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1989 DIGILAW 529 (MAD)

K. Chinnappa Gounder v. Kangeyam Panchayat Board Represented By Its Executive Officer

1989-11-10

K.S.BAKTHAVATSALAM

body1989
ORDER K.S. Bakthavatsalam, J. 1. When the miscellaneous petitions came up for hearing, by consent of both parties, the main writ petition itself is taken up for disposal. 2. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows: ...to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ order of direction forbearing the first respondent from conducting public auction for the shops in the Kangeyam Bus-Stand on 11.8.1989 pursuant to the order of the first respondent dated 19.6.1989 and consequently direct the respondent to grant the lease of the shops to the petitioners as per resolution No. 69 of 1989.... 3. The Kangeyam Bus Stand, which was in the junction point of Dharapuram-Erode and Coimbatore-Trichy road was situated in Kangeyam Town Panchayat. Since it became congested one and not suitable for the growing population of passengers necessity arose to expand the old Bus Stand as new one with provisions of shopping, retiring and public convenience facilities. Since the old bus stand was not suitable to overcome the public transport congestion, the Government, through Town and Country Planning Board has sanctioned Rs. 20 lakhs project to construct new bus stand with shopping centre for the benefit of the passengers. The new bus stand project is completed by the Town Panchayat from the borrowed fund. The petitioners were allowed to put up bunk stalls, vacant site etc. On annual lease in the old bus stand and the lease was renewed in their favour every year on condition the lessee should be bound to vacate the leased property as and when the Executive Officer requires. 4. The petitioners have been continuing as tenants under the first respondent. When the first respondent Town Panchayat attempted to conduct fresh lease of the shops without offering a chance for renewal to the existing lessees, the petitioners preferred civil suits and all the civil suits were decreed in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter the leases agreements in favour of the petitioners were renewed once again in the month of April, 1985 for a period of three years ending with 31st March, 1988. During the pendency of the above lease arrangement with the first respondent, the first respondent attempted to evict the petitioners from the shops and one of the shopkeepers by name Thiru. During the pendency of the above lease arrangement with the first respondent, the first respondent attempted to evict the petitioners from the shops and one of the shopkeepers by name Thiru. P.A. Meera Mohideen along with some petitioners filed W.P. No. 5855 of 1986 before this Court and the writ petition was admitted by this Court and interim injunction was also granted in W.M.P. No. 8430 of 1986. The prayer in that writ petition was for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to construct semi permanent shops in the proposed temporary bus stand at Kangeyam and allot the same to the petitioners during the pendency of the petitioners lease with the respondent viz. 31.3.1988. It seems on 205.1986, Resolution No. 69 of 1986 was passed by the first respondent herein. It seems that the said Resolution considered the Writ Petition No. 5855 of 1986 which has been pending before this Court stating that the shops which are going to be constructed will be given on lease to the petitioners therein either basing upon the rate fixed by the Public Works Department or 30% over the present rate prevailed thereon, whichever is higher and that the shops will be given to the petitioners therein on lease for three years from the date on which the new bus stand is handed over to the first respondent Panchayat. In view of this Resolution, it seems the Writ Petition No. 5855 of 1986 was dismissed as not pressed by Mohan, J. (as he then was) and the order of the Writ Petition is as follows: The learned counsel for the petitioners states that the respondents have agreed to give the lease in favour of the petitioners for a period of three years on increased rental. Hence, the writ petition is not pressed. Recording this, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. It is stated that the new bus stand thereafter came to be completed and when the petitioners found that no shops were offered to them, they once again moved this Court in W.P. No. 8518 of 1988 for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to implement the Resolution No. 69 of 1986. No costs. It is stated that the new bus stand thereafter came to be completed and when the petitioners found that no shops were offered to them, they once again moved this Court in W.P. No. 8518 of 1988 for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to implement the Resolution No. 69 of 1986. On 13.12.1988, the said Writ Petition No. 8518 of 1988 was heard by me and a direction was issued to the respondent stating that if the Resolution is not set aside by the higher Authorities, the first respondent is bound to follow the Resolution. The operative portion of my order dated 13.12.1988 reads as follows: ...It need not be stated that unless the Resolution is set aside by the Authority under the Act, the respondent is bound to follow the Resolution and he cannot say that he is not bound by the Resolution. As such, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to get lease of the shops, if the Resolution is not set aside by the higher authorities. This petition is ordered accordingly.... However the first respondent by advertisement dated 2.1.1989 sought to bring to public auction the various shops in the new bus stand and the auction was to be held on 11.1.1989. The petitioners herein preferred W.P. Nos. 164 and 417 of 1989 before this Court and on that the first respondent made a statement which runs as follows: ...I submit that the auction will not be conducted until