Judgment :- Balanarayana Marar, J. 1. This second appeal arises from the decision of the Sub-Court, Tirur in A.S.No.34/1978 which was filed against the judgment and decree in O.S. 12/1976 before the munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi. The suit was one for recovery of possession on the strength of title. The property was purchased by the plaintiff from one Narayanan Nair in 1964. Narayanan Nair had verumpattom rights. The property was mortgaged to one Moideenkutty, brother of defendants, on 29-1-1967 by which possession was also given. There is no document to evidence the mortgage. Moideenkutty was in possession till his death and thereafter defendants are in possession. The mortgage is alleged to have been granted for a consideration of Rs.225/- and on condition to pay 30 paras of paddy, out of which 71/2 paras are to be adjusted towards interest and the balance of 221/2 paras to be delivered to plaintiff during Makaram every year. Rent is alleged to have been paid till January 1967 and thereafter is in arrears. Defendants did not surrender possession as per demands made by plaintiff and that necessitated the suit. 2. Defendants denied the mortgage as well as the possession of Moideenkutty. They contended that the property was taken on lease by 1st defendant from plaintiff on 25-6-1964 on payment of a munpattom amount of Rs.200/-and agreeing to deliver 20 paras of paddy every year. They claimed fixity of tenure. 3. The dispute was referred to the Land Tribunal who held that 1st defendant is not entitled to fixity of tenure. The trial court accepted that finding and the suit was decreed. The appellate court concurred with that decision. Aggrieved by that defendants have come up in second appeal. 4. The learned Single Judge before whom the second appeal came up for hearing directed the appeal to be placed before a Division Bench in view of the conflict of views in the decisions in 1979 K.L.T. S.N.47, Rathna Bai v. Rajeeiva (1981 K.L.T. S.N. 62) and B. Rajeevi v. Thyampanna Shetty (AIR 1984 Ker. 222 = 1984 KLT 536). That is how the matter is now before us. 5. Can S.7 and 74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) be reconciled is the main question that we are called upon to consider. 222 = 1984 KLT 536). That is how the matter is now before us. 5. Can S.7 and 74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) be reconciled is the main question that we are called upon to consider. M.P. Menon J. in 1979 K.L.T. (S.N.) 47 held that if the conditions specified in S.7 are satisfied in a given case, the transaction shall be deemed to be a tenancy notwithstanding the embargo of S.74 against the creation of tenancies after 1-4-1964. It was stated that S.7 cannot be considered as repugnant to S.74 and it has to be given full effect. In a later decision Bhat, J. held that there is nothing in S.74 of the Act or in any other provision of the Act which will indicate that the expression "tenancy" in S.74 of the Act is intended to have such a restricted meaning. It was further stated: "To attach such a restricted meaning to "tenancy" occurring in S.74 would be to whittle down the vigour of the deeming provisions incorporated by the Legislature. In this view I am unable to agree that deeming tenancies will not attract the embargo contained in S.74 of the Act" (vide 1981 KLT SN 62). In. a still later decision in A.I.R. 1984 Ker. 222 Bhaskaran Ag. C. J. (as he then was) held that the deeming tenancy envisaged by S.7 within its sweep is capable of taking in all cases of occupation satisfying the requirements laid down in S.7 read with the Explanation. This apparent conflict of views has to be resolved. 6. S.7 as it originally stood conferred benefits on persons honestly believing themselves to be tenants provided they were continuously in occupation of the land of another situated in Malabar for not less than two years on 11th day of April 1957. S.7 was recast in the present form in 1969 by S.9 of Act 35 of 1969, at a time when S.74 was in the statute book and the embargo in creating future tenancies was still operative. S.74 prohibits creation of tenancies on and from the 1st of April, 1964 and any tenancy created in contravention of that provision shall be invalid. S.74 prohibits creation of tenancies on and from the 1st of April, 1964 and any tenancy created in contravention of that provision shall be invalid. That the legislature was not unaware of the prohibition contained in S.74 in creating tenancies after 1-4-1964 has been manifested in S.6C of the Act introduced by S.