Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in a suit for enforcement of his right of pre-emption in relation to the suit property, originally owned by the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 7 as co-owners, and for a perpetual injunction to restrain the first defendant in whose favour a sale deed has been executed by defendants 2 to 7. "from interfering in any manner with the suit property either by himself or through defendants 2 to 7", is the revision petitioner. 2. Failure on the part of the defendants to file the written statement resulted in the suit being disposed of under R.10 of O.8 CPC. The respondents thereupon moved I.A. Nos. 3319 and 3320 of 1987 (identical relief is sought for in these petitions) for an order setting aside the exparte decree. These applications have been allowed by the common order under challenge. 3. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary. objection that the revision is not maintainable because the order under challenge is an appealable one. In support of this contention be made reference to 0.43 R.1 (d) CPC. This rule provides that an order under R.13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed exparte is an appealable order. It is thus clear that no order allowing the application under Order IX R.13 is appealable and if that be so, the revision is maintainable. 4. As already noted the suit was decreed in terras of 0.8 R.10 CPC. It provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under R.1 or R.9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment, a decree shall be drawn up. A reference in this connection to 0.8 R.1 is relevant. This Rule, prior to the amendment by the Amending Act of 1976 did not make it obligatory to file a written statement at or before the first hearing or within such time as the court may permit. But by the Amending Act of 1976 the words "may and if so required by the Court" in the unamended Rule have been omitted. 5. But by the Amending Act of 1976 the words "may and if so required by the Court" in the unamended Rule have been omitted. 5. After the amendment of this Rule, the defendant thus is obliged to file the written statement either at or before the first hearing or within such time as the court may permit. The cumulative effect of R.1 and 10 of 0.8 CPC. therefore is that where the defendant who is obliged to, file the written statement fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, as the case may be, the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall he drawn up 6. It is not the case of the respondents that they have filed written statement. On the other hand they do concede that though they received the summons, they had not filed written statement. The suit therefore has been decreed in terms of Rule 10 of O.8 CPC. 7. Judicial pronouncements would show that a decree passed under 0.8 R.10 without any written judgment on merits could be treated as an exparte decree coming within the meaning of 0.9 R.13 and as such an application to set aside such a decree under 0.9 R.13 is maintainable. In other words, it is not a condition precedent that a decree shall be one passed after declaring the defendant exparte under R.6 of O.9. That means even a decree passed under O.8 R.10 can be treated as an exparte decree within the meaning of O.9 R.13. (See Pokku v. Ammini, 1987 (2) KLT 308) and N. Jayaraman v. Glaxo Laboratories India AIR. 1981 Mad. 258). 8. These judgments-it is discernible therefrom were rendered without considering the scope of S.58 of the CPC. Amendment Act, 104 of 1976 amending R.10 of 0.8 inserting the words" shall pronounce judgment and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up". Prior to this amendment it was not mandatory that the court shall pronounce judgment against the defendant under 0.8 R.10 if the defendant failed to file the written statement because the Rule then read only'may pronounce judgment'. Prior to this amendment it was not mandatory that the court shall pronounce judgment against the defendant under 0.8 R.10 if the defendant failed to file the written statement because the Rule then read only'may pronounce judgment'. But after the amendment by Act 104/76 omitting the words "may and if so required by the court" from R.1 and inserting the words "shall pronounce judgment (in the place of "may pronounce judgment")...and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up" in R.10 of 0.8, a defendant is bound to file the written statement within the time permitted or fixed by the court as the case may be. To put it briefly these amended rules (that is R.1, 9 and 10 of 0.8) make it obligatory to file the written statement on or before the first hearing or within such time as the court may permit and the additional written statement 'required by the court' within the time fixed in that regard; and failure to file the written statement and the additional written statement as the case may be, in the manner indicated above, shall result in the passing of the decree contemplated under R.10. However, it is interesting to note in this context that a judgment