further orders by the Director of Town Panchayat on the resolution pending with him.... Following that submission made by the first respondent the writ petitions were disposed of by K.M. Natarajan, J. on 23.2.1989. The petitioners made representations to the second respondent and the second respondent did not respond to it. An advertisement was published in the Tamil daily "Dina Malar" on 4.8.1989 calling for a public auction of the shops to be held on 11.8.1989 and one of the petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 10664 of 1989 praying for a mandatory injunction restraining the respondent from holding auction. When the matter came up for admission before me, the respondent's counsel produced before this Court the order passed by the second respondent purported to exercise powers conferred by Section 147 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act setting aside the Resolution 69 of 1986. When the matter came up for admission before me, the respondent's counsel produced before this Court the order passed by the second respondent purported to exercise powers conferred by Section 147 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act setting aside the Resolution 69 of 1986. It is alleged in the affidavit that they were not able to get a copy of the order and as such they approach this Court without a copy of the order with the prayer as stated supra. 5. The petitioners allege in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the order of the second respondent seeking to set aside the Resolution 69 of 1986 is contrary to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act and it is beyond the powers conferred by Section 147 of the Act. The petitioners claim that the respondents are estopped from seeking to set aside the Resolution since the petitioners had been forced to act upon the same and were led to believe that they would be given a three year lease under the said Resolution at a time when they withdrew the Writ Petition No. 5856 of 1986. It is further alleged that the question of the revenue of the Panchayat cannot be a ground to cancel the Resolution under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act. It is also alleged that the revenue is not likely to be affected since even under the terms of the said Resolution 69 of 1986, the petitioners have been called upon to pay 30% more than their existing rental or the market rent as determined by the Public Works Department whichever is higher. 6. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that all the petitioners were lessees of the shops auctioned by the Kangeyam Town Panchayat prior to 1986 some of them have been occupying on renewal of one year lease period temporarily and some of them have been occupying on renewal for every three years. It is claimed that all the petitioners have entered into an agreement with the Panchayat to hand over vacant possession of the sites on the expiry of the lease period of their own volition. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the Panchayat renewed bases in favour of the petitioners in the year 1985 for a period of three years ending 31st March, 1988. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the Panchayat renewed bases in favour of the petitioners in the year 1985 for a period of three years ending 31st March, 1988. It is further claimed that the Writ Petition No. 5855 of 1986 filed by the petitioners was withdrawn by the petitioners after the Chairman of the Panchayat Board has passed a Resolution No. 69 of 1986 dated 20.8.1986 that the petitioners will be given shops in the new bus stand on increased rent at the rate of 30% or at the rate fixed by the P.W.D. whichever is higher. It is further claimed that the second respondent herein has cancelled the Resolution No. 69 of 1986 by order dated 19.6.1989 and only in pursuance of that order the first respondent published the notice of auction of the shops on 4.8.1989 and sent the copies of the auction notice to all the petitioners. It is further claimed that during the subsistence of lease 1985-88 the petitioners were given an alternative site by the Panchayat and hence they were not prejudiced or suffered any loss. It is further alleged that a huge sum of Rs. 20 lakhs was borrowed by the first respondent for the construction of the shops and the same has to be repaid with interest to the Government and the first respondent also has to bear the maintenance charges amounting to Rs. 4 lakhs approximately every year. It is also further stated that as per Rule 12 (I-B) of the manual on Panchayat Administration Part-1 Public auction of all the permanent buildings is a must. It is also stated that the lease of the petitioners have not been renewed that the lease had expired with the end of 31.3.1988, that after the expiry of the lease period, the occupation of the petitioners even of the alternate site is unauthorised and that it is not correct to contend that Proviso to Section 147 provides calling for explanation from all the parties concerned before exercising the powers under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act. It is further claimed that the Resolution itself is illegal and is in excess of the power conferred by the Act and is contrary to Rule 12 (I-B) of the Manual on Panchayat Administration. It is further claimed that the Resolution itself is illegal and is in excess of the power conferred by the Act and is contrary to Rule 12 (I-B) of the Manual on Panchayat Administration. It is also claimed that the Panchayat revenue is being affected that being a new construction, the petitioners cannot seek for renewal and that on the basis of meagre increase of rent that is hardly sufficient to pay back a huge amount borrowed for the construction of the shops. It is further claimed that is wholly unjust and improper for the petitioners to prevent the Panchayat from auctioning the newly constructed shops to which they have no right whatsoever. 