JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. Second appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction who lost in both the courts. The question for consideration is whether a right of quasi easement or an easement of necessity is available to him to seek the injunction relief. 2. A and B-schedule properties together formed a compact plot of 78.75 cents having road frontage to its entire south. A-schedule 13.75 cents on the south-western corner of it having the full road frontage was sold by the respondent to the appellant under Ext. A1 on 16-7-1971 retaining B-schedule property with him. After about 10 years appellant removed the existing building and made a new construction covering the entire length and breadth of A-schedule. Respondent put up a gate to his B-schedule property from the southern road immediately to the east of A-schedule and then he closed it. It was then that this suit for injunction was filed claiming quasi easement and easement of necessity. Both claims' were denied. Claim was for access of lorries direct to an oil tank constructed in the back of his building. 3. On the evidence, both the courts found that the claims cannot stand. Those findings are unassailable. Neither Ext. A1 nor the evidence shows that the gate was there at the time of Ext. A1 or it was used for access to A-schedule property. The gate was a new construction after Ext.A1 for access to B-schedule property alone from the southern road. Such an access is not necessary for A-schedule property which itself is having the entire road frontage from the same southern road. Now what the appellant wants is access to the back yard of his premises through B-schedule property. Such an access became necessary only because he made the construction of his factory building covering the entire length and breadth of A-schedule without providing for vehicular access to the back from the road. 4. I do not think that there is any fancy or fairness in any of these claims. Just like easement of necessity, quasi easements also have their origin on severance of tenements on transfers, bequests or partitions. As S.13(b) of the Indian Easements Act indicates, it is an apparent and continuous accommodation necessary for enjoyment of the subject and available when the transfer, bequest or partition took effect. Just like easement of necessity, quasi easements also have their origin on severance of tenements on transfers, bequests or partitions. As S.13(b) of the Indian Easements Act indicates, it is an apparent and continuous accommodation necessary for enjoyment of the subject and available when the transfer, bequest or partition took effect. Such an apparent and continuous user upto the date of transfer and its necessity for enjoyment of the transferred portion are conditions necessary for such a right. The element of necessity may not be so absolute as in the case of an easement of necessity and unlike it a quasi easement may not get extinguished by the cessation of the necessity. Anyhow availability of the quasi easement is only when it is necessary for enjoying the subject of transfer and it was also apparent and continuous till the time of transfer and to the extent of availability at the time of transfer. No such necessity or existence were there at the time of Ext. A 1 and it is highly improbable also. Therefore, the question of quasi easement do not arise at all. 5. An easement of necessity under S.13 (a), (c) and (e) of the Easements Act could arise only on transfer, bequest or partition when it is absolutely necessary for enjoyment of the severed portion in the sense that it could not be enjoyed at all without such a right. Where real property is severed by the grant of a portion of it, there can be no implied reservation of an easement of convenience but only of an easement of necessity. So also an easement of necessity is extinguished when the necessity comes to an end and this fact is now given statutory recognition in S.41 of the Indian Easement Act. Citing the decisions in Ersad Ali v. Mohammad Yakub Khan (AIR 1969 Orissa 201), Bank of India v. Sarathy Brothers (AIR 1970 Madras 37) and Narayani Devi v. Phool Chand (AIR 1981 Allahabad 99), the counsel for the appellant wanted to water down the rigour of requirements of an easement of necessity. The argument was that in considering the easement of necessity, user according to the existing conditions alone could be thought of and a plaintiff who makes such a claim cannot be told that something capable of being done by him should be done to serve the necessity. The argument was that in considering the easement of necessity, user according to the existing conditions alone could be thought of and a plaintiff who makes such a claim cannot be told that something capable of being done by him should be done to serve the necessity. These decisions do not lay down such a law. Such a condition is against the spirit of the legal provision. Easement of necessity arises only by way of presumed grant implied by a legal fiction on severance in order to facilitate enjoyment which is otherwise impossible. The burden created on the servient owner in such a case by legal implication is only to avoid landlock. Reasonableness has no place. However inconvenient an alternate access is, if it is available there is no place for an easement of necessity. In this case, the inconvenience claimed is that A-schedule property is lying on a higher level than the road and especially after the construction, therefore, access of vehicles through that portion to the backyard is not possible. Height from the road is an inconvenience applicable equally to both A and B - schedule properties. That could have been made good, as is generally done in such cases, by levelling the ground at the time of construction. If he wanted vehicular access to his backyard, he could have made provision for that also at the time of construction. Not having done so and after having made use of his entire land to his advantage for construction, he has no right to say that the adjacent owner must bear the burden for his convenience. A way of necessity is implied by law only when access is otherwise impossible as of right. Mere inconvenience is not sufficient however great the inconvenience is. In Titchmarsh v. Ropston Water Co. ((1899) 81 LT 673) where access was possible, but difficult, via a public highway which lay in a cutting to 20 feet below the level of the defendant's land, it was held that no way of necessity was implied. This legal action is a glaring example of the process of law being misused purposely, actuated by self interest alone, in order to gain an unfair advantage over the respondent. After two concurrent adverse decisions, when it was again taken to a third court, the object has reached the stage of purposeful harassment also. This legal action is a glaring example of the process of law being misused purposely, actuated by self interest alone, in order to gain an unfair advantage over the respondent. After two concurrent adverse decisions, when it was again taken to a third court, the object has reached the stage of purposeful harassment also. Hence the second appeal is dismissed with costs.