KALYANOMY GANGULI, J. ( 1 ) IN this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an award dated 22nd December, 1988 passed by the learned 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and order No. 10 passed by the said learned. Tribunal being Annexures 'a' and 'd' to the petition have been challenged. ( 2 ) THE matter was very hotly contested. No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the respondents. Mr Jatin Gosh, Bar at Law, submitted that no affidavits would be necessary as the issue involved is purely a question of law. It is not necessary to go into all the rival contentions made at the hearing for the purpose of deciding the rule and/or issue involved in the matter. ( 3 ) THE short facts leading to the petition are as follows:-The petitioner No. 1 purchased 2 partnership firms, namely, M/s. B. S. Industries and M/s. B. S. Machine Tools Corporation on or about 21st August, 1985. The petitioner No. 1 is a private limited company registered under Companies Act, 1956. Four dates are relevant for the purpose of understanding the sequence of certain events. These are as follows:1. 22nd December, 1988 The impugned award was passed. 2. 19th January, 1989 The award was published in the Calcutta Gazelle. 3. 7th March, 1989 The petitioner company for the first time came to know about the said award. ( 4 ) 17th March, 1989 Application for setting aside the award was made by the petitioner. It is the allegation of the petitioners that on 7th March, 1989 the petitioners received a letter dated 20th February, 1989 from one Mr. Bidyut Bose of B. S. I. and B. S. N. Employees Union by which the petitioner company was requested to implement the award, impugned in the application, passed on 22nd December, 1988. The petitioners assert that for the first time on 7th March, 1989, the petitioners came to know that the impugned award was made and within 10 days of such knowledge, that is to say on 17th March, 1989, the petitioners filed an application for review of the award passed by the learned Tribunal. A copy of the said application has been annexed to the petition marked with the letter 'b'. A copy of the said application has been annexed to the petition marked with the letter 'b'. Although in the Cause Title of the petition it has been stated that the application was one for 'review', but in the payer portion the petitioner company prayed for setting aside the ex parte award and till such award was set aside, the petitioner company further prayed for grant of stay of implementation of the award. The petitioners contended that as the petitioners were totally ignorant of the initiation and pendency of the industrial dispute they were prevented from appearing and contesting the proceeding. The learned Tribunal by order No. 10 passed on 3rd May, 1989 rejected the application of the petitioner for setting aside the award on the ground stated therein. The impugned ground for rejecting such an application seems to be the view of the learned Tribunal that it becomes functus officio after 30 days of the publication of the award and in such a case an application for review of the ex parte award filed after 30 days of the publication of the award must be held to be barred by limitation. The learned Tribunal also referred, inter alia, to Rule 27 of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 which, inter alia, provides that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of 15 days from the date of the award. 4. Mr. Partha Sarathi Sen Gupta, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, contended that the award impugned in the petition is no award at all in the eye of law as the proceeding did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the rules. ( 5 ) UNDER Section 8 of the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal 2nd Amendment) Act, 1980 it is provided as under: after Section 17-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted: "17-B-Pronouncement and commencement of award, etc.- Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 17 and 17-A, (1) every award, other determination or decision by an arbitrator or a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose and shall be dated and signed by the person or persons pronouncing the award, determination or decision and such award, determination or decision once signed and dated shall not be altered save in the manner provided in this Act. (2) the award, determination or decision of an Arbitrator shall be pronounced in his office and the award, determination or decision of a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced in open Court. (3) a copy of every award, other determination or decision referred to in Clause (i) certified in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be given by the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, to each of the parties to the dispute free of cost and a copy of the award, determination or decision as so certified shall be sent by the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, to the appropriate Government; (4) every award, other determination or decision referred to in Clause (i) shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its pronouncement; provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the rest of the provisions of the said section are not relevant for our purpose. ( 6 ) IT may be remembered that the Section 17-B was subsequently renumbered as Section 17-AA. ( 7 ) RULE 20-A of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rule, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, provides that upon receipt of a reference from the Government under Section 10, the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court concerned shall issue notice in Form D-2 upon the parties to the dispute as mentioned in the order of reference, requiring them to appear before it on a specified date either by themselves or through their authorised representative for necessary directions. Clause (1) of Rule 20-B of the Rules provides as under:" (1) The Industrial Tribunal/labour Court shall on the date fixed in the summons for appearance of the parties direct the party which appears to the Tribunal/labour Court to be the party at whose instance the reference has been initiated or where no such party can be ascertained, the party which, in the opinion of the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court ought to be required to state its case first (hereinafter referred to as the first party) together with the grounds upon which the claim for relief is founded, and a list of relevant documents which are in their possession and upon which they want to rely in writing on a date fixed by the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court which shall ordinarily be within 2 weeks from the date of the order". Clause (5) of the said Rule 20-B provides as under:"a copy of the statement of case or the written statement shall be served on the first party or the second party, as the case may be, by the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court within 7 days from the date on which copies of the statement