7. The second respondent has also filed a counter affidavit stating that the issue is raised up on the illegal resolution passed by the Kangeyam Town Panchayat on 20.8.1986 and that after perusing the relevant records and factors the second respondent has ordered to cancel the illegal Resolution No. 69 of 1986 passed by the Kangeyam Town Panchayat on 20.8.1986. It is also claimed that the auction of the shops is a justified one and within the frame work of the civic law i.e. Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 and the rules issued thereunder. It is further claimed that the said resolution is in contravention of the provisions of Rules relating to lease of permanent building covered in Rule 12 (I-B) of the Rules of the Panchayats Act. It is further stated that the auction has been taken when the Resolution was referred to the higher authorities under Section 43 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958. It is further claimed that the petitioners in the writ Petition nowhere entrusted either long term lease of vacant land, bunk stall or permanent buildings in the old bus stand premises by the Kangeyam Town Panchayat and that the public auction proposed by Kangeyam Town Panchayat in respect of new bus stand shops is justified. It is further stated that the new bus stand has been constructed in Kangeyam Town Panchayat with a total outlay of Rs. It is further stated that the new bus stand has been constructed in Kangeyam Town Panchayat with a total outlay of Rs. 20 lakhs as per approved project of the Tamil Nadu Country planning Board that the said amount is borrowed from Government through a Committee on Town and Country Planning Board, Madras on condition that Kangeyam Town Panchayat has to repay the loan in 20 annual instalments and that the annuity fixed for the loan is Rs. 3.40 lakhs. It is further claimed in the counter affidavit that the first respondent herein referred the resolution to the second respondent and the resolution was cancelled on 10.6.1989 after giving opportunity to the Kangeyam Panchayat, as per the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act. It is clearly stated in the counter-affidavit that since the resolution No. 69 of 1986 of the Kangeyam Town Panchayat is an unlawful one and excessive and that if this resolution is implemented the civic body will certainly get heavy loss of revenue resources of the Town Panchayat. It is also stated that it is enough if a notice is given to the Town Panchayat and that has been done so. 8. Mr. V.P. Raman, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that in view of the orders passed by this Court by Mohan, J. (As he then was) in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986, which is extracted in the earlier part of this order, the petitioners are entitled to have a lease in the new shops in the new bus stand. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that the respondents are bound by the principle of promissory estoppel and the respondents should not go back on the resolution passed in the year 1986. The learned counsel also contends that the impugned order which is said to have been passed under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act is in gross violation of principles of natural justice as no notice has been given to the petitioners. He also contends that he loss of revenue to the said Panchayat cannot be a ground for cancelling the resolution passed in the year 1986 which is in favour of the petitioners. 9. Mr. R. Desabandhu, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and Mr. Sridevan, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 argue that the petitioners have no right at all to claim the lease. 9. Mr. R. Desabandhu, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and Mr. Sridevan, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 argue that the petitioners have no right at all to claim the lease. It is argued that the petitioners' leases have been expired by March, 1988 and that too in the old bus stand and not in the new shops which are constructed in the new bus stand. They further argue that the petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right that they should be given new lease for the new shops. It is also argued that the resolution has been cancelled under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act the petitioners cannot ask for the issuance of the writ of mandamus from this Court as prayed for. The learned Counsel refers to the Rules made under Panchayat Act and aruges that in such case, the lease has to be given in public auction. It is further argued that there is no promissory estoppel in this case as there cannot be any promissory estoppel against the statute. 10. I have given careful consideration to the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondents, It seems to be a long drawn war between the lessees and the Town Panchayat of the old town bus stand claiming rights in the shops which are constructed newly in the new bus stand. It is true a Resolution has been passed in the year 1986 and on that basis the petitioners herein withdrew the Writ Petition No. 5855 of 1986. Even in the order in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986, passed by Mohan, J. (as he then was) I do not find any consent was given by the learned Counsel appearing for the Town Panchayat. In the presence of the counsel, Mohan, J. (as he then was) passed that order in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986 which runs as follows:- The learned counsel for the petitioners states that the respondents have agreed to give the lease in favour of the petitioners for a period of three years on increased rental. Hence, the writ petition is not pressed. Recording this, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. The entire argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner revolves round this order. Hence, the writ petition is not pressed. Recording this, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. The entire argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner revolves round this order. Assuming that the abovementioned writ petition was withdrawn by the petitioners only because of the Resolution No. 69 of 1986, in my order in W.P. No. 8518 of 1988, which has been extracted in the earlier portion of this Order, I have made it clear that if the Resolution is not set aside by the Higher authorities, the petitioners are entitled to get lease of the shops. I find that the petitioners herein filed another writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 417 of 1989 and obtained interim injunction. On a perusal of the file, I find that the District Collector Periyar District at Erode referred the matter to the Director of Town Panchayat, Madras by his proceedings dated 3.1.1989, requesting to take proceedings to cancel the resolution. A notice has been given to the Panchayat on 24.5.1989 to show cause why the Resolution No. 69 of 1986 dated 20.8.1986 should not be cancelled. But no reply was received from the Panchayat. As such, by order dated 10.6.1989, the Resolution No. 69 of 1986 dated 20.8.1986 was cancelled by the second respondent under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act, 1958. But I find from the file that the President of Kangeyam Panchayat has already sent his reply requesting the Director of Panchayats to cancel the Resolution No. 69 of 1986. Unfortunately, this has not been taken note of by the Director of Panchayats when the order was passed cancelling the resolution No. 69 of 1986. As such, as on date Resolution No. 69 of 1986 is not in existence and it has been cancelled. Further I find from the records, the Panchayat itself has cancelled the earlier Resolution. 11. Section 147 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 reads as follows: 147. Power to suspend or cancel resolution etc. As such, as on date Resolution No. 69 of 1986 is not in existence and it has been cancelled. Further I find from the records, the Panchayat itself has cancelled the earlier Resolution. 11. Section 147 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 reads as follows: 147. Power to suspend or cancel resolution etc. under the Act.--(1) The Inspector may, by order in writing,-- (i) Suspend or cancel any resolution passed, order issued, or licence permission granted, or (ii) Prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done, in pursuance or under colour of the Act, if in his opinion-- (a) such resolution, order, licence, permission or act has not been legally passed, issued, granted or authorized, or (b) such resolution, order, licence, permission, or act is in excess of the powers conferred by this Act or any other law or an abuse of such powers or is considered by the Inspector to be otherwise undersirable, or (c) The execution of such resolution or order, or the continuance in force of such licence or permission or the doing of such act is likely to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or is likely to lead to a riot or an affray: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall enable the Inspector to set aside any election which has been held. (2) The Inspector shall, before taking action on any of the grounds referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) give the authority or person concerned an opportunity for explanation. (3) The power conferred on the Inspector under clause (c) of Sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of that clause.... Section 147 (1) (i) of the Act empowers the authority to cancel a resolution if a notice is given under Section 147 (2) of the said Act. In my view, Section 147 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 has been fully complied with in this case. The word 'resolution' which occurs in sub-clause (a) to (c) of Section 147 (1) (ii) of the said Act if to be cancelled, an opportunity has to be given only to the authority. In my view, Section 147 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 has been fully complied with in this case. The word 'resolution' which occurs in sub-clause (a) to (c) of Section 147 (1) (ii) of the said Act if to be cancelled, an opportunity has to be given only to the authority. On a perusal of the file, I find that before the resolution of the Panchayat was cancelled, a notice has been issued to the Panchayat and the said Panchayat has replied to the notice. As such, the petitioners contention that there is violation of principles of natural justice in this case cannot be accepted because they were not given enough notice. I do not think such a notice is contemplated under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958. 12. Rule 12 (1-B) of the Panchayat Rules reads as follows: (1-B) (a) All cases of shops, rooms, garages, markets, canteens, hotels, lodging houses and other permanent buildings to the Panchayat and for which rent is payable for each month of for a longer period shall be effected by public auction. Such auction shall be conducted by the Executive Authority or by persons duly authorised by him who shall give: full publicity thereto in such manner and he considers suitable. (b) The Executive Authority, shall place the bid at the auction before the Panchayat which shall determine which of the bid shall be accepted. (c) Where the bid accepted is not the highest bid, the reasons for rejecting a bid or bids higher than the one accepted shall be recorded in writing. (d) The lease shall be for a period of three years.... If a resolution is passed against this Rule mentioned above, I am of the view it is patently illegal. The Panchayat has no jurisdiction at all to pass such a resolution. As such the resolution passed in the year 1986, in which, much reliance was placed upon by the petitioners cannot stand in law. In that view of the matter, I hold that the action has , been taken rightly by the respondents under Section 147 of the Panchayats Rules has been rightly set aside. If it is so, the petitioners herein have no right to prevent the Panchayat from holding auction of the new shops in the new bus stand. In that view of the matter, I hold that the action has , been taken rightly by the respondents under Section 147 of the Panchayats Rules has been rightly set aside. If it is so, the petitioners herein have no right to prevent the Panchayat from holding auction of the new shops in the new bus stand. 