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1979. That section starts with the clause "notwithstanding anything contained in S.74 " The scope of S.6C came up for consideration in C.S. Chandrasekharan Nair v. K. George (AIR 1985 Ker. 131) wherein it was held that S.6C operates as an exception to the sweeping provisions contained in S.74. While observing that any tenancy after 1-4-1964 is devoid of force under that section, the decision stated that S.6C salvages only one class of transactions among the many types which would be within the mischief of S.74. That class is restricted to cases where the occupation of a person is on the basis of a lease-deed executed. If one class of transactions could be specifically excluded from the purview of S.74, we fail to understand as to why the legislature could not exclude any other class by using similar expressions in the statute. The non-mention of S.74 in the amended S.7 of the Act is therefore a clear indication of the intention of the legislature not to exclude that section from the operation of S.74. 7. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that leases granted by persons having only a limited interest are given protection under S.7B even though they are exempted under S.3(1)(vi) of the Act. But for the deeming provision contained in S.7B, persons in possession by virtue of leases granted by limited owners are exempted under Chap. 2 and such a person cannot claim fixity of tenure. Construing S.3(1)(vi) and S.7B together Khalid J. (as he then was) held in Travancore Devaswom Board v. Krishnan (1980 KLT 787) that S.3(1)(vi) has to be read subject to S.7B. Otherwise S.7B would be rendered inoperative. The question came up for consideration again in B. Rajeevi v. Thyampanna Shetty 1984 KLT 536 = AIR 1984 Ker. 222) where the applicability of S.7 to the case of a lease granted by a limited owner came up for consideration. Otherwise S.7B would be rendered inoperative. The question came up for consideration again in B. Rajeevi v. Thyampanna Shetty 1984 KLT 536 = AIR 1984 Ker. 222) where the applicability of S.7 to the case of a lease granted by a limited owner came up for consideration. It was held: "The deemed tenancy envisaged by S.7 within its sweep is capable of taking in all cases of occupation satisfying the requirements laid down in S.7 read with the Explanation, no exclusion from its purview appears to have been contemplated in case such conditions are satisfied. In view of the scheme of the Act and the object behind the deemed provision it is difficult to hold that it was the intention of the legislature to restrict the scope and amplitude of S.7 by.S3(1)(vi). Therefore, S3(1)(vi) would not nave any application to cases covered by S.7." The counsel wanted us to draw an analogy and find that the prohibition in S.74 will not stand in the way of a person claiming deemed tenancy under S.7 of the Act. That analogy is not apposite. S.3 only exempted certain tenancies from the benefit of the Act. Some of such tenancies were brought within the fold of the Act by the deeming provisions. One such provision is S.7 of the Act A fiction is necessary only when the realities are different from the situation visualised by the fiction. The effect of Rajeevi (supra) is only that persons covered by S.3(1)(vi) of the Act could not be tenants, they would still be deemed tenants in view of S.7 of the Act In Rajeev (supra) this Court had no occasion to consider the effect of a total prohibition for creation of tenancies, deemed or actual, whether by legal fiction-under S.7 or by act of parties subsequent to 1-4-1964. We hold that the above decision does not support the submission urged by the appellants. 8. The counsel for appellants argues that S.74 contemplates only voluntary acts. In other words, parties cannot create tenancies whereas the fixity under S.7 is conferred by a statutory fiction which has to be carried to its logical conclusion. It is pointed out that certain categories of persons who will not come under the definition of a tenant were brought into the act by the legal fiction created in S.7. In other words, parties cannot create tenancies whereas the fixity under S.7 is conferred by a statutory fiction which has to be carried to its logical conclusion. It is pointed out that certain categories of persons who will not come under the definition of a tenant were brought into the act by the legal fiction created in S.7. In spite of the prohibition in S.74, benefits of the Act can be claimed by such persons, according to the counsel. But the prohibition created by S.74 is an absolute prohibition as held in Kannan v. Kunhabdulla (1981 K.L.T. SN. 95). The prohibition in the section was found to be absolute and operates to nullify any lease that may be purported to be created. Even according to the counsel for the appellants S.7 does not validate any tenancy created by the parties after 1-4-1964. But it would only amount to a declaration by the legislature that under certain conditions the status of a tenant can be attributed to persons who are found to be in occupation for the period mentioned in that section. It was on this basis that M.P. Menon, J. tried to reconcile the