JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. Plaintiff is "M/s. Neldon Company", a partnership firm. The suit was filed by its Managing Partner, Mrs. Kunjumol Mathai, for realisation of the balance amount due under Ext. A1 pronote. One of the contentions was a vague plea of discharge. That is unsupported by any evidence and concurrently found against. The plea was not further pursued. Suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal solely on the ground of maintainability for want of proof of conditions of S.69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. That is the only moot point in this second appeal filed by the plaintiff. 2. In cases like this where there is a genuine claim which is not disputed, courts are expected to be more circumspect in dismissing the suit on such a plea especially when the contention itself is vague and evidently without bona fides. The purpose of the provision also should not be ignored. No plea as such was raised specifically-under S.69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. Registration of the partnership was denied. But the firm is proved to be registered by production and proof of Ext. A2, which is the original acknowledgment of the registration of firm. The only other contention is that Kunjumol Mathai, who signed the plaint as Managing Partner, is not the Managing Partner. There was no contention that she was not shown in the register of firms as a partner of managing partner. As DW 1, first defendant said that the above contentions were without any enquiry or knowledge and he cannot deny that the firm is registered and Kunjumol is the managing partner. Thereafter, he admitted frankly that the firm is registered and he knows the registered office also. He also said that now he knows that the person who signed the plaint is the managing partner. Thus the requirements of S.69 are practically admitted and proved. 3. First part of S.69 (2) of the Indian Partnership Act providing that the suit is not maintainable unless the firm is registered was, therefore, at any rate not available to the Trial Court or the appellate court for dismissing the suit. Then the only question is whether the suit is not maintainable for the reason that the person who signed the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff firm is not shown in the register of firms as partner, There is no such contention. Then the only question is whether the suit is not maintainable for the reason that the person who signed the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff firm is not shown in the register of firms as partner, There is no such contention. Then I fail to understand how the suit could have been dismissed without any surviving contention regarding maintainability under S.69 (2). 4. Law does not require that a plaint must expressly mention that the firm is a registered one or that the partner suing, as such, is recorded in the register of firms as a partner in the firm. Therefore, when the defendant does not raise a plea that the partner suing is not recorded in the register of firms as a partner of the firm, the plaintiff can assume that the plea was not raised and he need not adduce evidence that he is recorded as a partner in the register of firms. In such a case, the suit cannot be thrown out on the ground of maintainability (see page 1158 Indian Partnership Act, fifth edition by J. P. Singhal). The statute must not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the court from moulding its decision in such a manner as to be consistent with the justice of the case. In the plaint, in a suit instituted in the name of the firm or by all partners of the firm, the plaintiff need not disclose who are the partners unless a demand for disclosure comes under Order XXX R.2 C. P. C. Only when some of the partners institute the suit on behalf of the firm and an objection is taken by the defendants that they do not by themselves alone constitute the firm and the suit is not maintainable, they need disclose the names and show that they are shown in the register of firms as partners and hence the suit is maintainable. Under Order VIII R.2 C. P. G, the defendant is bound to plead all matters which show that the suit is not maintainable. Proof of registration and disclosure in the register may be necessary, but only when denied. What is not denied will be taken as admitted or waived. Under Order VIII R.2 C. P. G, the defendant is bound to plead all matters which show that the suit is not maintainable. Proof of registration and disclosure in the register may be necessary, but only when denied. What is not denied will be taken as admitted or waived. After the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground of maintainability under S.69 (2) of the Partnership Act, the registered deed of partnership was produced before the appellate court and when that was not accepted, the extract from the register of firms disclosing the names of partners was produced before this court. Now the contention is that the petitions for admission of these documents were filed by the Advocate alone and not the party, that no affidavit of the party was filed and that sufficient grounds under Order XLI R.27 are not stated and hence these documents cannot be admitted. That means, even after being satisfied that the bar under S.69 (2) is not there, the defendants want the dismissal of the suit to be maintained on the technical grounds. 