of case or the written statement, as the case may be, are filed by making it over to the party concerned or to its authorised representative in the office of the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court on a date and time fixed for the purpose and intimated to the party concerned by the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court. "14. "14. Rule 27 of the said Rules provides as under:"the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Arbitrator may- (i) correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake arising from an accidental slip or omission in any award made by it or him, and (ii) review an award on the ground of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record either of its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties; (iii) for sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite-party or parties as the case may be, the ex parte award or an award on the footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer in existence either by its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties: provided that no correction shall be made without previous notice to the parties or opposite-party, as the case may be: provided further that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. " ( 8 ) MR. Jatin Ghosh, Bar at Law, appearing on behalf of the respondents, referred to Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act to show that the proceedings before a Tribunal shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Mr. Ghosh contended that as this provision does not refer to Section 17-A A, Subsection (3) of Section 20 is not governed by the provisions of Section 17-AA. The provision of Section 17-AA itself provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 17 and Section 17-A the provisions of Section 17-AA shall apply. It may be remembered in this connection that Section 17-AA which is the State amendment, begins with a non obstante clause and provides that 'every award. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ( 9 ) THE order dated 3rd May, 1989, inter alia states as follows: "it will appear from the order sheet that after receiving the reference notices were issued to both the parties. shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ( 9 ) THE order dated 3rd May, 1989, inter alia states as follows: "it will appear from the order sheet that after receiving the reference notices were issued to both the parties. Notice was duly served upon M/s. B. S. Industries and B. S. Machine Tools Corporation as will appear from the acknowledgement receipt, which I find on record and in which it appears that it was duly signed on behalf of the said companies, but inspite of service of notice the companies did not turn up to contest the proceedings. " ( 10 ) IT appears from the said portion of the order that only a notice under Rule 20-A of the Rules was served, but notices under Rule 20-B (1) and (5) were admittedly not served on the predecessor of the petitioner No. 1. The requirements of the said Rules are mandatory. Although the entire scheme of both the Act and the Rules are to be construed, as far as possible, in favour of the vulnerable section of the society and Industrial Disputes Act being a social and beneficial legislation, interpretation of the provisions of the same must also be construed as far as possible in favour of the vulnerable section of the society. But both the legislations were not oblivious of the tact that over-enthusiasm in favour of any party to a lis is not to be encouraged. That is why the rule making authority in its wisdom has consciously incorporated the in-built safety measures to obviate any conscious and unconscious, deliberate or callous mistake in the matter of informing the employer or the employee as the case may be of the opportunities to be given to such parties to contest the lis. ( 11 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter, that is to say the meaning of the 2nd proviso to Rule 27 which provides that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. Obviously there is some mistake in the proviso itself for the simple reason review is dealt with in Clause (ii) of Rule 27 and not in Clause (iii) which deals with setting aside of an award. Obviously there is some mistake in the proviso itself for the simple reason review is dealt with in Clause (ii) of Rule 27 and not in Clause (iii) which deals with setting aside of an award. It may be remembered in this connection once again that the application on which the impugned order was passed was one for setting aside the award and not for review as would appear from the prayer portion of the said application. But for reasons to be stated hereinafter it may not be necessary to consider that aspect of the matter. ( 12 ) I concentrate more on the requirements of Rule 20-B (1) and (5 ). If these mandatory provisions are not complied with then whatever order was passed on 22nd December 1988 would not acquire the status of an award. In that view of that matter the award becomes a nullity ab initio or a non-est phenomenon. Apart from the requirements of law the question of compliance of the principle of natural justice also arises. The employer, however bad, cannot be denied the opportunity of hearing in accordance with the provisions of law. If in spite of such compliance the employer or the employee as the case may be chooses not to appear, then the Tribunal need not wait for the pleasure of appearance of such a party but can proceed ex parte but not before that. From the scheme, we have already discussed, it appears that the requirements of notifying the parties arise at three stages of the proceeding. In the instant case it has been complied with only in the first stage and not the other two stages. The said non-compliance renders the award itself a nullity. If the award itself is a nullity the question of cither the review of the same or setting aside the same may not arise at all. In that view of the matter the cases cited at the bar need not be gone into. ( 13 ) IF there is no award in the eye of law, mere publication of the same will not confer any sanctity on the same. In the circumstances, this application succeeds and the Rule is made absolute. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect and/or further effect to the impugned award as also the impugned order dated 3rd May, 1989. In the circumstances, this application succeeds and the Rule is made absolute. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect and/or further effect to the impugned award as also the impugned order dated 3rd May, 1989. The matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal with a direction to rehear the matter de nova No separate notice now need be issued as all the necessary parties are present at this court. The hearing is to be taken up as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a month from the date of communication of this order and is to be completed on a war footing without granting any adjournment except under compelling circumstances. There will, however, be no order as to costs.