14.1 do not find any substance in the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on the principles of promissory estoppel. It is well accepted that no question of promissory estoppel arises against the statute. The decision of the Supreme Court in A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai can be usefully referred to, in which the Supreme Court has observed as follows (at P. 929): ...It was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the appellant would be estopped from challenging the mechanical process because he did not oppose the introduction of this process although he was present in the meeting personally or through his agent. This argument is wholly untenable because when we are considering a constitutional or statutory provision there can be no estoppel against a statute and whether or not the appellant agreed or participated in the meeting which was held before introduction of the voting machines, if such a process is not permissible or authorised by law he cannot be estopped from challenging the same. As such when the Rules of Panchayat extracted above are against the leasing of shops except by way of public auction, the petitioners herein cannot rely upon an illegal resolution passed in the year 1986 and claim to obtain the shops on lease. Moreover, I do not think the order passed by Mohan, J. (as he then was) in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986 can be relied upon by the petitioners. The abovesaid writ petition was dismissed as not pressed recording the statement of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners only. It cannot be said that the abovesaid order is binding on the authorities. No doubt, on that date there was a resolution and the petitioners though fit to make the statement before the Court. Now after the resolution has been cancelled under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act, the petitioners herein cannot seek any support from the order passed by Mohan, J. (as he then was) in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986. 15. No doubt, on that date there was a resolution and the petitioners though fit to make the statement before the Court. Now after the resolution has been cancelled under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act, the petitioners herein cannot seek any support from the order passed by Mohan, J. (as he then was) in W.P. No. 5855 of 1986. 15. On another ground also, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition has been extracted in the earlier portion of this order. I do not understand how a writ of mandamus will lie when an order has been passed under the provisions of the Panchayats Act which is still existing. In my view, so far as that order stands, no writ of mandamus could be issued. Simply because the petitioners have not been able to file a writ of certiorari, I do not think that this Court can issue a writ of mandamus ignoring the order passed by the second respondent herein under Section 147 of the Panchayats Act, 1958. On the ground that the petitioners herein have not challenged the order of the second respondent properly by way of a writ of certiorari, this petition is bound to fail. 16. It is a well accepted principle that a writ of mandamus cannot issue against a statute. When the Panchayat Rules 12 (1-B) provides for a particular method of leasing out the shops, I think it is not possible for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus as prayed for. 17. Further it is a well accepted principle that a remedy under Article 226 is purely a discretionary, more so in a case of writ of mandamus. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Municipality v. Advance Builders in which the Supreme Court has observed as follows: (at P. 800). ...It was however, contended by the learned Attorney General that, after all, a writ of mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, a matter for the discretion of the Court. That is undoubtedly the case. ...It was however, contended by the learned Attorney General that, after all, a writ of mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, a matter for the discretion of the Court. That is undoubtedly the case. It is pointed out by Lord Hathorley in Queen v. Church Wardens of All Saints, Wigan (1875-76) 1 A.C. 611 that upon a prerogative writ there may arise many matters of discretion which may induce the Judges to withhold the grant of it-- matters connected with delay, or possibly with the conduct of the parties. A detailed statement showing the arrears of lease amount in the old bus stand and temporary bus stand upto 30.9.1989 to be paid by the petitioners herein has been filed by the Executive Officer, Kangeyam Panchayat before this Court. Per contra, the petitioners have also filed a statement disputing the quantum of arrears of rent. As such, it is clear that the petitioners herein are in arrears of rent due to the respondent Town Panchayat. As the petitioners have come up before this Court by making default in payment of rents due to the respondent Town Panchayat, I am not inclined to exercise the discretion, in their favour. Since I take the view that persons who come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of mandamus should come with clean hands and I have held that the petitioners are all in arrears of rent I am not inclined to entertain the writ petition. On this ground also, the petitioners are bound to fail. There are no merits in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.