JUDGMENT B.L Loomba, J. 1. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Controversy relates to House no, 9324 Mohalla Ganeshganj, Lucknow. Petitioners are the owner Landlords of this house while it was in the tenancy of respondents Rarnesh Chandra Shukla and Dinesh Chandra Shukla coming from the time of their father Shyam Narain. The landlords filed application under section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 72, on 91278 seeking release of the house in their favour on the ground that it was bona fide required for their personal use and for their family members. It appears that the respondents did not put in appearance in the proceedings and the service having been considered sufficient the case proceeded exparte. The application for release was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by judgment and order dated 27479 (Annexure3). This ex parte order recorded reasons for directing release. On the basis of the release order the respondents were evicted from the house on 161279. The respondents moved an application to have the ex parte order dated 27479 set aside. Unfortunately, it took nearly six years in disposal of this application and the ex parte order; dated 27479 was set aside on 29185. 3. When the ex parte order of release was set aside and the case was restored to its original number, the respondents prayed that they may be put back in possession of the house. Unfortunately, again, this application for restoration of possession was disposed of by the Prescribed Authority on 25289, that is after about four years. The application was allowed and the petitionerlandlords were directed to deliver the possession of the house to the respondents within 30 days from the date of that order. 4. The petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 25289 fifed the present writ petition on 7389 challenging the validity of the impugned order dated 25289 mainly on the ground that the Prescribed Authority failed to take into account the subsequent events which does not justify respondenttenants to be put back in possession in law and equity and particularly keeping in view the explanation appended to the provision of section 21 of the said Act. 5. 5. The important factual development on which great reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners is that after their eviction from the house on 161279 they succeeded in getting released their own house at Clay Square, Lucknow and secured possession thereof. This is the undisputed position that part of the house at Clay Square was already in the occupation of the respondents. The other part was in the tenancy of Kamani Engineering Corporation on a monthly rent of Rs. 500. The respondent successfully persuaded M/s Kamani Engineering Corporation to vacate the house and the respondents got its possession on 1880. In order to regularise their possession under law they moved release application under section 211 of the Act and it was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 111287 (Annexure2). The application for release and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority expressly mentioned that the respondents had been evicted from the disputed house in Ganeshganj and their need for the accommodation at Clay Square was bona fide and genuine. 6. The factual position as comes out, thus, is that while the petitioners are in occupation of the disputed house in Ganeshganj, the respondents are in possession and use of their own house at the Clay Square. The petitioners case on the basis of these facts is that the impugned order directing the petitioners eviction from the disputed house and to put the respondents back in its possession is grossly unfair and unjust and if it is carried out the petitioners will be deprived of the use of their own house and they would be put on road while the respondents who are already comfortably settled in their own house at Clay Square will get back the possession of the dispute house which they really do not need at all. This submission, it appears, was raised before the Prescribed Authority by the learned counsel for the petitioners but was rejected with the observation that the respondents ought to have been put back in possession on the very day the ex parte order was set aside and there being no order of release of the house in favour of the landlords they are not entitled to continue in possession thereof. 7. 7. This is the accepted position that there is no provision in the U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for restitution of the property. Learned Civil Judge has passed the impugned orders keeping in view the law laid down in Harnam Kaur v. Prescribed Authority, Lucknow (Allahabad Rent Cases 1986 (2), page 9. The landlord in that case had taken possession on the basis of ex parte order passed by the Prescribed Authority. After the ex parte order was set aside at the instance of the tenant, restitution was sought by the tenant. The Prescribed Authority allowed the restitution application and directed the tenant to be put back in possession. This order was challenged on various grounds including the ground that restitution application was not maintainable because provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not made applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act. Reference was made to rule 22 (f) of the Rules made under the Act which provides that the power referred to in sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned will be available to the Prescribed Authority or the appellate or revising authority. The validity of this rule was also challenged. Relying on the earlier decision of this Court, the contentions raised to challenge the power of restitution were repelled and it was held that rule 22 (f) is valid and permits the authorities under the Act to make orders in the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of Jaw. It was observed that the doctrine of restitution as contained in section 144 of the Code of Civil procedure is not exhaustive and restitution can be granted by the Court under its inherent power. It was also mentioned that it is the settled proposition of law that the doctrine of restitution, which section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure incorporates, is based on the principle that the acts of Courts arc not to be allowed to work, injury on the suitors. 