ORDER A. Abdul Hadi, J. 1. Application No. 348 of 1989 is for directing the Official Assignee to deliver the key of the premises at No. 30/2 Godown Street, Madras to the applicants to enable the applicants to resume their business therein. The applicants who were partners of a firm Sathianarayana and Co. and were carrying on business in the said premises, were adjudicated insolvents in their own petition. viz I.P. No. 9 of 1989 by order dated 3.2.1989. At that time, they were tenants of the said premises. Admittedly, the said tenancy was for a period of 10 years from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1990. That is, even during the pendency of the said lease, they were adjudicated insolvents. On adjudication, the premises was sealed by the Official Assignee and he is having the key of the said premises. 2. Now, the applicants have filed this application for getting back possession of the said premises for carrying on their business. 3. The first-respondent-Official Assignee opposes this application. His report says that a huge liability of Rs. 59 lakhs and odd have been disclosed by the insolvents as against their disproportionately small assets which included doubtful book debts also. Further, the report also says that if the insolvents are rein ducted to the said premises, for carrying on their business, it will only result in accrual of unnecessary further rental liabilities. The Official Assignee gives also other reasons for opposing the said application. The learned Official Assignee also argued that the leasehold interest which the applicants had at the time of adjudication for the period ending with 31.12.1990, vested with the Official Assignee along with other properties of the insolvents and hence this application would not lie. 4. Application No. 224 of 1989 is by the landlord of the above said premises. He prays for delivery of possession of the said premises back to him. The report of the Official Assignee in this regard says that with a view to avoid accrual of unnecessary rental liability, the premises can be handed over to the landlord. It is admitted that the monthly rent is Rs. 500 and already there are arrears of rent payable by the insolvents to the landlord to the extent of Rs. 5000. 5. It is admitted that the monthly rent is Rs. 500 and already there are arrears of rent payable by the insolvents to the landlord to the extent of Rs. 5000. 5. The main question to be considered is whether the above said leasehold interest enduring upto 31.12.1990 which the adjudicated insolvents had at the time of their adjudication, is a property that vested with the Official Assignee after adjudication, under Section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. If so, the applicants in Appln. No. 348 of 1989 cannot be lessees of the said premises after their adjudication and Appln. No. 348 of 1989 will not be maintainable. 6. The learned Counsel for the applicant brought to my notice the decisions reported in Viswanatha Chettiar v. Official Assignee, Madras 89 L.W. 557(D.B.), Mohanaranga Chetti v. Official Assignee 77 L.W. 528, and Hajee Abdulla Sait. v. K.D. Moorjari 88 L.W. 589 to contend that the abovesaid leasehold interest was their personal right and not a property which would vest with the Official Assignee on adjudication. But, these decisions dealt with cases of statutory tenancies, after the expirty of the contractual tenancy. But, the present case is one of contractual tenancy which subsists even upto 31.12.1990. The decision reported in D. Vasan Rai and Co., v. Official Assignee A.I.R. 1984 Bom.1, was also cited before me. But that refers to a monthly tenancy and has no application to the present case. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the abovesaid leasehold interest is a property. The definition of the term 'property' under Section 2 (f) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act runs as follows: Property" includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. Thus it is an inclusive definition. That also shows that the Legislature has deliberately defined the term inclusively and not exclusively or comprehensively. So, what all is property under the general law would necessarily come under the definition apart from what has been specifically included therein. An exactly identical definition is also contained in Section 2 (d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. It has also been held in Muktilal v. Trustees of Provident Fund, that the said word 'property' used in the said Provincial Insolvency Act is having widest meaning. An exactly identical definition is also contained in Section 2 (d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. It has also been held in Muktilal v. Trustees of Provident Fund, that the said word 'property' used in the said Provincial Insolvency Act is having widest meaning. In re Varikanti Ankamma A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 120, it has also been held that when an insolvent had a leasehold interest in a certain land, which he possessed, he having an absolute disposing power, it falls within the definition of the word 'property' under the said Section 2 (d). In the said decision it was observed thus: The property may be owned by another but the leasehold...over such property would also be regarded as property. The learned Judge in the said case cited Jones v. Skinner (1.835)5 L.J. Ch.87, and pointed out that 'property' is indicative of every possible interest which the party may have. In the present case, it is not the case of the insolvents that their leasehold interest is not disposable or transferable absolutely. Further, under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of contract to the contrary, lessee may transfer his leasehold interest absolutely. 7. The learned Official Assignee also brought to my notice the English decision reported in Stafford v. Levy (1946)2 All English Law Reports 256. The said decision cites with approval the following passage from Reeves v. Daviens (1921)2 K.B. 486. Where by statute the interest of the tenant of a house has been entirely divested or taken away from him and vested in his trustee by operation of law, the tenant has no right to intervene. In the said case also, the above the said tenant was adjudicated bankrupt and the trustee referred to in the above passage is the trustee in bankruptcy. 8. In the circumstances, Application No. 348 of 1989 is dismissed. Since the Official Assignees as that with a view to avoid accrual of unnecessary rental liability the premises can be handed over to the landlord. Application No. 224 of 1989 is allowed. However, the Official Assignee is given a month's time for handing over possession of the above said premises to the landlord applicant in Application No. 224 of 1989.