Judgment :- 1. Mother sued to cancel Ext.A2 sale deed for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the son relating to 68 cents and a building on the sole ground that she executed the document to benefit the son believing his word that it is only a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs. 10,000/-. The only evidence is her testimony as PW1 that she was made to execute the document saying that he wants money for his trade purposes. The suit was decreed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. Second appeal is by the defendant son. 2. Rejecting the contention that what is involved is a bona fide sale, the courts below decreed the suit on the grounds of relationship as mother and son, inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax by the mother after sale and possession of the original sale deed by her. Even after giving the most liberal interpretation what would come out from the plaint and evidence of PW1 is only a mistake of fact or a fraudulent misrepresentation. S.16 of the Contract Act or S.111 of the Evidence Act were not relied on by the respondent or the courts below, but the decisions seen to be presumably under those sections. 3. Voluntary execution of the document thinking that it is a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs.10,000/- is admitted. It is also admitted that the document was executed to benefit the appellant and she told the Sub Registrar, at the time of registration, that she received Rs. 10,000/-. Such a statement she could have made to the Sub Registrar only when asked by him. If so, it is clear that the Sub Registrar must have properly discharged his official duty eliciting voluntary execution and receipt of consideration. Though respondent claims to be illiterate, it is proved otherwise. She has experience in execution of documents and conduct of cases also. DW.2 and 3 are the scribe and attestor to Ext.A2. Their evidence show that contents of Ext.A2 were known to the respondent before execution and registration. The mere fact that DW2 was declared hostile on some other answer given by him does not make the above version unacceptable. Along with these aspects, there is also the presumption under S.114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act arising out of the registration of the document. 4. The mere fact that DW2 was declared hostile on some other answer given by him does not make the above version unacceptable. Along with these aspects, there is also the presumption under S.114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act arising out of the registration of the document. 4. Registration of a document is a solemn act to be performed in the presence of the Registrar, whose duty is to attend to the parties during registration and see that proper persons competent to act are present, and they are identified to his satisfaction; and all things done before him in his official capacity and verified by his signature, will, unless it is shown that some deliberate fraud was successfully committed on him, be presumed to be done duly and in order (Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhry - I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 537 P.C.). Though Ext.A2 is a document required to be attested, examination of attesting witness in proof of execution is necessary under S.68 of the Evidence Act only when execution is denied. In this case, execution is admitted. If so, under S.67 of the Evidence Act, proof can be by any evidence. The evidence furnished by the registration certificate under S.63 of the Registration Act coupled with the presumption under Illustration (e) to S.114 of the Evidence Act supported by the admission of the respondent and the depositions of DW.2 and 3 will be more than sufficient (Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma -1964 K.L.T. 945 and Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar and others - I.L.R. 1976(2) Kerala 678). 5. Inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax and possession of Ext.A2 are not grounds pleaded. Simply because the appellant said that consideration represents the market value but the market value is seen to be higher, the document cannot go on that ground. DW 1 is the wife of the appellant. They were residing with the respondent along with their children. Appellant is the eldest son of the respondent. He was managing the family affairs. Sisters were given away in marriage by him. Dispute is only whether he met the expenses single handed or not. Ext.B3 is a release deed executed by one of the sons in favour of the respondent relinquishing rights in her properties for a consideration of Rs.10,000/-. The amount was paid by the appellant. He was managing the family affairs. Sisters were given away in marriage by him. Dispute is only whether he met the expenses single handed or not. Ext.B3 is a release deed executed by one of the sons in favour of the respondent relinquishing rights in her properties for a consideration of Rs.10,000/-. The amount was paid by the appellant. In these circumstances, the mother selling the property to the son for a reduced value is hot improbable or unconscionable. Admittedly, after Ext.A2 in 1980, appellant fell seriously ill. He was paralysed and he completely lost his speech. It was even feared that he will collapse. Even now he is an invalid. His case is that in this situation, the mother filed the suit at the instance of the other children. Possibility cannot be ruled out. Suit was within two years of Ext.A2 in 1982 when appellant continued to be speechless and paralytic. The original document was got back from the Sub Registrar by the person authorised for that purpose. It was in the common box of the appellant in the house and all children were placing their documents in it. If it was intended as a chitty hypothecation bond, as contended by the respondent, the document must have been in the possession of the person to whom it was executed and not in the possession of the appellant or respondent. If the respondent got back the document from the Sub Registrar and kept with her, she cannot say she was unaware of the contents. Possession of the original and payment of tax in such a situation, especially when they are not grounds relied on, cannot be of any use. 6. Case of the respondent is that she came to know of the real nature of the document on verification when during a quarrel DW 1 asserted ownership. That contention is denied and DW 1 gave evidence. Case of the respondent in this respect appears to be artificial. Her case that what she executed is a chitty hypothecation bond could be only as surety for the appellant to enable him to draw prize amount in a chitty. Her case itself is that she executed the document to benefit her son to get money for business. There must be a chitty for that amount which was prized. There is no such case. It must be in favour of a chitty foreman. Her case itself is that she executed the document to benefit her son to get money for business. There must be a chitty for that amount which was prized. There is no such case. It must be in favour of a chitty foreman. There is no explanation. If it is such a document, how can she admit receipt of money before the Sub Registrar. These are all circumstances indicating that chitty hypothecation bond is an artificial story and what was intended was a sale itself. 