8. Another decision winch has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is reported in Ashok Kumar v. Additional District Judge: Kanpur (Alld. Rent Cases 1987 (1), page 366). 8. Another decision winch has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is reported in Ashok Kumar v. Additional District Judge: Kanpur (Alld. Rent Cases 1987 (1), page 366). This Court accepted the finding of fact that the landlord in the matter of service in the release proceedings was guilty of fraudulent conduct in interfering with the course of justice in fabricating circumstances on the service of notice on me tenant. He found a fictitious lawyer for the tenant. The order of the Prescribed Authority in directing the tenant to be put back in possession was upheld by this Court with the observations that the Prescribed Authority had rightly balanced the scales of justice on die principle that an order obtained by fraud and collusion must be set aside, h was also observed that a person who had practiced fraud cannot be encouraged to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction o this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. I respectfully agree with the principle of law laid down in both the cases and normally speaking, the tenant ought to be put back in possession when the ex pane order of release is set aside. There are, however, certain special facts and circumstances of this case which require consideration. There is nothing on record that the conduct of the landlord petitioner was fraudulent in the matter of services in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. The ex parte order of release was passed on 2741979 an9 the landlord got possession of the accommodation on 16121979. It is after the eviction that the tenant moved an application to have the ex parte order set aside. It is not clear as to what were the causes for the delay in the disposal of this application. However, this ex parte order of release was set aside after about six years. In between, the tenant persuaded M/s Kamani Engineering Corporation to vacate the house at Clay Square belonging to the tenantsopposite parties. The tenants got possession of their own house on 181980 and thereafter obtained formal order of release from the Prescribed Authority. It appears that they could persuade M/s Kamani Engineering Corporation to vacate their house on the ground that they had been evicted from the accommodation with which we are concerned in this writ petition. The tenants got possession of their own house on 181980 and thereafter obtained formal order of release from the Prescribed Authority. It appears that they could persuade M/s Kamani Engineering Corporation to vacate their house on the ground that they had been evicted from the accommodation with which we are concerned in this writ petition. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release of the accommodation at Clay Square in favour of the respondents on the same ground. The respondents are in actual possession of their own house which was released in their favour by the Prescribed Authority under the Act solely on the ground that they had been evicted m execution of the ex parte order of release in favour of the petitionerlard lord Mere important factor submitted is that while respondents are in comfortable occupation of their own house at Clay Square, the petitioner landlord will be on road in case the impugned order is allowed to be implemented. It could not be shown in any way that the petitioners were responsible for the delay in the disposal of the respondent's application for Setting aside the ex parte order or for the delay in the disposal 6f the application for restitution and delivery of possession in favour of the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents could not show that any hardship will be caused to them in case they are not given possession of the disputed accommodation in pursuance of the impugned order. They could not rebut the assertion of the petitioners that in the event of the impugned order being implemented, the petitioners will be put on road, there being no other accommodation available to them where they can shift. In these special facts of the case, it does not appear just and proper to let the petitioners be evicted during the period their application for release of the accommodation remains pending. The impugned order has, after all, been passed for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned If it appears that the scale of justice in the context of particular set of facts tilts in favour of the petitioners, this Court should, in my view, step in to intervene to avoid injustice to be inflicted on the petitioners. As is already mentioned, the ex parte order was dated 2771979 and was set aside on 2911985 and thereafter the matter of delivery of possession remained pending for another four years. If the respondents could wait for over ten years, they can wait for some time more for the ultimate result of the litigation resting with the disposal of the release application of the petitioner. It appears just and proper to set aside the impugned order and direct the expeditious disposal of the release application of the petitioners pending with the Prescribed Authority. 10. The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 2521989 contained in Annexure 5 is quashed. It is directed that the Prescribed Authority shall dispose of the release application of the petitioner expeditiously and, in any case, within a period of four months from the date of this order. The parties shall appear before the Prescribed Authority on July 27, 1989. Parties shall bear their own costs. (Petition Allowed)