passed under the unamended R.10 of O.8 could be appealed against under S.104 read with clause (b) of R.1 of 0.43 CPC. By S.58 of The Amending Act, Act 104 of 1976, as already noted, R.10 of 0.8 was amended and clause (h) of R.1 of 0.43 was deleted. The objects and reasons for the aforesaid amendment are stated as follows: "Clause (h) provides for an appeal against an order under 0.8 R.10 where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the time fixed by the Court and the court pronounces judgment against him. This clause is being omitted with a view to reduce it to two appeals because the defendant can, in an appeal from the decree passed as a result of the order, take the same point as be can take in an appeal under clause (b)". It is thus clear from the objects and reasons, an anneal can be preferred against a decree passed under 0.8 R.10. It is thus clear from the objects and reasons, an anneal can be preferred against a decree passed under 0.8 R.10. The intention of the legislature in inserting the words shall pronounce judgment ...and on pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up" in R.10 of 0.8 and deleting clause (h) of R.1 of 0.43 by The Amending Act is that the decree passed under the amended R.10 can be challenged by filing an appeal as in the case of a decree passed under 0.20 R.6 CPC. A similar view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in Nandagopal Bacchas and others v. Bank of India Bombay (AIR 1982 Delhi 280) With respect I agree with this view. 9. A decree passed under R.10 of O.8 therefore cannot be treated as an exparte decree within the meaning of 0.9 R.13. A reference in this connection to the provisions contained in Order IX is relevant. The title given to this order reads:-"Appearance of parties and consequences of non-appearance" R.6 of this Order highlights the consequences of a defendant not appearing in court after receipt of the summons. It provides that if it is proved that summons was duly served, yet the defendant did not appear, the court could make an order that the suit be beard exparte. Consequently the suit will be decreed exparte. Such an exparte decree is the one contemplated under R.13 of O.9. The exparte decree cannot be said to be on a par with a decree passed under R.10 of 0.8 because it, going by the scheme of 0.8, is one passed on the failure of the defendant to file the written statement or the additional written statement within the meaning of Rule I and R.9 thereof, after he appeared in court in response to the summons. The legislature in its wisdom however, has found it necessary to extend the provisions of 0.9 and make them part of Order XVII R.2. Order XVII R.2 however, has no application here because disposal of a suit under R.10 of 0.8 does not tantamount to a disposal doe to the failure of the parties or any one of them to appear on the date to which the hearing of the suit stood adjourned. Order XVII R.2 however, has no application here because disposal of a suit under R.10 of 0.8 does not tantamount to a disposal doe to the failure of the parties or any one of them to appear on the date to which the hearing of the suit stood adjourned. The word "bearing" means the taking of evidence or the hearing of arguments and not consideration of merely interlocutory matters as observed by the Privy Council in Lachmi Narayan v. Balmakund (AIR. 1924 P.C.198) A disposal of a case under 0.17 R.2 on default of appearance of parties at the adjourned bearings can be bad (a) it the plaintiff fails to appear by an order under R.8 of 0.9 and (b) if the defendant fails to appear by an order under R.6 of 0.9 or (c) make such other order as the court deems fit. 10. It therefore follows that in the absence of any such extension of 0.9, making it part of the procedure contemplated under R.10 of 0.8, I am of the view that the decree passed under that Rule cannot be treated as an exparte decree within the meaning of 0.9 R.13 and hence no petition to set aside such a decree is maintainable. 11. In the light of the principles stated above, the law stated in the rulings referred to in para 7 supra, in my view, requires reconsideration. I would have accordingly adjourned the hearing of this case under S.3(2) of The High Court Act by a Division Bench; however that is not done, as the question arising in this case, according to me, can be disposed of by applying the principles enunciated hereunder. 12. The principle discernible from the rulings aforesaid (assuming the same is the correct view), however has no universal application. The applicability of this principle, in my judgment, would depend upon the facts of each case. 13. For instance in a suit like the one on band, where the relief sought for is for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption, the applicability of this principle, in my view, is circumscribed by the provisions contained in 0.20 R.14 CPC. Relevant parts of this rule read: - "14. Decree in pre-emption suit. 13. For instance in a suit like the one on band, where the relief sought for is for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption, the applicability of this principle, in my view, is circumscribed by the provisions contained in 0.20 R.14 CPC. Relevant parts of this rule read: - "14. Decree in pre-emption suit. -- (1) Where the court decrees a claim to preemption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall (a) specify a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be so paid and (b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in Cls. (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs". 