5. Order XLI R.27 does not require filing of an application for admission of additional evidence though an application setting forth grounds may be desirable. Statutory provisions including rules of procedure are intended to advance the cause of justice and not for its denial on technical grounds. Plaintiff could not have expected the suit to be dismissed for non compliance of S.69(2) when registration of the firm and status of the person who signed the plaint as a partner were admitted and proved and when there was no contention that register of firms does not disclose the name. That may be the reason why an extract from the register of firms, which was genuinely thought unnecessary, was not produced. Even when the first two grounds under Order XLI R.27 are not satisfied, the court can always admit additional evidence which it may require to pronounce judgment or for any other sufficient cause. Ability to pronounce a judgment refers not to ability to pronounce any judgment but to the ability to pronounce a satisfactory and fair judgment to the satisfaction of the court delivering it and which is capable of doing justice between the parties. 'Any other substantial cause' also cannot be given a narrow interpretation. Ability to pronounce a judgment refers not to ability to pronounce any judgment but to the ability to pronounce a satisfactory and fair judgment to the satisfaction of the court delivering it and which is capable of doing justice between the parties. 'Any other substantial cause' also cannot be given a narrow interpretation. In this case, even without the additional documents, the appellate court could have allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. If it felt any doubt, that must have been over on seeing the additional document. That ought to have been admitted instead of rejecting it on technical grounds and dismissing the appeal directing the appellant to a fresh suit. That attitude has helped only denial of justice and not its advancement. Further the new documents are not technically new items of evidence for proving the case. I allow admission of these documents. In view of these facts and circumstances, it is not necessary for me to advert to the argument based on the decision in M.J. Velu Mudaliar and another v. Sri. Venkiteswara Finance Corporation and others AIR 1971 Andhra Pradesh 63 that when S.69(2) is read along with Order XXX R.1 and 2 C.P.C. the word "and" in between the two conditions in S.69 (2) will have to be read as "or" and that the latter part of S.69 (2) will come into play only in cases where a disclosure of the names and particulars is called for in accordance with Order XXX C.P.C. I had occasion to deal with that aspect earlier in a different context. Both the conditions may be necessary because prohibition is against institution without the conditions being satisfied. But the provision must be construed strictly and proof demanded only when denied or otherwise felt necessary. The object is to protect the public against dealing with firms which are not registered and which do not disclose names of partners and not to impose penalties. A practical and realistic approach is necessary and justice should not be allowed to suffer on technicalities. Here no issue was also there under S.69(2). 6. It is unfortunate that in these circumstances plaintiff suffered dismissal of the suit and appeal and had to come up in second appeal. A practical and realistic approach is necessary and justice should not be allowed to suffer on technicalities. Here no issue was also there under S.69(2). 6. It is unfortunate that in these circumstances plaintiff suffered dismissal of the suit and appeal and had to come up in second appeal. The further unfortunate position is that even after being fully satisfied that the bar under S.69(2) is not applicable, the respondents strenuously argued for a dismissal of the appeal on technicalities. The sole responsibility for the two appeals is on the respondents. Justice demands that the suit has to be decreed instead of driving the appellant to a fresh suit, as was done by the courts below. 7. It was argued for the respondents that interest after suit should be allowed only at 6% even though contract rate is 18%. I cannot agree. Interest till date of suit is a matter of right and the contract between parties should govern it in the absence of any statutory restriction. Interest after suit till decree is within the discretion of the court. As of right the plaintiff is not entitled to contract rate after suit. But normally the court can allow the contract rate of interest till the date of decree except when it would be inequitable to do so. The discretion has to be exercised judicially. After having delayed the decree by 8 or 9 years, there is no equity in favour of the respondents and it is only in favour of the appellant. Interest after decree is not discretionary and the discretion is only in allowing upto 6%. Second appeal is allowed and in reversal of the decrees and judgments of the courts below, plaintiff is given a decree for realisation of Rs. 4,125/- with 18% interest for Rs. 3,000/- from the date of suit till today and thereafter at 6% till realisation and costs of suit in all the three courts from the respondents and their assets.