7. Plea of mistake of fact is peculiar to the law of written contracts due to the existence of the common law defence of non-est-factum, which permits one who has signed a document, which is essentially different from what he intended to sign, to plead that, notwithstanding his signature, it is not "his deed in contemplation law". The defence of being too lazy or too busy to read is not available. The plea must be kept within narrow limits in order to avoid confusion and uncertainty in the field of contract if a man is permitted to disown his signature simply by asserting that he did not understand what he signed. He must show that the transaction which the document purports is essentially different in substance or kind from the transaction intended. In a case where the person executing the deed is not blind, infirm or otherwise incapacitated and no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to him and he had opportunity of reading the deed, the plea of non-est factum is not available. It is immaterial whether he read or not. He is bound by the deed because it operates as a conclusive bar against him not because he read or understood, but because he has chosen to execute it. That is so in equity as at law except in special cases where there is an equitable ground (Martin Cashin and others v. Peter J. Cashin A.I.R. 1938 P.C.103). The plea can rarely be established by a person of full capacity. Though it is not confined to blind or illiterate alone, any extension of the scope of the plea will have to be kept within specified limits. The plea must be proved by the person setting it up. He must show that he acted with care (Saunders v. Anglia Building Society -1970 (3) A.E.R. 961). The plea of non-est factum is not available in this case. The plea must be proved by the person setting it up. He must show that he acted with care (Saunders v. Anglia Building Society -1970 (3) A.E.R. 961). The plea of non-est factum is not available in this case. When vitiating circumstances are there, the rule has no application also. 8. Law presumes, prima facie, in favour of deeds being duly executed. Burden of proving vitiating factors is on the person who alleges them. Major exceptions to this rule are those provided under S.111 of the Evidence Act and S.16(3) of the Indian Contract Act. The last part of S.16 of the Contract Act says that the section will not affect S.111 of the Evidence Act. S.16(3) and S.111 both operate on the realm of burden of proof alone. The ordinary initial burden in such cases is shifted to the person who supports the document. That is on account of the position of "active confidence" affecting good faith. When good faith is challenged and position of active confidence is alleged, S.111 and when dominating position is alleged and established, S.16 will apply. For the applicability of S.16(3), one more factor is necessary. The transaction must also appear on the face of the deed or on the evidence adduced to be unconscionable. Those exceptions to the general rule of burden of proof flow either from the extra ordinary physical or mental condition of the executant or the peculiar relationship between him and the person in whose favour the deed is executed. Allegation and proof of the existence of the relationship of "active confidence" or "fiduciary relationship" or "the dominating position" is a condition precedent to the shift of burden. Plea of bad faith is also necessary under S.111. Then only burden to prove good faith will shift. Mere allegation of a blood relationship or other relationship is not sufficient. Position of active confidence is necessary. Possibility of exercise of domination and influence must exist. In such cases, under S.111, there is a presumption against the deed unless good faith is proved by the person who holds the position of active confidence. But the burden of proof under S.16(3) of the Contract Act is shifted to the person who is in a dominating position only when the deed also appears or proved to be unconscionable. 9. In view of Order VI R.4 read with R.2, specific plea is necessary. But the burden of proof under S.16(3) of the Contract Act is shifted to the person who is in a dominating position only when the deed also appears or proved to be unconscionable. 9. In view of Order VI R.4 read with R.2, specific plea is necessary. Modification of the rule of evidence is only on allegation and proof of existence of certain conditions to prevent failure of justice in such cases. The position of active confidence' under S.111 of the Evidence Act or dominating position under S.16 of the Contract Act could he proved by evidence or by the presumption arising under S.16(2) of the Contract Act in cases where that presumption is available. Such a presumption of active confidence or dominating position is available only when the authority or fiduciary relationship is proved to exist or contract is made with a person whose mental capacity is affected by reason of age, illness, etc. S.16(1) of the Contract Act defines undue influence. Sub-section (2) narrates areas where dominance is presumed and Sub-section (3) deals with the conditions required for shifting the burden. Plea and proof regarding the position of confidence and trust enabling undue influence is necessary. A vague or general plea may not be sufficient. The rule is evolved to narrow the issue and protect the party charged with improper conduct from being taken by surprise (Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. and others - A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1279, Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others - A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 878 and Afsar Shaikh and another v. Soleman Bibi and others - A.I.R. 1976 S.C.163). 10. The normal rule of burden of proof is not applicable in cases involving paradanashim ladies or illiterate or old or infirm persons also. In such cases also, burden is on the person who supports the document when such persons did not have the opportunity of extraneous help. The person who supports the deed will have to establish not only that the deed was executed, but was explained to and was really understood by the grantor, that the deed was not signed under duress, but arose from the free and independent will of the grantor. None of these conditions are satisfied in this case. The person who supports the deed will have to establish not only that the deed was executed, but was explained to and was really understood by the grantor, that the deed was not signed under duress, but arose from the free and independent will of the grantor. None of these conditions are satisfied in this case. Here the allegation and evidence is the maximum only of a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the nature of the document which itself is disproved by the defence. The position of active confidence or dominance of will and unconscionable nature of the transaction are not alleged and proved in order to give notice to the appellant to take up the burden. Even if such allegations are also accepted to be there, sufficient rebuttal evidence is given. Illustration (b) to S.111 of the Evidence Act itself indicates that burden of proving good faith is shifted not on account of the relationship as mother and son or the like, but on account of the position of active confidence subsisting enabling domination and influence. Here, it is a case of the mother executing a document in favour of the son. Mistake or fact or fraudulent misrepresentation alleged are not proved but disproved. There is no need for a remand as requested. Both the courts decreed the suit on a misunderstanding of the legal and factual positions. Second Appear is allowed. Decrees and judgments are set aside. Suit is dismissed. No costs. Allowed.