ORDER : 1. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and we have also gone through the following passages in Special Reference No. I of 1964; 1965 (1) SCR 413 at pages 492 to 494 which is a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court which is binding on us. "Assuming, however, that the right claimed by the House can be treated as an integral part of the privileges of the House of Commons, the question to consider would be whether such a right has been conferred on the House by the latter part of Art. 194 (3). On this alternative hypothesis, it is necessary to consider whether this part of the privilege is consistent with the material provisions of our Constitution. We have already referred to Articles 32 and 226. Let us take Art. 32 because it emphatically brings out the significance of the fundamental right conferred on the citizens of India to move this `Court if their fundamental rights are contravened either by the Legislature or the Executive. Now, Art 32 makes no exception in regard to any encroachment at all, and it would appear illogical to contend that even if the right claimed by the House may contravene the fundamental rights of the citizen, the aggrieved citizen cannot successfully move this Court under Art. 32. To the absolute constitutional right conferred on the citizens by Art. 32 no exception can be made and no exception is intended to be made by the Constitution by reference to any power or privilege vesting in the Legislatures of this country." 2. As we have already indicated we do not propose to enter into a general discussion as to the applicability of all the fundamental rights to the cases where legislative powers and privileges can be exercised against any individual citizen of this country, and that we are dealing with this matter on the footing that Art. 19 (1) (a) does not apply and Art. 21 does. If an occasion arises, it may become necessary to consider whether Art. 22 can be contravened by the exercise of the 3 power or privilege under Art. 194 (3). But, for the moment, we may consider Art. 20. If an occasion arises, it may become necessary to consider whether Art. 22 can be contravened by the exercise of the 3 power or privilege under Art. 194 (3). But, for the moment, we may consider Art. 20. If Art. 21 applies, Art. 20 may conceivably apply, and the question may arise, if a citizen complains that his fundamental right had been contravened either under Art. 20 or Art. 21, can he or can he not move this Court under Art. 32 ? For the purpose of 4 making the point which we are discussing, the applicability of Art. 21 itself would be enough. If a citizen moves this Court and complains that his fundamental right under Art. 21 had been contravened, it would plainly be the duty of this Court to examine the merits of the said contention, and that inevitably raises the question as to whether the personal liberty of the citizen has been taken away according to the procedure established by law. In fact, this question was actually considered by this Court in the case of Pandit Sharma. It is true that the answer was made in favour of the legislature; but that is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the present discussion. If in a given, case the allegation made by the citizen is that he has been deprived of his liberty not in accordance with law, but for capricious or mala fide reasons, this Court will have to examine the validity of the said contention, and it would be no answer in such a case to say that the warrant issued against the citizen is a general warrant and a general warrant must stop all further judicial inquiry and scrutiny. In our opinion, therefore, the impact of the fundamental constitutional right conferred on Indian citizens by Art. 32 on the construction of the letter part of Art. 194 (3) is decisively against the view that a power or privilege can be claimed by the House though it may be inconsistent with Art. 21. In this connection, it may be relevant to recall that the rules which the House has to make for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution under Art. 208 (1).... 3. In this connection, it may be relevant to recall that the rules which the House has to make for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution under Art. 208 (1).... 3. If the power of the High Courts under Art. 226 and the authority of this Court under Art. 32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would be futile to contend that a citizen cannot move the High Courts or this Court to invoke their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated. The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf, otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts and this Court would be rendered virtually meaningless. Let it not be forgotten that the judicial power conferred on the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection of the citizens fundamental rights, and so, in the existence of the said judicial power itself is necessarily involved the right of the citizen to appeal to the said power in a proper case. (Underlining by us). 4. We have also gone through all the papers placed before us. In the circumstances we feel that this petition should be admitted for further consideration having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. In this case there is an allegation that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution has been violated. 5. Issue notice to the Respondents. We direct that the impugned warrant of arrest shall not be given effect to until further orders of this Court.