JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. Admittedly, the Idayangara mosque and its properties form a public trust of a religious and charitable nature and as such, a wakf. First defendant was its former trustee. He was removed and in his place, second defendant was appointed as trustee. A schedule properties are admittedly trust properties and they were surrendered to the second defendant. Plaintiff, claiming to be a resident in the mahal and a worshipper of the mosque, filed the suit representing the inhabitants in the mahal after publication under O.1 R.8, (i) for a declaration that B schedule properties are also wakf properties, which are not liable to be alienated by the first defendant as his own, (ii) for a direction to surrender B schedule properties also to the second defendant, and (iii) for a further declaration that first defendant cannot alienate the properties. 2. Defendants 1 and 2 alone were made parties when the suit was filed. Third defendant is the alienee of B schedule properties. His contention is that B schedule properties are not wakf properties, but they exclusively belonged to the father of the defendant, first under whom defendants 7 and 8 were in possession on karaima tenure, and he got their rights. Fourth defendant is the Wakf Board and defendants 5 and 6 are the present President and Secretary of the mahal committee. They were impleaded. None of them, except the third defendant, contested the claim. 3. Third defendant resisted the suit on three grounds, namely; (i) schedule properties are not wakf properties; (ii) plaintiff is not an interested person and as such not entitled to maintain the suit; and (iii) the suit is not maintainable for non compliance of the provisions of S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Parties let in evidence, oral and documentary. Without looking into the evidence and deciding the suit on the merits, trial court dismissed the suit on grounds that plaintiff is not an interested person and the provisions of S.92 of the Code, of Civil Procedure are not complied with. The Appellate Judge did not go into the competency of the plaintiff. The dismissal was confirmed for the reason that S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S.55 of the Wakf Act were not complied with. That is how the plaintiff came up in second appeal. 4. The Appellate Judge did not go into the competency of the plaintiff. The dismissal was confirmed for the reason that S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S.55 of the Wakf Act were not complied with. That is how the plaintiff came up in second appeal. 4. The only contention in common between S.92 of the Code and S.55 of the Wakf Act is that the suit should be to obtain any of the reliefs mentioned in S.92 of the Code. A suit relating to a wakf need not be by the Advocate General or two or more persons interested in the trust. Leave of court is not necessary. The Wakf Board can institute a suit without the leave. If the suit is by any person or authority other than the Wakf Board what is required is only consent in writing by the Board. The conditions that the suit must be by the Advocate General or two or more interested persons or leave of court is necessary are not applicable. Any person or authority could file a suit if the consent in writing of the Wakf Board is obtained. Even then, it is only reasonable to think that the person or authority instituting the suit must have some interest in the trust because the provision is intended to safeguard the interest of the trust. Courts must be liberal in construing the interest. Any person who is a resident within the mahal and who is a worshipper of the mosque must be treated as an interested person who is competent to institute the suit. So also, the fact that S.92 of the Code alone was mentioned in the written statement and S.55 of the Wakf Act was not specifically stated should not stand in the way of considering the maintainability under that provision. We are concerned with the substance of the plea of maintainability and not its technical form. When plea of non maintainability is for want of leave and interest there is nothing wrong in the appellate court having considered S.55 of the Wakf Act also. But evidently plaintiff is a resident of the mahal and a worshipper of the mosque. Dismissal of the suit on the ground of incompetence cannot be sustained. 5. Consent of the Wakf Board is not obtained. But evidently plaintiff is a resident of the mahal and a worshipper of the mosque. Dismissal of the suit on the ground of incompetence cannot be sustained. 5. Consent of the Wakf Board is not obtained. Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the suit is to obtain any one of the reliefs mentioned in Clauses (a) to (h) of S.92(1) of the Code. If it is not, the question of obtaining written consent of the Wakf Board does not arise at all. Clauses (c), (cc) and (h) are provisions said to apply. Clause (c) relates to a suit to obtain a decree vesting any property in a trustee. Clause (cc) concerns a suit to direct a former trustee to deliver trust property in his possession to the person entitled to possession and clause (h) is the residuary clause. 6. The leading earlier decisions in this respect are Abaur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali ( AIR 1928 PC 16 ) and Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Ishwarlal Bhai Narsibhai ( AIR 1952 SC 143 ). These decisions were only followed in later decisions. One such decision is Bishwanath v. Radha Ballabhji ( AIR 1967 SC 1044 ). The three conditions to be satisfied to invoke S.92 of the Code are: (i) The charitable and religious nature the public purpose of the creation of the trust; (ii) There was a breach of trust or a situation when direction of court has become necessary for administration of such a trust; and (iii) The relief claimed comes under S.92. A suit for a declaration that the property belongs to the trust is not one for a relief enumerated in S.92. In this case, neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants have a case that on the date of suit, schedule properties were in the possession of the first defendant. Properties were held by persons who are strangers to the trust. Prayer for recovery from strangers who are in illegal possession is only in the nature of enforcement of private right and cannot come under Clauses (c) or (cc). Properties were held by persons who are strangers to the trust. Prayer for recovery from strangers who are in illegal possession is only in the nature of enforcement of private right and cannot come under Clauses (c) or (cc). Vesting of property in a trustee can refer only to cases where a new trustee is appointed and not to cases where properties are sought to be recovered in favour of the trustee from trespassers in wrongful possession (Johnson D Po Min v. U Ogh AIR 1933 Rangoon 132V It is true that allegations in the plaint alone could be looked into for that purpose. 7. A suit on behalf of the villagers that the suit property belongs to the temple and certain alienations by the poojaries are void is maintainable apart from S.92 (Subramania v. Maya Kone - AIR 1940 Madras 81) A declaratory relief on behalf of a public trust of a religious and charitable character regarding title does not fall under S.92 (Ranchhoddas v. Mahalaxmi Vahuji - AIR 1953 Bombay 153). S.92 is applicable only when atleast one of the prayers will come under any of the clauses enumerated in S.92 (Veerbasavaradhya v. Devotees of Lingadagudi Mutt - AIR 1973 Mysore 280). A suit for possession against a person who is not a trustee is not one enumerated in S.92. Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh ( AIR 1975 SC 371 ) relied on by the third respondent cannot in any way help him. That was a case in which when the plaintiffs, who wanted to file a suit under S.92, failed to obtain consent, they instituted the suit purposely to take the reliefs out of the section. Even though Their Lordships held that the reliefs may not strictly fall under the main clauses, they were found very much akin to these clauses and covered by the residuary clause (h). Observations necessary for such a case cannot be made applicable to this case when none of the reliefs could come under S.92. In interpreting the reliefs, the object should always be in favour of litigations found to be bona fide and not to reject them on maintainability or technical grounds. It is not possible to agree with the courts below that any one or more of the reliefs in this suit will come under S.92. In interpreting the reliefs, the object should always be in favour of litigations found to be bona fide and not to reject them on maintainability or technical grounds. It is not possible to agree with the courts below that any one or more of the reliefs in this suit will come under S.92. The suit is in effect to safeguard the interest of the trust by challenging unauthorised actions of the first defendant and recover properties from strangers. It may not be proper to dismiss the suit without considering whether B schedule properties are trust properties or not. The suit is not hit by S.92 of the Code or S.55 of the Wakf Act. The only person interested in opposing the prayer is the third defendant. Second appeal is allowed. Dismissal of suit is set aside and it is remanded to trial court for decision afresh on the merits in the light of the above findings and subject to what is stated above. Parties will be given opportunities for evidence. Parties will suffer costs in this court. Office will transmit the records forthwith to the trial court, before which the parties will appear on 19-2-1990. Court fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal will be refunded to the appellant.