deal with the allegations made by the Union Carbide Corporation in the said application. It is useful to refer to the conclusions reached by the Single Judge in regard to the abovesaid matters. 6. In paras 38 and 39 of the relevant order dated 13-10-1988, the point discussed by the Single Judge and the conclusion reached by him in respect of it were as follows: It was pointed out that as per prayer made in its application for transfer of suit the Defendant-UCC expected the District Judge to order himself to 'recuse' from hearing the case. It was submitted that such a procedure was unheard of in this country where the normal course was to approach the High Court in case it was desired to have a suit pending in the Court of District Judge transferred to another Court. Frankly speaking, this Court is unable to understand the abovesaid objection raised on behalf of the non-applicant. It was crystal clear from the power conferred on the District Court by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Code that an application for transfer of any suit pending before the district Court i. e. the District Judge could be made by any of the parties to that Court itself. In the circumstances, it is not understandable as to how any objection could be taken by the Plaintiff Union of India to the application for transfer made by the Defendant UCC to the District Judge on the ground that such a procedure was unheard of. In the said connection, it was further stated in para 43 of the order as follows: There was also nothing undignified about the use of the word 'recuse' used in the application. As per its dictionary meaning, the said word meant 'to object to (a Judge) as prejudiced' or 'to reject or challenge (a Judge or Juror) as disqualified to act, esp. because of interest or bias'. The said word was related to 'a species of exception or plea to the jurisdiction, to the effect that the partial judge is disqualified from hearing the case, by reason of interest or prejudice'. because of interest or bias'. The said word was related to 'a species of exception or plea to the jurisdiction, to the effect that the partial judge is disqualified from hearing the case, by reason of interest or prejudice'. In fact, in his opt quoted passage from Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Poliak, (1952) 343 US 451, 466 a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court, Frankfurter, J. used the said word in the sense of a Judge 'dissociating himself or 'withdrawing himself from a proceeding' and nothing more than that. 7. Again, in paras 40 to 42, the point discussed by the Single Judge and the conclusion reached by him in respect of the same were as follows: This is not to say that there could not arise the question of propriety of making such an application to the District Judge in certain cases. But, then, the said question had essentially to do with the facts and circumstances of particular cases-it had nothing to do with the competence of the District Judge to try and dispose of such an application. However, in the context of objection raised on behalf of the Plaintiff Union of India, it is pertinent to examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case there was any impropriety committed by the Defendant-UCC in making the application for transfer to the District Judge himself and hot to this Court. Now, as mentioned earlier, the main ground urged by the Defendant UCC in its application for transfer of the suit made to the District Judge was related to the manner in which the District Judge had passed the order of interim relief against it on l7-l2-1987 and directed it to deposit a sum of three thousand five hundred million rupees for payment of 'substantial interim compensation and welfare measures' for the tort victims represented by the Plaintiff-Union of India According to the Defendant-UCC, the said order disclosed that the District Judge had prejudged the basic issue and formed a definite opinion against it even before the trial of the suit began and that the said fact created a reasonable apprehension in its mind that it might not have a fair and impartial trial in his Court, ft was on the basis of the said ground that a prayer was made to the District Judge to recuse himself from hearing the case. It is significant to note that in support of its case that it was a fit case for the District Judge to recuse himself from hearing the case, the Defendant-UCC analysed the order of interim relief passed by the District Judge in great detail and high lighted the particular aspects of the said order relied on by it. It was another thing that while doing so it viewed the said aspects from its own point of view and drew its own inferences from them. But, then, there was not an indecent word used or any wild allegation made against the Judge. The entire approach in the application was simply to tell the Judge to view the order passed by him in the light of the aspects high-lighted in the application and thereafter to decide for himself whether the apprehension in the mind of the Defendant-UCC that it might not have a fair and impartial trial was a reasonable one? (Emphasis supplied) 8. Thus, on the basis of the above said conclusions reached by him, the finding on the question relating to the alleged impropriety on the part of the Union Carbide Corporation in making the application in question (I. A. No. 33) for transfer of the suit to District Judge Shri Deo was as follows: Thus, in the case of the application in question, made by the Defendant-UCC, in which the entire argument relating to 'bias' as the ground for seeking transfer of the suit pending before the District Judge was built around the material on record of the suit, and not on any personal allegations made against the Judge, it was difficult to understand as to how it could be said that there was any impropriety committed by the Defendant, UCC in making the said application to the District Judge himself-and not to this Court. In fact, there was nothing wrong in the Defendant-UCC reposing faith in the District Judge to decide the question of his own 'bias' in a dispassionate manner on the basis of objective facts pointed out to him from the record of the suit. In the opinion of this Court, the approach of the Defendant-UCC in the said regard was in accordance with the highest traditions of judicial discipline and there was absolutely nothing 'demeaning' or 'degrading' about it. 9. In the opinion of this Court, the approach of the Defendant-UCC in the said regard was in accordance with the highest traditions of judicial discipline and there was absolutely nothing 'demeaning' or 'degrading' about it. 9. In our opinion in view of the above said conclusions reached by one of us (Seth, J.) in the order dated 13-10-1988 passed in C.R No. 229/88 from which conclusions we do not see any reason to depart in this petition for contempt moved by the Advocate General Under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, there remains absolutely no basis for contending that the allegations made by the Respondent No. 1 Union Carbide Corporation in the application in question (I.A. No. 33) made by the said Respondent in C. S. No. 1113 of 1986 pending in the Court of Shri M. W. Deo, District Judge, Bhopal were in any manner meant to scandalise the said Court or to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or to obstruct the administration of justice. Accordingly, there is no case made out for taking action for contempt against the Respondents Under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 10. Accordingly, the notices issued to the Respondents to show cause why they should not be punished for Contempt of Court are discharged and the present proceedings initiated on the motion of the Advocate General are closed.