14. The general principles embodied in this rule, going by judicial pronouncements are: The period fixed by the decree for paying the purchase money cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of S.148. However if the last day allowed for deposit of the purchase money is a holiday the money can be deposited on the next day based on the provisions contained in The General Clauses Act. Similarly in cases of short deposit due to bonafide mistake the time fixed for payment of the purchase money can be extended. (See Jogdhayan v. Baburam, AIR. 1983 SC. 57). The mere filing of an appeal will not operate as a stay of the proceedings in the lower court. That means the time fixed for payment by the decree will not get extended by the fact that an appeal has been preferred against the said decree. (See Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC. 50). What is to happen if the decretal amount is not deposited on or before the date prescribed in the decree was the question before the Supreme Court in the decision in Sullesh Singh & Ors. v. Sohanlal & anr. (AIR. 1975 SC 1957) The Supreme Court held that under such circumstances the suit requires to be dismissed. 50). What is to happen if the decretal amount is not deposited on or before the date prescribed in the decree was the question before the Supreme Court in the decision in Sullesh Singh & Ors. v. Sohanlal & anr. (AIR. 1975 SC 1957) The Supreme Court held that under such circumstances the suit requires to be dismissed. However such a contingency may not arise if it is established that the appellate court where the matter was pending had granted a stay or while disposing of the appeal varied the decree. It is so because as observed by the Supreme Court in Dattatraya v. Shaikh Mahaboob (AIR 1970 SC. 750) a decree passed under this role "imposes obligations on both sides and they are so conditioned mat performance by one is conditional on performance by the other". The obligations thus are reciprocal and hence are inter linked and inter laced and therefore they cannot be separated. Where however an appeal is dismissed or the decree of the lower court is varied and the appellate court is silent about the extension of time, it must be deemed that the appellate court has intended to exercise its power of extending the time and accordingly the preemptor can deposit the purchase money within the time fixed by the original decree which however will be calculated from the date of the appellate decree. The preemptor must be held to have acquired the property from the date of payment of the purchase money toto court and not from the date of the sale or of the decree. (See Hazari v. Neki, AIR. 1968 SC 1205). It is not necessary to have a registered instrument for passing the title. A reference in this connection to the words used in the Rule namely "whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payments" is relevant. It therefore follows that a decree passed under this rule cannot he treated as exparte decree within the meaning of 0.9 R.13. It should be treated as a decree having all the trappings of a decree passed under 0.20 R.6 and hence the validity of the said decree can be challenged only by filing an appeal. 15. Applying this principle to the facts of the case on hand I unhesitatingly hold that the decree in question cannot be challenged by preferring an application under 0.9 R.13. 15. Applying this principle to the facts of the case on hand I unhesitatingly hold that the decree in question cannot be challenged by preferring an application under 0.9 R.13. Because of the peculiar facts of the case I am of opinion, there is no scope for challenging the decree by filing even an appeal. A reference in this connection to the facts stated hereunder, is relevant. In compliance with the directions contained in the decree, the plaintiff has already deposited the purchase money. He therefore has become the absolute owner of the property although possession has not been delivered to him. The defendants therefore are bound to deliver the property without raising any objection. The defendants however failed to deliver the property and therefore what remains to be done by the plaintiff is only to execute the decree and get delivery of the property through court. 16. In the light of what is stated above, the order under challenge is liable to be set aside. I accordingly set aside the same and declare that the plaintiff-decree holder is entitled to take delivery of the properly in enforcement of the decree in bis favour. The CRP. is allowed. No costs. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.