provisions contained in S.7 and 74. The contention that the words in S.74 of the Act that "no tenancy shall be created" must be taken to be limited to contractual tenancies and not to deemed tenancies did not find favour with Bhat, J. in the decision in Rathna Bai v. Rajeeiva (1981 KLT SN. 62) (CRP 1407/80). It is stated therein that the expressions "deemed tenant" and "deemed tenancy" do not indicate, in effect, a category of persons or relationship different from the category of tenants or tenancies atleast for the purpose of the Act A "deemed tenant" for the purpose of the Act was found to be a tenant with all the rights and obligations vesting in a "tenant" simpliciter under the Act. It is further stated: "There is nothing in S.74 of the Act or in any other provision of the Act which will indicate that the expression "tenancy" in S.74 of the Act is intended to have such a restricted meaning. It is further stated: "There is nothing in S.74 of the Act or in any other provision of the Act which will indicate that the expression "tenancy" in S.74 of the Act is intended to have such a restricted meaning. To attach such a restricted meaning to "tenancy" occurring in S.74 would be to whittle down the vigour of the deeming provisions incorporated by the Legislature." It was in this view that the learned judge held that the revision petitioner therein who had come into possession after the commencement of Act 1/1964 was not entitled to get the benefits of Chap. 2 of the Act. We are in agreement with the view expressed by Bhat, J. in the decision in 1981 KLT SN. 62 and the decision of M. P. Menon, J. in 1979 KLT SN. 47 to the extent it is against the observations contained herein is overruled. 9. A question may arise as to who are the persons intended to be benefited by the amended S.7 of the Act in case persons who had come into occupation after 1-4-1964 are excluded from the purview of that section by virtue of the prohibition contained in S.74. S.7 envisages a class of persons who had been in occupation of the land of another situated in Malabar and they shall be deemed to be tenants provided (1) they were in possession on 1-1-1970, and (2) they were in continuous possession for a period of 2 years within a period of 12 years prior to 11-4-1967. When possession for a period of two years within the said period of twelve years has been proved, it has to be presumed by virtue of the explanations to S.7 that such person has been in such occupation honestly believing himself to be a tenant. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that the purpose of the legislation will be defeated if persons who were in possession on 1-1-1970 and satisfying the conditions embodied in S.7 are not conferred the benefits intended to be conferred by that section. Acceptance of this submission will result in classification of tenancies which came into being after 1-4-1964 into two and treatment of these two subclasses differently. Tenancy "created" after 1-4-1964 may not be recognised whereas those "deemed to be tenants" by possession subsequent to that date may enjoy all the benefits of tenancy. Acceptance of this submission will result in classification of tenancies which came into being after 1-4-1964 into two and treatment of these two subclasses differently. Tenancy "created" after 1-4-1964 may not be recognised whereas those "deemed to be tenants" by possession subsequent to that date may enjoy all the benefits of tenancy. We do not find any justification for such sub-classification. "Deemed tenants" under other provisions of the Act are within the prohibition of S.74 of the Act. There is no reason to treat deemed tenants under S.7 alone differently. The legislature would not have intended such anomalous position. A certain class of persons will definitely come within the category contemplated in S.7 and without doing violence to S.74 they can be conferred the benefits of that section. They are persons who had come into possession before 1-4-1964 and continued in possession honestly believing themselves to be tenants for a period of two years between that date and 11-4-1967 and were in occupation on 1-1-1970. A harmonious construction of S.7 and 74 together will lead to the conclusion that only this class of persons are intended to be benefited by S.7 and they can claim those benefits by invoking the aid of that section and the explanation thereto. 10. The appellant has admittedly come into possession in 1967 after the commencement of the Land Reforms Act. The lease or the deemed tenancy in his favour is violative of S.74 of the Act and as such invalid. The rights of a deemed tenant cannot, therefore, be claimed by him. The Land Tribunal and the appellate court had rightly denied the relief claimed by the appellant No interference is called for in second appeal. We dismiss the second appeal, but without costs. Dismissed.